DOCSLIB.ORG

The Cuban Dual Monetary System and Challenges Ahead

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Cuban Dual Monetary System and Challenges Ahead THE CUBAN DUAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND CHALLENGES AHEAD Roberto Orro In 2004, the Cuban Government announced the pro- we believe that the opinions and conclusions present- hibition of the use of the U.S. dollar as a means of ex- ed in this paper are valid in the event another foreign change in retail as well as in other commercial opera- currency—the Euro, for example—should displace the tions. From then on, all transactions have been U.S. dollar as the prevailing foreign currency in Cuba. conducted using Cuban convertible pesos (CUC), the Cuban peso backed in U.S. dollars. Cuban authorities The CUC has also failed to foster monetary conver- proclaimed that the proscription of the U.S. dollar was gence. Moreover, criticism of the dual system has an act of independence, aimed at untying the Cuban gained more proponents and spread across the coun- economy from the currency of the staunchest enemy try. Whether ordinary citizens, dissidents, or Cuban of the Revolution. This measure was presented as a de- officials, they all agree that the current dual monetary cisive move towards monetary convergence, a step to system should be eliminated. For some, the CUC em- end the nation’s dual monetary system, which also fea- bodies a discriminatory action against Cuban workers, tures several exchange rates. who are paid in authentic Cuban pesos (ACP). For others, the coexistence of the CUC and the ACP cre- Embracing the use of the U.S. dollar has been a thorny ates a distortion that prevents the economy from an ef- issue for the Cuban leadership. In fact, since the very ficient allocation of resources. The monetary issue has creation of the Cuban Central Bank in 1997, the au- become so important, that General Raúl Castro could thorities stressed the need for a single currency.1 We not avoid the issue in his first speech as the new head have often heard Cuban officials criticizing the use of the dollar. But time has passed and nothing—even the of the Cuban Government. plunge of the dollar against other foreign currencies— In this paper, we review the performance of the Cuban has managed to uproot the American currency in Cu- monetary system over the past four years. We also ex- ba. amine some likely scenarios for the Cuban economy It is noteworthy that by dollarization we mean more and monetary system, based on the latest political de- than the use of the U.S. currency. In the economic lit- velopments in Cuba, and the recent takeover by a new erature, dollarization means total or partial replace- head of state. This paper is also based on my personal ment of the national currency by a foreign currency, experiences during my last visit to Cuba in 2006. We with regard to the three functions of money: means of conclude that the CUC should be eliminated, no mat- exchange, unit of account, and store of value. Hence, ter the final path of Cuba’s transition. 1. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000, La Economía Cubana: Reformas Estructurales y Desempeño en los Noventa, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México. 44 The Cuban Dual Monetary System MONEY AND ECONOMY IN CUBA AFTER The special relationship with Venezuela has given the THE COUNTER-REFORM OF 2003 Cuban Government enough power and confidence to In 2003, the Cuban Government began to roll back behave the way it really wants to. Meanwhile, the Gov- the tepid reforms started in 1993. The counter-reform ernment has overturned some measures it grudgingly marked the return to centralization and the elimina- accepted in the 1990s. Many small foreign firms have tion of some concessions to public firms and the incip- been expelled and self-employment licenses trimmed. ient private sector. In July 2003, the Cuban Govern- Moreover, the high degree of confidence on inflows ment made the first big move against the circulation of from Venezuela has put the Government in the “com- the dollar in Cuba. From this point forward, all trans- fortable” position of being able to focus just on those actions in the dollarized network would have to be strategic sectors, like nickel and energy, considered as conducted in CUC. Deposits and banking accounts of less costly from the political standpoint. Other sectors, Cuban firms also would have to be denominated in like tourism and agriculture, seen as potentially dan- CUC. In addition, all operations by Cuban firms de- gerous within the political equation, have been ne- manding foreign currencies would require approval of glected. the Cuban Central Bank. The economic stability has secured exchange rate sta- A radical move followed the next year. A decree passed bility. In spite of some ups and downs, the Cuban peso in November 2004 designated the CUC as the only has been hovering around 24 pesos per U.S. dollar currency accepted in the dollarized network of goods (Figure 1). Since 1994, the Government has not faced and services. At the same time, the Government estab- a sudden and sharp devaluation of the Cuban peso. lished a 10% tax on the U.S. dollar. By taxing the U.S. This rate is no exempted of Government manipula- dollar, the Cuban Government was supposedly en- tion. After the elimination of the U.S. dollar as a couraging remittances in other foreign currencies. U.S. means of payment, most exchange outlets sell Cuban restrictions on the use of U.S. dollars by Cuba were al- pesos and CUC. However, buying back U.S. dollars or legedly the reason for implementing the tax. Cuban any other foreign currency can be done at few economists claim that this measure has succeeded in places. slashing the share of inflows in dollars from 80% to 30%.2 Finally, the CUC was officially appreciated Figure 1. Unofficial Exchange Rate against all foreign currencies in April 2005. Cuban Pesos/U.S. Dollar The offensive against decentralization, the private sec- pesos/dollar tor, and the U.S. dollar was not a coincidence. External 100 factors have played a key role in the strengthening the 80 60 CUC. Very favorable trade terms and other inflows 40 from Venezuela have made possible the return to cen- 20 tralization. The Cuban Government has reasons to 0 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ooze confidence. Thanks to Venezuela, Cuba is now shielded from the ravages of the oil market.3 Revenues from services rendered by Cuban workers in Venezue- The CUC has not helped tourism at all. I have not la have enabled the island to double imports over three conducted empirical research to measure the impact of years, 2003–2006. Chinese investments in nickel have the CUC appreciation on foreign tourism in Cuba. also helped, but they pale compared to the paramount Nevertheless, tourists are doubtlessly feeling the heat. support from Venezuela. Based on my experiences during my last visit to Cuba 2. Vidal, Pavel, 2006, Estabilidad, Desdolarización y Política Monetaria en Cuba. Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana. 3. It is noteworthy that Granma, the official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party, cheers every new record high world market oil price. 45 Cuba in Transition • ASCE 2008 in 2006, I perceived that tourist money does not go tribuidos de una forma igualitaria, como los de la li- very far, and visitors experience how their funds literal- breta de abastecimiento...4 ly evaporate as a result of the harsh mix of an unfavor- Just a few days after Raúl’s inauguration as head of able exchange rate, very high prices, and little options state, rumors about an imminent appreciation of the in the streets of Cuban cities. Cuban peso drew many Cubans to exchange outlets. Citizens were trying to sell U.S. dollars and other for- Cuban citizens who receive money from relatives eign currencies at the best possible rate. The events of abroad have not gone unscathed. It is worth to point 2004 were still too fresh to be disregarded. It did not out that a significant share of the Cuban population take long before the authorities made it clear no signif- has access to, and depends indirectly on, remittances. icant change was about to happen. In fact, the most re- The purchasing power of many Cuban households has cent measures have signaled the new government is been adversely impacted by the appreciation of the implicitly protecting the use of foreign currencies in CUC. At the same time, workers who are paid in ACP Cuba. keep complaining and blaming the CUC for their many shortages. Everybody is unsatisfied. Since February 2008, the Government has lifted sever- al restrictions on Cuban citizens regarding the use and In sum, although performing stably, the CUC has not access to some goods and services. At the time this arti- fulfilled the expectations after the monetary reform in cle was being written, some prohibitions had already 2003–2005. been lifted. THE MONETARY SYSTEM AND THE NEW 1 Cuban citizens can now buy electric appliances LEADERSHIP and computers in the shoppings. The resignation of Fidel Castro as head of the Cuban 2 Cubans have now access to hotels, previously re- Government has focused worldwide attention on Cu- served for foreigners. ba. The designation of Army General Raúl Castro, 3 Restrictions on the use of cellular phones by Cu- known as more in favor of institutionalization and of ban citizens were lifted. economic reform, has unleashed a wave of speculation 4 Cimex and other dollarized retailers have begun on the economic and political future of Cuba.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Meetings & Incentives
    MOVES PEOPLE TO BUSINESS TRAVEL & MICE Nº 37 EDICIÓN ESPECIAL FERIAS 2016-2017 / SPECIAL EDITION SHOWS 2016-2017 5,80 € BUSCANDO América Meetings & Incentives Edición bilingüe Bilingual edition 8 PRESENTACIÓN INTRODUCTION Buscando América. Un Nuevo Searching for America. A New Mundo de oportunidades 8 World of Opportunities 9 NORTE Y CENTRO NORTH AND CENTRAL Belice 16 Belize 16 Costa Rica 18 Costa Rica 19 El Salvador 22 El Salvador 22 14 Guatemala 24 Guatemala 24 Honduras 28 Honduras 28 México 30 Mexico 30 Nicaragua 36 Nicaragua 36 Panamá 40 Panama 40 CARIBE CARIBEAN Cuba 48 Cuba 48 Jamaica 52 Jamaica 52 Puerto Rico 54 Puerto Rico 54 46 República Dominicana 58 Dominican Republic 58 SUDAMÉRICA SOUTH AMERICA Argentina 64 Argentina 64 Bolivia 70 Bolivia 70 Brasil 72 Brazil 72 62 Chile 78 Chile 78 Colombia 82 Colombia 82 Ecuador 88 Ecuador 88 Paraguay 92 Paraguay 92 Perú 94 Peru 94 Uruguay 98 Uruguay 99 Venezuela 102 Venezuela 102 104 TURISMO RESPONSABLE SUSTAINABLE TOURISM 106 CHECK OUT Un subcontinente cada vez más An increasingly consolidated consolidado en el segmento MICE continent in the MICE segment Txema Txuglà Txema Txuglà MEET IN EDICIÓN ESPECIAL FERIAS 2016-2017 / SPECIAL EDITION SHOWS 2016-2017 EDITORIAL Natalia Ros EDITORA Fernando Sagaseta DIRECTOR Te busco y sí te I search for you encuentro and I find you «Te estoy buscando, América… Te busco y no te encuentro», “ I am searching for you America… I am searching for you but cantaba en los 80 el panameño Rubén Blades, por más señas I can’t find you ”, sang the Panamanian Rubén Blades in the ministro de Turismo de su país entre 2004 y 2009.
    [Show full text]
  • Ernesto 'Che' Guevara: the Existing Literature
    Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara: socialist political economy and economic management in Cuba, 1959-1965 Helen Yaffe London School of Economics and Political Science Doctor of Philosophy 1 UMI Number: U615258 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615258 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I, Helen Yaffe, assert that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Helen Yaffe Date: 2 Iritish Library of Political nrjPr v . # ^pc £ i ! Abstract The problem facing the Cuban Revolution after 1959 was how to increase productive capacity and labour productivity, in conditions of underdevelopment and in transition to socialism, without relying on capitalist mechanisms that would undermine the formation of new consciousness and social relations integral to communism. Locating Guevara’s economic analysis at the heart of the research, the thesis examines policies and development strategies formulated to meet this challenge, thereby refuting the mainstream view that his emphasis on consciousness was idealist. Rather, it was intrinsic and instrumental to the economic philosophy and strategy for social change advocated.
    [Show full text]
  • Culture Box of Cuba
    CUBA CONTENIDO CONTENTS Acknowledgments .......................3 Introduction .................................6 Items .............................................8 More Information ........................89 Contents Checklist ......................108 Evaluation.....................................110 AGRADECIMIENTOS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Contributors The Culture Box program was created by the University of New Mexico’s Latin American and Iberian Institute (LAII), with support provided by the LAII’s Title VI National Resource Center grant from the U.S. Department of Education. Contributing authors include Latin Americanist graduate students Adam Flores, Charla Henley, Jennie Grebb, Sarah Leister, Neoshia Roemer, Jacob Sandler, Kalyn Finnell, Lorraine Archibald, Amanda Hooker, Teresa Drenten, Marty Smith, María José Ramos, and Kathryn Peters. LAII project assistant Katrina Dillon created all curriculum materials. Project management, document design, and editorial support were provided by LAII staff person Keira Philipp-Schnurer. Amanda Wolfe, Marie McGhee, and Scott Sandlin generously collected and donated materials to the Culture Box of Cuba. Sponsors All program materials are readily available to educators in New Mexico courtesy of a partnership between the LAII, Instituto Cervantes of Albuquerque, National Hispanic Cultural Center, and Spanish Resource Center of Albuquerque - who, together, oversee the lending process. To learn more about the sponsor organizations, see their respective websites: • Latin American & Iberian Institute at the
    [Show full text]
  • When Racial Inequalities Return: Assessing the Restratification of Cuban Society 60 Years After Revolution
    When Racial Inequalities Return: Assessing the Restratification of Cuban Society 60 Years After Revolution Katrin Hansing Bert Hoffmann ABSTRACT Few political transformations have attacked social inequalities more thoroughly than the 1959 Cuban Revolution. As the survey data in this article show, however, sixty years on, structural inequalities are returning that echo the prerevolutionary socioethnic hierarchies. While official Cuban statistics are mute about social differ- ences along racial lines, the authors were able to conduct a unique, nationwide survey with more than one thousand respondents that shows the contrary. Amid depressed wages in the state-run economy, access to hard currency has become key. However, racialized migration patterns of the past make for highly unequal access to family remittances, and the gradual opening of private business disfavors Afro- Cubans, due to their lack of access to prerevolutionary property and startup capital. Despite the political continuity of Communist Party rule, a restructuring of Cuban society with a profound racial bias is turning back one of the proudest achieve- ments of the revolution. Keywords: Cuba, social inequality, race, socialism, migration, remittances he 1959 Cuban Revolution radically broke with a past in which “class” tended Tto influence and overlap most aspects of social life, including “race,” gender, income, education, and territory. The “centralized, state-sponsored economy, which provided full employment and guaranteed modest income differences, was the great social elevator of the lower strata of society. As a result, by the 1980s Cuba had become one of the most egalitarian societies in the world” (Mesa-Lago and Pérez- López 2005, 71). Katrin Hansing is an associate professor of sociology and anthropology at Baruch College, City University of New York.
    [Show full text]
  • Cuba! Identity Revealed Through Cultural Connections
    Curriculum Units by Fellows of the Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute 2016 Volume II: Literature and Identity Cuba! Identity Revealed through Cultural Connections Curriculum Unit 16.02.07 by Waltrina Dianne Kirkland-Mullins Introduction I am a New Haven, Connecticut Public School instructor who loves to travel abroad. I do so because it affords me the opportunity to connect with people from myriad cultures, providing insight into the lives, customs, and traditions of diverse populations within our global community. It too helps me have a better understanding of diverse groups of Americans whose families live beyond American shores, many with whom I interact right within my New Haven residential and school community. Equally important, getting to experience diverse cultures first-hand helps to dispel misconceptions and false identification regarding specific cultural groups. Last summer, I was honored to travel to Cuba as part of a team of college students, teaching professionals, and businesspersons who visited the country with Washington State’s Pinchot University. While there, I met and conversed with professors, educators, entrepreneurs, scientists, and everyday folk—gaining insight into Cuba and its people from their perspective. Through that interaction, I experienced that Cuba, like the U.S., is a diverse nation. Primarily comprised of descendants of the Taíno, the Ciboney, and Arawak (original inhabitants of the island), Africans, and Spaniards, the diversity is evident in the color spectrum of the population, ranging from deep, ebony-hues to sun-kissed tan and creamy vanilla tones. I too learned something deeper. One afternoon, my Pinchot roommate and I decided to venture out to visit Callejon de Hamel , a narrow thoroughfare laden with impressive Santeria murals, sculptures, and Yoruba images.
    [Show full text]
  • Black Market Peso Exchange As a Mechanism to Place Substantial Amounts of Currency from U.S
    United States Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network FinCEN Advisory Subject: This advisory is provided to alert banks and other depository institutions Colombian to a large-scale, complex money laundering system being used extensively by Black Market Colombian drug cartels to launder the proceeds of narcotics sales. This Peso Exchange system is affecting both U.S. financial depository institutions and many U.S. businesses. The information contained in this advisory is intended to help explain how this money laundering system works so that U.S. financial institutions and businesses can take steps to help law enforcement counter it. Overview Date: November Drug sales in the United States are estimated by the Office of National 1997 Drug Control Policy to generate $57.3 billion annually, and most of these transactions are in cash. Through concerted efforts by the Congress and the Executive branch, laws and regulatory actions have made the movement of this cash a significant problem for the drug cartels. America’s banks have effective systems to report large cash transactions and report suspicious or Advisory: unusual activity to appropriate authorities. As a result of these successes, the Issue 9 placement of large amounts of cash into U.S. financial institutions has created vulnerabilities for the drug organizations and cartels. Efforts to avoid report- ing requirements by structuring transactions at levels well below the $10,000 limit or camouflage the proceeds in otherwise legitimate activity are continu- ing. Drug cartels are also being forced to devise creative ways to smuggle the cash out of the country. This advisory discusses a primary money laundering system used by Colombian drug cartels.
    [Show full text]
  • View Currency List
    Currency List business.westernunion.com.au CURRENCY TT OUTGOING DRAFT OUTGOING FOREIGN CHEQUE INCOMING TT INCOMING CURRENCY TT OUTGOING DRAFT OUTGOING FOREIGN CHEQUE INCOMING TT INCOMING CURRENCY TT OUTGOING DRAFT OUTGOING FOREIGN CHEQUE INCOMING TT INCOMING Africa Asia continued Middle East Algerian Dinar – DZD Laos Kip – LAK Bahrain Dinar – BHD Angola Kwanza – AOA Macau Pataca – MOP Israeli Shekel – ILS Botswana Pula – BWP Malaysian Ringgit – MYR Jordanian Dinar – JOD Burundi Franc – BIF Maldives Rufiyaa – MVR Kuwaiti Dinar – KWD Cape Verde Escudo – CVE Nepal Rupee – NPR Lebanese Pound – LBP Central African States – XOF Pakistan Rupee – PKR Omani Rial – OMR Central African States – XAF Philippine Peso – PHP Qatari Rial – QAR Comoros Franc – KMF Singapore Dollar – SGD Saudi Arabian Riyal – SAR Djibouti Franc – DJF Sri Lanka Rupee – LKR Turkish Lira – TRY Egyptian Pound – EGP Taiwanese Dollar – TWD UAE Dirham – AED Eritrea Nakfa – ERN Thai Baht – THB Yemeni Rial – YER Ethiopia Birr – ETB Uzbekistan Sum – UZS North America Gambian Dalasi – GMD Vietnamese Dong – VND Canadian Dollar – CAD Ghanian Cedi – GHS Oceania Mexican Peso – MXN Guinea Republic Franc – GNF Australian Dollar – AUD United States Dollar – USD Kenyan Shilling – KES Fiji Dollar – FJD South and Central America, The Caribbean Lesotho Malati – LSL New Zealand Dollar – NZD Argentine Peso – ARS Madagascar Ariary – MGA Papua New Guinea Kina – PGK Bahamian Dollar – BSD Malawi Kwacha – MWK Samoan Tala – WST Barbados Dollar – BBD Mauritanian Ouguiya – MRO Solomon Islands Dollar –
    [Show full text]
  • Colombian Peso Forecast Special Edition Nov
    Friday Nov. 4, 2016 Nov. 4, 2016 Mexican Peso Outlook Is Bleak With or Without Trump Buyside View By George Lei, Bloomberg First Word The peso may look historically very cheap, but weak fundamentals will probably prevent "We're increasingly much appreciation, regardless of who wins the U.S. election. concerned about the The embattled currency hit a three-week low Nov. 1 after a poll showed Republican difference between PDVSA candidate Donald Trump narrowly ahead a week before the vote. A Trump victory and Venezuela. There's a could further bruise the peso, but Hillary Clinton wouldn't do much to reverse 26 scenario where PDVSA percent undervaluation of the real effective exchange rate compared to the 20-year average. doesn't get paid as much as The combination of lower oil prices, falling domestic crude production, tepid economic Venezuela." growth and a rising debt-to-GDP ratio are key challenges Mexico must address, even if — Robert Koenigsberger, CIO at Gramercy a status quo in U.S. trade relations is preserved. Oil and related revenues contribute to Funds Management about one third of Mexico's budget and output is at a 32-year low. Economic growth is forecast at 2.07 percent in 2016 and 2.26 percent in 2017, according to a Nov. 1 central bank survey. This is lower than potential GDP growth, What to Watch generally considered at or slightly below 3 percent. To make matters worse, Central Banks Deputy Governor Manuel Sanchez said Oct. Nov. 9: Mexico's CPI 21 that the GDP outlook has downside risks and that the government must urgently Nov.
    [Show full text]
  • The Wall Street Journal New York, New York 25 July 2021
    U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc. New York, New York Telephone (917) 453-6726 • E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.cubatrade.org • Twitter: @CubaCouncil Facebook: www.facebook.com/uscubatradeandeconomiccouncil LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/company/u-s--cuba-trade-and-economic-council-inc- The Wall Street Journal New York, New York 25 July 2021 Opinion The Americas The Root Causes of Cuban Poverty The only blockade is the one imposed by Havana. Regime elites oppose competition. A man is arrested during a demonstration against the government of Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel in Havana, July 11. Photo: yamil lage/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images Cuba’s primal scream for liberty on July 11 has gone viral and exposed the grisly methods used by Cuba’s gestapo to keep the lid on dissent. But Cubans need outside help. They need the civilized world to come together and ostracize the barbarians in Havana. This requires U.S. leadership. Unfortunately, the Biden administration hasn’t seemed up to the task. Repression and propaganda are the only two things that Havana does well. U.S. intervention to protect against human-rights violations is not practical. But the Biden administration could launch a campaign to inform the public about the realities of Cuban communism. Vice President Kamala Harris might label it “the root causes” of Cuban poverty. Debunking the Marxist myth that sanctions impede Cuban development would be a good place to start. For decades, Cuba has blamed what it calls the U.S. “blockade” for island privation. Regime talking points have been repeated ad nauseam in U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Cuba's New Social Structure: Assessing the Re- Stratification of Cuban Society 60 Years After Revolution
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Hansing, Katrin; Hoffmann, Bert Working Paper Cuba's new social structure: Assessing the re- stratification of Cuban society 60 years after revolution GIGA Working Papers, No. 315 Provided in Cooperation with: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Suggested Citation: Hansing, Katrin; Hoffmann, Bert (2019) : Cuba's new social structure: Assessing the re-stratification of Cuban society 60 years after revolution, GIGA Working Papers, No. 315, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/193161 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Inclusion of a paper in the Working Papers series does not constitute publication and should limit in any other venue.
    [Show full text]
  • Argentina's 2001 Economic and Financial Crisis: Lessons for Europe
    Argentina’s 2001 economic and Financial Crisis: Lessons for europe Former Under Secretary of Finance and Chief Advisor to the Minister of the Miguel Kiguel Economy, Argentina; Former President, Banco Hipotecario; Director, Econviews; Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella he 2001 Argentine economic and financial banks and international reserves—was not enough crisis has many parallels with the problems to cover the financial liabilities of the consolidated Tthat some European countries are facing to- financial system . This was a major source of vulner- day . Prior to the crisis, Argentina was suffering a ability, especially because there is ample evidence deep recession, large levels of debt, twin deficits in that an economy without a lender of last resort is the fiscal and current accounts, and the country inherently unstable and subject to bank runs . This had an overvalued currency but devaluation was is not a pressing issue in Europe, where the Euro- not an option . pean Central Bank can provide liquidity to banks . Argentina tried in vain to restore its competitive- The trigger for the crisis in Argentina was a run on ness through domestic deflation and improving the banking system as people realized that there its solvency by increasing its fiscal accounts in were not enough dollars in the system to cover all the midst of a recession . The country also tried to the deposits . As the run intensified, the Argentine avoid a default first by resorting to a large financial government was forced to introduce a so-called package from the multilateral institutions (the so “fence” to control the outflow of deposits .
    [Show full text]
  • Cuban Exile Filmmaker León Ichaso Amy S
    Northern Michigan University The Commons Conference Presentations 7-8-2016 Paradise Lost: Cuban Exile Filmmaker León Ichaso Amy S. Orf Northern Michigan University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.nmu.edu/facwork_conferencepresentations Part of the Film and Media Studies Commons Recommended Citation Orf, Amy S., "Paradise Lost: Cuban Exile Filmmaker León Ichaso" (2016). Conference Presentations. Paper 141. http://commons.nmu.edu/facwork_conferencepresentations/141 This Conference Presentation is brought to you for free and open access by The ommonC s. It has been accepted for inclusion in Conference Presentations by an authorized administrator of The ommonC s. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. “Paradise Lost: Cuban Exile Filmmaker León Ichaso” Amy Orf Northern Michigan University AATSP 2016 Conference Abstract: In this paper I examine the trilogy of Spanish-language films directed by Cuban exile León Ichaso: El súper (1979), Azúcar amarga (1996), and Paraíso: Freedom is Murder (2009). The profound sense of loss that Ichaso must have experienced when he left Cuba at the age of fourteen comes through in his films, which portray life after the Cuban Revolution as a loss of paradise both for those who have left Cuba, as well as for those who still live on the island. LEÓN (RODRÍGUEZ) ICHASO León Ichaso was born in Havana on August 3, 1948. His father, Justo Rodríguez Santos, was a renowned poet who frequently published in the Cuban literary magazine Orígenes and a pioneering director of television and radio. Ichaso’s father often took him to the station where he saw live television shows and films being made.
    [Show full text]