Urban Violence in an Urban Village

wrn o ki g paper GENEVA DECLARATION

U rban Violence in an Urban Village A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste

Editor Robert Muggah Principal researchers Oliver Jütersonke, Ryan Murray, Edward Rees, and James Scambary A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 2 © by Published in the Switzerland prior permission in writing of the of the in writing permission prior in any or or form system, transmitted, by a any retrieval the means, without No of part this may publication in be stored reserved. reproduced, All rights at at the address below. the outside scope of the above should be sent to Manager the Publications reproduction concerning Enquiries organization. rights reprographics appropriate the with agreed terms or by under law, permitted expressly G ISBN: ISBN: 978-2-940415-39-7 1202 47 Avenue Blanc c/o Small Survey Arms Printed by Printed nbmedia, & Design Services Editorial Exile: in Typeset by Meta Richard Jones ([email protected]), by Jillian MAP Luff, Cartography by John Linnegar Proofread by TaniaCopy-edited Inowlocki Switzerland e G neva Declaration Secretariat Secretariat neva Declaration e neva Declaration Secretariat, Secretariat, neva Declaration G e neva neva pyright C o G e neva grafix G e G neva Declaration Secretariat neva Declaration G e e neva Declaration Secretariat, or as Secretariat, Declaration neva neva neva 2010 Further information about the the about information Further of the support Programme. United Nations Development Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, and Thailand, the United Spain, Philippines, Switzerland, cations is cations available at www.genevadeclaration.org. Finland, Finland, in by 2015. human Colombia, Core include members security group Brazil, reductions in the global burden of armed violence and tangible improvements calls upon to states The achieve Declaration of measurable best practices. and to programmes, disseminate of knowledge violence reduction armed to to violence, the evaluate and risks effectiveness assess vulnerabilities, by endorsed on and Violence Armed Development, neva Declaration initiatives intended to measure the human, social, and economic more coststhan 108 ofcountries as of armed this commits writing, signatories to supporting The G e G u atemala, Indonesia, Indonesia, atemala, eva eva Declaration The G en G e K neva Declaration, its activities, and publi- and activities, its Declaration, neva e nya, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Norway, Netherlands, Morocco, nya, K i ngdom, ngdom, with the V V I II I I II V I T HE GENEVA DECLARATION 3 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 4 Executive summary summary Executive A A I I st of abbreviations of st L I V. Recurrent factors shaping urban violence in Dili Dili in violence urban shaping factors V. Recurrent I I n I II . S V i c . H b . Preliminary characteristics of urban violence in Dili Dili in violence urban of characteristics . Preliminary troduction troduction . S knowledgements out the editor and principal researchers researchers principal and editor the out patial, demographic, and social characteristics of Dili Dili of characteristics social and demographic, patial, The The 1980s Unemployment and migration and Unemployment migration G The The 1970s Informal security groups groups security Informal Since Since independence Returning the displaced Returning Vulnerability to victimization and dynamics of perpetration and of to dynamics perpetration victimization Vulnerability The 1990s Perceptions of security providers in urban contexts in providers urban contexts of Perceptions security Assessing local security priorities priorities local security Assessing Property disputes Property Socioeconomic inequalities inequalities Socioeconomic The groups role of and arts youth gangs martial istorical overview of urban violence violence urban of overview istorical urveying contemporary urban violence in Dili Dili in violence urban contemporary urveying e ographic distribution and incidence of distribution ographic urban violence �� ntents C �� o �� 28 40 39 42 49 49 22 33 56 54 27 25 45 45 57 21 55 10 41 13 17 8 6 9 B Endnotes Endnotes violence urban A Figure 6 Figure Dili 1 Map Maps, boxes, figures, and tables programmes reduction and prevention violence urban ecent V Figure 9 Figure C Timor-Leste 2 Map (Delta III and (Delta Ai n Mutin, = 257) 5 Figure people ‘Most are only out looking for themselves’ community (Perumnas, n = (Perumnas, 315; community n III, Delta = 103; Ai n Mutin, = 131) 7 Figure Type impact in of one’snegative violence with the greatest event (Robbery, n n = = event (Robbery, 101; Assault, 19;n = Arson, 7) violent in experienced personally perpetrators 8 Figure Reported after one another’ (n one = another’ after 614) 4 Figure B robberies, per neighbourhood (n = per 614) neighbourhood robberies, 3 Figure vs. population 2 Figure 1 Figure Table 1 o I n i o bliography bliography . R nclusions nclusions 2006–09 violence: of armed surveillance x 1 Hospital-based nexe 1. Typology of interventions to prevent and reduce reduce and to prevent interventions of Typology 1. nexe Redressing property rights rights property Redressing Addressing MA Addressing Typology of Typology to interventions prevent and reduce urban violence 2007 2006–June January hospital, Dili Trauma patients, ‘People in this neighbourhood can in to ‘People be this look trusted neighbourhood Percentage of respondents reporting on household reporting of Percentage respondents Age distribution: hospitalized violence victims violence victims hospitalized distribution: Age Currently the greatest concern in the community (n in = the community 558) concern the greatest Currently efforts and reduction prevention violence of urban Typology �� ...... �� ...... �� G ...... s and gangs and in gangs Dili ...... �� ...... �� ...... �� ......

...... 68 66 66 64 44 46 39 34 34 76 59 63 43 59 47 45 35 14 61 15 V V I II I I II V I CNSONTE T 5 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 6 FRET A AB F–FDT F I I I FORK C C C B N MSS M S O D A N E A P R G A F P M LIN P V ODET R I R O

M A R

T I

I D

A LIN T L

I M B

L I

I L (Indonesian Armed Forces) Armed (Indonesian A st of abbreviations L (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of for Forces the Timor-Leste) National Liberation (Armed of Timor) East for the Congress (National Reconstruction I I Front for an Timor) East Independent (Revolutionary F C Defence Force) (FALINTIL–Timor-Leste F F C Ce C B of Timor) Association Democratic (Popular A M M I N nternational Organization for Migration Organization nternational displaced person nternally nternational Stabilisation Force Stabilisation nternational ALINTIL–Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste de de Defesa Timor-Leste ALINTIL–Forças rente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente Independente de rente Revolucionária Timor-Leste orças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste Nacional de da Timor-Leste Armadas orças Libertação onselho Nacional de Reconstrução onselho do Nacional de Timor Reconstrução ommission for Truth, and Reception, Reconciliation ommunication Forum for Timor-Leste’s Martial Arts Arts Martial for Forum Timor-Leste’s ommunication ngkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Bersenjata ngkatan rigade Mobil (Indonesian paramilitary riot police) Mobil paramilitary (Indonesian rigade ssociação Popular Democrática de Timor Popular Democrática ssociação on-governmental organization on-governmental i artial arts group arts artial inistry of Social Solidarity inistry ntre ntre of Studies of Peace and Development G r oups U U UDT T PSHT P E P L N I N N D A T

M V L

I A

U U U T Brotherhood) Heart Faithful (Lotus P Police (National of Timor-Leste) P and State Defence Police) (International P imor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment Assessment Violence Armed imor-Leste ersaudaraan Setia Hati Terate ersaudaraan olícia Nacional de Timor-Leste olícia Nacional de Timor-Leste olícia e Internacional de do Defesa Estado nited Nations Integrated Mission in nited Nations Integrated Timor-Leste nited Nations Union) Democratic (Timorese Timorense nião Democrática V V I II I I II V I LISTFABB O REVIATIONS 7 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 8 Studies, Studies, Secretary- UN tothe officer a political was York, in New Operations Peacekeeping He of Trust in has with the worked Timor-Leste. United Nations Department Edward Rees Davis grant. Peace Project and neuroscience is the of recipient both a and scholarship US a Fulbright He and Violence is Armed Development. in pursuing a degree Master’s and Peacebuilding at the Jütersonke Oliver of Sussex. of Oxford and his Master’s at the Institute for Development Studies, University Research Council. Research for a of range and including agencies, the AusAID New York Social Science has been conducting research on gangs and communal conflict inTimor-Leste of in Technology Melbourne. at based University Swinburne Scambary James G He has as for worked Timor-Leste. a Crisis with the consultant International in of the Office High forCommissioner CommissionHuman of Rights Inquiry of and the the Small the Survey Secretariat Arms for adviser both is and analyst Murray Ryan methodological the statistical of practices. development His Ethics. spans and violence, research issues the of politics sovereignty, studied at Mc and He the US International, State Department. Amnesty College London, principal of the SecDev a fellow of and Development the Peacebuilding, and for Centre Conflict, a a lecturer at the is Muggah of the Robert director research the He Small Survey. is Arms also r oup, oup, the G e G G neva, and for neva, Centre fellow at research the University Zurich e e is senior adviser and formerly country director of Peace Dividend neral’s neral’s Special in Envoy in 2006, and Timor-Leste participated G principal researchers out the editor and A neva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, of Forces, Control neva for Centre Armed the Democratic i ll and the University and b G is a research fellow at the Institute of Social Research, Research, of Social Institute at the fellow is a research raduate raduate Institute of International and Development Studies, is head of at research the Development on Centre Conflict, G r G oup in Canada. He received his PhD at the University r aduate Institute of International and Development K i ng’s College, University of London. G e neva Declaration on neva Declaration

S ince 2006, he K i ng’s ng’s Additional assistance and input were received from Nicolas manager, Asia. East Trócaire, South (AUSAID) and the (AUSAID) draft. Finally, credit is due to the Australian Miller, and (E response early and warning early Marriott, Andrew Timor; East International CARE Project, manager, CALMER Richard Bowd, program Timor; East UNIFEM consultant, research Ferguson, Phyllis for Migration; Organization International officer, University, Perth, Australia; and a of study risk and resilience among displaced persons), internally Curtin of of (co-author State; US Jaya Earnest Department Asian Public East Affairs, project officer and researcher, BELUN. Jim Della- Daniel Timor; Services–East Relief manager, Catholic Peace program Building and Participation, Civil Danby, country director, Concern International, Timor-Leste; Catherina Maria, are Thanks also due to Jose youth officer, Mousaco, (Eduardo da Silva). and Lopes, Crispin Queizar Savio), Freitas, and Altino Manuel, a recorder (Maia journalists ETDA), Agency, (including the Development Timor East Belo as and (Abilio well Soares), translators Mica as Barreto facilitators (under the supervision of Elias Ferreira, Americo Soares, and Lourenco Soares); of the Directorate Statistics (with special to thanks Lyn ActionAid with by in the was collaboration This undertaken researchers study principal G o knowledgements A rdon Peake deserve additional thanks for reviewing the for additional thanks rdon final reviewing Peake deserve c W W E o R) coordinator, BELUN East Timor; and R) Timor; coordinator, Shabnam East BELUN Huq, rld Bank for supporting rld the Bank of development for this supporting study. G K o . vernment of Timor-Leste’s Ministry of Finance Ministry of vernment Timor-Leste’s Delk, Jr., Timor-Leste desk BureauJr., of officer, Delk, Timor-Leste K a thryn Robertson Marcal,thryn assistant regional W an); enumerators from an);the from National enumerators G o vernment Overseas Aid Program G i acomo, Emile LeBrun, Steven W o rld Bank, rld Dili; Bank, Clare K r oger, programme V V I II I I II V I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 9 10 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste spread spread sense of social injustice and impunity. land and grabs and disputes, migration, a forced and wide- opportunistic of killings), infrastructure, the and severe degradation trauma, widespread accompanied in by routinely escalations homicide (including revenge rates of earlier. urban violence was This pattern as lower rates, experienced by tensions, to spikes punctuated then violence, of returning collective episode of acute of violence was succeeded periods by low-level extended in decades: 1942, 1975, 1980, 1991, 1999, 2002, 2006, and 2007. Each violence on of by over occasions the several paroxysms collective past six findsThis study that the town and, morethe recently,of city Dili wasseized to violence contain and and strategies reduce it. of the shaping urban and risks the duration, severity onset, identifying is of to development historical the critical understanding city’s thorough In Dili, as around cities’ the in the world, past is A many present. ‘fragile to relation of the social the and and city its periphery. physical morphology in consequences of important urban violence generated manifestations can be on situated Earlier a continuum spanning historical generations. restricted to the recent independence period. Rather, the incidence of conflict of But the urban violence of in capital experience Timor-Leste. Dili is not violence in over of concern acute collective Dili, outbreaks the registered and Over the agencies have multilateral bilateral past decade, periodically As As is residing communities in well to known of most analysts Timor-Leste, that informs and shapes the nature of violence in the urban country’s spaces. that define the city. It is the ‘interaction’ of theseexternal and boundaries and to internal and both external the administrative geographic internal dynamics violence are economic,and byinfluenced thatsocial political, dynamics are the city to the country’s hinterland. Indeed, the origins and character of urban urban violence in Dili requires looking not only to history but also well beyond an of Crucially, and of the understanding duration, dynamics subtle causes, for defend the themselves future. to prepared as and communities society, entrepreneurs’ ‘violence Timorese of militarization to the urban violence of contributed progressive collective Executive summary W h at at is more, each outbreak and reduce victimization in and the reduce long victimization term. that approaches seek to prevent voluntary by than the informal, government to seeking deter urban violence are interventions more commonly pursued Dili since 2007, that and muscular coercive security-led the observes study low in a incidence of recognizing comparatively victimization violent overall to anticipate the authorities onset of acute of forms urban violence. through customary means, if at all, it is difficultfor international and domestic and and the health that surveillance fact most minor are incidents dealt with in Owing to forms fashion. dramatic the interpersonal weak state of crime findsThe study that violenceurban to in fromDili collective can shift often of reciprocity. may and these threaten social networks urbanization, increased transience and anonymity, owing in part to an exploding population as willing neighbours to look out for one another. towards The tendency as of adequate, and their their the neighbourhoods communities, security their violence, as communities from safer free than as surrounding generally the violence, findstheirstudy that neighbourhoods describe most residents of In violence. urban ment experiences of terms and subjective protracted unemploy- systemic and between the providers, interconnections security formal towards attitudes and ambiguous the violence, distrustful seemingly alcohol consumption and the violence, between the relationship onset of high the of rates high of prevalence robbery, relatively and sexual domestic of low) including urban violence, homicide the (the rates, comparatively on also focuses symptoms the The objective report economic inequalities. and disputes, and socio- persistent land glaring and movements, property while internally displaced persons (IDPs), permanent and seasonal population violence in erst- Dili. actors, include These the of presence security informal shaping and urban factors proximate this considers the study structural June and between 2009, December undertaken review literature extensive and an on interviews, focus group Drawing a survey, household randomized interaction. geospatial to and prevent intervene reduce urban violence must be of cognizant this live cheek who often other by Those areas. aim from jowl with villagers to one from In side residents this setting. of urbanized context, the country of in communities extensions rural an that and villages represents clustered can and should as be an understood set ‘urban village’—a of interconnected in and to areas, connected rural vice Dili grievances versa. fundamentally In a way, what is of considered an violence is manifestation ‘urban’ often and mountains districts. outlying Dili aexperience close physical, emotive, and historical relationship with the W h ile ile V V I II I I II V 11 I EXEC UtiVE SUMMARY 12 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste promote more predictable and transparent property rights regimes. rights property and promote more transparent predictable to contain of attempts and gang violence and various regulate overview of ‘buying peace’ in concludes This with study a the country. descriptive including members, the leading prime the minister, government facilitated shaping it risk urban violence, factors fundamental has, in the words of authorities. authorities. the from public support have in individuals become rent-seekers leveraging for urban violence may the as result, propensity and have groups decreased, to public boost spending per by cent 400–550 in the past 36 As months. a the coming 2009). decade (BPA, This has government allowed the Timorese USD 5 billion in total and to many projected be times this worth amount in has a fund valued at developed the petroleum example, roughly country Since may be 2006, for experience atypical. that mentioning the Timor-Leste In the of context wider debates on it states, urban is violence in worth fragile W h ile this shifting relationship ile may relationship this not shifting address many of the

inhabitants, dominated in every sense by rural issues, interests, and dynamics.Today, Dili is the sole of urban centre a of small just over country one million was the of least urbanized Indonesia’s 27 2008, p. (Nixon, provinces 196). to Prior independence and until the late 1990s, the of province Timur Timor may result in a to failure anticipate the onset and spread of urban violence. city. But this was not always the case. Moreover, neglecting existing fault lines Dili, In is capital, 2010, widely considered a safe Timor-Leste’s moderately 1915, (Conrad, p. 62). In 1915 Dili a visitor as described notable place’ foreign a pestilential ‘highly outlying rural districts. rural outlying as selves being Dili, from but as rather hailing one from 12 of the country’s them- how reveals identify few people even actually a casual observation urban unrest in the capital profoundly affected all of Timorese society. Indeed, in Dili and Timor-Leste, the between complex other relationships districts and on Owing to marks material symbolic, urban residents. psychological, the 2002 and Dili physical, the riots, of left events 2006–07. These of June 1980, the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991, the 1999 Popular Consultation, the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL) from 1942 to 1945, the Indonesian invasion of 1975 (and occupation until 1999), era are notable in the and Japanese invasion the contemporary occupation experienced bursts of intense collective violence throughout its history. Most Dili violence, low has of rates despite In interpersonal comparatively fact, W virtually every every virtually in is occurrence a daily and victimization violence interpersonal routine cent of the population was categorized as rural residents drawing their cent drawing liveli- as residents of rural the was categorized population in For resided in example, always 2007,the periphery. rural more than 70 per has of gravity centre and demographic political the of Timor-Leste, heart of the Dili and importance as economic the administrative Notwithstanding and the vice country, versa. the restof throughout Putviolence in succinctly, conflict. Dili reverberates or ongoing tensions in it areas, a rural is of violent driver also rural frequently h ereas ereas it can be standards, by safe judged a city international relatively troduction I n (neighbourhood). bairro (neighbourhood). 3 So urban violence in whereas Dili older may express 2 attack 1

V V I II I I II V 13 I I NTroduCTION 14 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste LEGEND: Tibar Becora Beto VERA

L DILI Bidau DOM ALEIXO Map 1Dili Map

I Tasi Tolu Baru Kampong Q 1km1km U Comoro I Ç Á Main road Built-up area District Sub-district Suco Settlement Kelapa Pantai Bebonuk Dili Ai Mutin Ai Bairro Bairro Pite Pite Perumnas Manumeta Meti-Aut

D Bebora

Verde I Vila Caicoli Caicoli VERA CRUZ Colmera Quintal Boot Quintal Quintal Boot Quintal L

Occidental I Caicoli Lahane Bidau Lec Lecidere Bidau

I L Quintal K Quintal Quintal Kiik Quintal E idere Santa Santa Cruz Cruz Bidau Oriental Lahane FETO NAIN U iik Kuluhun CRISTO Becora Metinaro Taibessi REI Map 2Timor-Leste Map

INDONESIA

DILI Atauro

Nain Feto Lautém Tutuala Vera Cruz Cristo Rei Baucau Laga LAUTÉM Dom Aleixo Metinaro DILI BAUCAU Luro Bazartete Laclo Laleia Lospalos Liquiça Manatuto Vemase Quelicai Baguia LIQUIÇÁ Laulara Venilale Maubara Remexio Railaco AILEU MANATUTO Iliomar Savu Aileu Liquidoe Laclubar Ossu Hatolia Vila Lacluta Uatolari Atabae ERMERA VIQUEQUE Sea Letefoho Turiscai Uatucarbau Cailaco Maubisse Soibada Viqueque BOBONARO Atsabe Hatu- Fatuberliu Builico Balibo Maliana MANUFAHI Ainaro Same Barique/ TIMOR-LESTE Bobonaro AINARO Alas Natarbora Fatululic Lolotoe Hatu- Zumalai Udo Pante FatumFatumeanean COVALIMA Macasar Forohem OECUSSI Suai Nitibe OesilOesiloo Tilomar Malikasar PassabPassabee Timor Sea INDONESIA Timor-Leste Timor International boundary AILEU District 30 km30 km Ossu Sub-district V V I II I I II V 15 I I NTroduCTION 16 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste selected and groupin research focus and methods fromsurvey household findings of context urban violence in three and Dili. Sections four the then explore The firsttwo sections ofthis study considerthe physical,social, and historical they felt safer in 2009 than in year.the previous some of form or say domestic most abuse, sexual experienced respondents of having in ten reports and two a robbery experienced of having reports in the in capital victimization 2009 and one 2010. in Although Timorese five violent of rates low comparatively finds study the and 2006–07, 2002, in 1999, outbursts violent Notwithstanding the and city periphery. its rural to connected of the development Dili historical and between the interaction violenceurban fundamentally are it of findsthat contemporary patterns June and 2009. Overall, between administered August violence assessment ofan urban findings the highlights study this sections, six into Divided as such in the 1970s. new ‘city’, a only it emerging comparatively is of nevertheless Timor-Leste, the Indonesian province of Timor Timur, and today of the independent country to Timor, useful while that, recall Dili the of capital was originally Portuguese the towards of urban centre then shifted emerging Dili. It is was purposefully and, in economic, focus to political 1975, the some demographic, extent, in In fact, the instantaneously. wake of the Indonesian of invasion Timor East with with the so-called ‘Dutch disease’. and it is a undergo oil-driven is transition: flirting profound fundamentally of to the the past few however, economy has years, the started structure and, and to sandalwood timber coffee teak). (in particular, some In extent, and rearing, cash gardens’, modest such crops, cattle ‘family as on so-called 2007,ADB, p. 9). Traditionally, was the dependent economy of Timor-Leste economy ( agricultural a from subsistence-based hoods directly t The finalsectionreviewsviolence prevention and under reductionstrategies of recurrent factors shaping the origins, onset, and duration of urban violence. aken aken over the past fiveyears. bairros of the capital. 5 6 The fifthsection ofthe report turns to arange

4 This economic transition has not occurred W B G and urban settlements, if at they existed all 2006, pp. (Durand, 64–65). urban settlements, Surik Mas, and Tasi Tolu (among others) were as only permanent emerging Bebonuk, Becora, Delta (I, II, III, and IV), Fatuhada, Manleuana, Pantai Pite, of Bairro Ailok Laran, neighbourhoods the this During ‘modern’ period, p. 2005, 1975, the almost doubled to population 2).(CAVR, residents 28,000 of this in around the core. ‘urban’ Significantly, periphery were scattered Traditional settlements village and neighbourhoods. Lecidere, Cruz Santa in located the km 3x3 area consisting of the Caicoli, Vila Verde, Bidau, Farol, In 1966, Dili reported a population of just 17,000, with permanent settlements closer inspection. warrant lence, growth the of dynamics specific population Owing to influencetheir in critical of shapingvio- urban patters subsequent crisis. during the especially 2006–07 of in forms and as urban violence, period the witnessed post-independence the for conditions generated various occurred growth which population in under adults concentrated 30 years of manner age. in The unregulated growth of that most with 35 years, than in less 13-fold grew population overall the unprecedented: was transition demographic The Timorese. and rate, a a kind violence, of spiralling fertility ‘capital fetish’ among many in forced displacement the of episodes during repeated capital, collective of a including economic combination of the activity centralization factors, IHCT, 2008, p. appears to 2).have by been growth driven population Urban above soared 1.1 of million population Timor-Leste by 2009 (OCHA–UNMIT Fulfilling a the explosion. population 2004projection, a startling witnessed From 1975 town to from as onwards, the city, Dili its city graduation began rising with mountains just rapidly 3 the north, km of south the coastline. Dili. came The city to a encompass 12 of km stretch land bounded by sea to over the has past three decades tion led growth to the of rapid expansion and popula- urbanization as Dili’.unregulated ‘central and Swift frequently the was limited city to the small area in and around what is to now referred above sea level and rests in the shadow of a coastal mountain range. In 1975, In geographical terms, the city of Dili straddles swampy and arid lowlands just characteristics of Dili Spatial, demographic, and social I . K e lapa, V V I II I I II V 17 I SAI P T AL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DILI 18 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 2006 new neighbourhoods have in appeared 2006 new the neighbourhoods that as of reveals since part this undertaken Research report migration. on spurring rural–urban their only option advancement, for socioeconomic in exist tunities Dili, and to as many youths view the migration rural ‘city’ country. To be sure, the of majority economic, educational, and social oppor- not enjoyed of in the other parts attractions the features city tional contexts, were eased from independence onwards. Moreover, not unlike other transi- occupation, restrictions limited physical and social mobility. These constraints of movement enjoyed by Timorese in the post-1999 period. UnderDili’s spectacular thepopulation isIndonesiangrowth also connected to the relative freedom 2009). fund (BPA, petroleum and presence spending rise the in linked unprecedented government to the which is by economic in fuelled activity, a Dili-based international large in be much fact, due larger to of the 2006 violence and outburst the increase place estimates it It at may, residents. 209,000 national conservative rate, p. 2). that Assuming the in population Dili to is the in growing proportion population is set to double in the next 18 years (Brady and Timberman, 2006, W rate of 6.53has a per fertility the family, in rates amongst highest the world. p. is29). at population growing about 3.2 per Timor-Leste’s cent per year and of to estimates in 123,305 previous 1990 and in 123,474 2001 2004, (NDS, the a This in total compared increase population. represented dramatic itself 19 in located representing with 175,730 per the cent Dili 924,642, of district, According to the 2004 was national census, the of population Timor-Leste what to p.amounts 2004, (NDS, witnessing explosion a 29). demographic of 5.3 growth population is per 2001 cent and Timor-Leste between 2004, Currently registering among the highest birth rates in the world, with an annual which numbers over 180,000 and hails from the central mountain range range mountain central the from and hails 180,000 over numbers which which Lautém, than fewer numbers 7,000, to the group, the Mambai, largest the from range Iliomar, small These from group in Makalero of the district and groups dialects. language about 35 different 15 ethno-linguistic distinct ‘civic’ identity is more notional than real: Timor-Leste is home for to tion, the Theoften time. first ideacitizens sharethat approximately theone country’s popula- of strands Timor-Leste’s for labour, various rural Dili together brings As the Leste’s entire population. sole and urban centre genuinely a magnet From a Dili sociological perspective, constitutes a social microcosm of Timor- 2024. before any guide, Dili’s population could swell to more than half a million inhabitants are is and of realistic projections Dili’shistory If urban expansion. statistical some 15 km to the west, as well as Metinaro, 25 km to the east, in anticipation and Tasi Tolu are residents wealthier land buying Moreover, areas. in Tibar, i th th more than 50 per cent under of 18 Timorese years of age, Timor-Leste’s K a mpong Baru, Meti-Aut, mpong Meti-Aut, Baru, resolved justice issue. Finally, few people—if any—responsible for crimes crimes for any—responsible people—if few Finally, issue. justice resolved petrators of the violence of 1999. The 2002 Dili riot also remainssubstantive justice an was meted inadequatelyout either in Indonesia or in Timor-Leste for per- power and influence. Evencallsforthough intensified justice in2009,little the fromthe civil war withof positions also Indonesian occupation benefited periods of occupation. Indeed, during protagonists pro-Indonesian Timorese were to subject during their for committed credible processes justice crimes nor the the Portuguese Indonesian administrations (nor their forces) security virtually no cases were perpetrators held accountable for their crimes. Neither in violence in of collective Timor-Leste, outbreaks repeated Notwithstanding Tasi Tolu, it is cut for or off weeks months at a time. in such degraded; some as of seriously the neighbourhoods, newer outlying as as 2009. recently the September Moreover, piped water is supply system power supply is since especially to subject 1999 blackouts, routine but also least one in occasion 1999, and badly the Indeed, damaged during others. on at was destroyed completely grid The electricity limited coverage. offers and The sewage and is maintained. disposal waste system under-resourced The associated road services. is network chaotic and dilapidated, and poorly and and regime, the and development maintenance of key infrastructure vented organized and predictable urban planning, a functional rights property in and has a population expanded the contracted city’s manner that has pre- Indeed, and land illegal and annexation alienation, infrastructure. decaying ing options), the and city shelter, and those seeking safety, resettlement (those successive waves of flee- migration of physical destruction, repeated a combination experienced well tion—as as generally—Dili weak governance Owing in part to the aforementioned periods of occupation and violent confronta- encompassing parts of Aileu, Ainaro, Ermera, Liquiçá, and Manufahi. in districts such as in Baucau and districts and Viqueque, a handful of areas in Lautém. (which Makassae is with 130,000 members), primarily second based largest Mambai the versus the eastern-based the in western-based the country: groups ethno-linguistic the largest two between by explained competition divide’, ‘east–west which became most prominent in 2006, can be partially so-called the Indeed, power. political and for land, over in markets, the and compete subsequently intermingle where these groups location primary had a Timorese they state before as became a Dili the nation. Thus, serves the in which a situation generated movement independence successful theduring conflict armed Indonesianera, and era, a during the Portuguese and infrastructure communication A combination of limited transportation Tetun, or Indonesian) second. grow up speaking a regional language first andthe lingua franca (Portuguese, 9 7 Timorese 8 V V I II I I II V 19 I SAI P T AL, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DILI 20 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste outs, and outs, land. as well as access to sizeable resources, government contracts, material hand- and command other of positions in posts influence services, the uniformed out in of seats acts include Rewards violence. parliament, posts, ministerial can be institutions held private to by ransom or either threatening carrying tain forms of violence are regarded as profitable business. To many, public and the leadership in the collective violence can flare uponce more. As aresult, for many urbanyouths, This lingering culture of impunity provides ample tinder for situations in which with of with the theOffice Prosecutor- dating 2000 criminal cases were from still under outstanding consideration still are serving time for the meager sentences meted out. crisis have and during the been committed convicted, 2006–07 even fewer

political parties, and security institutions, cer- institutions, and security parties, political bairros, G e neral (OHCHR, 2008). neral (OHCHR, 10 As of 2008, 4,700 the latest rural the challenger to rural latest those holding power in urban Dili. 2008, another man the Reinado, from area, Manufahi Maj. became Alfredo genuineleader’. first ‘resistance From as 2006the to Timorese country’s p. 2004, (Field, 362). by many As is a Dom mythologized result, Bonaventura the in streets through Dili officials and the paraded heads of Portuguese two ers of the rebellion’s leader, Dom Bonaventura, sacked the government palace stood to have taken place in the mountains 50–75 km south of Dili. Yet follow- 2006, p. of colony’s (Durand, population 56).400,000 This isconflict under- per centof the thenTimorese—five lives of an 15,000–25,000 estimated The in primarily the Dili as rioted, Bidau itself residents p. 2004, area (Field, 45). were compelled one to in occasion in deploy troops the 1886, Portuguese On were the subjugated. and before decades at ‘rebels’ several lasted least major some of rebellions, which of included thousands belligerents armed Timorese interior during the interior 19 Timorese into the its administration extended when For Portugal example, symbolic. as a served site Dili has of frequently violence and both real resistance, and authority. in and government trust public institutions, of social cohesion, the undermines integrity that dynamic systematically ciated ciated with a in or groups, a These followers sense, militias. were usually asso- historical tionally yielded key figuresthat surroundedthemselves with groups of armed areas mountain have tensions. the For tradi- example, present-day Timorese of dynamics the in shaping role a central played have identities ethnic and competing topography In Timor-Leste, context. within their historical of urban violence in patterns It Dili to is situate contemporary important in in Dili. actors with a central influenceover of patterns criminal andpolitical violence andgangs, elements of the institutions have security evolved into politicized influencethe from city the mountains.Leaders of militias, martialgroups, arts of big ‘the in man itself the or and to has city seeks his reconstituted cohort’ peers. Dili or were and employed their by deployed against those same authorities W ar of Manufahi (1908–12) was the largest insurrection, claiming ar the of (1908–12) Manufahi insurrection, was the largest 12 11 In and the of period with modern the Dili, urbanization the dynamic ile ile and the fulfilling offilling interests the coffers few, a this is a W h liurai liurai Historical overview of urban violence II . (king), who alternately challenged central authority in authority central challenged who alternately (king), th century, it was century, by challenged at least seven V V I II I I II V 21 I H AIstoriC L OVERVIEW OF URBAN VIOLENCE 22 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste the commonplace nature of violence in Portuguese Timor the in Timor commonplace nature of the 1960s: violence in Portuguese Commission for Truth, and Reception, is (CAVR), of Reconciliation indicative opposite. opposite. One anecdote, as by related Minister Xanana Prime the argue Most as critics a of tranquility. some period observers relative has by period been romanticized the Indonesian occupation, Portuguese Defesa do Estado (PIDE), to Dili. to Dili. (PIDE), do Estado Defesa police, its secret the e introduced Polícia Internacional de administration a latent feudal system. in to existed subjugation most dilemmas. Indeed, action Timorese collective were unable to Timorese to develop of overcome a self-governance tradition a As result, and nation-building. self-determination for required of unity the development restricted case of divide and exemplary This rule. strategy social groups against each other kept indigenous political alliances weak—an of found, for that The CAVR Leste. example, the playing tactics colonizers’ The full extent of brutality Portuguese remains a matter of hot debate in Timor- (Taylor, 2003). use of Timorese proxies and African troops, at least 1,000 Timorese were killed armed revolt in 1959. Portugal’s response was decisive and, with the extensive was the Viqueque rule, site of the of the resumption Portuguese major last in resulted Following the and 40,000 killing of Timorese. 70,000 between campaign guerrilla for an Allied bombing. Japanese reprisals Australian-led due to and Japanese naval physical subsequent destruction bombardments In 1942, Dili but fell resistance considerable to with little Japanese invasion, regime regime in and Portugal the beginning of a political awakening in Timor (Dunn, The Revolution’ ‘Carnation so-called in 1974 the witnessed end of the Salazar The 1970s than elsewhere in than the elsewhere country. live in to where constituencies competing much each closer proximity other (and of cycles traditions resulting violence) seems most likely to occur in Dili, violence that to persist Timorese the day.present The absence of democratic the mistrust fostered by the contributedPortuguese to cycles of Timorese-on- any formal tradition of democratic rule (CAVR, 2005, p. 7). Analysts claim that to little develop or did institutionalize comparatively tions, the Portuguese colonists, Chinese or assimilated Timorese (CAVR, 2005, p. 2005, 11). (CAVR, Timorese or Chinese assimilated colonists, or as for roads, work their building work up in had they all for corvee not their blood turned over, because covered people with sentbeingoutoror in groups returning locals saw officials friends— school with my during adventures Sometimes forced to stand on coral stone, hot from the scorching sun, with their feet shackled. they were because groaned They posts. I whipped in saw prisoners [government] 13 In order to quell future rebellious activity, the Portuguese the In Portuguese order to activity, rebellious quell future W h at is more, and typical of most colonial administra- asu-lear asu-lear W [indentured workers] on the properties of on the properties workers] [indentured h en compared retrospectively to the retrospectively en compared children—I also also liurai children—I G u smao smao to the recalled how: recalled (APODETI), (APODETI), de Timor Popular Democrática Associação (UDT), Timorense Democrática União (FRETILIN), Independente de Timor-Leste Revolucionária Frente a this in period, were number formed Dili, of including parties political the violence, both during a civil war and then during Indonesia’s invasion. During by then,Almost Dilicentre. definition, was‘urbanized’ the siteof most urban being and small, Timor Dili remained its only was the of capital Portuguese became the for the locus time.of competition Despite first political domestic W 2003). was Portugal determined to oversee a rapid process of decolonization. informed by informed these events. civil war are still in today, leadership positions remains and politics current It a is to context. critical note that many of in the the leading protagonists and insecure 2008).armouries (TLAVA, Civil war was almost inevitable in such ulated by by its and overloaded neighbour, Indonesia, exacerbated rapidly lence in Dili manip- and the Such outside capital. violence was also expertly led to competition vio- political political domestic Predictably, institutions. of and the establishment colony’s political immaturity the given relative ambitious, were, of Such extremely course, democracy. aspirations liberal emerge from its condition as a poor and isolated ‘police state’ to a full-fledged to In was expected Timor less than a of year, Portuguese the tiny territory mate, violence became prevalent. In mate, to violence testimony Xanana became prevalent. the CAVR, any real as national unity well cli- political as in aggressive an increasingly addition to alliances of securing with elements the police. In the absence of in Maubisse the Dili. in from barracks army UDT to support sought garner in on Taibessi, the politicizing barracks its attentions army focused FRETILIN APODETI aimed for an advanced capacity in the Indonesian border regions and time,UDT, FRETILIN, and began APODETI developing paramilitary capacities. many and in offended both UDT.terrified rhetoric In the mean- revolutionary drove them. a campaigns FRETILIN’s propaganda wedge between sustained to Timor. and East However, Indonesian absorb intelligence agents efforts and in UDT,a loose co-existed alliance, with both of of them Indonesian wary In the months preceding July 1975, the two largest Timorese parties, FRETILIN i th the prospect th of the prospect Dili becoming the of capital the state, a town Timorese regarded as a small victory [. as . a .]. had small victory regarded If the of number in most a people a party come would and ‘ say: quite were supporters happy when their that we the parties noticed Sometimes on. to going to what was the of address level reduce leaders violence, party of for. this a we And because noticed lack of will striving was on of the the part that we are all of nor people as Timor, what the nation a consideration whole but take didn’t into as interest, the views their national presented party Each K l ibur Oan Timor Asuwain, ibur and Oan Trabalhista. Asuwain, Timor W e beat up this person’ or beat up ‘ this person’ 14

W e killed that person’. It that person’. was killed G u smao smao V V I II I I II V 23 I H AIstoriC L OVERVIEW OF URBAN VIOLENCE 24 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste armoury. Timorese regulars in the Taibessi Army Portuguese barracks, along with their by the enabled 1975, on 20 August a counter-attack launched FRETILIN p. 2005, 41).(CAVR, the territory throughout porters and abused, some were more Hundreds killed. were by detained UDT sup- in at they Dili. leaders, Palapaço, were its headquarters There, the party’s including of members, several and hundreds of detained FRETILIN armoury took control of the city on 10–11 August 1975. UDT gained access to the police UDT moved and first attack, (Nichol, 2002, rifles p.303). Fearing aFRETILIN support, FRETILIN and its armed wing FALINTIL defeated UDT.defeated and wing its armed FALINTIL FRETILIN support, p. 2005, 43). streets of area the Colmera of central streets Dili, with armed put 50 men day, inside next on elements FRETILIN some the more aggressive ‘communists’. In called for of the a the expulsion show FRETILIN of force the on 27 July 1975, UDT in held a the of centre demonstration large Dili and of on areas but Dili. outlying the ended up For streets example, reverberating of more violence intense were political generally in expressions Early rural present day.present events remains contentious among the older generation in to Timor-Leste the and 40,000–50,000 civilians were displaced to Indonesian and 3,000 people were killed, hundreds of political prisoners were executed, the During 1975 of course 1,500 civil the war, August–September between fied before the CAVR: CAVR: fiedthebefore testi- leader, Liquiçá, Lobato, from Rogério As a FRETILIN former otherwise. parochial or on based they were often past grievances, differences; political of for expressions violence were of seldom reserved collective Outbursts p. 2005, and Manatuto, Liquiçá, 42).(CAVR, Manufahi in Ermera, Ainaro, clan tensions long-standing feuds and overlaid grudges—primarily personal in were where greatest political the areas, ing Casualties rural out reprisals. were engaged in hostilities in the capital, the rural fringe took the lead in carry- within days. As news that reached communities their country counterparts others and to take justice into their own hands (CAVR, 2005, p. 2005, 43). and to into hands others own their (CAVR, take justice a of chance to this war to beat him. took I advantage beat People this. know and so now he it used as girlfriend else’s had taken someone someone because it an was I but from old that sometimes know problem. situation, [political] had they this about them a with because problem this wasn’t Sometimes p. 2005, 29). at each and other rocks beat each (CAVR, throw other way, boycott, their block go would attack, would to people places those parties when other in And so that area. campaign [sic] they let parties didn’t other sub-district, 15 ile ile violence was in sparked Dili, it spread rapidly across the W h W i th th a of men preponderance under arms and wide popular G 3 semi-automatic semi-automatic W e 16 st Timor (CAVR, This series of This series ABRI from behind from lines ABRI encircling redoubts. mountain 1975 from continued fighting to 1980, warfare Conventional with FALINTIL ship. of leader- civilians and assassinations and Timorese targeted prearranged and massacres, killings, arbitrary undertaking forces began immediately of and 2,500 7,500 regulars Dili succumbed. Indonesian rapidly irregulars), Notwithstanding the presence of more than 10,000 FALINTIL fighters (composed FALINTIL lines. FALINTIL behind to mountains the and took country the across settlements their of fled the the forming majority population, Timorese, Pro-independence occupation (CAVR, 2005). (CAVR, occupation are to alleged have died and famine, of disease as exposure, a result of the command. war, the During civilians ensuing an 180,000 guerrilla estimated in to was selected 1981, lead with just FALINTIL a few hundred men under his 2005). In to response and Xanana continued occupation repression, and people were more arrested than 120 in executed (CAVR, that operation of Dili in of Hundreds the outskirts Lahane and neighbourhoods. Becora launched an on attack Dili in June 1980, managing as to far as penetrate the pacifiedin Timor declared March 1979.But in a final act ofFALINTIL defiance, as a force. of Indonesia fighting conventional FALINTIL destruction eventual mass of the Indonesian resources—both mass human of the Indonesian resources—both (Durand, (Durand, 2006), harbouring sympathies with FALINTIL were frequently detained and tortured. the to were subjected city and a of those suspected of range constraints, civilians who for many Indeed, remained in Indonesian occupiers. Timorese the assumed Dili role gradually of a and of centre intelligence administration The 1980s Indonesia. threat from growing the of from matter a due establishing viable distracted to government the was FRETILIN Having their consolidated over territory, control the Timorese ries. and UDT auxilia- by APODETI supported were 1975. November often These scene of border incursions by numerous Indonesian forces in and October (Durand, 2006). (Durand, Lobato were sent Tiago abroad to the from seek community world assistance and Rogério Roque Rodrigues, Mari Alkatiri, days later, José Ramos-Horta, make of a independence on declaration unilateral 28 1975. November A few operation ever carried out by Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI). Dili served as the gateway to the invasion of Timor, 18 23 Faced with the prospect of imminent invasion, FRETILIN decided to Faced of with the prospect imminent FRETILIN invasion, Baucau and other towns also fell in and the weeks following months. 24 21 19

Indonesian forces by arrived air, land, and sea in the largest They would 1999. until They not after return 17 For example, Bobonaro district was the district Bobonaro For example, 26 and material 20 and on 7 December 1975 25 However, the sheer 27 —led —led to the G u smao smao 22

V V I II I I II V 25 I H AIstoriC L OVERVIEW OF URBAN VIOLENCE 26 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste some 60,000 to 120,000 civilians in addition to numbers of civilians were forcibly recruited as operational support personnel— Leste and an number unknown of in additional troops a combat role. Large Timor- (around outside soldiers) from 12,000 at battalions least 15 territorial Operasi during Indeed, the 1981 ABRI ian organizations. defence and paramilitary of the deployment a force occupying large and the of creation dozens of civil- through society succeeded The in Indonesian regime Timorese militarizing to ease. monitor the with greater population elsewhere, this pattern of forced urbanization enabled the military apparatus by the undertaken Indonesian authorities and ‘villagization’ transmigration in exercises similar Like 2005). in to 1975 67,039 28,000 in (CAVR, 1980 an In from estimated dramatically, the Dili’s process, expanded population could and their the control movements. Indonesian regulate administration the from into mountains were relocated where positions forcibly population of until 6,000 the In mid-1980s. the of interior Timor, many of the surviving into a converted penal colony with a population prisoner Dili—Atauro—was in especially norm, Dili. The island of and coast the within sight north of and were the disappearances torture, 2005). Abductions, (CAVR, society’ were all of arrest features controlled this tightly and movement arbitrary cards and of identity limited freedom to a networks, police ‘informant state: In the wake of war, wholesale what Indonesia was tantamount established Timorese students studying in studying Indonesia and free students enjoying the Timorese relatively it ages, relied on heavily In young out men tasks. 1988, dangerous to carry resistance. fromthe late Specifically, Dili 1980s, was at the of centre the clandestine urban violence. and Indonesia’s exacerbated radically response in resistance Dili; actions and abroad. These to develop diplomatic activities assing, but not directly confronting, ABRI; to expand civilian-based clandestine to wage a guerrilla campaign from isolated mountain areas with a view to har- character from the mid-1980s onwards. Specifically,was FALINTIL determined and shape a assumed and different its strategy in to hostilities reformulate in resumed used movement 1983. the The resistance lull hostilities August ceasefire between FALINTIL andthe Indonesian administration in March 1983, shaped the of dynamics urban violence in the Despite a capital. short-lived of civilians and directly conflict militarization subsequent The protracted developments. untouched by were no left these Timorese Virtually more were victimized. to resistance Indonesia’s and invasion of Hundreds occupation. thousands in the combatants warascivil guerrilla first ticipated and then in the armed p. 2005, units 91). (CAVR, In the tens process, of par- of thousands Timorese K e amanan (Operation Security), the Indonesian military deployed deployed the Indonesian military amanan Security), (Operation W h ile this network comprised Timorese men and Timorese ile comprised women of this all network W a nra nra and Ratih civil defence into agents of Indonesian oppression. In 1995, the especially instructive in explaining how youths were militarized and converted which of in resulted one The independence. history in is group, particular, role in the urban violence that occurred during the 1999 Popular Consultation, during the established 1990s groups Youth played a and pivotal paramilitary in 1998, momentum. the independence regained movement missing (Lowry, 1996). Nevertheless, with the downfall of the Suharto regime people were an killed, number and unknown wounded, up to 250 listed as and BRIMOB units opened forces, fire.AtABRI 271 least Indonesian security lence since 1980. a During march youth killed by for funeral a pro-resistance On 12 its 1991, most November instance of Dili severe witnessed urban vio- military and militias were reportedly involved in killing between 1,200 and 1,200 in involved killing and between were militias reportedly military and Before the 1999 after 30 August vote for the independence, Indonesian militia. Aitarak so-called gling, gambling, and extortion. By 1996, and gambling, gling, extortion. income it smug- group, into from generating evolved a criminal organization organizations. and youth groups, civil defence politicized units, paramilitary informants, were of by They supplemented the resistance. a clandestine wide of range and members execute ‘ninja’ was to whose torture, purpose units, abduct, in its so-called campaign implemented a Dili, activating counter-insurgency ment. In the 1990s, early Indonesian special forces and intelligence services to and terror violence Indonesia in resorted order to quell the civilian move- The 1990s a demonstration. of 100,000 held by Pope John Paul II in Tasi Tolu, the student resistance staged the clandestine resistance became widely known in 1989 when, during a mass In Dili, RENETIL. a organization, established resistance student movement, of environment Java and Bali, links to but with extensive the Dili clandestine many many are in of positions leadership today. riot police units—the Brigade Mobil, or BRIMOB—into Timor, especially Dili. Timor, especially Mobil, or Brigade BRIMOB—into riot police units—the Col. Prabowo Subianto. Col. Prabowo and founded was personally managed by son-in-law, Suharto’s President Upholding Integration) was formed in Dili. Aileu Aileu and Java 2003). (Robinson, in training than in members 1,200 Dili, paramilitary with hundreds receiving resources. resources. But in resistance. this case it and was official openly established received ation of the earlier ‘ninja’ entities, originally designed to target the clandestine W i th th close links to the Indonesian special forces (‘ 29 Indonesia also introduced large numbers of paramilitary of numbers large Indonesia also introduced paramilitary 28 Its leaders were imprisoned or Its leaders were imprisoned though fled the country, 31 Originally conceived as conceived a Originally business development 32 By 1999 it had again into morphed the G G A A DAPA DAPA K K G S S A I was basically a continu- I had registered I more had registered DAPA K SI (Young K o passus’), it passus’), G u ards 30

V V I II I I II V 27 I H AIstoriC L OVERVIEW OF URBAN VIOLENCE 28 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste its critical infrastructure were destroyed, especially in especially Dili. were destroyed, infrastructure its critical of buildings and Timor’s much of p. 2005, 46).three-quarters Approximately forcibly displaced, including 250,000 who were deported to 550,000 people—were more than population—some half of the territory’s Remarkably, and blunt explosives, instruments. bladed darts, weapons, and riflessupplied firearms assault by modern to the Indonesian military communal communal urban violence that flaredup in 2006–07. hoc by process for which laid the land the was appropriated, groundwork into by Dili, a war, degraded and city and economy already seriously the ad ( city that led to the half of occupation illegal of approximately the in houses the to Dili to returnees and an 53,000 contributed urban migration transported (IOM) and the United Nations High (UNHCR) Commissioner for Refugees for Migration Organization inhabitable) The International became available. of amounts large land and Indonesian withdrawal, housing (much of it semi- of fromIndonesiaother fled parts Dili. police Inofficers the wake ofthe final and of the of of families thousands Indonesian civil and servants soldiers cially felt in to the the During tens run-up capital. the Popular Consultation, The and material violence were espe- human of costs independence-related palities. in especially and Dili arson, and theft, munici- populations, its surrounding of forcible transfers violence, sexual and to beatings from assaults torture, ranging violence, of and urban violence included interpersonal collective many as p.1,500 2005, more in 46).(CAVR, executions isolated forms Other violence included the repressive mass killing of at least 400 people and as violence Urban many assumed in forms the late 1990s. In 1999, for example, network. messenger) and (clandestine FALINTIL’s estafeta Nacional de Resistência Timorese (National Council for the Timorese of Civil the the especially Conselho Seguranza independence youth groups, Resistance) the were leaders and often their of members zation, targets opposing pro- in addition to civilians involved or trading small-scale ordinary social mobili- during the 1990s. In youth organizations paramilitary Indonesian-sponsored young men, many of whom had of been of incarnations members previous for considerable violence in Dili. These militias largely comprised unemployed were responsible Ermera, Liquiçá and from Putih from Putih Merah Daderus Besi especially Merah districts, neighbouring other from militias though militia notorious, was 2005). especially The Aitarak (CAVR, 1,500 Timorese have diminished somewhat of th the a between urban 1999violence arrival appears to presence, major international and 2002. Apart from the absence W Since independence i K n ezevic, 2005, p. 2005, ezevic, 28). of influx The subsequent migrants numerous 33 Such violence was perpetrated with multiple vectors, ranging from from ranging with multiple vectors, Such violence was perpetrated W 34 e st Timor (CAVR, most severe political security crisis, primarily centred in centred Dili, primarily crisis, but in drawing security most political severe its the During halfexperienced first of the 2006, country independent newly crime and, at activism. political times, to have others resorted groups, and community-oriented remain, positive easy for easy ‘big men’ to of build young followers. cohorts it and was comparatively unemployment, rampant Combined with poverty is remote from rural, traditional, and family support and control mechanisms. and that an adult has youth population features supervision expanding little into The city the these Dili groups. fosters for conditions itself recruitment were fluidgroups armed and multivariate. forces, and other key institutions. Loyalties to and membership of groups these extended deep variousinto political parties, including the police, the defence Indonesia’s of occupation during the Timor of 1990s. Membership these that had to of emerged extensions organizations either resist or promote theycame influences, to or dominate life.Dili Many street were offshoots and other outlets, to recreational attraction structures, and patronage kinship belief systems, neous combination of ritualistic agendas, political in on groups, addition to Drawing a gangs. arts countless heteroge- martial (re-)emergence of a large number of mobilized veterans and the youths as well as in particular—witnessed Dili Timor—and and 2005 2002 Between and of actors. interests politicized parliament and the prime minister’s residence, suggesting the hand of a range Some at of tion the of this explicitly national violence property. was targeted were killed and wounded in by the addition to PNTL, destruc- considerable awitnessed riot large-scale on 4 December 2002 in which a number of people areas around the country during areas around the to April country 2002. November or Polícia and in Nacional de PNTL), civilians occurred several Timor-Leste, the the (the new national police police between Clashes service service, of unemployed youth, and marginalized groups of veterans created an caseload expanding posturing, political a tion resentment, of tinderbox.generational the daunting Indeed, challenges. presented combina- de governance facto of of the realities features ground reconstituting nationhood, the existential the independence provided space to Although for to begin Timorese explore to violence. a to return trigger straightforward it relatively society, proved traumatized the incidence of urban violence once to again began rise in Dili. In a highly drawn down and the external threat presented by Indonesian militia receded, as was presence subsequently the international mission. Nevertheless, and euphoria the of presence a United large Nations peacekeeping (UN) of the Indonesian to occupiers, decline can post-independence be attributed 35 37 ile ile some were, W h 36 Dili, in particular, V V I II I I II V 29 I H AIstoriC L OVERVIEW OF URBAN VIOLENCE 30 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste Photo and a poor justice and governance record dating from 1999. the advent of armed civilian militias, the absence of a visible ‘peace dividend’, the crisis include a weak of economy, urban youth, unemployed the growth Leste Defence Force, or F–FDTL). As noted previously, risks structural shaping (FALINTIL–Timor- de de Defesa and Timor-Leste PNTL the FALINTIL–Forças the institutions, security and competitive be to traced dysfunctional, weak, cause of The proximate across the from the country. crisis can protagonists bairro called in to order, restore in resulting more in killings several the western and of police protesters were killed in Dili. central The defence force was along and political communal and control lines. likewise A fracturing number 2000, on 28 April 2006 (Peake, 2009). The subsequent riot led to PNTL losing came to be was hijacked Colimau known, group, by ex-resistance a ritualistic when a as by protest they ‘petitioners’, the triggered ultimately western in March 2006. An of dismissed F-FDTL outbreak from urban violence was As a a result, number large and of left were the group subsequently former ( ‘westerners’ split internal between with poor of management the defence an force, which, in generated turn, of views included of highly polarized the the combined history resistance led led Joint Task Force 631 was called in to Dili to order. restore  of Rai Australian Defence Force personnel Joint Task Force 631, Dili. © ADF 2006 ©ADF Dili. 631, Force Task Joint personnel Force Defence Australian K o tuk. tuk. After considerable escalation of tensions, the Australian- loromunu ) and ‘easterners’ ) ( and ‘easterners’ 38 Proximate factors 39 lorosae ). temporary firearms. of influx uncontrolled temporary in 2006 period, a which Dili sharp the and April–May experienced infamous people were 100–150 killed in Dili during this far that exceeding of period, 2006 that to October as from 2007 many April suggests as reports situation grievances were present. grievances in communal camps, and which and outstanding neighbourhoods land the across IDP but on and city fighting centred attacks markets, arson street and Fatuhada, contested ommended ommended for prosecution. in which 100 nearly for report, responsible people believed were crimes rec- the October publication of the UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry However, violence once curfew. to subsequent again erupted dusk-to-dawn communities against one against communities other. youths in and western of the entire markets Dili pitted during 1999–2001 eastern According to between fighting Dionísio Soares, were aggravated. of and control markets land, communal and tensions rising unemployment, and combined with unequal over growth access competition to resources, nested in the urbanization of Dili. In the wake of rapid unregulated population communalism of The persistence is east–west a much complex very dynamic was mandated in August. UN peacekeeping mission—the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)— a established modicum actors while of international law and order and a new peaceful, comparatively remained Dili 2006, and October July Between fighting street and Dili protracted residents, the communities, and forced displacement of western more than 100,000 and figures opposingpolitical dation arson against eastern and targeted to youths relocated Dili at the foot of the Palacio by western to protests 26 May. anti-government It sustained also generated the in violence resulted Overall, the killing of at least 37 28 people from April 2006. of end at June the resigned Alkatiri Mari Minister Prime until in Dili Instances of collective and interpersonal violence continued for several weeks and markets. and According to markets. Soares, roles in of the but, more the over respective resistance tangibly, others’ land occupied by both groups (Nixon, 2008, p. 2008, 262). (Nixon, by groups both occupied Comoro, Caicoli, Bebora, Becora, to refers (Soares again parts Other by ‘westerners’. occupied were Manumeta) and Manleuana Bebonuk, Pite, (Bairro meanwhile areas, Other ‘easterners’. Quintal and Boot Quintal of Dili (Delta, parts in particular properties abandoned such as Ailok Laran, Bairro Pite, Bebonuk, Beto, such Comoro, bairros, Pite, Bebonuk, as Bairro Ailok Laran, K a mea, mea, to name but a few. 42 44 A traumatized population observed a self-imposed K A selective review of news reports and of UNMIT review A news reports selective i ik) were occupied in the post-1999 period by period post-1999 in the occupied were ik) 43 This violence manifested itself in This itself violence manifested a of renewal 46 K These contests arose over differing views views arose over contests differing These u luhun and Vila Verde) were apparently luhun and Verde) Vila apparently were 41 45 40 between groups of groups youths in between G o verno, widespread intimi- widespread verno, K o moro Mota Ulun, Ulun, Mota moro V V I II I I II V 31 I H AIstoriC L OVERVIEW OF URBAN VIOLENCE 32 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste lation lation of Dili to began break curfew. came fighting thetoBy 2008, two popu- halt January weeks. a within virtual it was as welcomed by street population, the observers, city’s international by tactics for Dili the wishes, its heavy-handed PNTL Criticized Taskforce. its mandate UNMIT’s in against asserted 2007 December by reactivating, several thousand people being displaced. In Dili, however, the newated with governmentthe 1959 rebellion, with hundreds of properties being destroyed and Baucau) was the scene of major communal in fighting the area mostassoci- Alliance was coalition appointed to in 2007,govern August (andViqueque population explosion (BPA, 2009). (BPA, explosion population lenges and the pressures it will experience on its resources due to its pending chal- development massive not when boundless Timor-Leste’s considering pates pates the 2012 elections. have contributed to feelings of tension and animosity as the population antici- during the sweeps despite the protests of human rights groups. These actions of Hundreds (and people were arrested later freed) to connected FRETILIN. it after was claimed politicized that may the assailant(s) unknown have been the after murder of a woman one The murder month was previously. highly (Covalima and Bobonaro) in to border districts up January sweep ‘ninjas’ Ninja ated in Operation in action 2010. involved the The operation western Even remain. so, initi- Most the recently, the PNTL seeds of instability future cent increase cent in increase budget in the 2008 government as compared to 2005. and demobilized, economic life in Dili a received major with boost a 400 per petitioners the closed, were camps all IDP 18 months, in subsequent the attacks, the focus of anti-establishment groups all but evaporated. Moreover, 2008 and throughout 2009. and prime minister of 2008, on levels violence 11 in Dili February dissipated the launched against president attempts assassination Notwithstanding but violence, almost none in Dili proper. communal violence and for there were of better incidents sporadic worse, W and elections. In presidential mid-2007,held parliamentary Timor-Leste tions of this study. in communities rival 2006 and 2007, a in discussed subject sec- subsequent Many of these areas were the of focus communal to violence designed eject fund. fund. increase in funds is based entirely upon income from Timor-Leste’s petroleum h ile generally peaceful, suggesting that political control could that control influence political suggesting ile peaceful, generally W h ile ile a sum substantial USD at 5 approximately billion, 47

W i th th the death of Maj. Reinado during these 52 49 48 en the Parliamentary Majority Majority en the Parliamentary W h 51 this fund is 50 This In In order to lacuna, overcome this the data information side side of the UN and the aid bilateral (see Box community 1). incident with violence data out- lance, associated much less disaggregated is not information there is Indeed, readily available. limited surveil- sentinel Yet as in such policing in authorities. states, many Timor-Leste, other fragile data by produced public surveillance population health and metropolitan can be on national potentially and generated the basis of disaggregated lence reliable and requires data. Such baseline valid longitudinal evidence vio- of urban and of effects the risks assessment empirical A meaningful the confidence intervals were expanded to expanded were 4the withconfidence aintervals confidencelevel of 95per sites. In order to achieve a representative sample in relation to the entire city, pilot the from pre-designated randomly 615selected targeted respondents of urban violence in the the Second, survey characteristics capital. different in with key views profileof order informants to a generate representative on areas were These selected Fatuhada. the basis of neighbourhood, inter- III Delta (357); (117); and Ai Mutin (141). A pilot in was administered a fourth Perumnas sampled from randomly within Dili, with respondents bourhoods neigh- of it three different included the First, pre-selection process. cluster according sample to was determined survey a The household two-stage data collection and data collection analysis. a minimum is requirement routine lence efforts, and prevention reduction In and design, order urban to vio- evaluate authorities. prioritize, Timorese and aid community international by the investment limited also but ers such data can be to traced the of and negligence colonial occupi- authorities the survey. Only the one survey. each member was from interviewed. household member of this older household than 17 in years was to eligible participate of tification aas singlehousehold an unitindividual or Anycase. individual included the to iden- survey note household important that the urban-based itis outset, Atthe findings. of preliminary and a team range research the adopted by and considers the July 2009. methodology section The following June between in and Dili districts and key interviews informant neighbouring sioned the Small Arms Survey to undertake household surveys, focus groups, Surveying contemporary violenceurban in Dili III . 54

W o rld rld Bank commis- 53 The absence of 55

V V I II I I II V 33 I SUREI V Y NG CONTEMPORARY URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 34 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste ‘externally injured’ by traffic and ‘accidents’. other by traffic injured’ ‘externally 52 Of per these, cent were patients. trauma to tended room 1,464 emergency the Dili hospital period, the observation During (2006–08). years consecutive over three of months three for periods sample abstracted were records patient trauma in since the crisis, 2006 violence trends In to longitudinal order assess injury. and external surveillance health on of the state population authorities and domestic amonginternational reflection as a critical pilot to serve stimulate from 2006 to 592006 2008 from from to 36 per cent. to in have appears of the fallen Dili, share of violence ment victims of security improve- In over time. line the general with dramatically to have transformed the Notwithstanding partial nature of the data, the incidence of violence appears unit in of and Dili 2006 Hospital 2007. on accident- and trauma violence-related as patients, collected by the statistical incidents when compared to other ‘fragile city’ contexts. city’ to ‘fragile other when compared incidents of violence caseload high a relatively per represents This for cent three of cases. in cause 45 or per cent the suspected noted No was of known cause the cases. Source 0 50 100 150 200 250 Trauma cases 2007 2006–June January hospital, Dili patients, 1Trauma Figure record management for surveillance. hospital-based in changes patient and to on investigate caseloads the violence of basis trauma of analysis intentional to a produce retrospective twofold: were objectives The in and Baucau. Maliana, of Dili, wards hospitals to the emergency admitted patients on data trauma 2,600 preliminary assembled (TLAVA) Assessment Violence Armed the of Timor-Leste Health, the Ministry with understanding On the of of basis a memorandum or mortuaries. clinics, wards, trauma tals, hospi- the country’s from data and morbidity made been mortality to assemble have if Few, any, efforts in violence Timor-Leste. and interpersonal collective of on data the and scale is distribution a There of absence quantitative marked Box 1 concerns the use of weapons in committing violence. violence. the use of in concerns weapons committing ccidents A a Feb Jan : Hospital-based surveillance of violence: 2006–09 armed surveillance Hospital-based TLAVA (2009c) TLAVA

iolence V a p a u Jul Jun May Apr Mar

ale-to-female ratio, all trauma patients all trauma ratio, ale-to-female M 2006 Aug e c o e a e a p a Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan Dec Nov Oct Sep 59 In Dili, another important change change important In another Dili, 57 56 Intentional violence was was violence Intentional This study was designed to W h 58 ile the numbers ile of the numbers Figure 1 data shows Figure 2007 Ra  tio 6 2 4 3 5 1 management reform framework. reform management the from support with value has This is concern remained modest. being by addressed the government and human resource to analytical create for management data Yet the capacity (N tions organiza- led by non-governmental services hospital from transition effective of since ever it a Health managed surprisingly of a been the concern Ministry who had safe access to the Dili National Hospital. Hospital data management has for patients of the burden trauma increase but did not displacement necessarily led to more mid-2007. ‘violence’ This during in attacks arson increase steep a reported UNMIT because chiefly not were correlated, the trends However, UNMIT’s Joint Operations Centre incident database, which was launched in 2007. to that of periods, for overlapping compared, was data hospital-based Further, in this age bracket. cent patients of the trauma female for 30 of per cause injury the was This stated violence. to domestic subject been for may the women 20 is ages have injured elevated to 29. Many intentionally 2). risk For women, (see Figure 15- to comprises men, 34-year-olds the group risk For and adults. young among adolescents prevalent are highly violence tional of inten- victims at large, to the Compared population generally. more patterns (and international) to country with be appears of consistent violence victims of profile The may but be incidence their underreported. persons, hospitalized among prominent never were injuries Firearm warfare. of gang weapons urban and machetes—typical knives, to owing in arrows, injuries clear reduction was a there constant, remained or sticks stones, fists, with injured persons Source 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Percent in particular age group Figure 2 ale violence victims in Baucau and Dili emergency rooms and emergency Dili in Baucau victims ale violence M

00–04 : G TLAVA (2009c) TLAVA O 05–09 distribution:Age hospitalized violence victims vs. population s) to those led by the government in the early years of independence. s) of in years to independence. the led early those by the government

10–14

15–19

W 20–24 o rld Health Organization within a care within health wider Organization Health rld 25–29

30–34

35–39 Age group 40–44

45–49

50–54

55–59 ale population 2004 ale population M 60–64

65–69

70–74

75–79

80–84

85+ V V I II I I II V 35 I SUREI V Y NG CONTEMPORARY URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 36 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste felt obliged to participate out felt obliged to of to participate respect leader’s wishes. their community team would be coming and may Residents that have they should participate. leader Each made community it a point that to the residents inform research the leader. from had local community permission location already received The rate of refusal was zero per cent, perhaps attributable to the fact that each had been read aloud or by moderator. the interviewer the after consent form to upon a participate agreement verbal respondent’s sultations with local residents sultations discussions with with instaff projects partner Delta III and Ai Mutin, and con- youth group members in Perumnas as well as Radio Timor-Leste journalists, with the lence UN Police, was on discussions with based interviews informal by the number of Data people used to involved. the of determine levels vio- violent in event occurred the was defined past 12 intensity whereas months, lent victimization events. Frequency was defined bythe number oftimes a violence was definedin of terms and boththetheoffrequency vio- intensity ent of levels violence were considered: ‘low’, ‘moderate’, and ‘high’. Level of in violence present within the the past 12 community differ- Three months. was the The main used level for variable of the grouping sampling strategy of terms sampling reach. in representation in household a the presenting area, thereby near-perfect every virtually to survey teams the allowed neighbourhood of size each until the were The small of reached. limits the population neighbourhood were placed in the and of centre outwardly were the directed neighbourhood cent. In order to sample rapidly, three teams households of four interviewers survey and the survey groups. focus and for prior to questioning both the recruitment household participants A with was all consent conducted procedure thorough prospective arrival. they would to also agree of their inform residents the team’s impending their community. If the leaders consented to offer their community to the study, leaders to inform them of the assessment, its goals, and the desire to include and the team research groups, focus survey met household with community were to employed the the moderate women’s to Prior sessions. undertaking minutes. (17–34 and 35+) and and sex, discussions were 90 held and for between 120 in were grouped Ai of terms Individuals III, and Delta Mutin, age Perumnas. neighbourhoods analogous to those included in the survey: Fatuhada (pilot), were discussions in conducted semi-structured Specifically, bourhood. in For four the were discussions, organized groups each focus group neigh- (moderate), and III Delta (low). (high), Ai were Mutin Perumnas of neighbourhoods the violence, selected G i ven the sensitivity of ven the female issues the facilitators discussed, sensitivity 60

Participation in the was contingent study Participation o f these areas. f In these areas. descending order of levels naire naire supplied by the stantive changes and omissions were made to the original blueprint question- On the basis of a checks, and piloting and number of validity reliability sub- of the and study its objectives. were unaware Both English translators by resident. another local Timorese Timorese resident bilingual in English and Tetum and then translated bya local backinto Tetum first into translated was instrument questionnaire the and is, That a process. then through suggestions passed double translation pointed pointed out areas of concern. each and question reviewed residents local Timorese Three dation process. vali- cultural a tool through was the passed rigorous survey and sensitivity, appropriateness, relevance, cultural issues ensuring while simultaneously in Moreover, order to ensure key that addressed the accurately questions able the that accounting; cases did two not the were from analysis. removed that indicated consistent and showed save All correlations reli- two, cases, the questionnaire. throughout that were questions were scattered inversed and Triangulated consistently. truthfully were answering that respondents into tool to the were checks integrated survey ensure reliability Meanwhile, the contrary. have within the checks questionnaire shown however, reliability responses; in bias invoke may residents by local consent passive hypothesized This of of both the and respondent the interviewer. was in reason of the the and ethics important interests well-being protecting meeting the criteria of the terms of reference. to allow be the in interview conducted 30 minutes (on average), while still was thus into distilled The questionnaire a assessment. that version would and in to the the deadlines the overall attached neighbourhoods research required at least 90 minutes to administer—unthinkable, given the conditions was in would of have the time. interests instrument The initial questionnaire for reasons principal were these changes two There and omissions. The first violence with sexual and violence. to domestic related experiences personal and fatigue avoiding survey sensitivity, in of the ethical integrity, interests questions pertaining to mob justice were removed. Finally, questions removed irrelevant, or non-existent, in Dili, for example, is ‘mob justice’. Therefore, any were per removed A input process. the validation from cultural topic that was programmes and attitudes towards them. of the content and to original related violence prevention reduction current portion that questions were naire. amaintained modified Likewise, varying children the and from biological question- of levels were stripped education efficient interviewwith prospectiverespondents, informationrelated totheir W o rld in rld Bank. Specifically, order to ensure arapid and 61 Questions were revised according were to revised Questions their W h

ere culturally relevant, questions T ccording ccording to the international he second and, arguably, more V V I II I I II V 37 I SUREI V Y NG CONTEMPORARY URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 38 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste Timor Crisis Reflection Network, observed how: how: observed Network, Crisis Reflection Timor an and forthe adviser UNIFEM East Ferguson, Phyllis Specifically, experts. to and domestic and violence sexual on gender-based the advice of local was made by the principal researchers of this study to omit questions related unreliable outcomes but also endanger the of safety respondents. A decision and that not developed are screened only poorly many surveys yield cases, Leste Leste may well be one on of earth. countries the most surveyed heavily cities is in research administering Timor- the fragile issue fatigue. of survey In in addition and to temporal to relation ethical factors the aforementioned were removed. assault, sexual including violence, violence and domestic with gender-based experiences any about enquiring personal questions protocol, ethics direct research such questions such cannot be questions asked. This is in with the alignment trainedwithout extensivelyqualified by interviewers qualified professionals, Organization’s ethical standards on interviewing women. on ethical standards interviewing Organization’s further violence. further for catalysts to be potential demonstrated were raised questions the and on topics these surveys interview with of the cooperation limits have reached to sexes Both and are alcohol they abuse. related drug as often sensitive more based violence (S violence based and and gender- sexual (DV) violence domestic about particularly questions and IDP camp violence, of amount due community to issues, the heightened and security assistance on was humanitarian of focus the many surveys general and N local and many international ministries, its Timor-Leste, of of the government the assistance with and IDP camp closure, resettlement safe a has This with been to view have comprehensive, interviews. continuous camps and in those the in residing of IDP those of the crisis 2006–07, In as Dili, a particularly result 65 G

B V) featured prominently. The issues of issues The DV and prominently. S featured V) of Dili have been the objects of repeated and of of bairros repeated Dili have the been objects 62 This is and ethical concern, a demonstrated 63 G O s. s. W W G o h B rld rld Health ile ile the V are the 64 In Perumnas and Perumnas III Delta (p < 3). 0.05) (see Figure than both robbery higherreporting number a of respondents significantly sleeping or not at present the time. In data addition, shows Ai Mutin to have either was victim the which during burglaries as described were beries at least once in year. the previous of that It several these rob- is noteworthy with 20 per cent of the sample (n = that they 615)had been reporting robbed robbery, was personal event experienced of the victimization main category only of one a Rather, report killed. member being household (intentionally) (n = 611). There were far fewer reported personal experiences (n of = physical 611).experiences personal were far There reported fewer 17 from ranged to 18 violence reporting per cent of the sample responding reporting ranged from 10 to 12 per cent of the entire sample, whereas domestic to appeared low. sexualabuse be Specifically, victimization comparatively G and Delta III (p = (p III and 0.046). Delta (p =0.048) in than AiinPerumnas higher Mutin both significantly were robberies of household * Reports 0 5 10 15 20 25 Percentage of respondents (n =614)* neighbourhood per robberies, household on reporting respondents of 3Percentage Figure since 2007.victimization low incidences overall of of comparatively real assessments and perceived urban violence in 2002 qualitative confirms and 2006, the survey household of surges dramatic comparatively Following victimization. of interpersonal by violence followed of peaks incidents sporadic featured tionally collective As of noted in sections this previous study, urban violence in Dili has tradi- e nder-based violence was comparatively prominent, though other forms of other forms though prominent, violence was comparatively nder-based Perumnas urban violence in Dili . Preliminary characteristics of I V 66 out Specifically, of the sample entire therewas Neighbourhood Delta III Delta Ai Ai Mutin V V I II I I II V 39 I P ARELimiN RY CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 40 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste contribution to more and generally. violence prevention reduction contribution ment in as crime would an and routine serve health essential surveillance awithout readilycause.Ultimately, invest- into legible open conflagration tensions can lower-order out fester of public view but then suddenly burst be weakening in A Dili’s consequence of environment. transient this is that appear which and to themselves processes, authorities tional or customary to mediated via disputes and violence tradi- are inter-personal frequently unpunished, contributing to escalating grievances. major Likewise, and can national minor or go authorities. offences domestic and by are events go not inter- unreported of registered forms victimization of Inthese findings. be various with the many cautious interpretation cases, to to be the case in Ai Mutin more so than in the neighbourhoods. other two than in This rather appears investing safety. wider themselves, community out looking were for still primarily residents that community observing from trusted to look out for one another. However, this did not prevent respondents were adequate, and that people neighbourhoods in could the community be that their in were communities safer that than of their levels others, security violence in from theyfree 2009. hoods noted were Specifically, generally that of their Residents neighbour- Ai III, and Delta Mutin, reported Perumnas by groups), followed arson and homicide of (3 12 groups). focus assaults and robbery to be the most prevalent forms of violence (5 of 12 focus half data. Almost of mented reported survey the respondents group focus additional that insight and discussions provided comple- group information than and both Perumnas 3). III Delta (see robbery Focus Figure experiencing ofmembers’ household Ai more reports MutinSpecifically, had significantly events, except when reporting household members’ experience with robbery. All three neighbourhoods were comparable in terms of their reporting of violent which to appeared of forms to be theft, with respect certain larly significant. the sampled neighbourhoods. There were, however, some variations, particu- of urban violence in distribution even 2009 across was fairly The geographic ographic distribution and incidence of urban violence G countries, were high when compared to neighbourhoods in rates most upper-income among respondents. Although rates of violence and invictimization sampled of feelings safety positive generally also highlighted survey The household sample. or assault arson in less year than the constituted fiveprevious per centof the (such as and assault incidence confrontation arson). of the In reported fact, appeared appeared to be low relatively in regional terms. e 67 they were nowhere near the levels experienced in 2006–07 and in they were near nowhere 2006–07 the experienced levels 68 Yet there are also grounds to 69 Indeed, local responses sampled neighbourhoods. sampled neighbourhoods. in well Ai as Mutin than of higher levels participation in community the other appears to be as a groups of presence greater and arts youth gangs martial including a issues below. host discussed of In there other addition, security in their with the overall area’, security a ‘dissatisfaction greater reported area, not only talked fear the about outside elevated ‘when home’, but also police as comprising just 68 per in cent presence of the the security known reported who in Mutin, Ai residents of contrast, way By trend. same the being too much in violence’ the in exhibited area. Respondents Perumnas of force in a relatedto the security area awas significantly sense of ‘there the to reporting Specifically, improve of local safety. perceptions community Delta III. Meanwhile, in Delta III, an to increased compared security presencewhen alsocrime’ appeared group-related arts of ‘youth/martial reporting to III Delta and higher a Ai Mutin). significantly also registered Perumnas were high of (in feelings comparison safety force, reported security known where in police For example, 95 comprise safety. Perumnas, per cent of the and on of a individual perceptions security generate effect (hidden) positive should be noted, however, that the of presence police in the area may also It in entities their of neighbourhood. or or formal security informal activities only 20 per cent of sampled residents reported any knowledge of the presence across allSpecifically, neighbourhoods, neighbourhoods. all three surveyed was uneven across Confidenceapparatus in the and formal security informal Perceptions of security providers in urban contexts sion, and in even violence or order to banditry make ends meet. anger, can aggres- anxiety, induce stress, the poverty resulting participants, ment, thus their crippling income and According to livelihood. group focus employ- legitimate seeking from individuals on prevent mobility Constraints in his or community. her freely about moving from individual the venting how violence can induce demonstrated thus groups focus pre- immobility, of fear.and experiences personal These unemployment, urban violence, on and the nature of concentrated cyclical pernicious cussions deliberately dis- group focus Moreover, than do social surveys. experience household the given reveal more way methods of group subtle focus forms surprising, about one’s security, future, and the safety of loved ones. This is not altogether ofreports psychological and emotional trauma, fear, depression, and anxiety in showing data, presented elevated elements the survey certain tradict to appeared groups con- population discussions with selected group Focus inside or the outside home or at during the the marketplace day or evening. feeling of relative) a hoods ultimately safety again, exhibit (but general of residents Still, data, according all to survey three neighbour- household V V I II I I II V 41 I P ARELimiN RY CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 42 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste law, in leadershipand traditional their formalization through mediation conflict Photo tomary means. tomary traditional orcus- ostensibly through it to is conflicts resolve difficult often influence.In Dili,exert where many including people ‘leaders’, are transient, of with members in the community order and to consolidate their authority a require social and longstanding familial relationship leaders reportedly traditional Specifically, effectively. these functions to perform capacity even disputes, if there were local about mixed neighbourhood their feelings in considered mediating more were important often authorities’ ‘traditional were often the least preferred option for promoting security and safety. Rather, they show that across urban provision Dili. the Intriguingly, police security the sources andhowever, findings, highlight of diverse forms group Focus pendence, pendence, while is episodic, lower than considerably in decades. previous they were not. On the one hand, the incidence of collective violence since inde- lence in 2009 than in the A past. of closer that inspection the data suggests of Ai more urban Mutin—were Dili—particularly at risk of being victims of vio- A by and key the is explored groups focus question survey residents whether Vulnerability to victimization and dynamics of perpetration political leaders to promote peace, 10 December 2006. © Candido Alves/AFP ©Candido 2006. December 10 peace, promote to leaders political 71 outcomes have been mixed (Cummins, 2009).  Traditional warriors attend a traditional oath-taking ceremony during meetings between between meetings during ceremony oath-taking atraditional attend warriors Traditional 70 Notwithstanding donor appetites to support local-level donor to local-level appetites support Notwithstanding neighbourhood residents. residents. neighbourhood in their levels trust lower significantly reported also personally robbed being reported who * Those 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 Trust level (1 = low; 4 = high) (n =614)* another’ one after look to trusted be can neighbourhood this in 4‘People Figure (p = 0.069). Could who members family are forced to with one share quarters robbed had fewer rooms than households in which a member was not robbed is, That in members. households household which a between member was of in a the the and reporting robbery household the number of rooms shared ported by a marginally significant correlation discovered inAi Mutin between the idea or the towards of other callousness may indifference also be sup- in III Delta and strongest appeared Ai Mutin. Finally, and more anecdotally, are only out (p = ‘looking for themselves’ 0.026); however, this relationship an elevated reporting of robberies associated with a stated belief that people will that care (p neighbours for = 5 each 0.033). safety other’s Figure shows is where there is robberies higher in less faith neighbourhoods experienced 4 Figure shows how of the robberies. the number reporting of personally as well cohesion as appear community to influencing factors be significant Trust in others robberies. that precipitates factor be an collective underlying in of have robberies Ai been there the could Mutin. In main fact, perpetrators According do to groups not the and arts seem youth gangs data, to martial in belief their that area security was inadequate. respondents’ and the with robbery of experience accounts members’ household between as of there was a relationship insecurity, experience significant subjective of household members being robbed were perhaps contributing to Ai Mutin’s testimonies of assault, arson, or homicide. Indeed, the or to members’ with respect arson; nor household widelywere there differences reported accounts assault, III Delta or with in robbery, Perumnas of terms experiences personal being Ai members when no robbed, Mutin compared to revealed difference of household reporting elevated moderately from apart Indeed, bourhoods. when to compared no other differences neigh- violence suggest significant of accounts abuse sexual and domestic third-party under Likewise, review. low and relatively appear to be declining in Dili and in the neighbourhoods Moreover, documented rates of interpersonal violence, such as homicide, were Robbed Not robbed Not V V I II I I II V 43 I P ARELimiN RY CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 44 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste residents. Likewise, unemployment also potentially plays another important plays also another important potentially unemployment Likewise, residents. the individual can lose and control lash out at or members family community help mitigate these personal challenges and disturbances. Once intoxicated, can cause a and rise in anger. anxiety, depression, Alcohol may be used to how unemployment stressed themselves another. participants group Focus are hard to as independently, they most distinguish influenceprobably one access to factors alcohol, alcoholism, and These chronic unemployment. violence mate appear of and to risks both interpersonal collective stem from According to survey findings andfocus group discussions, however,the proxi- are issued nance 2009). (Parker, contracts companies that building are and flourishing—as security the mainte- private with and youth gangs may formalized—together groups become increasingly Meanwhile, managed by may unless public intensify, carefully authorities. and It is grievances— migration, likely inequality, that some risks—including also being affected by the dramatic rise in public spending due to oil revenues. period. the post-independence appears to groups to of have the urban violence contributed in normalization above, the of spread, and and rise, arts youth gangs martial politicization as Likewise, discussed grievances. and ethno-linguistic urban migration, rapid rural– youth unemployment, widespread inequality, socioeconomic shaping risks tural the onset and of duration urban violence is to connected W the in and increase of feelings robberies insecurity. if that, Still, there are other unaccounted for, probably factors to contribute a contention that was significantly higherthan inboth Perumnas andDelta III. reporting that Ai Mutin residents were only looking out for their own interests, another be the one stealing explain from this another? Perhaps could further out for themselves. looking are only people that more significantly agreed also personally robbed being whoreported Those significant. no were longer * The sample includes only Delta III and Ai when was included, the Perumnas Mutin respondents; findings 0 1 2 3 4 5 Agreement level (1 = low; 4 = high) n= 257)* Mutin, Ai and III (Delta themselves’ for out looking only are people 5‘Most Figure h at, then, are the main risk factors for urban violence in Dili? A range of struc- Robbed W h ile these structural risks persist, they are persist, risks ile these structural Not robbed Not (see Figure 6). (see Figure and, neighbourhoods more anecdotally, for urban residents in Dili as a whole as the was described top unemployment Ultimately, across concern all three a main ‘risk’ or a ‘catalysing factor’ for violence and crime onset and severity. Eleven of groups. the to 12 considered unemployment be groups focus either than in both were III views Delta in echoed These and the Perumnas. focus more in of violence Ai was ansignificantly whereas Mutin, issuein Ai Mutin sidered by respondents to be significantly more of an issue inPerumnas than crime (14.3 per cent, n = 558). It is worth noting that unemployment was con- was the ofpresence routine violence (both ‘domestic’ and ‘communal’) and as (nunemployed themselves = identifying concern 593). greatest The next cent) per (45 respondents to of the half n close = cent, 558), with per (75.6 group violence reportedly generated the greatest negative impact on one’s negative the greatest generated violence reportedly group w about youth and however, feelings MA by neighbourhood, disaggregated impact in their negative the community. greatest violence generated More than 90 per cent (n = 549) of said all that youth and respondents MA as a ‘source’ primary of urban violence in all three neighbourhoods. surveyed (MA group youth and arts Not martial surprisingly, The role of youth gangs and martial arts groups Legend: (n =558) community the in concern greatest the 6Currently Figure iolence and crime (14.3%) and crime iolence (75.6%) nemployment ack of/poor transportation (0.4%) ack transportation of/poor (0.4%) facilities ack health of/poor (1.1%) in condition oads poor (1.3%) ack education of/poor (3.2%) water ack drinking of/poor (3.8%) ack sanitation of/poor V U L L R L L L ere more differentiated. In and both Perumnas III, for youth Delta ere example, more differentiated. ment as the overwhelming concern ment concern as the overwhelming neighbourhoods selected unemploy- in residents all en priorities’, three asked about their ‘security W priorities sessing local security A of community and domestic violence. to related the onset and persistence appear to unemployment be heavily and inequality social violence, to connected collective be strongly to do appear not of assets levels and varying incomes disparate Although inequality. (horizontal) and social (vertical) of economic and exacerbation the perpetuation role in violence through catalysing s h G ) activity was identified was identified activity W h en en G G s

V V I II I I II V 45 I P ARELimiN RY CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 46 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste and martial arts group activity to be source of the but violence, activity primary group there and arts martial rate youth overwhelmingly respondents a This data contradiction: suggests behaviour. and a predatory towards inclination therefore heightened Ai Mutin’s. Consequently, there may be greater desperation to earn livelihoods Ai Mutin and Delta III, and its unemployment rate was significantly higherthan than and more As investment a support it significantly result, was receiving to appeared hood. Perumnas be than poorer the neighbourhoods. other two Perumnas may be partially explained by the level of income in that neighbour- in of robberies number being The elevated of robbed. experiences reported of presence one to related such was the positively group number of personal or assault, The only arson. was where in the exception robbery, Perumnas, with orexperiences relatedhousehold to experiences nificantly personal the was More not groups positively, of presence sig- youth and arts martial their or violent miscreant behaviour. youth leader member who turned played a role in disciplining local youth for focus groups alluded to a (now deceased) respected and popular former gang 2009). The (Scambary, Perumnas pursuits and artistic activities recreational such as helping programmes, the poor, and cleaning organizing the streets, of that youth groups with a assist their civic oriented community variety socially are local, Much overlooked in of Timor-Leste. group in the types the 2006–07 violence, it is useful to recall that there is considerable diversity W in present groups their neighbourhoods. or arts martial said and of there were III, however, Delta no the respondents majority youth least one youth or martial arts group present in their neighborhood; claimed that In residents there was at Ai for most Mutin, surveyed example, in Perumnas community. However, in Ai Mutin, MA 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Percentage of respondents identifying category n=131) Mutin, Ai n=103; III, n=315; Delta (Perumnas, community one’s in impact negative greatest the with violence of 7Type Figure erumnas P h ile much attention ile has on much focused the attention role of MA violent Youth group violence Martial arts group violence group arts Martial violence group Youth

elta III elta D

i Mutin A G s were held responsible (see 7).Figure Domestic violence Domestic G s and gangs and in gangs of robbery, assault, and assault, arson. of robbery, Overall, youth and martial arts groups appear to be less obvious perpetrators perpetration trends. perpetration it to is the recognize small important sample sizes general when inferring 8). with arson (see not Figure even in Still, mentioned experiences personal 43 per cent were (nacquaintances = 7). were Youth groups and arts martial sonal experiences with arson, some 57 per cent were strangers, while roughly another 37 whereas per cent were (nstrangers, acquaintances = 19). In per- 37 per were approximately reportedly cent with assault, of the perpetrators were acquaintances (n = 101). Meanwhile, in the case of personal experiences robbery, roughly 78 per cent were purportedly strangers, and about 25 per cent with experiences personal Regarding in acts violent these neighbourhoods. by followed ‘acquaintances’, ‘strangers’, of are the most likely perpetrator(s) that suggests Data robbery. with experience of Perumnas’ exception the are no significant correlations inthe datathat appear to supportthis link, with 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Percentage of respondents identifying category n=7) n=19; Arson, Assault, n=101; (Robbery, event violent experienced personally in perpetrators 8Reported Figure that is being portrayed by that media is and being accounts. verbal portrayed while such they are may accurate, not references echo necessarily the story may groups be and arts commonplace in martial discussions of violence; groups, despite the absence of any direct link. Over time, the mention of youth news media and with mentions of saturating media thereby youth sources, to commit a groupmay youth an crime, comeaffiliated into in question news if Moreover, communities. an within the individual aims surveyed pervasive grouppossible with is that a or membership youthor affiliation arts martial It is quite venture. a as group be not executed may activity criminal their that data suggests as groups perpetrators, potential youth and arts martial group. Owing to group. of the that the fact a entire male proportion considerable was a member that assumed of the perpetrator a youth gang or arts martial it is generally or narrated, is reported incident a violent when be, may obbery R

ssault A Stranger

rson A 72

73 ile ile the team research could not rule out W h Acquaintance W Youth or martial arts group arts or Youth martial h atever atever the reason V V I II I I II V 47 I P ARELimiN RY CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 48 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste group is often inconsequential with regard to with regard is the group inconsequential crime being often committed. this that The fact is the relationship. antagonist a member of a arts martial act of evidence of In violence. however, most there is supporting cases, little may link a person’s affiliationwith a specificarts martialgroup to a particular population of Timor-Leste is affiliatedwith suchgroups, acausal assumption Photo  Mother and child standing in front of gang insignia, Dili, 2008. © James Scambary ©James 2008. Dili, insignia, gang of front in standing child and Mother

to recognize these factors. to these factors. recognize programmes to prevent and reduce urban violence could usefully be designed It on that, follows the basis of policies and more evidence, comprehensive political and media attention, about 15 of these MA and large-scale, hierarchical martial arts groups. The subject of considerable entities composed of ex-resistance fighters and impoverishedrural villagers, organized loosely include groups gangs, of localized These array groups. unusual in the appears to way into the have a society factionalized diverse Since at least the 1970s and, most recently, since 1999, has Timor-Leste been formal security groups I and outcomes of urban violence in Dili: as shapingvariables theemerge central factors character five The following (TLAVA, 2009a). (TLAVA, and members, some put estimates total at membership more than 90,000 up boast groups principal to The two 1310,000 out the districts. country’s involved in involved of the 2006, MA violence and destruction of the ‘combatants’ or violence entrepreneurs. MA or declined in influence or numbers,MA W media headlines insist. that their real tocontribution violence remains limited and a far from what cry a But threat it to stability. to is the young recognize also country’s important in conflictassessments and briefings since independence and allegedly pose n nformal security groups; security nformal ignificant socioeconomic inequalities. inequalities. socioeconomic ignificant disputes; and and and property and movements; egular population seasonal of he IDPs; return h ile the veterans groups ile and disbanded the groups veterans largely militant social movements s l r t i violence in Dili V. Recurrent factors shaping urban W h ereas numerous different groups and groups were communities different ereas numerous G s have endured and even consolidated G G s s have consistently figured are distributed through- G s comprised the comprised bulk V V I II I I II V 49 I RC NE UrrE T FACTORS SHAPING URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 50 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste © Firdia Lisanwati/AP Photo Lisanwati/AP © Firdia Photo not not only for of members opposing MA out carved (orthem. constitute between zones no-go These territories ‘turfs’) their since Indeed, presence. 2006, they now have more defined territories villages. Each village roughly corresponds to the territory of one to extended the corresponds Each territory roughly village villages. families felt families unsafe in their due own of villages to these MA the activity and their in that participants three out of reported the four neighbourhoods within the zones they control. Focus groups undertaken by the research team The violence of on some movement of also these places groups restrictions on public placing mobility. of and a restriction degree relatives, significant lent lent MA also were higher Some where these most groups of numerous. the more vio- The incidence of crime violent and and violence sexual was gender-based W and nities in role recreation models. of terms alternative since 2008, a loss forsignificant their territory local youthand their commu- networks. MA between in 2006 symmetry reveal a striking are many these groups dynamics within them. embedded cases, The conflict h ile ile these MA

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A Timorese youth holds a homemade weapon as he guards his neighbourhood in Dili, 27 May 2006. G s 74 have have displaced the within youth groups more oriented socially each More specifically, ofsuburb Dili is into divided separate G s and gangs sometimes exist outside of outside exist and the sometimes in community, gangs G s , but also for their members family G membership and membership kinship G s . downplay the actual extent of the ( downplay extent actual ‘disorder’ be can rates often injury quite misleading, tending external and to reported and 2007, the number of fatalities was comparatively low. But homicide rates nature of the communal and gang violence that in shook the 2006 country symbolic. As reported in earlier sections, despite the intense and widespread is and non-lethal in Most gang fortunately, violence, many largely cases to difficult mediate. and notoriously ensure that parallels Enduring MA Thiswas agang ofconflicts. feature the gang 2007 and communalviolence. are masked as MA sometimes so conflicts that country, longstanding the occurs throughout This pattern mobilizes its youth to defend its territory. appear to be a MA not within villages, them. are between Timor-Leste MA family, and it is not unusual for an to entire village belong to one particular 2008). 2008). have cemented the links between gangs have and gangs cemented MA the links between The 2006 crisis and the gang subsequent violence of 2007 also appears to and even projectiles crude bombs 2007). (UNMIT, in 2007 an revealed January arsenal of weapons plus a of range homemade Force raid in Stabilisation a gang strongholds joint UN Police–International strong likelihood that all the major gangs have access to suchG weapons. Indeed, drivers. drivers. bus and (private) shopkeepers, drivers, including taxi actors, private-sector out around Dili were carried with all 50 manner key interviews of informant approximately the ToIndonesian period. of levels current extortion, assess businesses and small and medium during intraders particularly Timor-Leste, Protection rackets, for example, have long been a scourge affecting legitimate limited to gang members from within the PNTL or armed forces 2009b).(TLAVA, is weapons in vised The weapons. use mostly of Timor-Leste manufactured is and with rocks waged most impro- gang warfare elsewhere, As reported in the case of become normalized—even homicide. and pressure, in the absence crime violent can of nets, also social safety comes under society as traditional Importantly, are murdered. occasionally which, in ‘witches’ In can some suspected addition, cases, skip generations. murder. prohibiting If a is person is a activated, killed, often vendetta family Timorese society is still very traditional, with robust spiritual and social hundred It people. several to involved is note also important that frequently taboos that to low, witness of gang incidents conflicts the was often city ritualized i ven the links between gangs and the security forces, however, there forces, is and ven gangs a the the security links between G . This phenomenon This isphenomenon by the underscored that in fact most conflicts W W h h ile the number of fatalities in the 2006–07 violence was relatively ile the number in violence was of relatively the fatalities 2006–07 ile most agreed that problem the had extortion abated since 2007, G

dispute is often a communal dispute, as each community G and gang isconflict unpredictable highly G e neva Declaration Secretariat, Secretariat, neva Declaration G s W and organized crime. and crime. organized h at at can sometimes G or V V I II I I II V 51 I RC NE UrrE T FACTORS SHAPING URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 52 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste groups. MA and Both PNTL UN that Police gangmore sources agreed highly defined and effects. deterrent certain still generates that visibility agreed as a police participants force, group focus ineffective only after the PNTL returns to regular duties. the of more mundane policing will requirements take Nevertheless, place these and nature of the given hit-and-run challenges, related the attacks. force, appear to be less thaneffective regular police foot patrols in addressing including forces, the Task- the national police response-based personnel, and According with inter- to intimidation. working key informants extortion, door of investigation local businesses to appraise the extent of racketeering, issue. In early 2008, for example, the Dili PNTL Taskforce conducted a door-to- have There to been racket many and tackle the attempts extortion protection in crime. involved are members organized actively PNTL that certain of astheby groupsPNTL wouldthese ainfiltration serve indication strong the of and involvement gangs MA being PNTL. by threatened number uniformed of reported businesses similar similar problems or it had themselves. experienced that they all had nearly reported heard of experiencing other businesses gangs strong community support, approval, and, power. ultimately, political approval, support, community strong gangs as a form of patronage to families and local community winsstructures these labour opportunities and, ultimately, employment. The ability to dispense jobs western gangs. Indeed, control over commercial zones is central to controlling were being gangs out driven by and replaced gradually eastern-dominated the three main commercial areas in Taibessi, Becora, and Comoro. Ethnically for included stall space competition as well around as rackets the protection element element of racism and social jealousy. a appear potential to suggesting The most be affected Chinese enterprises, or criminal threats, damage at ing the theft, routine time of the group. focus others. In Perumnas almost all businesses reported that they were experienc- how than some highlighted areas were more affected participants group acquired regular security, a considerable expense for small family businesses. bers of the PNTL were explicitly involved in involved bers of ‘criminal’ activities. were the explicitly PNTL requests for assistance or follow-up; others reported that in some cases, mem- said did that not police who frequently at respond were interviewed all to Some Chinese vendors of police interventions. the effectiveness regarding not to report incidents either to a fear of reprisal from the gangs or to scepticismincidents to the police, either local or national. They attributed their decisions violence or victimization-related reported few business owners Importantly, G territories occasionally give rise to violent competition between these rise give to between occasionally competition violent territories 79 One of the lesser-known motivations shaping One the of motivations 2006 outbreak the lesser-known G s in protection and extortion rackets, the rackets, and in extortion protection 76 Some have Chinese pharmacies W h ereas the PNTL may be largely 75 Nevertheless, focus focus Nevertheless, 78 Likewise, a Likewise, G i ven ven 77

Indonesian nationals. Local gangs and MA up in to operating Dili and by four directed syndicates Chinese Timorese with crime elements, have organized the of also revealed existence ‘foreign’ raids in A Dili number since and of 2008 anti-prostitution counter-narcotics One objective of intimidation and petty extortion by gangs and MA groups for by groups public isfigures alsoof Ramos-Horta, President deep concern. during the groups violence front of of 2006. The endorsement such violent as violent political who are in figures organized government, the current a Moreover, number of MA of of a MA of the personnel of the two major security companies is composed of members largest private-sector employers in Timor-Leste. The fact that a high proportion are firms among the in involved quently these security Indeed, such rackets. Timorese-born but Jakarta-based underworld figure, Hercules Rozario Marçal. within them, also appear individuals to be on the A rise. case in point is the business for and, these MA crime, therefore, organized for international a represent magnet presence, by boom spurred the international increased has and been by promised construction a the regulated government, loosely the Moreover, of potential groups. tapping oil as for revenues development, tial is for competition violent the high, given sheer scale of some of these Leste makes crime a more compelling option for MA The emergence of human trafficking and an incipient narcoticstrade inTimor- the police and forces by armed MA and local gangs MA between linkages growing a The route. apparently west, smuggling principal inter-MA continuous have led to rising tensions over the of control is There border crossing points. of militia and elements with former and the corrupt PNTL Indonesian army— of and these gangs MA activities smuggling The syndicates. by these run and nightclubs operations, machine poker a nesses attest to nesses attest the nature of widespread such practices. around Dili and the outside guards the smallest of of presence busi- security firms of security private the Indeed, and proliferation protection. security access to alcohol or to resources—is ensure that to they are recruited provide could also be controlling these street corner could gangs. corner also be these street controlling groups—not just Timorese but also Chinese mafiafrom the Chinese mainland— one source said gangs’. PNTL corner that Nonetheless, called larger ‘street is much to out sources, and by of small-scale PNTL carried so- the extortion the as generate and ‘problem’ the themselves present ‘solution’. According nd gangs. Connections between gangs and gangs MA between nd Connections gangs. G is of that as concern, these MA it suggests G G s conflict, for overexample, the conflict, Maliana market in the to organized crime syndicates make of to crime syndicates the organized infiltration G leaders are in senior within ministries positions G s of even graver of concern. even graver G s G provide security to the brothels, s —some —some of which have links G s G and political parties, or and parties, political G 81 s

s and gangs. The poten- can simultaneously can simultaneously 80 are are fre- MA G s G s —beyond G s 82

V V I II I I II V 53 I RC NE UrrE T FACTORS SHAPING URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 54 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste different adversaries and different issues. and different adversaries different had been made to mediate the tensions of 2007, which completely involved had while been attempts made to mediate the of conflict no 2006, attempt made about processes). donor-led mediation The same source that, states by the conflict (thisthat affected samewere actually claim been has often than level rather at the Another criticism was that mediation sessions were held at a p. 6). 2008, (IDMC, place in first the to tensions the rise gave that issues than rather on too the legislation, much about government on information as it focused that the argues ineffective, MSS was process mediation largely holds holds displaced in to 2006 and their by 2007 villages mid-2009. ‘returned’ most up-to-date figures report that almosttwo-thirds (65 per cent) of thehandout house-process to facilitate the return of IDPs to their villages. As a result, the an conducted intensive and dialogue the cash UN Programme, Development of As part by IDPs. this the process, MSS, of process supported reintegrating gramme and a range of international development agencies, commenced the with the (MSS), Pro- United in Nations Development partnership Solidarity 2009, of p. (IOM, Social 4). destroyed Ministry In 2008, the Timorese January of fighting and 2006, 5,590an estimated homes were of qualities various Approximately 150,000 people were displaced throughout the by country the Returning the displaced manager in the 2007 elections. presidential leader as campaign his a employed paramilitary district example, notorious are, in fact, refusing to accept further returnees. returnees. further to accept refusing in fact, are, issues within the communities to which they are returning. A number of villages of their those who own returned volition, mostly remain may face intractable Unlike the wave elsewhere. first of most who to challenging IDPs, resettle believe that these IDPs will be the Many practitioners humanitarian writing. of time at the and reintegration resettlement awaiting still were ile people most of IDPs appear to the returned have been accepted, about 3,000 W W their return—and the to villages their which return—and they were to be returned. of both them the sensitization prepare for IDPs—to the taking necessary or under- safeguards or adequate legislative normative preparing without the rushed returns the donors, government international from pressure come Many in under under criticism. involved that, heavy the report process of of 120).para. five2006, people (OHCHR, of Inquiry for leading an attack on the army in May 2006, resulting in the death by the for been UN recommended criminal investigation Special Commission h h ile ile the succeeded process in of numbers large it IDPs, relocating has (village) level, thereby aldeia not thereby (village) level, addressing villages 86 83 This paramilitary leader had This paramilitary W h ile the IOM generally generally IOM ile the suco 85 (suburban) One report One report 84

erty law to ownership. determine erty land and and compensation no prop- restitution effective for property being home occupied have by People returning no others. framework legal cent home, to while afraid another return 10 per cent say their homes are were the homeless before of outbreak violence in 40 2006, with nearly per placed people still remain in transitional housing. Approximately half of them most of the the dis- 30,000 of ‘successes’ resettlement, Notwithstanding was top of the list for communal tensions. in Pite tensions, indicate Bairro that than gang rather violence, east–west conflict was largely an internecinefamily andgang-related affair.Focus homes groups in 2006 the disputes, due 2007 tensions to and east–west property tensions in 2007. of true those who may have been in involved as criminal acts a result of gang of of MA is As noted above, youth unemployment a major shaping factor the growth Unemployment and migration per cent are in conflicts. involved of low-level returnees accompanied by an escalation in disputes. For example, in Bairro Pite, 30–40 the to of movement encourages their these some IDPs, return areas may be operation of these N these IDPs is N now largely there is a Care of lack of strategy. funding for a national recovery long-term of causes the The underlying have process. conflict not and been resolved, of the return about sustainability the questions are long-term There serious out (E foundations rebuilding their houses, with most preferring to live in damaged or even burnt- as Only food. about nine per cent have towards their allocated cash benefits to package buy consumable such than (rather goods, durable or productive) has reportedly resisted these efforts. resisted has reportedly of allocate land Land and for even these IDPs, its own Property Department be implemented ( to build housing for permanent the it IDPs, is not clear when this will policy male teenagers male and teenagers around 50 per cent in the Household age 20–24. group (no longer actively seeking employment). This figurerises to 60 per cent among of Dili’sone-third labour force aged 25–29 is or unemployed ‘discouraged’ 2008, 2008, p. 10). Such conflict. for a ground future may scenario fertile provide will be forgotten, with the government already winding down services (IDMC, once that, is process the thosereturn finished, living inshelters transitional services to the IDPs or general population is extremely limited, and many fear G s , gangs, and, ultimately, various forms of , forms and, About urban violence. ultimately, various gangs, K W W n h G ezevic, ezevic, 2005). E ile many returning ile IDPs had many out been returning driven of their O R, R, 2009, p. 4). s. The capacity of the state to provide basic protection G O -driven and thus -driven within the localized zones of 88 W Although the government has the promised government Although h 89 ereas ereas the government has promised to Many have now used their recovery 87 This is especially V V I II I I II V 55 I RC NE UrrE T FACTORS SHAPING URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 56 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste swells, so will swells, the of ranks these gangs. of income. It is entirely predictable that, as the unemployed youth population o and family guests. with stay extended are unwanted often as many social status, youths who have come to for the looking work city young men’s is unemployment their loss through subordinate of self-esteem rural migration to the city breed and frustration social tension. Compounding rates highofstates, and in unemployment other post-conflict As observed on sector. an already weak agricultural domestic itive during short-term effects—particularly election time—it also put pressure supplies of rice into Timor-Leste (Intellasia, supplies 2009). of (Intellasia, rice into Timor-Leste a in signed with Vietnam of large memorandum order import understanding the and off farm into the city. In government 2009, September the Timorese the propensity for violence may actually be having the ofeffect driving youths chase of 120,000 tons of rice designed to combat high rice prices and (E decrease districts rural also notes the a report in marked increase the number of youths leaving the in poverty; resulting prices across the growing country, falling agricultural this According may to influx in increase another recent responseto report, number of displaced families from the 2006 and 2007 crises (IOM, 2009, p. 4). areas also two have These the populations. highest migrant already large the in city, of rates the with the and suburbs conflict existing two highest in the of arrived Most west months. of of two the these immigrants previous that more than 683 reported youths were residing newly within the as village chiefs village Of these movements, periods. 2009 reporting and February the was to some 2008 of December form their between migration villages A found that recent IOM 64 survey per cent of chiefs village said that there 2006, p. was due and 25). (Lopes this to Neupert, growth inward migration 100,715 from to According grew to 173,541. the per 56.4 same centfigures, of 1999 in reveal that, and just a 2004—Dili’s population few years—between within the Thehas past five occurred years. 2004migration censusfigures and Dili’s of consists most population of new migrants, internal this inward to 40 Dili. approximately per Indeed, men, districts the cent from outlying of unemployment is a high rate of rural–urban migration, predominantly of young of in rates Dili. analogous Coupled sampled with neighbourhoods reported by the research teamfindingsundertaken principal for thissurvey study and and 2007 of bouts violence in both Dili To and the be districts. sure, the new disputes as are key widely regarded of causes Land and the property 2006 disputesProperty ffer these youths companionship, status, protection, and, often, a and, often, source protection, these youths companionship, status, ffer W E R, 2009, p. 4). Interestingly, the government’s R, 2008 2009, p. pur- the government’s 4). Interestingly, W h ile this generated ile pos- this generated G a ngs ngs and MA G s Timor-Leste in 2009 than Timor-Leste at any other time in its history. in 2009 (La’o 2010). Hamutuk, In other there in was words, more liquidity of its budget was poor at 35 per cent in 2005, it was in the range of 85 per cent 2009 budget at stood USD 620 million).execution government And whereas budget was USD 250 million in 2006, it was USD 820 million in 2008 (the ing the Timorese ing in the ways that Timorese are unique in their history. However, since community. the mid-2008, wave of public spending is enrich- aid and as community international well as post-conflict the international and, Indonesians subsequently, and Portuguese Timorese between existed social and growing This is economic disparity. not new, entirely as inequities to relates in Timor-Leste developing dynamic and troubling emerging An Socioeconomic inequalities 2008, p. 183). orders, and the courts have yet to resolve a single land dispute land involving have to let proceeded enforced alone judgement, casesuccessfully (Fitzpatrick, after 1999, has naturally prioritized its criminal caseload. Very few civil cases which had system, The national mediation. court to be built scratch from and burden placed for onmanagement the conflict of systemsprimary local to ship adjudicate attempts has land in undermined conflicts Timor-Leste illegal occupants themselves. The lack of legal certainty relating to land owner- being asked by to the make government often way for owners, the previous adding are now another layer residents, of Squatters ownership. contested and now to come occupied belonging houses the down former from districts Since duethe flight population to the violence of many 2006, people have these same areas are are also where altercations violent commonplace. in the Timorese absence of land a Not regime. coincidentally, transparent housing is Indonesian which now civil servant former occupied by various and Comoro, Fatuda, Pite, Delta, Ai TasiBairro Mutin, Tolu, are all areas in suburbs. These areas are continuing sources of tension, even now. by much violence, For of the 2006 example,and 2007 on violence was focused these new 1999, causing intense social jealousy. by in illegally the new was then city. Much migrants squatted of this property in mostly and plexes the built military, west for of Indonesian civil servants housing the com- Indonesians extensive also residents, vacated Timorese remaining ( houses led rampage to the of occupation illegal an 50 estimated per cent of the the after flight vote 1999referendum population and militia subsequent the and matters, Complicating Indonesian occupation. of both Portuguese a inherited highly complex and a land country contested system, title legacy K n ezevic, 2005, p. 2005, ezevic, 28).housing by vacated from Apart W h ile ile most of the was capital affected W h ile ile the national V V I II I I II V 57 I RC NE UrrE T FACTORS SHAPING URBAN VIOLENCE IN DILI 58 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste whether this whether ‘peace’ is durable. paid simply people peaceful are because The real off. is getting question United and the States, sense the is Overall, Philippines. that Dili is relatively that to include with destinations abroad, China, Indonesia, study the Macau, is also awarding thousands of scholarships per year to 22–50-year-old for one, has almost of doubled in of Agriculture, size. Education TimoreseThe Ministry via short-term contracts by as much as 40 per cent since 2007, (USD the 7 public expanded million).service of andTimor-Leste The government the Ministry rice provision (in the order of USD 120 million), and local vegetable subsidies to (out of the payments petitioners the prime minister’s office),subsidized hundreds of of thousands people) to for housing packages IDPs, generous to over for persons payments and 55 veterans support years of age (affecting areand fromrangepensions elaborate and programmes entitlement benefit in in public spending can as be the ‘buying peace’.construed to ransom with threats of political instability and violence, the massiveIn a increase system of patronage politics and where a national government can be held police units and an of expansion defence force roles in security. internal paramilitary through tactics and enforcement-based using heavy-handed to of predisposed It wealth. is the redistribution occasional nevertheless tendencies towards self-preservation, seeking to ensure its longevity through demonstrates and occasionally for with a The violence. oligarchy propensity and, increasingly, urban youths, remain poor, unemployed, disenfranchised, clique is becoming wealthy, while the population, the rural of centre gravity, seen by some as abusing its control over the public purse. This small, exclusive and Portuguese-speaking pro-Independence, married families spanning political parties—with elements of pro-Indonesian, previous decade. The oligarchy that governs Timor-Leste as a collection more is so of a now certainly challenge, corruption Indeed, than serious in inter- the activity. for corrupt and servants civil officers prime minister dismissed has or personally a suspended number of police culture; the National Police Command; and a host of other public officials.The and commerce tourism, and agri- economy, justice, development, industry, prime minister; the vice prime minister; the of ministers health, education, were also by levelled allegations the media and corruption at opposition the thethough claim Serious are is corrupt, unsubstantiated. officials ernment that 50 has unequivocally per stated cent of Minister Carrascalao Mario gov- Vice Prime and clear disparities corruption. rampant of indications salary spending in is Dili concentrated as are compared to There areas. also rural are Questions being however, as raised, to how much new of Timor-Leste’s

90 assimilado assimilado constituencies—is constituencies—is 91 vernment vernment G o ponderance of muscular enforcement-based programmes. Dili, as in many cities in which violence is considered a problem, there is a pre- range from coercive state-led interventions to informal voluntary activities. In programmes and urban violence prevention reduction 9 As Figure suggests, voluntary activities are glaringly absent. are glaringly activities voluntary figures and a number of conflict prevention and mediationorganizations, more of a modest number of reconciliation initiatives brokered by senior government Formal efforts reduction and prevention violence urban of 9Typology Figure FOR and of Development Peace of Studies = Centre CEPAD examples is included as a separate annexe at theand brieflyend presentstheir of merits and limitations.the Areport more comprehensive(see list of Annexe 1). ceptual of typology initiatives pursued by public and non-governmental actors K A MTIL = Communication Forum for Timor-Leste’s Martial Arts Arts Martial Timor-Leste’s for Forum = Communication MTIL

property regime property Nia Land)—national Rai (Our Ita efforts mediation State-led Fund Youth UNICEF/National conferences youth and state-led International F–FDTL Units Police Special (UNMIT) UN Police Taskforce and Dili PNTL National Republican Portuguese Force Stabilisation International Recent urban and violencereduction preventionprogrammes V I . Compliance G Voluntary u Coercive ard 92 This final considers asection con- G G Pay-offs to MA Pay-offs FOR CEPAD mediation: Community CARE BELUN Asia/HA Action Security APAC Security Maubere MA r oups a rdamor Security rdamor G leaders W i th the exception K Association G s i nformal and and gangs K A MTIL V V I II I I II V 59 I RCENE T U BAN VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION PROGRAMMES 60 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 1,800 guards), and 2,500 (an guards), (with approximately estimated APAC Security Security Maubere companies, notably are present Also a of range security private against gang violence, in addition to carrying out regular patrols and out patrols estab- gang in violence, against regular addition to carrying the units, UN Police, and the ISF have all actions rapid conducted response a reactive approach to containing urban violence. For example, formed police Internationally mandated and Timorese security forces have typically adopted of violence. the ‘instruments’ and to collect violencetactics repress entrepreneurs the use of heavy-fisted has actors encouraged 2009). security armed The abundance of frequently 30 August 2009. © Mario Jonny Dos Santos/AFP Dos Jonny ©Mario 2009. August 30 Photo National National into a in Public late Order Republican Battalion 2009) and the Portuguese (and its Dili Taskforce) to and Special the Police F–FDTL (amalgamated Units of the Dili from PNTL ranging are host to services a of constellation security the Indeed, streets and government. community the Timorese international built presence and up the by security patterns considerable the historical of is forms The to decision deterrence to shaped by more resort aggressive

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PNTL take police inPNTL part officers parade ato ofmilitary mark the independence, tenth anniversary G u ard to the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) and ard UN Force (ISF) to Police. Stabilisation the International G a rdamor Security (with approximately 650 guards) (Parker, ebbs and flows. However, the primary risk factors shaping their formation ebbs riskshapingfactors their and formation However,the flows. primary Domestic and dressinginternational M interest in conflict mediation between youthgroups A sector. the and the system justice security reform implementing a national youth policy and ongoing programmes to strengthen attacks on the two heads of state in 2008.February There are moves towards and IDPs, there has returning been of an period calm extended since the ment and have communities hard worked at public ensuring acceptance of complex land issues. The to govern- ownership Timor-Leste’s resolve efforts has been made progress significant in mediationand conflict Nevertheless, renamed the recently Public Order Battalion. appears to Rapid with the somewhat Response Unit, PNTL the overlap UIR— and the It UN response. also Police and for for heavy-handed its reputation this force has been widely criticized for its lack of communication with the ISF in combating gang and communal effective have violence, been relatively intended as unit. a mobile rapid response crowd-control the equipment, Equipped Taskforce with riot was control state for security. in of 2007 Taskforce the by was reactivated PNTL Separately, the secretary quarters, it continued in other areas, and other leaders quickly filledthe void. the the raid the head- stopped PSHT violence localized surrounding purely round of a violence. revenge spurring further families, gang members’ and and by other owned down the houses tory headquarters burned PSHT moved into the gangs increased violence: rival that the terri- actually empty The raid generated mixed outcomes. One criticism was that it created a vacuum Setia Hati Brotherhood). Terate, or Heart Faithful (Persaudaraan Lotus W with the major MA talks hosting high-level groups, to the warring attempted mediate between and the the PNTL, ISF.sections, The Affairs Political of the gang in violence, 2007, escalating the January formation authorized UNMIT also an of example In policing a to initiative. response community successful aimed at specifically been key gangtwo violence combating initiatives and lishing static police posts at a number of key ‘hot spots’. There have, however, with with the programmes and deal policies gangsthat andwith MA programmes specifically there ispast conflict, a vitaland needfor consistent, sustained coherent, are essential to addressing the broader, overarching issues that have sparked d h en en this UN police failed, and Police, units, formed the ISF, in coordination G a G ng ng Task the and Human from with members UNMIT Force, Rights a ng ng Task of MA the the raided Force, largest headquarters G A leaders on at 24 Dili January the PNTL headquarters. G s and gangs in Dili 94 ile these initiatives ile these initiatives W G h a ng ng Task Force at first W h ile ile it appears to G G s . , 93 PSHT PSHT W h ile ile V V I II I I II V 61 I RCENE T U BAN VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION PROGRAMMES 62 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste conflicts. under ofreconvened the theMA Office Presidentto various help resolve Communication Forum for Timor-Leste’s Martial Arts the the from Asia Foundation, in For best. example, with support mid-2005, have been mixed at of The results these efforts approaches. and civil society security forces, both local and international, to more conciliatory government the approach of from enforcement ranging of despite a responses, variety and durability remain unaddressed. There is little to show on this front to date, players, PSHT and PSHT players, MA programmes and For policies. example: programmes attention be paid to the comprehensive implementation of meaningful youth of it youth in violence isand conflicts, thatvitalthe current 2006–07 urgent in remote rural areas. Although FOR in Although areas. remote rural resistance-era network that has generated few positive outcomes. that outcomes. few has positive generated network resistance-era National Youth Council, is regarded by some as an unrepresentative, moribund current government. The group chosen to facilitate this disbursal of funds, the however, that the few so funds disbursed far have gone to loyal to groups the signs, the are from There United worrying Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). with support and activities, recreational training youth-oriented support ment of A such National legislation. Youth Fund has to also been established or there for is inaction reason optimism disinterest, about little the enforce- government and from reform other issues sector suffering But with security sport and so represents at least the intent to deal with the of was state for initiated by issue2008. youth and This legislation the secretary (TLAVA, 2009a). to MA more Meanwhile, legislation regulate p. 2009a, 5). May 2007 (TLAVA, G i ven ven that almost half of the consists population youths and the given role G groups, and Philippine army officers (TLAVA, 2009a, p. 2009a, 6). (TLAVA, officers army and Philippine groups, solidarity members, gang imprisoned including in that country, non-violence and a that have the played peace process key role in with groups promoting met [participants] where to visit the Philippines, an exposure involved course of One the part course. peace-building one-year in a collective participate each of from one the MA junior) nine main active (one Two senior, members to the run project. engaged was network, building national N national N international two between a partnership from resulted 2006, in September began which initiative, This project. training and deal gang with MA to specifically process society-led civil and comprehensive sustained most The s could not control their various factions and could especially not local factions branches, their control various 95 Indeed, FOR G O s, Yayasan Hak s, and Yayasan N K O R K K G A . violence was the Action Asia/Hak Association MA Association Asia/Hak the was Action violence This agreement did This agreement not however, since last, many MTIL consisted of 14 MA G O K Forum. Action Asia, a regional peace- a Asia, regional Action Forum. A MTIL still exists, its funding ran out in still exists, MTIL G O s, Concern and Oxfam, and two and Oxfam, s, Concern G s G groups were selected to selected were groups was promulgated on 23 was promulgated June G s , including the two largest G r oups (FOR K A MTIL) MTIL) was G

of land registration and land of administration. land registration Rai aims to collect claims to land ownership across the country for the purpose Ita Nia of Development; initiative the for International United States Agency a USD(Our from is five-year, Land), 10with support being million undertaken named of Ita in Nia project, land This data the Rai rights collection country. land which the could ownership, form basis eventually for a national registry is The a cadastre of database comprehensive claims Cadastre. to Property More in recently, of July launched a Justice 2008, the Ministry new National the dispute can mediated. be officially until and ‘ceasefire’ ‘peace’ or agreements, temporary the courts, through approach to the iscurrent addressing in Timor-Leste land primarily conflicts 2008). that The findingssuggest dispute (Fitzpatrick, mediation for property withrecommendations ownership customary and land traditional, conflicts aadministered recently of study Land Program Pacific AusAID’s example, a For through of series initiatives. rights addressing the issue of property with the and together agencies, UN, bilateral N government, of the IDPs, Timorese and the recent resettlement return Notwithstanding Redressing property rights politicization. overt a Likewise, number of chiefs village have also been by compromised their from rural districts, where the village chiefs concerned have faltering authority. In a addition, inal number appear agreements. of to antagonists be migrants as they were not of conflicts, spark renewed part the sometimes capital orig- MA rivalries. dealt with conflict atthe community level andso do nottake into accountgang urban communal disputes. Most of these traditional mediation attempts have as of can and can rural complicate the peace interrelationship agreements, success. However, nature of the overlapping communal and gang conflicts of with some degree authorities, and ceremonies lize traditional traditional A mediation. violence using number traditional of agencies have to tried uti- agencies have and to Many responded international civil society communal at two at pilot two sites overthat land. do contestation not significant feature to extend the project to other areas, the initial data collection was conducted law are as being cursory. criticized time with erable the to public consultations on Early implement. land a draft G members moving from the districts to the the or capital moving from members districts within the W h ile there have been preliminary ile steps there have been preliminary 96 This initiative will This initiative take consid- G O s is belatedly

V V I II I I II V 63 I RCENE T U BAN VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION PROGRAMMES 64 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste sions with members sions of with members and youth groups MA once and could more. both Indeed, informal discus- resurface group focus to its symptoms of have forms urban violence pushed underground, overt forces appear and peacekeepers of public responses security international violence that in erupted 2006 and 2007 remain. And while the muscular shaping long and the grievances communal deep. and The underlying gang as in In plunged into most Timor-Leste, countries civil war, run memories makers each time acute urban violence of occurs on Dili. the streets and of the policy- explaining domestic international surprise at least partly These and other forms of violence are protracted and remain misunderstood, is physical assault common and neighbourhoods, principal underreported. national aid community and on the backstreets of the lence are endemic. just Moreover, beyond the main roads plied by the inter- and vio- of domestic forms neighbourhood limited, ‘internal’ comparatively communal tensions. violence remains on And while the ‘external’ streets study findsthat the dynamics of urbanviolence are interconnectedwith rural but 2006–07, also those as as distant the this late 1950s. Equally important, of events recent more the experience—including to historical materially sonal Real violence. and urban violence is perceived linked and emotionally violence and of by interper- collective routine outbreaks sporadic affected Although Dili can today be considered a moderately ‘safe’ city, it is nevertheless and potentially inexhaustible resource, it resource, is and not. inexhaustible potentially Timorese—excluding future generations. living each for to 55,000 USD amounts oil wealth and projected current that Timor–Leste’s project estimates As noted dollars. above, conservative of The 2009 peacefulness Dili to with petro- was, purchased a extent, large the of events 2006. by its role in continue remains to unperturbed and inhabit the F–FDTL PNTL, the pervasive dysfunction of the security sector. Criminals and gang members to of urban violence connected of is the collective fundamentally recurrence The likelihood levels. reaches unbearable services and security authorities of to public and violence incompetence, again if brutality the corruption, nclusions C o W h ile this may sound like a sizeable G s suggest a suggest readiness to resort W h en set against Timor’s en set Timor’s against bairros outside of Dili’s cally rethought, Dili’s fragile gains Dili’scould easily be fragile cally reversed. rethought, unless that, is policy radi- of suggests 4) development ongoing rural neglect ments, 2) ments, ongoing impunity, on coupled based entitle- with 1) unsustainable programme a government serious corruption into the political equation in Timor-Leste since 2008 in Timor-Leste equation into the political corruption serious of The emergence and ulated citizens: impunity by unemployment. Timorese Yet do these approaches of not causes address violence the as primary artic- of including the the defence introduction force into policing internal roles. sector, in the security public empowering to revenues and expanding further financialfrom range and These enabled by materialincentives the increase society. in its of violence causes the to address which with instruments has access government to and of The Timorese a persuasive coercive variety iour and of legacies the past. leadership and take the responsibility to necessary reject the divisive behav- tensions will rely on the willpower of the Timorese government to demonstrate the of part the public. of Any general durable or these resolution sustainable These reforms will, however, take time and require both trust and patience on of to MA ment, and the activities regulate attempts for and youth education employ- the of expansion opportunities regulation, ances to that land shape attention and Increased urban violence. property to some remedy of the of are examples griev- enduring There positive efforts again to spikes substantial in violence in Dili and across Timor-Leste. yet may contribute these managed, factors coming Unless decades. properly will be and that a scarcity capital environmental major challenge over the there is doubt challenges and population, little developmental exploding 98 3) exploding urban unemployed youth, and youth, urban 3) unemployed exploding G s are good examples. are good examples.

V V I II I I II V 65 I C ON LusioNS 66 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste Typology of interventions to prevent and reduce urban violence urban reduce and prevent to interventions of 1Typology Table in team 2009. research principal by the collected information intervention-related Table 1 lists Policing benefit programmes benefit G Type o vernment entitlement/ vernment prevent nexeand 1. reduceTypology ofurban interventionsviolence to A n Description of interventions in Dili of interventions Description ecial Police Units amalgamated into a Public Order Battalion SD 7 million of local vegetable subsidies (for central central (for subsidies SD 7 of vegetable local million SD 120 million of subsidized rice (entire affected) population USD 8,500 700 than persons, (more to petitioners ayments of of people thousands for (hundreds IDPs ousing packages over to persons payments and support for veterans ensions FP Timor-Leste Police Development Program, and Asia Program, Development Police Timor-Leste FP 650 (ISF)—approximately Force Stabilisation nternational (UNMIT): in Timor-Leste Mission Integrated Nations nited ( Halibur peration to order Dili restored 2007) (December Dili Taskforce NTL service. public for the entire increases alary U U P H P A I U O in late 2009. Sp P S and Industry. high and Industry. Commerce, of Tourism, the Ministry from Minister. of Prime the the Office each) from Solidarity. of Social the Ministry from affected) for veterans. of state and secretary Solidarity of Social the Ministry from affected) of people of thousands 55 of age years (hundreds Foundation/US Agency for International Development. for International Agency Foundation/US AUD estimated 350 million (USD 315 million) per year in 2009. an personnel, Force and Defence 150 Zealand New Australian per USD year. 200 million personnel), 150 (each with units police 4 UN formed Police, 1,000 and Security. of Defence the Ministry though 2008), (February–April Command Joint Force-led Defence under and Security. of Defence the Ministry through l ands farmers) from the Ministry of Tourism, Commerce, Commerce, of Tourism, the Ministry from ands farmers) G a ther Up) through the F-FDTL and PNTL and PNTL the F-FDTL Up) ther through W initiatives Reconciliation companies) security (private provision security Informal projects Employment Early warning Early Land reform Land e apons collection collection apons ld Bank is exploring a massive rural youth employment he 008 Operation Operation 008 undreds of have initiatives reconciliation low-level been and and Reconciliation: Truth, for Reception, ommission Commission. and Truth Friendship imor-Leste/Indonesia Special the Norwegian for example discussion, igh-level (CEPAD)– of and of Peace Development Studies entre of Justice led by the Ministry programme ajor land reform (650 guards). Security rdamor g guards). (1,800 PAC Security guards). (2,500 Security aubere and service the police both that indications are here strong the public has expanded of Timor-Leste vernment he of the Ministry through on works road employment outh been agency—SNSE—has intelligence domestic he former reports. warning early quarterly commenced n BELUN 2009, a established for security of state n the secretary 2008, report. H C M A M T T project, 2010–2015. T Y T I I Defence and Security. Defence of the Ministry through in Timor-Leste, collection weapons 2 leaders. and youth on community concentrating level, at the community conducted are being H C T W and the by Norway (supported and of Club Envoy Madrid districts. in the rural leaders political on middle-ranking emphasis with Forum Dialogue National Nia Rai). (Ita Development for Rural Association Development/ for International by US Agency and supported expanded be will force significantly defence in size. doubled has almost of Agriculture 2007. Ministry The by as much as 40% since contracts via short-term service by AusAID. funded Organization; Labour UN International training, for vocational of state the secretary Infrastructure, the SNI. renamed Unit. and Research Prevention Conflict a o rld Bank, respectively). Bank, rld W G o or K i lat lat ( G u n): first major, nationally organized organized n): major,nationally first Chega! V V I II I I II V 67 I TY POloGY OF INTERVENTIONS TO PREVENT AND REDUCE URBAN VIOLENCE 68 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 ysically, Timor-Leste is larger than 41 othercountries andterritories, andit has a 1 12 11 10 9

The mo The B See Hatt Timor-Leste. See, f Team. tion andprevention initiatives by the Thi Section III. with archival andliterature reviews. Afull review of themethodology is provided in section of theurban population, andextensive key informant interviews,together includes ahousehold survey, several focus groups with arepresentative sub- Thi can result in the public sector becoming interconnected with business interests. exchange rate. This reduces thecompetitiveness of themanufacturing sector and (or, say, foreign assistance) can deindustrialize astate’s economy by raising the manufacturing sector. Intheory, anincrease inrevenues from natural resources between anincrease intheexploitation of natural resources andthedecline inthe D grouping andallegiances through aperson’s Tetun dialect oraccent. D Forces for theNational Liberation of East Timor. F 2004, p. 17). that almost 25 percent of theworld’s nations are smaller than Timor-Leste (NDS, larger population than 43 countries andterritories (Durand, 2006). This means Ph See See R abroad (observations of theprincipal researchers). sentence was commuted by President José Ramos-Horta in2008,but heremains justice, to travel to Malaysia onthegovernment’s bill for medical treatment. His four months,hereceived permission from his cousin, Lúcia Lobato, theminister of Rogerio Lobato to 7.5 years inprison for weapons-related offences. Afterserving (observation of theprincipal researchers). ALINTIL stands for Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste, or Armed uring violent episodes in2006–07, opposing actors would gauge ethno-linguistic utch disease is an economic expression intended to explain the relationship relationship the explain to intended expression economic an is disease utch s case study was designed to inform aglobal review of urban violence reduc- s study was undertaken between June andAugust 2009; the methodology TLAVA (2009a). TN IIarea of Tasi Tolu had nowater supply between June andAugust 2009 obinson (2001). or example, Hattori (2005)for areview of theethno-linguistic context of st notable case was theMarch 2007 conviction of ex-minister of interior ori (2005). Endnotes W orl d Bank’s Conflict, Crime, and Violence

26 25 19 17 15 1 27 24 23 22 21 20 18 16 14 3

United States. ABRI r B UDT andAPODETI prisoners intheircustody. D with FALINTIL forces inthemountains (Durand, 2006,p. 74). Ap An e The f ist inDili, onthecoming reported storm: ‘ O Y At Xanana National Congress for theReconstruction of East Timor (CNRT), PrimeMinister the National Police of East Timor (2002–06), now amemberof parliament inthe The The FRETILINa See Dunn (1996, p. 258; 2003, p. 251). who had received rudimentary training since October. ‘It was a“people’s army.”’ 7,000 second-line reservists, 10,000 with previous military training, and villagers F The d just afew of thetop tier. Fransisco Xavier Amaral; Rogério Tiago Lobato; andJosé Ramos-Horta, to name The Int (Laakso, 2007, p. 84). special forces (Durand, 2006,p. 73). film BALIBO,released inJuly 2009; seeConnolly (2009). guarded the beach and the streets.’ These events are celebrated in the controversial empty, abandoned by its people. Acurfew was applied [...]andarmedsoldiers situation, people started quietly to leave for the hills. Tonight Dili is quiet and almost border incursions for theprevious two months. exile inIndonesia. Lobato, thedisgraced former minister of interior/vice-president of FRETILIN,was in of defence, was security sector reform adviser to thepresident; andRogério Tiago was secretary-general of FRETILIN;Roque Rodrigues, thedisgraced former minister forced labour (CAVR 2005,pp. 47–49). cially in rural districts. Abuses included massacres, murder, assault, rape, and 15 July 2009. one anotherinthemodernpolitical andstreet scene. Observation of Edward Rees, ciated with different sides of the Viqueque rebellion find themselves pitted against hostile debate inDili. Many of thechildren andgrandchildren of individuals asso- ALINTIL strength reportedly comprised ‘a hard professional core’ of 2,500 regulars, et Indonesian special forces and Timorese auxiliaries had beenengaged incross- y 1978, Indonesia had more than 48,000troops in Timor (Durand, 2006). uring theretreat from Indonesian forces, certain FALINTIL units elected to execute n the evening of 6 December 1975, Roger East, the only remaining foreign journal- thetimeof writing, José Ramos-Horta was president of Timor-Leste; Mari Alkatiri erestingly, the50thanniversary of this rebellion inJune 2009 generated some proximately 66percent of thepopulation—450,000 civilians—sought shelter se auxiliaries included Paulo deFatima Martins,former general commander of se individuals include Mario, João, andManuel Carrascalão; Mari Alkatiri; stimated 2,000citizens were killed inDili during thefirst days of theinvasion orces included 20warships, 13 planes, 10,000 frontline troops, andassorted ay is now recognized as date thebirth of FALINTIL. elied especially ontheprovision of ground attack aircraft (Broncos) by the G usmao’s political party. dministration was marked by vigilante justice inmany areas, espe- W ith thedet erioration of thesecurity V V I II I I II V 69 I ENT DNO ES 70 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 34 33 32 30 or example, Nicholson (2001)and Stephan (2006). 29 28 36 35 31

‘The scout movement, martial groups, arts andstudent bodies inschools andat About such as Eurico cases, these individuals ran for political office inthe2009 Indonesian elections, and thefew Timorese jail short whowere andserved terms are now free. Insome tion, inIndonesia, nomembers of theIndonesian military have been convicted, Marques, a Tim Alfa militia leader responsible for murdering nuns in1999. Inaddi- Timor-Leste. Some convicted individuals were pardoned in2008,including Joni between June andJuly 2009. The named its commander. See Robinson (2003, pp. 86–87). after the receiving considerable financial inducements. His loyalty was rewarded in 1999 Its elections. S B the TNI’ (CAVR, 2005). violence. Nevertheless, in1999 it was clear that themilitias were anextension of Timorese to give non-Timorese troops “plausible deniability” for theirrole inthe military] in1998–99. As in1974–75, the Indonesian military again used East forerunners to themilitias that were rapidly developed by ABRI/TNI[Indonesian disappearances of independence supporters by night. These youth group[s] were Forces Command ( paramilitary groups was brutal. These groups, under theprotection of the Special taristic quality, therecruitment of East Timorese youth inthemid-1990s to form to celebrate national days. the performance of nationalist rituals through military-style ceremonies and events youth. Indonesia placed great emphasis onits national ideology (Pancasila) and universities aimedto instill discipline andloyalty to Indonesia into East Timorese See, f into amajor riot involving upto 1,500 people. Several people were shot andkilled, protest outside the National University across from thenewparliament erupted was shot andkilled by thePNTL.Aweek later, on4December 2002, astudent ans, attacked the Baucau police station whenaprotest turned violent; one person fomenting much of thedissent. That same day, civilians, mostly youths and veter- G The for Torture Victims had post-traumatic stress disorder in2000(Field, 2004, p. 13). researchers). the 1990 census population figure of 747,557) (CAVR, 2005). in East Timor, this ratio stood around 1:700 (based on1,013 BRIMOBin1998 and The ratio of BRIMOB troops to civilians in Indonesia is 1:20,000 (Lowry, 1996, p. 94); units brought from outside the territory (7,156). See CAVR (2005, ch. 7.4, pp. 14–15). deployed inEast Timor, divided between territorial units (with 214 personnel) and ubianto was acandidate for vice-president inthe2009 Indonesian presidential y August 1998, nearly 7,400 anti-riot police, renowned for their violence, were usmao called for thedismissal of Minister of Interior Rogério Lobato, whowas ith thee leader was aformer resistance activist named Eurico se caused somuch alarm that, on28November 2002, President Xanana se findings were confirmed during focus groups withurban residents in Dili one-third of 750,000 respondents in the International Rehabilitation Council G xception of afew minormilitias, few have beenconvicted of crimes in ADAPA G uterres, leader of theAitarak militia (observations of theprincipal K K SI morphedint op assus) conducted organised crime activities by day and W hile these activities may have had aninsidious mili- o theprincipal Dili militia, Aitarak, andhewas G uterres, whojoined after 39 38 37

sitting memberof parliament, attacked theresidence of Maj.- member of thePSHT MA On the same day, a group led by PNTL sub-inspectors Abilio Mesquita (a prominent tioners, attacked the F–FDTL headquarters in Tasi Tolu on thewestern edge of Dili. led by former F–FDTL Rai Los,Sgt. along with anumberof Liquiçá PNTL andpeti- with F-FDTL ontheeastern edge of Dili at Fatu Ahi.On 24 March, acivilian militia leave thecity inlarge numbers. On23 May 2006, Maj. Reinado’s group clashed eral groups of civilian militia inLiquiçá andErmera. Meanwhile, civilians began to Reinado defected to thepetitionercause, andtheminister of interior armedsev- B ‘B T tral Dili to Pantai and m 2008 and2009. Observations of theprincipal researchers; interviews conducted by Edward Rees, officers were massacred by four F–FDTL as they were being led away by UN officials. the PNTL headquarters inCaicoli, central Dili. Afteraceasefire, surrendering PNTL evening of 24 May. On25 May, agun battle ensued between PNTL andF–FDTL at Ruak. F–FDTL distributed weapons to 200civilians andsympathetic PNTL onthe cent of thepopulation in2001andis ontheincrease’ ( ments equivalent to earnings of less than US$0.55 per day—afflicted about 39.7 per Timor-Leste—defined as capacity to buy food andnon-food consumption require- increase unless vigorous growth inthenon-oil sectors can becreated. Poverty in urban youth unemployment andtheproblems associated with it are destined to 58 percent for the15–19-year-old age bracket. Dili was estimated at 23 percent and youth unemployment at 40percent, rising to formal jobs are being created. According to the2004 census, unemployment in that some15,000 young people enter thelabor market each year, while only 400 climates intheworld [...].As aresult, job creation has stalled—it is estimated is minimal, with insecurity compounding oneof themost unattractive business one-third of thenation’s loanis portfolio now nonperforming.Private investment Companies andindividuals have struggled to make loan payments, andaround Consumer prices have also increased by about 13 percent since March 2006. oil sectors, where per capita incomes have been stagnant in real terms since 2002. a failure of thetransport system. Almost all Timorese earn theirliving inthenon- suffered disruptions to supply, theloss of asignificant ofpart the coffee crop, and however, economic activity inDili came to a virtual standstill. Outlying districts stability had beenachieved through sound fiscal management. Inmid-2006, and July 2009. researchers during interviews with gang leaders andduring focus groups inJune See Tempo Semanal (n.d.) andCJITL (n.d.). ing politicians had orchestrated the violence, it caused aparliamentary debate. when national investigative journalists exposed documents suggesting that lead- associated with 4December 2002. It is such acontentious issue that, in2008, able to secure thecity. To thepresent day, noonehas beenconvicted for crimes disperse, andnational andinternational law enforcement andmilitary units were he factors shaping ‘recruitment’ into gangs were confirmed by the principal principal the by confirmed were gangs into ‘recruitment’ shaping factors he etween 28 April and 23 May 2006, a number of F-FDTL and PNTL led by a Maj. Alfredo y fiscal year 2004–5, economic growth was more positive, and macroeconomic any were wounded. Dozens of properties were destroyed, ranging from cen- K el apa 4kmto thewest. It was only rain that caused thecrowd to G ) and Artur Avelar) andArtur Borges, along with Leandro Isaac, a W ith h alf thepopulation under 18, W B G andADB,2007, p. 2). G en. Taur Matan V V I II I I II V 71 I ENT DNO ES 72 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 57 55 52 51 50 48 47 46 43 42 41 anotherlevel, the violence in Timor-Leste oftenseems to bemore about specta- 40 56 54 53 49 45 44

TLAVA (2009b). tion andanalysis capacities inthepublic health anddevelopment sectors. See led by certain groups, such as BELUN andthe TLAVA, are investing indata collec- Economic Development andRecreation. Likewise, somenon-governmental efforts Ther The do Timor more information, seeBPA (n.d.). The P O O On oneoc putes exist inDili (Nixon, 2008,p. 286). in 2004 discovered that thegreatest absolute of numberandproportion land dis- A by Xanana So The B The Unit Timor incentral Dili (OHCHR,2008). in September by rogue PNTL officers ontheJardin IDP camp across from Hotel D OHCHR (2008). B See also Robinson (2007); (2001);Myrttinen Scambary (2009). phase of the Indonesian-sponsored militia activities in 1998–9, and again in 2006. mayhem’ took place during pre-modern warfare in Timor as it didduring theinitial cle andintimidation than actual killing. The public spectacle of such ‘controlled At See, f The findin Arms Survey were not eligible for participation. An of this information is considered highly sensitive andclassified. cells inUNMITas well as from theinternational aidanddonorcommunities. Much La’o Hamutuk (2010). who will beadded to thetotal population by 2020. Statistically, at least, petro USD 55,000perperson anddoes not include theonemillion additional Timorese Viqueque. lenges andaroot cause of violence in Timorese society (OHCHR,2008). 2009 that impunity continues to remain oneof Timor-Leste’s most pressing chal- land and property survey funded by the US Agency for International Development etween 2,500 and4,000properties were reportedly damaged ordestroyed. See ecora, Taibessi, andComoro markets were afocus of violence in2006. espite several notable communal killings andadramatic daylight armed attack bservations of theprincipal researchers. bservations of theprincipal researchers. llars will not bethedevelopment panacea many assume. See, for example, ares is secretary-general of themodern version of CNRT, thepolitical partyled y households that had participated in previous surveys by AustCare or the Small se include daily, weekly, andmonthly situation reports. TLAVA charts out data onarmed violence available from specialized security e are somenascent effortsto generate this capacity within theMinistry of etroleum Fund generated USD5billion for thefirst timeon31July 2009. For -Leste’s current oil andgas wealth is estimated at USD55billion. This allows or example, TLAVA (2009c). ed Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights in reported September gs from this assessment can befound in TLAVA (2009c). casion, asupporterof Xanana G usmao. G usmao was shot andkilled at arally in 74 72 70 69 68 66 65 63 62 61 60 59 58 73 71 67 64

F thus, unaware of theidentity of theperpetrator. bery. Often, burglary happened at night while therespondent was sleeping and, I F See In a the law, as intherecent Maternus Bere case, impunity frequently prevails. are considered beyond thelaw. Even whenthey are brought within thereach of M See, f Int A Int P It Rosenstein (2004). See, f individuals. it was considered satisfactory to validate thesurveytool using these three local sive experience with the Timorese culture, coupled with theirstrong English skills, The thr Torres Edejer (1999). F considered thebuilding too dangerous to visit. See TLAVA (2009c). have beenbusier. But infact, it was not,as many people whosuffered injuries early 2009. InMay 2006most of the violence took off, andthehospital should closed to people of certain backgrounds. This remained very much thecase until 2006. This is partlybecause Dili hospital became anIDPcamp andwas largely I Zambia, andelsewhere. analysis of violence rates incities inEthiopia, cations from the Violence Prevention andInjury (VIP)programme for retrospective See, f not valid. themselves as victims of arson. Furthermore, one response among these eight was of elections for traditional leaders has undermined theirefficacy. findings are noted inthe text. youth May andsport, 2009 (Dili and the country. See Asia Foundation (2009). 2008 found that domestic violence remains themost commonly crime reported in (2004); Newman and Lekha Sriram et (2009); al. Newman and t is noteworthy that many respondents included burglary in their definition of rob- t is worth noting that there was an especially dramatic reduction of patients in May or more details, see TLAVA (2009a). or instance, among thetotal sample, only eight of the615 respondents identified or areview of consent procedures, consult Collogan et (2004); al. ersonal correspondence with theminister of finance andthesecretary of state for ll significant findings have a p-value of p< 0.05. P-values of marginally significant any elites and former military personnel who perpetrated acts of violence in 1999 is noting, however, worth that asurveyadministered by theAsia Foundation erview witherview erview, 15June 2009. See also, TLAVA (2009d). ddition, according to key informants associated with BELUN, therecent advent Timor-Leste (2004). or example, LeBrun andMuggah (2005). or example, Collogan et (2004); al. Fleischman and or example, Small Arms Survey (2007) and ee Timorese individuals were recommended by AustCare. G raeme K a W loupek (2004); Newman, Risch, and i lliams, UNMITJoint Mission Analysis Centre, July 2009. G eneva). K aloupek K en W ya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, (2004); Seligson (2008); Tan- orl d Health Organization publi- W ood (200 K a ssam-Adams (2006); G iven theirexten- K irsch (2000); 2); Levine V V I II I I II V 73 I ENT DNO ES 74 A Case Study of Dili, Timor-Leste 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 esearch team also noted that most respondents were afraid to relate their 76 75 92 84

Envoy, and theCentre for Humanitarian Dialogue. violence, such as those undertaken by the Club of Madrid, theNorwegian Special José Luís Int See, f Int Int Int See, f but was informally ‘released’. treatment for two months. Liquiçá. Arrested andimprisoned in2008,hewas sent to Indonesia for medical a numberof public works contracts by thegovernment in2008his homedistrict number of people were killed before theattack was repelled. Rai Los was awarded attack ontheF–FDTL headquarters at Tasi Tolu inwestern Dili on24 May 2006. A V ant with interview agovernment official, Dili, 2008. 30January governance, and justice reform sectors and among international donors. prime waterfront development sites, ringing warning bells throughout thesecurity, in Parliament House inDili. As aresult of this meeting, Hercules was awarded two with seniorPNTL officer, Dili,2008. 31January M See P Int (which hestill controls). member of a MA One not marriage, are cordial andkept to aminimum. Timor-Leste. Their relations with ethnic Timorese, despite someinstances of inter- Chine extent to which they are targeted. conducted by entrepreneurs of Chinese originto beable to better understand the It personal experiences and so were recounting these experiences in the third person. The r V government policy. See, for example, Prime Mini See, f 2008.30 January until thelate 1990s. 2007, InJanuary Hercules met PrimeMinister Xanana Hercules controlled prostitution, gambling, rings andextortion incentral Jakarta oluntary activities include, for example, international efforts to promote non- icente ‘Rai Los’ da Conceição has profited from violence. Rai Los’s group led the is important to determine what of proportion formal andinformal business is ost organized prostitution in Dili appears to be run by mainland Chinese. Interview ith s erview witherview Catherine Maria, Catholic Relief Services, Dili, 8July 2009. witherview Richard Bowd, CARE International, Dili, 17 July 2009. witherview village chief, Dili, 25 July 2009. witherview Richard Bowd, CARE International, Dili, 17 July 2009. witherview UNPolice officer, Dili, 2008.29 January arker (2009) for areview of private security companies. or example, Jornal DiarioNacional (2009). or example, IDMC (n.d.). or example, IDMC (n.d.). se Timorese have traditionally controlled themajority of economic activity in trong links to former militia and corrupt elements of theIndonesian army, orious case in2007 involved aDili PNTL deputy commander (also asenior G ster uterres are all onrecord as stating that ‘buying thepeace’ has been G G usmao, Foreign Minister Zacaria da Costa, and Vice PrimeMinister ) running an extortion racket in one of the major commercial areas W hen hecame back, hedidnot return to Becora Prison K ey informant with interview agovernment official, G usmao (2009). K e y inform- G usmao 98 97 95 9 96 94 3

The dec Timor-Leste onanalmost weekly basis. See Tempo Semanal (n.d.). The w See, f ‘The O C In wh unconstitutional andagainst international law. The Timorese Court of Appeal and the parliamentary opposition declared the action Maternus Bere on 30 August 2009 led to a constitutional crisis the following commander month.militia pro-Indonesia captured recently release to Lobato Justice Martial aftertheApril–May Arts 2006political crisis’ (TLAVA, 2009a, pp. 5–6). national dialogue process, having set up the National Forum forThe the Ministry Dialogue of Labour between and Community Reinsertion [. . .] has also been involved in the2006 to mediate the new conflict between PSHT and an alliance of other groups [. . .]. Prime Minister Ramos-Horta initiated a separate dialogue process in late November nist groups organized aseries of “peace demonstrations” [...].Inparallel, interim the east–west violence. Agroup comprising theleaders of theformer main antago- radios. 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G Indonesia: Peoples and Histories. NewHaven andLondon: r oup and Asian Development Bank). 2007. Economic Social G K E10/09OJE2010.htm> o sovo Albanian Self-determination Move- G e nder-based Violence in Timor-Leste.’ W a y for LandReform in Timor- G G G G G LISH.pdf> LISH.pdf> LISH.pdf> LISH.pdf> LISH.pdf>