Internal Political and Security Situation
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Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 31, November, 1985 Afghanistan, Page 33989 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Internal political and security situation Summary and key dates Convocation of Loya Jirga (April 23, 1985). Internal security situation (April 1984 to October 1985). Other developments relating to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan (April 1984 to August 1985). security developments involving foreign countries (May 1984 to November 1985). United Nations attempts to mediate in conflict (August 1984 to August 1985). UN report on human rights violations (March 13, 1985). Internal political affairs (September 1984 to October 1985). Government appointments (July 1984 to June 1985). The Afghan Revolutionary Council announced on April 6, 1985, that a Loya Jirga (Grand National Assembly or Supreme Council–a nationwide traditional gathering of tribal leaders) would be held during the current Afghan year (i. e. before March 21, 1986). The announcement came in a government statement broadcast on Kabul radio which stressed that such an assembly had traditionally been called at ‘sensitive historic moments’, adding that the forthcomingLoya Jirga would discuss ways of ‘maintaining reliable peace and security, halting intervention by imperialist and reactionary forces, preventing Afghan blood being shed by Afghan, and implementing the revolution’. A special commission to be chaired by President Babrak Karmal was appointed to organize elections to the assembly and to set a date for convocation. [For last Loya Jirga in 1977;see 28224 B; 28467 A.] The Loya Jirga took place on April 23–25. On the final day the 1,796 delegates unanimously adopted a resolution approving the continuing Soviet military presence in Afghanistan which followed the armed intervention of the Soviet Union at the end of 1979 [for previous reports see 32249 A. 32858 A.]. The resolution also called upon Afghans who had fled the country to return, and called upon the opposition groups of mujaheddin (‘holy warrior’) guerrillas to lay down their arms. Internal security situation In 1984 and 1985 Soviet and Afghan government forces continued to face strong opposition throughout Afghanistan from the mujaheddin. The fighting was reported to be having a serious effect upon the Afghan economy, arousing fears that large parts of the country might be on the verge of famine. During this period there was widespread speculation that Soviet forces in Afghanistan, hitherto estimated to number around 105,000 troops [see page 32858], had been increased to as many as 140,000. Moreover, Kabul radio announced on Oct. 23, 1985, that all Afghan male nationals up to 40 years of age had been ordered to enlist for three years’ military service, regardless of whether they had already completed a tour of duty. Military campaigns in northern Afghanistan The Panjshir valley, a major rebel stronghold to the north of Kabul and a springboard for mujaheddin operations against the main highway linking Kabul with the Soviet Union, in 1984 and the first half of 1985 saw some of the fiercest fighting to have taken place in that area since the Soviet intervention in 1979–80. Preparations for a Soviet offensive in March and April 1984 followed the expiry of a ceasefire agreement between Soviet commanders and the leader of the rebel group holding the valley, Mr Ahmad Shah Masood, which had haltedSoviet and Afghan government military action in the Panjshir valley throughout 1983 [ibid.]. Soviet and Afghan government troops supported by tanks and armoured personnel carriers were reported to have begun moving up the Panjshir valley on April 21, preceded by high-altitude saturation bombing by Tupolev-16S bombers and Sukhoi-24 fighter bombers believed to be operating from inside the Soviet Union; this was the first time that such bombing tactics had been used in Afghanistan. On April 23 Kabul radio declared that the combined Soviet and Afghan government forces had gained complete control of the valley. However, it subsequently emerged that they had met with little resistance; having been apparently forwarned of the offensive the mujaheddin had instructed the civilian population of the area to leave and had themselves staged a tactical withdrawal into side valleys. On May 3 it was reported that Soviet airborne commandos had engaged mujaheddin guerrillas in the Andarab valley, a key northern supply route into the Panjshir, apparently as part of an attempt to seal off the principal routes used by the rebels to send in supplies and reinforcements. The fighting was reported to have extended as far as the western end of the Andarab valley to the north of the Salang road tunnel on the main supply route between Kabul and theSoviet border. Soviet and Afghan government forces were reported on May 16 to have secured the floor of the valley, and by the end of the month were believed to occupy at least 45 positions and all vital routes into the Panjshir. There was renewed fighting in the area and on the nearby Shomali plateau during August and September. In November reports reaching the headquarters of the Jamaat-i-Islami Afghanistan rebel group in Peshawar, Pakistan, indicated that the action had spread south to the Kohistan area. Throughout early 1985, mujaheddin guerrillas continued to harrass military posts and staged attacks on convoys along the Panjshir and in the area of the Salang tunnel. Attacks on military outposts had by June grown into a major offensive, renewed fighting in the Panjshir valley and on the Shomali plateau resulting in a heavy loss of life according to Western diplomatic sources in Pakistan. Elsewhere in northern Afghanistan 45 civilians were reported to have been killed on March 28, 1985, in the town of Khanabad in Takhar province in reprisal for the killing of Soviet soldiers. Mujaheddin guerrillas were also reported to be active around Mazar-i-Sharif in Balkh province where 140 civilians died on June 5 in a rebel bomb attack on a building being used as a hostel by members of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Rebels claimed to have destroyed a natural gas pipeline and a number of other installations in Jozjan province on Sept. 25, 1985. In February it had been similarly reported that rebels had blown up sections of an 80-mile long pipeline linking the Shibarghan gasfields in Jozjan to Mazar-i-Sharif. In the area directly to the north of Kabul Soviet and Afghan government forces were said to have launched a large-scale offensive in late June 1984 against rebels holding the town of Kohe Safi, 25 miles north-west of the capital. The town was regarded as a supply point for the nearby area around Paghman, which was itself the scene of heavy fighting during October and in early 1985. There were also a number of rebel rocket attacks on the Baghran airbase, about 40 miles north of Kabul: on June 3, 1984, rebels of the Hizb-i-Islami group claimed to have destroyed more than 35 Soviet helicopters and MiG fighters and to have killed or wounded a number of Soviet troops. The runway and other installations were also said to have been damaged. Subsequent attacks were reported on Jan. 17 and March 9, 1985, the latter attack precipitating punitive Soviet raids on villages near Kabul. Campaigns in eastern Afghanistan Soviet offensives in eastern and south-eastern Afghanistan in the same period concentrated on breaking the supply routes used by the mujaheddin operating from bases inside neighbouring Pakistan. Large concentrations of Soviettroops were reported to be in action throughout the period in Konar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Logar and Paktia provinces. A large build-up of Soviet forces was reported in Paktia in August 1984. Since the previous May the province had been the scene of fighting following the rebel seizure of an Army outpost at Ali Khel and there had been repeated attacks on military convoys. Soviet raids frequently spilled over the border into Pakistan, with aerial and artillery attacks inflicting a number of civilian casualties. However, protests by the Pakistan Foreign Ministry were rejected by theAfghan government as ‘total lies’, Afghanistan in turn accusing Pakistan of similar border violations. Following the retaking of the Panjshir valley, Soviet forces were reported in early 1985 to be preparing for a similar offensive in the Konar valley close to the border with Pakistan, their intention being apparently to lift the rebel siege of the garrison town of Barikot at the north-eastern end of the valley. Soviet forces had already been active in the Konar in December 1984 in a major mine-laying operation. Intensive air strikes against rebel positions began on May 11, followed on May 21 by an offensive by ground forces which made rapid progress up the valley towards Barikot. Soviet troops were reported to have lifted the eight-month siege on or around June 9, and to have driven mujaheddin resistance from the valley. In the course of the Konar offensive there were again repeated accusations by both Pakistan and Afghanistan of border violations. Pakistani officials speculated that the noticeable increase in air and artillery attacks across the border from Afghanistan might represent a concerted attempt to undermine support for the rebels in Pakistan's border areas, in keeping with the campaign against mujaheddin supplies from Pakistan. In 1984 alone there had been 63 recorded violations of Pakistani territory and airspace, killing 113 people and injuring 94. The New York Times on May 16, 1985, noted that ‘the increased activity has stirred new concerns among (US) and Pakistani policy makers that the attacks could generate resentment and fear among Pakistanis over the toll being taken by the fighting in Afghanistan’, and on July 11 the US administration was reported to be speeding up the delivery of 100 ‘Stinger’ portable anti-aircraft missiles and ‘Sidewinder’ air-to-air missiles to Pakistan to help it defend itself against air incursions from Afghanistan.