Title Russia’s “Turn to the East”: a Study in Policy Making Author Stephen Fortescue Affiliation School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, and Centre for European Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia Address 27A Brook Road, Glenbrook, NSW 2773, Australia Telephone/E-mail +61 2 47390027 [email protected] 1 Abstract Russia’s recent reorientation ‘to the East’ has gained increased urgency given events in Ukraine. In this article the policy-making process around the ‘turn to the East’ is examined, both pre- and post-Ukrainian events. The focus is on the economic dimension of the ‘turn’, as related to both the economic development of the Russian Far East and economic engagement with the Asia Pacific, rather than geostrategic issues. The framework is personalist vs institutionalist views of the Russian policy process. A generally dominant personalist view has been strengthened by Ukrainian events. The author finds a far more institutionalised policy process than a personalist view would lead us to expect, with relevant bureaucratic and non-state actors well represented in an elaborate and relatively formal process. However he also finds a considerable weakening of sign-off (soglasovaniye) procedures, which has lead to policy inconsistency and unpredictability and indeed ‘policy irresponsibility’ among participants. Putin is reluctant to take firm control. The author puts the weakening of soglasovaniye down to Putin’s frustration with the gridlock tendencies of strict soglasovaniye regimes, rather than a desire to create a total personalist regime of hands-on management (ruchnoye upravleniye). This suggests that improvement of the Russian policy process requires structural and procedural change, rather than simply leadership change. Key words Russian Far East; Putin; policy-making; institutionalism; personalism. 2 Main text At a time when there is great interest in the nature of the Russian policy process – how does it work? does it work? – a case study is undertaken of policy making related to Russia’s ‘turn to the East’. The ‘turn to the East’ includes the economic development of the Russian Far East (RFE), economic engagement with the Asia- Pacific Region (APR), and geostrategic engagement with the region and individual countries within in. The focus of this study will be the first two of these concerns.1 While the ‘turn to the East’ might not have the dramatic topicality of Russia’s current ‘turn to the South’ – Crimea and other parts of eastern Ukraine – it is presented by the leadership as a key, if not the key, long-term strategic orientation for Russia, with events in Ukraine making it even more urgent. In his December 2013 state of the nation address Putin said: “The resources of the state and private business must be devoted to development and the achievement of strategic goals. For example, the renaissance of Siberia and the Far East. That is our national priority for the whole 21st century” (Poslaniye 2013). And as Prime Minister Medvedev delicately put it in talking of economic links with the APR in May 2014, ‘they are particularly useful in circumstances when we face some difficulties in other markets’ (Soveshchaniye 2014a). 1 For more detail on the economic issues, see Fortescue 2015; on the geostrategic engagement, see Lo 2014. 3 It is a policy commitment which requires significant public and private investment. It involves complex financial, commercial and engineering issues, suggesting the involvement of a range of bureaucratic and corporate actors. At the same time there are strong expectations of the direct personal involvement of President Putin. There is also evidence of a lot going on behind the scenes, with those who might be considered Putin’s cronies often lurking in the background. These features make it a good case study of the contemporary Russian policy process. It is true that a lot of key policy decisions were taken before events in Ukraine posed major new questions. However there is enough still happening around RFE policy making for the case study to retain its relevance in new circumstances. A personalist view Those new circumstances have strongly reinforced existing personalist views of policy making under Putin. Gaaze (in Novaya vremya, September 1, 2014) and Minchenko (2014) draw the picture well, but it is commonplace in any amount of commentary. In this view Putin takes decisions on everything himself, after discussion within a very small circle of his most trusted advisers. In the most extreme view the inner circle consists of no more than the head of the FSB, Aleksandr Bortnikov and his deputies, and perhaps a few other siloviki.2 This small circle maintains its influence over Putin by presenting everything – including domestic policy – in a foreign policy context of external threat (Medvedev in Forbes.ru, September 26, 2014). In this view, even the personal friends who have used their 2 The FSB is the successor organization of the KGB. Siloviki are those with backgrounds in the so-called ‘power agencies’, above all the KGB/FSB. 4 friendship with Putin to pursue highly lucrative careers in business and who are often considered part of the inner circle are no longer trusted (Shul’man in Vedomosti, February 2, 2015). To the extent that the government (in the specific Russian sense of the word)3 and other institutionalised sources of policy-making capacity have any involvement, it is to rubber-stamp and implement decisions made by Putin within the inner circle (Samoylova in Politcom.ru, February 18, 2013). The consequences of this approach to the policy process are seen as catastrophic. Decisions that emerge from the inner circle are made on the basis of inadequate information, with the country having either to live with the consequences of the resulting bad decisions, or the policy-making system being further disrupted by the watering down of decisions during implementation (Shul’man in Vedomosti, August 29, 2014). Policy issues that do not make it into the inner circle – and inevitably many do not – languish in a policy-making limbo, the much vaunted ‘power vertical’ being replaced by a ‘power horizontal’ of no one answering to anyone (Pastukhov in Polit.ru, March 7, 2012). This description of the policy process in its strongest form derives from recent dramatic circumstances. But it is an extension of a common view of the Russian policy system going back far into the past. Russia has generally been seen as personalist or patrimonial, whether we are talking of despotic and capricious Tsars, 3 In the Russian context the ‘government’ refers to the office of the prime minister and subordinate ministries and other agencies. It does not include the presidency and its agencies. 5 their families and favourites, and a network of corrupt bureaucrats (LeDonne 1987; Kollmann 1987); or of Soviet leaders with their patron-client relationships replicated down through state and party hierarchies (Gill 1990; Easter 2000; Rigby and Harasymiw 1983); or of Yeltsin and Putin in the post-Soviet era, with their ‘superpresidentially’ autocratic styles of governing (Holmes 1993-94; Fish 2000), their clientelistic and crony allegiances, and clannish networks extending deep down into society (Ledeneva, 2013; Nikolyuk and Chernov, 2012). Even a recently popular approach such as neo-patrimonialism, while granting a place to institutionalist phenomena alongside the personalist, arguably gives priority to the latter, as suggested by its name (Whitmore, 2010, 1000). An institutionalist view While personalist characterisations have predominated, institutionalist approaches have not been entirely absent, it being recognised by some that even Tsarist Russia - as a complex, modernising state - was no less subject to the pressures of institutionalisation than any other (Pintner and Rowney 1980; Orlovsky 1981). There are excellent accounts of the struggles of Lenin and even Stalin to introduce coherent and effective administrative institutions in the early Soviet period (Rigby 1979; Khlevnyuk 1996), while the late Soviet period saw the controversial but influential concept of ‘institutional pluralism’ (Hough 1972; Solomon 1983). In the author’s view it is unlikely – and certainly would be catastrophic – if the personalist view of Russian policy making set out above were complete and accurate. The policy-making process in a modern society needs to use specialised knowledge in an efficient way, such that decisions are arrived at on the basis of the consideration of 6 all relevant information and with due dispatch (Fortescue 2010a). Efficiency requires that policy participants approach the policy-making process with a sense of responsibility: they present with due persistence views based on their specialised knowledge, but respect outcomes even if they do not fully reflect those views. To put it another way, participants grant the process legitimacy. That requires that they feel that they have an appropriate role and that their knowledge is treated with respect. Both efficiency and legitimacy are achieved – beyond the mutual reinforcement they offer each other – through the appropriate handling by those running the system of access, procedures, and leadership. Access Access has to be granted to the range of holders of the various specialised knowledges that are relevant to the particular policy issue. In a complex society that requires a far greater range of policy participants – both state agencies and non-state actors, in this case primarily business - than the personalist model allows. Procedures It is through procedures that those with specialised knowledge use the access they are granted, and decisions are ultimately made. There will inevitably be an informal element, but in a complex, modern system one would expect significant levels of formality and institutionalisation. Constitutional arrangements set out procedures at the highest level. There is not the space here to describe even in outline Russian constitutional arrangements (Smith 7 2012). However it should be noted that the constitution is semi-presidential, in that a prime minister chairs cabinet (Zaznaev 2008; Protsyk 2006).