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Vladimir Putin Reinvents Russian Federalism

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Vladimir Putin Reinvents Russian Federalism Vladimir Putin reinvents Russian federalism BY ANDREI ZAGORODNIKOV When President Putin came to Yeltsin’s time. This is the Council of the replaced by full-time members, some office he found that even though the Federation, the body designed in the of them chosen directly by the regional constitution of the Russian Federation 1993 constitution to be the Russian executives and the others elected by invested him with enormous power on version of the German Bundesrat, the assemblies of the constitutent units. paper, he could not use it effectively. As or the senate in other federations. he tried to put his programs into effect, The Council was composed of the heads Too much centralized control? he discovered that the Parliament of the executives of the regions (who maintained the power to block many To some, this change is problematic. have different titles depending on what of his key initiatives. They argue that the new members of type of constituent unit they lead—i.e., the upper house will no longer have the Ironically, the present Russian whether it is a Republic, autonomous capacity to act as honest brokers between Constitution—which was promulgated territory, etc.) and the speakers or the centre and the regions. They will be in 1993 during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency— chairpersons of the regional legislative financed by funds from federal coffers concentrates power in the Presidency. assemblies. All 89 constituent units and their housing, cars and other perks were represented, giving the Council But, as President, Boris Yeltsin essentially will be provided by the federal a membership of 178. ‘gave’ the heads of the regional administration. Indeed this federal governments a great deal of power that The Council of the Federation was largesse might even include providing was not constitutionally theirs. In many designed to mediate between the regions jobs for their family members. cases these power-sharing arrangements and the centre. But during Yeltsin’s time Based permanently in Moscow and were based on personal understandings its role went beyond that. The leaders of integrated into the Moscow power between Yeltsin and the regional leaders. the regions would negotiate particular structure, the argument goes, members arrangements for their regions there and The 1996 regional elections led to the of the newly constituted Council could the Council became the focus for many rise of local legislative assemblies, which become isolated from the real needs important decisions for the entire country. were mostly in opposition to the Kremlin. of the regions. Many regions enacted constitutions that So powerful did this body become that And critics point out that this reform included articles in conflict with the candidates for Prime Minister (including of the parliamentary upper house should Russian Federation constitution. That Mr. Putin) felt compelled to appeal to it be seen in connection with another began what is sometimes referred to for political support before seeking the significant reform Putin has initiated: as a ‘War of Laws’. constitutionally mandated approval of the naming of seven plenipotentiary the directly elected lower chamber of At the same time, the way federal representatives of the President to deal Parliament (the State Duma). subsidies to the regions were allocated with the 89 regions. Part of the job of generated much dissatisfaction. Regions And so—in part to increase the these seven federal representatives will were divided into “donors” and President’s influence over Parliament, be to see to it that the laws and “recipients”. The “recipients” received but also to enable the upper house to constitutions of the regions correspond donations from the federal government function more effectively—Putin got to the laws and constitution of the as well as from the “donors”. Observers Parliament to pass a law that established Russian Federation. say this system was awkward and new “guiding principles” for the Council Some critics argue that these initiatives worked ineffectively. of Federations. taken together could be turning the The most important change was to the Russian Federation into something that The role of the upper house way members of the Council would be more closely resembles a centralized state. Another complicating factor for the selected. No longer would the Council be Others point out that, since the fall practice of federalism in Russia was the made up of the heads of regional govern- of communism, many of the regional increased power assumed by Russia’s ments and the speakers of the legislatures. governments have been dominated upper house of Parliament during These ex-officio members would be by self-serving oligarchs. In addition, Federations volume 1, number 1, november 2000 a number of the regional government The original State Council was the When one considers that over the past leaders were in the habit of devoting predecessor to the current Council of seven years a great many of the states inordinate energy to political the Federation—an upper house of have acted almost as though they were gamesmanship in Moscow—when they Parliament designed to be the voice independent countries, Putin’s strategy should have been seeing to the needs of the regions at the centre. In its new may seem not so much a power grab as of their regions. incarnation, reinvented by Putin, the State a defense of the integrity of the Russian Council is a consultative body whose aim Federation. After all, among many Putin’s reforms, according to this view, is to co-ordinate the activities of the examples of constituent unit governments serve to rationalize the federal system. presidency and the upper house of going their merry way, we have: They serve to encourage the governments Parliament. And the members of the of the regions to focus on the problems • several states, such as Tyva, Tatarstan, State Council are those very same of their home territories. At the same Krasnodar and Daghestan signing regional governors and other executive time, they create deliberative bodies international agreements and creating leaders whom Putin’s reforms had at the centre that can focus on the needs their own security forces; ejected from the upper house. of the federation as a whole. • Bashkorstan recognizing the Putin created this new body by sovereignty of the breakaway Presidential edict so it has no Putin’s approach different from Georgian territory of Abkhazia; Yeltsin’s constitutional status, and serves only to advise the President. But while only • Yakutia adopting English as its What is clear to everyone is that Putin consultative, it could become very ‘official’ language; is creating a system quite different from important. Observers see it becoming • Buryatia, Karelia, Ossetia and several Yeltsin’s—a system of balance and the body that drafts legislation and other constituent units passing laws counterbalance. For instance, he has Presidential edicts, and that could giving themselves the right to declare sought to increase the power and formulate plans to reduce the territorial a state of emergency at will; authority of the lower house of divisions of the Federation. Parliament, the Duma. To cite one • and Ingushetia legalizing polygamy. And so, in one sense, Putin has brought example: with President Putin’s support regional power right into the centre of Given all that, it’s not hard to sympathize the lower chamber has discussed taking the action. with a Russian President who might want over from the Council of the Federation to put some order and coherence into the prerogative of appointing Another way of looking at it, though, the practice of federal governance in Constitutional Court judges and would be that the creation of the State the country. the Attorney General. Council is part of a process by which Putin is concentrating power in the But still, many in Russia argue that there The Kremlin might consider that now presidency—since it only exists by virtue could be a different way to approach the that the question of reforming the upper of the will of the President. Indeed, while reform of federal structures in Russia. The house is settled it can turn its attention the State Council will be able to offer government, they say, not the President, to the Duma—and that the lower house advice, it is the President who will have could become the centre of economic might pose less of a barrier to the the ultimate power of decision. Plus, power. These same critics advocate that exercise of presidential power. of course, administratively and financially the power of the judiciary should be This could be an illusion. The present the State Council is completely a creature strengthened and that measures should Duma was elected during President of the Kremlin. be taken to insulate legislators from the Yeltsin’s term. In the course of Putin’s corrupting influence of lobbyists. There are those who argue that the reforms the socio-economic situation in ultimate plan is to have the State Council The President’s role, according to this the country has changed. There is unrest take upon itself some of the constitutional view, should be that of guarantor of the in the parliamentary alliances, which are responsibilities of the upper house of Constitution. The President, they say, on the brink of break up. Under those Parliament. And some go so far as to should see to it that any political crisis circumstances the State Duma might suggest that the creation of this new be solved peacefully by co-ordinating become difficult to control. body, in some ways, violates the principle the interests of different federal elite But Putin seems to move in contradictory of separation of powers. and pressure groups—just as presidents ways. On the one hand many of his of many other democratic countries policies seem to have the goal of moving do.
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