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Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates · Econ Journal Watch Discuss this article at Journaltalk: http://journaltalk.net/articles/5811 ECON JOURNAL WATCH 10(3) September 2013: 255-682 Ideological Profiles of the Economics Laureates LINK TO ABSTRACT This document contains ideological profiles of the 71 Nobel laureates in economics, 1969–2012. It is the chief part of the project called “Ideological Migration of the Economics Laureates,” presented in the September 2013 issue of Econ Journal Watch. A formal table of contents for this document begins on the next page. The document can also be navigated by clicking on a laureate’s name in the table below to jump to his or her profile (and at the bottom of every page there is a link back to this navigation table). Navigation Table Akerlof Allais Arrow Aumann Becker Buchanan Coase Debreu Diamond Engle Fogel Friedman Frisch Granger Haavelmo Harsanyi Hayek Heckman Hicks Hurwicz Kahneman Kantorovich Klein Koopmans Krugman Kuznets Kydland Leontief Lewis Lucas Markowitz Maskin McFadden Meade Merton Miller Mirrlees Modigliani Mortensen Mundell Myerson Myrdal Nash North Ohlin Ostrom Phelps Pissarides Prescott Roth Samuelson Sargent Schelling Scholes Schultz Selten Sen Shapley Sharpe Simon Sims Smith Solow Spence Stigler Stiglitz Stone Tinbergen Tobin Vickrey Williamson jump to navigation table 255 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 2013 ECON JOURNAL WATCH George A. Akerlof by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 258-264 Maurice Allais by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 264-267 Kenneth J. Arrow by Daniel B. Klein 268-281 Robert J. Aumann by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 281-284 Gary S. Becker by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 285-291 James M. Buchanan Jr. by Niclas Berggren 292-299 Ronald H. Coase by Daniel B. Klein 299-307 Gerard Debreu by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 307-309 Peter A. Diamond by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 309-313 Robert F. Engle III by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 313-316 Robert W. Fogel by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 316-325 Milton Friedman by J. Daniel Hammond 325-332 Ragnar Frisch by Arild Sæther and Ib E. Eriksen 332-342 Clive W. J. Granger by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 342-344 Trygve Haavelmo by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 344-347 John C. Harsanyi by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 347-352 Friedrich A. Hayek by Daniel B. Klein 352-358 James J. Heckman by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 358-366 John R. Hicks by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 366-377 Leonid Hurwicz by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 377-381 Daniel Kahneman by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 381-385 Leonid Vitaliyevich Kantorovich by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 385-388 Lawrence R. Klein by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 388-396 Tjalling C. Koopmans by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 396-399 Paul Krugman by Jason Briggeman 400-410 Simon Kuznets by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 411-413 Finn E. Kydland by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 414-417 Wassily Leontief by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 417-428 Arthur Lewis by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 428-433 Robert E. Lucas Jr. by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 434-440 Harry M. Markowitz by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 440-443 Eric S. Maskin by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 443-448 Daniel L. McFadden by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 448-452 James E. Meade by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 453-457 Robert C. Merton by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 457-460 Merton H. Miller by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 460-466 jump to navigation table VOLUME 10, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 2013 256 IDEOLOGICAL PROFILES OF THE ECONOMICS LAUREATES James A. Mirrlees by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 466-472 Franco Modigliani by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza, with Viviana Di Giovinazzo 472-493 Dale T. Mortensen by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 493-496 Robert A. Mundell by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 496-500 Roger B. Myerson by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 501-507 Gunnar Myrdal by Benny Carlson 507-520 John F. Nash Jr. by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 520-525 Douglass C. North by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 525-532 Bertil Ohlin by Niclas Berggren 532-536 Elinor Ostrom by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 536-542 Edmund S. Phelps by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 542-551 Christopher A. Pissarides by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 551-556 Edward C. Prescott by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 556-559 Alvin E. Roth by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 559-561 Paul A. Samuelson by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 561-569 Thomas J. Sargent by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 570-576 Thomas C. Schelling by Daniel B. Klein 576-590 Myron S. Scholes by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 590-593 Theodore W. Schultz by E. C. Pasour, Jr. 593-601 Reinhard Selten by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 601-604 Amartya Sen by Jason Briggeman 604-616 Lloyd S. Shapley by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 616-617 William F. Sharpe by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 617-621 Herbert A. Simon by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 622-624 Christopher A. Sims by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 624-625 Vernon L. Smith by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 626-632 Robert M. Solow by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 632-640 A. Michael Spence by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 641-644 George J. Stigler by Daniel B. Klein 644-649 Joseph E. Stiglitz by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 650-658 Richard Stone by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 658-660 Jan Tinbergen by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 660-666 James Tobin by Daniel B. Klein and Ryan Daza 666-670 William Vickrey by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 671-676 Oliver E. Williamson by Daniel B. Klein, Ryan Daza, and Hannah Mead 677-679 jump to navigation table 257 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 2013 ECON JOURNAL WATCH George A. Akerlof by Daniel B. Klein1, Ryan Daza2, and Hannah Mead3 George Akerlof (1940–) says that one of his earliest “significant thoughts in economics” came to him around age 11 or 12: If my father lost his job, and my family stopped spending their money, then another father (it was typically fathers rather than mothers who worked at the time) would lose his job, and so on. The economy would spiral downward. Well, … my father got re-employed, so the system was not put to a test. Although slightly wrong, I had understood the foundation of Keynesian economics. The exploration of the reasons for unemployment and the defense of Keynesian macroeconomics have dominated my work as an economist. It is thus no coincidence, perhaps, either that I had made this observation, or that I now remember it. (Akerlof 2002) Akerlof earned his bachelor’s degree in economics at Yale, going on to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for his Ph.D.; at MIT, Akerlof worked under Robert Solow (Main 2008). Akerlof has taught primarily at the University of California at Berkeley, although he has done stints elsewhere, including one on staff at the Council of Economic Advisers for the administration of Richard Nixon, to whom Akerlof says he held “no loyalty” (Akerlof 2002). Akerlof is married to fellow economist Janet Yellen, who for two years chaired President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers and who has served as Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors since 2010. Akerlof (2002) says of Yellen: “Our lone disagreement [about macroeconomics] is that she is a bit more supportive of free trade than I.” Akerlof was awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics along with Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for their analyses of markets with asymmetric infor- mation. Akerlof’s work on asymmetric information began when he noted the importance of disparities in information among individuals engaging in exchange. His famous example was of the used-car market (Akerlof 1970). In the primary model, the seller knows the car’s quality and the buyer does not, and as a result the market may unravel. David Henderson suggests that Akerlof’s analysis did 1. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. 2. Washington, DC 20018. 3. Graduate student, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. jump to navigation table VOLUME 10, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER 2013 258 IDEOLOGICAL PROFILES OF THE ECONOMICS LAUREATES not argue particularly for government intervention: “Instead, he pointed out that many free-market institutions can be seen as ways of solving or reducing ‘lemon problems.’ One solution Akerlof noted is warranties…” (Henderson 2008). On the other hand, Akerlof (1970) made no distinction between free-market or voluntary institutions and those that initiate coercion, as he included occupational licensing in his listing of “counteracting institutions.” Akerlof also has been prolific in other areas including cycles of poverty and crime among African-Americans, inflation and employment, and the impact of social norms on family structure.
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