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Argentina’s 2001 Economic and Financial Crisis: Lessons for Europe Former Under Secretary of Finance and Chief Advisor to the Minister of the Miguel Kiguel Economy, ; Former President, Banco Hipotecario; Director, Econviews; Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

he 2001 Argentine economic and financial banks and international reserves—was not enough crisis has many parallels with the problems to cover the financial liabilities of the consolidated Tthat some European countries are facing to- financial system . This was a major source of vulner- day . Prior to the crisis, Argentina was suffering a ability, especially because there is ample evidence deep recession, large levels of debt, twin deficits in that an economy without a lender of last resort is the fiscal and current accounts, and the country inherently unstable and subject to bank runs . This had an overvalued but devaluation was is not a pressing issue in Europe, where the - not an option . pean Central Bank can provide liquidity to banks .

Argentina tried in vain to restore its competitive- The trigger for the crisis in Argentina was a run on ness through domestic deflation and improving the banking system as people realized that there its solvency by increasing its fiscal accounts in were not enough in the system to cover all the midst of a recession . The country also tried to the deposits . As the run intensified, the Argentine avoid a default first by resorting to a large financial government was forced to introduce a so-called package from the multilateral institutions (the so “fence” to control the outflow of deposits . Un- called shield or blindaje) and then by implement- der this system, people could only transfer funds ing a debt mega-swap that helped to refinance within the banking system but they were not al- most of the debt with private banks . In the end, lowed to get cash, except in small amounts . This none of these efforts worked and Argentina faced measure resulted in a monetary crunch and led to its worst economic and financial crisis ever . a collapse of economic activity—especially in the informal sector which mainly works on cash—and There were two issues that complicated the policy to widespread social unrest . response to the crisis in Argentina, which to differ- ent degrees are important in Europe today . First, In the end, the fixed exchange rate regime collapsed Argentina was unable to devalue its currency— and the country declared what until now has been without breaking the convertibility law—to restore the largest sovereign default in history ($85 billion) . competitiveness when the external conditions de- Argentina suffered its worst economic and finan- teriorated . The strategy of trying to achieve a real cial crisis ever . The currency depreciated from one depreciation through deflation did not work be- to more than three pesos per U .S . in a matter cause there was not enough downward flexibility of weeks, GDP per capita fell by around 20 percent in nominal prices and wages . during the whole period, while unemployment in- creased to 25 percent of the labor force and poverty Second, there was a large degree of financial dol- levels reached 55 percent of the population . larization in the economy, as the banking system functioned mainly in dollars . In this environment, While the crisis was extremely painful, the econ- the banking system had short-term liabilities in omy recovered relatively quickly . Since the crisis, dollars but lacked a lender of last resort, as the Argentina has enjoyed sustained high rates of stock of dollar assets—namely liquidity held by growth (a median of around 8 percent per year),

Think Tank 20: Beyond Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Discussions in the G-20 7 which only suffered a pause during the 2008 global denominated in dollars . To address this problem, financial crisis . What factors explain the Argentine the government adopted a forceful conversion of recovery? There is certainly no consensus on this most financial assets and liabilities that were de- issue . Some analysts give most of the credit to the nominated in dollars into pesos at the old parity— default on the debt, others to the depreciation of this is now widely known as “pesification” . the currency combined with policies that reduced macroeconomic vulnerability, while others argue This policy was very disruptive and was a source that the key factor was the improvement in the ex- of social unrest, especially among small deposi- ternal environment . tors who found that their savings had lost pur- chasing power . It definitely affected property Although the default is often seen as the most im- rights; the exchange rate that was used to convert portant policy decision, it is not obvious that Ar- the assets and liabilities was arbitrary and implied gentina had a solvency problem at that time even excessively large transfers of wealth from credi- though it definitely had a liquidity one . In 2001, tors to debtors, but it also avoided widespread the debt-to-GDP ratio was 55 percent, although bankruptcies . the figure increased to 150 percent after the depre- ciation since most of the debt was denominated in In the case of the Europe, this would only become foreign currency . The default was helpful in deal- a problem if one of the countries were to abandon ing with the refinancing problems because it pro- the euro . This may not have severe balance sheets vided significant relief to the liquidity problems . effects if in the end the euro depreciates against But in itself it did not help to restore competitive- other . The opposite may happen, how- ness or confidence to resume growth . ever . On balance, it would appear that an exit from the euro could be full of huge risks for any country The depreciation of the currency was probably in the eurozone . more important, as it helped to improve competi- tiveness and to generate the twin surpluses . It was The greater competitiveness of the economy in the particularly effective in eroding the real value of aftermath of the devaluation was helped by a better wages and public sector expenditures (especially external environment, especially the improvement pensions), where there had been significant resis- in export prices and the stronger demand from tance to accept nominal reductions . It provided Brazil, China and other emerging markets . the flexibility in real wages that was not possible to achieve through reductions in nominal wages . The In addition, the de-dollarization of the banking fact that the economy was suffering a severe reces- system, while traumatic, did reduce the financial sion and high rates of unemployment minimized vulnerability of Argentina, as the central bank the inflationary effects of the devaluation, which could again act as lender of last resort . The gov- previously had been a problem . ernment also reduced its currency miss-match as a large part of public debt was also “pesified”, which The devaluation was also critical in reducing gov- implied that it could service the debt using its tax ernment expenditures in real terms and in im- revenues that were mainly in pesos . proving the fiscal accounts . It was also instrumen- tal in allowing the government to run large fiscal Four years after announcing the default, Argen- surpluses for more than five years . tina finally restructured 72 percent of its debt and it managed to negotiate long maturities and a 65 While the sharp depreciation of the currency suc- percent haircut in net present value . Most of the ceeded in changing relative prices, it did have outstanding debt that remained in default after the substantially negative balance sheet effects, as first offer was restructured in 2010—nine years af- firms and individuals had most of their debts ter the default—under similar financial terms .

Think Tank 20: Beyond Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Discussions in the G-20 8 Is the Argentine default and subsequent restruc- With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that Argen- turing an example to follow for Europe? There is tina could have done a few things differently . The no clear cut answer to this question, as the Argen- market understood and accepted a restructuring tina case had mixed outcomes . True, Argentina has of its debt and a large haircut as part of the process enjoyed high growth since the crisis, but it could to restore solvency and access to financial markets . be argued that this took place thanks to the depre- But it penalized the country thereafter mainly be- ciation and the improvement in the external envi- cause Argentina imposed tougher terms than the ronment, and at the cost of allowing inflation to market had expected . In addition, once Argentina rise to almost 25 percent per year . Argentina took finished the restructuring, it once again affected a large haircut that over time has led to a reduc- the property rights of the creditors, making what tion in the net debt burden to around 25 percent some economists have termed a “technical default” of GDP . However, as this reduction was obtained on the peso-indexed bonds . by what the market perceived as an “excessive” ini- tial haircut and by eroding the peso-indexed debt The lessons for Europe are important . A default is through the under-reporting of inflation, Argen- doable, the market can accept it and it can work tina has not been able to regain fluid access to fi- to restore fiscal solvency . However, in and of itself, nancial markets and credit spreads have been the a default is not enough to restore growth . In Ar- second highest among emerging countries—only gentina, the real depreciation of the currency and surpassed by . luck—the rise in soybean prices—were critical to sustaining a strong recovery .

Think Tank 20: Beyond Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Discussions in the G-20 9