DOCSLIB.ORG

Timor-Leste’S Security Sector Collapsed and the Fledgling the Security Sector Nation Lurched Toward Civil War

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Timor-Leste’S Security Sector Collapsed and the Fledgling the Security Sector Nation Lurched Toward Civil War AddressingSECURITY International Governance Challenges SECURITYSECTOR SECTORREFORM RMEFORMONITOR MONITOR TIMOR-LEEAST TIMORSTE Decemberoctober 20092009 •• No.1No.1 INSIDE INTRODUCTION Introduction 1 Historical Background of 2 In mid-2006, large parts of Timor-Leste’s security sector collapsed and the fledgling the Security Sector nation lurched toward civil war. The country’s police (Polícia Nacional de Timor Leste - Security Environment 4 PNTL) and military (Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste - F-FDTL) were at best incapable The United Nations and 6 of controlling, and at worst complicit in fomenting crime and lawlessness, requiring SSR the government to request an Australian-led peacekeeping force and international Policing 6 policing presence to restore public order. Justice Sector 10 Armed Forces 10 The tragic events of April–June 2006—in which 37 died in the violence and over Conclusion 11 150,000 were driven from their homes—laid bare the dysfunctions of the security Works Cited 12 sector. “The Crisis,” as the events of 2006 are now known, revealed that there was ISSN 1920-1087. little substance to many parts of the security sector beyond uniforms and weapons. The opinions expressed in this It became clear that Timor-Leste required a comprehensive and far-reaching security paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance sector reform (SSR) process. Innovation or its Board of Directors and/or Board of Governors. Copyright © 2009, The Centre for International Governance Innovation. This work was carried out There have been significant changes in the Timorese security sector since 2006, with the support of The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (www.cigionline.org). This work is licensed not all of which have been positive. After nearly three years of executive policing under a Creative Commons Attribution — Non- commercial — No Derivatives License. To view this authority, the United Nations Police (UNPOL) has begun a staged handover to license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by- nc-nd/2.5/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice. national authorities. There has also been a marked improvement in relations between Financial support for the Security the PNTL and F-FDTL. The return to national control of the police is a welcome Sector Reform Monitor provided by The International Security Sector Advisory Team. development as it demonstrates the growing legitimacy of the country’s security Cover Photo: Members of the United Nations institutions and increasing local ownership over the SSR process. However, it Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) are accompanied by a group of local children as they conduct a security patrol in the Becora district of Dili. (UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe 2 THE CENTRE FOR INTERNAtiONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVAtiON comes with some risk; it was the Timorese government’s ABOUT THE SSR MONITOR mismanagement of the security sector that led to the 2006 crisis. The Security Sector Reform Monitor Although this edition of the Security Sector Reform Monitor: is a quarterly publication that tracks Timor-Leste will cover sector-wide developments and developments and trends in the ongoing trends, it will focus predominantly on police reform. security sector reform (SSR) processes of five countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Timor-Leste, Haiti and Southern Sudan. OF THE SECURITY SECTOR Every quarter, there will be separate editions for each case study country. Adopting a The primary institutions in Timor-Leste’s security sector holistic definition of the security sector, the are less than a decade old. Although these structures have Monitor will cover a wide range of actors, achieved some successes, they have also suffered setbacks, topics and themes, from reforms in the rule and cannot yet be considered fully mature. In March 2000 of law institutions and armed forces to the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) was formed. demilitarization activities and the role of In a contentious move, the United Nations Transitional non-statutory security and justice actors. Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (1999-2002) recruited much of the senior command for the force from Research for the Monitor is field-based: the senior ranks of the former Indonesian National Police a resident researcher in each case study (POLRI) (Hood, 2006: 64). country leads data collection and analysis, with support from desk-based analysts at In February 2001, the former independence guerrilla force, The Centre for International Governance the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste Innovation (CIGI). The same research (FALINTIL), was transformed into the national defence guidelines are employed for each country. force, the Força de Defeza de Timor Leste (F-FDTL). The All editions of the Monitor are subjected to manner in which UNTAET oversaw the establishment and an external peer review process in addition recruitment for the F-FDTL was also a source of discontent to our internal editorial review. in Timorese society, and was influential in the creation and expansion of politically activist veterans groups (Rees, 2004: 3). Clashes between the PNTL and veterans groups STAFF represented a serious security concern in 2002 and 2003. Mark Sedra Managing Editor UNTAET and successor missions failed to establish Nélson Belo Field Researcher civilian oversight structures for the PNTL and F-FDTL. Geoff Burt Project Coordinator As a result, the policy, legislative and budgeting capacity Carla Angulo Pasel Research Assistant of these organizations was virtually non-existent at the Brandon Currie Layout & Production Lauren Amundsen Copy Editor Security Sector reform monitor • timor-LeSte 3 time of independence. Just two years after assuming EDITORIal BOARD formal control over its security sector, the Timorese Eveline de Bruijn United Nations Mission government faced a major political and security crisis in in Sudan (UNMIS) April and May 2006. In January 2006, 159 soldiers of the F-FDTL signed a petition addressed to President Xanana Mark Downes International Security Gusmão complaining about discrimination in the armed Sector Advisory Team forces against soldiers from the country’s western region (ISSAT) (loromonu) in favour of those from the east (lorosae) (ICG, Rory Keane OECD International 2008). The lack of government action in response to the Network on Conflict and petition prompted the petitioners to leave their barracks Fragility and begin protesting. In March 2006, Brigadier-General Alexander Mayer-Rieckh After Conflict Group Taur Matan Ruak made the decision to dismiss 594 soldiers, almost half of the 1,435-member armed forces (IFP, 2009). Boubacar N’Diaye The College of Wooster Demonstrations in Dili over the dismissals led to violent and African Security clashes between elements of the F-FDTL and PNTL as well Sector Network (ASSN) as the petitioners themselves. In May 2006, Military Police Nader Nadery Afghanistan Independent Commander Major Alfredo Reinado, along with a number Human Rights of his subordinates and PNTL officers, broke ranks and left Commission the chain of command, taking with them their weapons. Gordon Peake Timor-Leste Police Although they did not formally join the petitioners they Development Program shared a common cause. The hostilities culminated with a Robert Perito United States Institute gun battle between F-FDTL and PNTL forces on May 25, of Peace (USIP) 2006, in and around the PNTL Headquarters building in central Dili (IFP, 2009).1 Edward Rees Peace Dividend Trust Serge Rumin After Conflict Group The crisis resulted in the displacement of a tenth of Timor- Yasmine Shamsie Wilfrid Laurier Leste’s population, the death of 37 people, the deepening University of politicized ethnic divisions and the destruction of thousands of properties. Moreover, the police had been Jake Sherman Center on International partially disbanded, marked by the disintegration of the Cooperation (CIC) Headquarters and Special Police Units, and half of the Graham Thompson UK Department army had deserted or been dismissed (ICG, 2008). for International Development (DFID) At the request of the government of Timor-Leste, the Australian-led Joint Task Force 631 was deployed on May United Nations mission, the UN Integrated Mission in 27-30, 2006 to restore security.2 In August 2006, a new Timor-Leste (UNMIT)3 was authorized with a mandate centred on police issues including both an executive policing 1 The battle was waged between the headquarters of the two institutions, located in proximity to each other in central Dili. 3 Established under UNSC Resolution 1704, UNMIT was originally given a six- 2 JTF 631 consisted of Australian, New Zealander and Malaysian troops – along month mandate. The mandate was most recently extended until February 2010 with a large contingent of Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers. with UNSC Resolution 1867. 4 THE CENTRE FOR INTERNAtiONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVAtiON role and a directive to assist in the reform, restructuring UNMIT and other international actors strongly criticized and rebuilding of the PNTL. It also included a mandate to the action, alleging that the unit was responsible for various undertake a comprehensive review of the security sector. human rights abuses, the population of Dili deemed the initiative a success. Within a month, nighttime vehicle and SECURITY ENVIRONMENT pedestrian traffic returned to the streets. On February
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency
    Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°87 Dili/Brussels, 9 February 2009 Timor-Leste: No Time for Complacency I. OVERVIEW saw a stream of human rights abuses, stemming from ill-discipline and a sense of being above the law. There are tensions between the Timorese and the international A year after the near-fatal shooting of President José security forces, with the Timorese police increasingly Ramos-Horta, security in Timor-Leste is strikingly resisting UN supervision. There are also signs of wor- improved. Armed rebels are no longer at large. The rying disdain for the justice system and civilian con- atmosphere on the streets of Dili is far less tense. The trol over the army. The police and army depend too government does not seem to be facing any serious heavily on a few individuals and on personal relation- political threat to its survival. It has, at least temporar- ships that have been able to hold the security forces ily, been able to address several of the most pressing together. security threats, in large part by buying off those it sees as potential troublemakers. Nevertheless, the cur- Presidential interventions in cases involving political rent period of calm is not cause for complacency. Secu- violence have undermined an already weak justice sys- rity sector reform is lagging, the justice system is weak, tem. They send a signal that those involved, especially the government shows signs of intolerance towards the elite, will not be held to account, creating resent- dissenting voices, and it has not got a grip on corrup- ment among the victims and failing to create a deter- tion.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the Official Parliamentary Delegation
    The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Report of the Official Parliamentary Delegation Visit to Papua New Guinea and East Timor October – November 2008 December 2008 © Commonwealth of Australia 2008 ISBN 978-1-74229-021-8 This document was prepared by the Parliamentary Education Office and printed by the Printing and Delivery Services section of the Department of the Senate, Parliament House, Canberra. ii Contents Preface ..........................................................................................1 Membership of the Delegation ....................................................4 1 Introduction ......................................................................... 5 Objectives ............................................................................................5 Acknowledgments ...............................................................................6 Papua New Guinea – background information ...................................13 East Timor – background information .................................................16 2 Delegation visit to Papua New Guinea ................................ 21 Strengthening ties between Australian and PNG Parliaments .............21 Meetings with Government ......................................................................... 21 Parliament-to-Parliament ties ...................................................................... 23 Strongim Gavman Program .......................................................................... 23 Contemporary political, economic
    [Show full text]
  • Idss Commentaries
    18/2008 RSIS COMMENTARIES RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from RSIS. Due recognition must be given to the author or authors and RSIS. Please email: [email protected] or call 6790 6982 to speak to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, Yang Razali Kassim. __________________________________________________________________________________________________ Assassination attempts in Timor-Leste: Tragedy of a Young Nation Loro Horta 21 February 2008 On 11 February 2008, renegade soldiers led by former army Major Alfredo Reinado attacked the presidential villa in Timor Leste in a pre-dawn attack. The president, Jose Ramos Horta, was seriously injured and hanged on to dear life. An incredulous nation asks how things could have gone this far. THE ATTEMPTS on the lives of Timor-Leste’s top two leaders – President Jose Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao -- were shocking and tragic. For a young nation still struggling to stand on its feet, the attempted killings were the most serious manifestation of the Timorese leadership’s failure in nation-building. Sadly, the perpetrators -- Major Alfredo Reinado and his group -- are the result of the political infighting between Prime Minister Gusmao and Fretilin, the former party in power, that characterised Timorese politics from the early days of its independence. Both Xanana and Fretilin created their own cadres of loyal supporters within the military and the police leading to the factionalisation of the security forces from the birth of the nation.
    [Show full text]
  • Timor-Leste's Veterans
    Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°129 Dili/Jakarta/Brussels, 18 November 2011 Timor-Leste’s Veterans: An Unfinished Struggle? not solved the problem. Judgment on difficult cases has I. OVERVIEW been deferred based on a belief that fraudulent claims will be revealed through denunciation once the lists are pub- More than ten years after the formation of Timor-Leste’s lished. Even with the option to appeal, new discontent is army and the demobilisation of the guerrilla force that being created that will require mediation. fought for independence, the struggle continues about how to pay tribute to the veterans. The increasingly wealthy state Beyond cash benefits, there are two areas where veterans’ has bought off the threat once posed by most dissidents demands for greater influence will have to be checked. The with an expensive cash benefits scheme and succeeded in first is the scope and shape of a proposed veterans’ council, engaging most veterans’ voices in mainstream politics. This whose primary role will be to consult on benefits as well approach has created a heavy financial burden and a com- as to offer a seal of institutional legitimacy. Some veterans plicated process of determining who is eligible that will hope it will be given an advisory dimension, allowing them create new tensions even as it resolves others. A greater to guide government policy and cementing their elite sta- challenge lies in containing pressures to give them dispro- tus. Such a broad role looks unlikely but the illusion that portionate political influence and a formal security role. veterans might be given more influence has likely in- A careful balance will need to be struck between paying creased the government’s appeal in advance of elections homage to heroes while allowing a younger generation of next year.
    [Show full text]
  • Timor-Leste Building Agribusiness Capacity in East Timor
    Timor-Leste Building Agribusiness Capacity in East Timor (BACET) Cooperative Agreement 486-A-00-06-00011-00 Quarterly Report July 01 - September 30, 2010 Submitted to: USAID/Timor-Leste Dili, Timor-Leste Angela Rodrigues Lopes da Cruz, Agreement Officer Technical Representative Submitted by: Land O’Lakes, Inc. International Development Division P. O. Box 64281 St. Paul, MN 55164-0281 U.S.A. October 2010 © Copyright 2010 by Land O'Lakes, Inc. All rights reserved. Building Agribusiness Capacity in East Timor CA # 486-A-00-06-00011-00 BUILDING AGRIBUSINESS CAPACITY IN EAST TIMOR USAID CA# 486-A-00-06-00011-00 Quarterly Report July - September 2010 Name of Project: Building Agribusiness Capacity in East Timor Locations: Fuiloro, Lautem District Maliana, Bobonaro District Natarbora, Manatutu District Dates of project: September 22, 2006 – September 30, 2011 Total estimated federal funding: $6,000,000 Total federal funding obligated: $6,000,000 Total project funds spent to September 30, 2010: $5,150,425 Contact in Timor-Leste: Michael J. Parr, Chief of Party Telephone: +670 331-2719 Mobile: +670 735-4382 E-mail: [email protected] Summary: BACET directly contributes to USAID/Timor- Leste’s agriculture and workforce development strategies for economic growth. though categorized as a capacity building and workforce development activity, many of the key activities of BACET have included infrastructure improvements, which are longer-term in nature. Similarly, teacher training and changed teaching methods have long-term impact. Quarterly Report July - September 2010 Land O'Lakes, Inc. Building Agribusiness Capacity in East Timor CA # 486-A-00-06-00011-00 Table of Contents 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Xanana Gusmão (Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão(De Verdadero Nombre José Alexandre Gusmão))
    Xanana Gusmão (Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão(de verdadero nombre José Alexandre Gusmão)) Timor-Leste, Primer ministro; ex-presidente de la República Duración del mandato: 08 de Agosto de 2007 - de de Nacimiento: Laleia, distrito de Manatuto, 20 de Junio de 1946 Partido político: CNRT Profesión : Funcionario público y periodista ResumenHijo de un profesor de escuela que le enseño el idioma portugués y con ancestro en parte portugués, se crió en el campo, junto con su hermano menor y sus cinco hermanas. Recibió la educación primaria en el colegio Santa Teresa de Ossu, en Vikeke, y la secundaria en dos centros regidos por los jesuitas, el seminario de Soibade y la misión Nuestra Señora de Fátima de Dare, cerca de Dili, capital de la entonces provincia portuguesa de ultramar de Timor Oriental. http://www.cidob.org 1 of 9 Biografía No obstante sus aptitudes académicas, la falta de recursos impidió que terminara el bachillerato en el Liceo Francisco Veira Machado de Dili. Desde 1962 se contrató en diversos trabajos, como mecanógrafo, ayudante de topógrafo, pescador, estibador portuario y docente en una escuela de la minoría china, hasta 1966, cuando consiguió un puesto de funcionario público en el Departamento de Silvicultura y Agricultura. En 1968 inició el servicio militar de tres años en el Ejército portugués y en 1969 contrajo matrimonio con Maria Emília Batista, con la que iba a tener dos hijos, Nito y Zenilda. Nacionalista moderado, en mayo de 1974, días después de la Revolución que terminó la dictadura salazarista en la metrópoli y dio paso a un gobierno descolonizador, Gusmão empezó a trabajar en la emisora de radio Voz de Timor al tiempo que se adhirió al recién fundado partido independentista Asociación Social Demócrata Timoresa (ASDT).
    [Show full text]
  • In Bissilau^Ajleu (Area) on 16Th This Month Falantil Ambushed the Enemy and Killed Ko Indonesian Soldiers
    - -'..-. •.-'• -•• -••. :.••'/; \s< ..:'-:: u. z^ T" .o::--. first floor, 232 Casilereagh St..Sydney NSW aoOO^ phoner-2b'l?0't Pecerabex * PRESS RELEASE " 1^,000 INDONESIANS KILLED SINCE DECEMBER 7 1975" Radio Maubere on November . 19 claimed in a broadcast that Falantil (National Liberation Forces of East Timor) "has killed over 1*f,000 Indonesian troops since December 7, 1975." This news was contained in a communique from the Ministry of Information and National Security , read in English in the form in which messages' were, previously sent to Telecom Darwin, Prime Minister Eraser ordered Telecom to no longer pass on messages received from Fretilin inside East - Timor on Outpost Radio Darwin. The last message sent on- by Telecom was on November 14. The text of the message read on Radio Maubere on November 19 is as follows ( due to poor reception, some parts were indecipherable and are marked by dots) Democratic Republic of East Timor Ministry of Information and National Security Indonesia is increasing strongly its aggression in East Timor. Through the territory ,fierce fighting is still going on. Falantil has killed over 14,000 Indonesian troops since December 7 1975. In Bissilau^Ajleu (area) on 16th this month Falantil ambushed the enemy and killed kO Indonesian soldiers. Indonesian warplanes,ships and heavy artillery are still bombarding the territory.... The peace can be restored by the withdrawal of all Indonesian soldiers. The The world should not remain indifferent to the human suffering of the people of ^ast Timor Indonesian authorities .... heroic people of East Timor under the leadership of Fretilin .... €* Fernandes, Minister of Information and National Security.
    [Show full text]
  • Timor-Leste After the UN
    CHAPTER 3 Past, Present and Future: Why the Past Matters Fidelis Magalhães Future is past’s child, and has the father’s face. This chapter presents my analysis of the current state of Timor-Leste’s development process. It is divided into the following sections. First, I discuss the tension between the theory and the realpolitik of state-building. Second, I discuss Timor-Leste as a country in the making. Third, I discuss the path to independence, the current Timorese leadership and the present political landscape. Fourth, I touch on the roles and the five-year plan of the president. Finally, I try to paint a picture of the future and identify challenges. The theory and the realpolitik of state-building I hold the view that most of the contemporary analyses on the socioeconomic development of Timor-Leste suffer from a serious historical deficiency. It is common for expert opinions to make claims about Timor-Leste’s current economic performance while seldom referring to the course on which the country has sailed. Like driving a car, one ought to have a rear mirror to look behind. If the mirror is too big the driver will be distracted; but without one, the car cannot be driven safely. Moreover, expert opinions seldom acknowledge that the development process is largely a political process. Beyond having the right economic theories and formulas, it is only through having strong political commitments and 31 A New Era? Timor-Leste After the UN sensitivities that a recently independent, economically underdeveloped country can progress. To succeed, it requires strong political will on the part of the leadership to build democratic governance based on the rule of law, yet at the same time ensure that the state is capable of creating consensus among main political forces that can otherwise be belligerent towards the state.
    [Show full text]
  • IPRIS Viewpoints
    76 IPRIS Viewpoints SEPTEMBER 2011 Taur Matan Ruak: the first candidate for the 2012 presidential elections in Timor Leste? PAUlo GorjÃO Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) On September 2nd, the Chief of General Staff of the Armed his presidential ambitions have the necessary political Forces of Timor Leste, Major-General Taur Matan Ruak, support to succeed. If Matan Ruak decides to run for resigned, claiming that after 36 years in FALINTIL and President it is possible that he might have the support of the F-FDTL, this was the right time “to go back to civilian the main ruling party, the National Congress for Timorese life”.1 On August 20th, the Timorese government had Reconstruction (CNRT), founded by José Alexandre officially disbanded the Armed Forces for the Liberation ‘Xanana’ Gusmão in 2007, as well as from other parties of Timor Leste (FALINTIL), who fought against the close to CNRT, such as the Social Democratic Party Indonesian occupation for more than two decades.2 In a (PSD). So far, Xanana has given no public signal on his way, the demobilization of the FALINTIL marks the end of position regarding Matan Ruak’s presidential ambitions. a cycle and, as such, the resignation of Matan Ruak fits Bearing in mind the men’s good personal relationship, as well in this process. well as the fact that Xanana is not close to Ramos-Horta, Yet, while ending his military career, the decision of it would not be a surprise if Xanana, sooner or later, Matan Ruak could also mark the beginning of his active reveals that he supports Matan Ruak’s presidential bid.
    [Show full text]
  • Unfulfilled Expectations Victims’ Perceptions of Justice and Reparations in Timor-Leste
    InternationalInternational Center Center Center for“These Transitional MedalsUnfulfilled Don’t Expectations: Feed Justice Us”: Victims’ Victims’ perceptions perceptions of of justice justice and and reparations reparations inin Timor-LesteTimor-Leste for Transitionalfor Transitional Justice Justice Unfulfilled Expectations Victims’ perceptions of justice and reparations in Timor-Leste February 2010 Picture/ Photo www.ictj.org 1 INISIATIVA ne’e HETAN APOIU HUSI UNIAUN EUROPEIA International Center Unfulfilled Expectations: Victims’ perceptions of justice and reparations in Timor-Leste for Transitional Justice Women victims resting in front of the CAVR office during a victims’ healing workshop, 2004. Photo by Poriaman Sitanggang for CAVR. www.ictj.org 2 International Center Unfulfilled Expectations: Victims’ perceptions of justice and reparations in Timor-Leste for Transitional Justice February 2010 Unfulfilled Expectations Victims’ perceptions of justice and reparations in Timor-Leste www.ictj.org 3 International Center Unfulfilled Expectations: Victims’ perceptions of justice and reparations in Timor-Leste for Transitional Justice ICTJ Brussels 11 Bischoffsheim Boulevard, 8th floor Brussels, 1000, Belgium Tel + 322 227 6140 Fax + 322 227 6148 Acknowledgement The ICTJ would like to thank the victims of the 1975 – 1999 conflict who participated in discussions and provided the ideas, opinions and information necessary for producing this research paper. ICTJ also thanks the organizations that facilitated the victims consultation workshops in the 13 districts in 2008, namely East Timor Women’s Communication Forum (Fokupers), HAK (Human Rights and Law Association) and the Commission for Justice and Peace of Baucau, and the Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat. ICTJ would like to acknowledge the primary authors of this paper, Naomi Kinsella and Manuela Leong Pereira.
    [Show full text]
  • Timor-Leste's Elections
    Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°134 Dili/Jakarta/Brussels, 21 February 2012 Timor-Leste’s Elections: Leaving Behind a Violent Past? I. OVERVIEW Political tensions have largely been tempered in the lead up to polls and the security situation remains stable despite a small uptick in violent crime. As campaign season ap- Timor-Leste’s 2012 general elections will provide an im- proaches and the political temperature rises, law enforce- portant test of the country’s resilience as it celebrates ten ment capacity remains weak and this means the sources years of independence. The governing coalition has under- of potential security risks are many. The UN police and taken few of the long-term reforms seen as necessary after the small International Stabilisation Force (ISF) can help the 2006 crisis but increased wealth has given many a grow- buttress crowd control and riot response, but the focus ing stake in stability. The outcome of polls remains difficult should be on other measures. Civil society groups have a to predict given the breadth of the field in each poll and role to play in helping educate voters and monitoring ad- the weakness of issue-based politics. Successful elections herence to codes of conduct, as well as shining light on any will be important not just toward securing the long-awaited proxy role in election-related intimidation or violence that withdrawal of the country’s UN peacekeeping mission but martial arts groups could play. Public relations should be also may give its leaders the confidence to confront its a key part of the planned joint operations centre for elec- many challenges.
    [Show full text]
  • East Timor Delegation Report
    The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Delegation to East Timor 3 to 5 September 2003 November 2003 Canberra © Commonwealth of Australia 1999 ISBN 0 642 78446 9 Contents Foreword.............................................................................................................................................vi Membership of the Delegation...........................................................................................................viii Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................ix List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ x 1: Introduction ..............................................................................................................1 Objectives and Scope............................................................................................................... 1 East Timor–background information ...................................................................................... 2 Government and politics ............................................................................................................. 2 Economic overview ..................................................................................................................... 4 Australia’s bilateral relations with East Timor.............................................................................
    [Show full text]