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Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis

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Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis !"#"$%&$'()*$\&,%-( Managing Crisis European and American Perspectives Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major, Henning Riecke, Editors Preventing Conflict, Managing Crisis European and American Perspectives Edited by Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major, Henning Riecke Gross, Eva; Hamilton, Daniel; Major, Claudia; Riecke, Henning, Preventing Conict, Managing Crisis. European and American Perspectives. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011. © 2011 Center for Transatlantic Relations; SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik—Deutsches Insti- tut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit / German Institute for International and Security A#airs; ZIF–Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze–Center for International Peace Operations; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik / German Council on Foreign Relations ; Free University Brussels. %e Crisis Management Toolbox. © SWP / ZIF 2011. All rights reserved. Center for Transatlantic Relations %e Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies %e Johns Hopkins University 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 525 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 663-5880 Fax (202) 663-5879 Email: [email protected] http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik www.dgap.org Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik www.swp-berlin.org Institute for European Studies Vrije Universiteit Brussel www.ies.be Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze www.zif-berlin.org ISBN 0-9848544-1-X ISBN 978-0-9848544-1-7 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................... v Introduction Changing Scenarios in Transatlantic Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major, Henning Riecke ..................................................... 1 Section I EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management Chapter 1 Failed States and the International Community 10 Years After 9/11: A Shifting Paradigm? ................................................................................. 9 John Herbst Chapter 2 Waiting for Soft Power: Why the EU Struggles with Civilian Crisis Management ............................. 15 Claudia Major and Martina Bail Chapter 3 EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories ............................................................................ 37 Eva Gross Section II Case Studies Chapter 4 Did the Afghanistan War Change Germany? ............................................ 49 Niels Annen Chapter 5 Protecting Civilians: The Politics of Intervention and Non-Intervention in Africa .................................................................................................. 55 Alex Vines Chapter 6 Western Crisis Response and the Question of Palestine ............................ 61 Alfred Pijpers Chapter 7 Sudan: The Prospect of Intervention and its Implications .......................... 67 Jon Temin Chapter 8 From Protecting to Rebuilding: The EU’s Role in Libya .............................. 73 Patryk Pawlak Chapter 9 From Afghanistan to the Arab Spring: A Critical Moment for Transatlantic Crisis Response ................................................................ 83 Glenn Nye Section III The Crisis Management Toolbox Chapter 10 The Crisis Management Toolbox—From Civilian Crisis Prevention to Peacebuilding: Principles, Actors, Instruments ....................................... 91 Claudia Major, Tobias Pietz, Elisabeth Schöndorf, Wanda Hummel List of Abbreviations ................................................................................... 138 About the Authors .......................................................................................... 141 About the Partners ........................................................................................ 145 Acknowledgements %is project succeeded because of the excellent Henning Riecke wants to thank the German partnership among our four institutions. %e Marshall Fund of the United States for sup- Center for Transatlantic Relations acknowl- porting the project entitled “Friends in Crisis,” edges the support of the European Union for on Western thinking regarding crisis reaction its participation and support of this e#ort as post-Afghanistan in 2010-2011. %e chapters part of the Center’s “Cornerstone” project on by Annen, Nye, Pawlak, Pijpers, Vines, and U.S.-EU relations. We thank the authors and Temin were written following a workshop at to the many colleagues who participated in the the GMF in Washington in the context of the deliberations and meetings that produced this project. He also wants to thank Kevin Francke, book, and Nikolas Foster, Peggy Irvine and Pe- Laura Lee Smith and Johannes Böhme and ter Lindeman for working with us on the many the reviewers for supporting the editing of the details related to the production of the book. manuscripts. Claudia Major would like to thank her chapter Our authors express their own views, and do co-author Martina Bail, her co-authors of the not necessarily re*ect views of any institution “Crisis Management Toolbox,” and other col- or government. leagues, including Christoph Baron, Tobias von Gienanth, Andreas Hirblinger, Markus Kaim, Stefan Köppe, Barbara Lippert, Jens Eva Gross Philip Meierjohann, Agnieszka Miadowicz, Stormy Mildner, Christian Mölling, Marco Daniel Hamilton Overhaus, Michael Paul, Volker Perthes, Wolf- gang Richter, Ilyas Saliba, Gundula Stein, Falk Claudia Major Tettweiler, Oliver %ränert, Alicia von Voss, and Almut Wieland-Karimi. Henning Riecke Introduction: Changing Scenarios in Transatlantic Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Eva Gross, Daniel Hamilton, Claudia Major, Henning Riecke %e past two decades have witnessed signi+- in pursuit of a comprehensive or integrated cant transatlantic engagement with crisis man- approach to crisis management. Consequently, agement. %e wars in the Balkans challenged the U.S. has developed capabilities within the transatlantic community not only to inter- State Department structures for planning and vene militarily but also to engage in post-con- coordinating con*ict response to strengthen *ict reconstruction and long-term institution the diplomatic and development components building e#orts. %e Rwandan genocide dem- of its international capabilities. Both partners onstrated the moral costs of non-intervention, also increasingly work together, either through just as the massacre in Srebrencia and other U.S. participation in CSDP missions or the war time atrocities during the Balkan wars EU working alongside or in partnership with shifted the focus to the plight of individuals U.S. or NATO operations in the Balkans and and civilians rather than the security of states. Afghanistan. Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq high- lighted how state failure could a#ect regional %e ongoing Arab transition and transatlan- as well as global security, but also the limita- tic responses, particularly with regard to the tions of military instruments in post-con*ict intervention in Libya and its aftermath, have intervention. %ese experiences collectively brought full circle many of the conceptual spurred the conceptual debate on the link be- debates and operational challenges outlined tween state failure and insecurity and discus- in the +rst paragraph. %ey also reinforce the sion about the appropriate mix of civilian and need for the EU and the U.S. to tailor and military means in crisis management. design individual and collective responses; and to improve the framework for cooperation. Both sides of the Atlantic also drew insti- At the same time, the global and transatlantic tutional and operational lessons from these contexts have changed signi+cantly since the experiences. %e EU created the Common early 1990s and the post-9/11 environment. Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and %is also applies to geopolitical conditions in amassed operational experience particularly the crisis regions. Both have important impli- in the civilian aspects of crisis management. cations for future transatlantic crisis response Since the launch of the +rst CSDP operation but also long-term engagement. in 2003, the EU has conducted 28 civilian and military operations around the globe, and First, economic constraints resulting from has attained signi+cant experience in civilian the +nancial crisis and subsequent austerity contributions to crisis management ranging programs, limit the scope of possible crisis from police, justice and border reform to the response missions in a long term perspective. integrated rule of law. %e U.S. for its part Second, alternative models of transition as- came increasingly to recognize the value of sistance demonstrate that the transatlantic civilian aspects of post-con*ict reconstruction community as a whole is no longer the only < P=>?>QY[Q\ C]Q^_[`Y, M{Q{\[Q\ C=[|[|: E}=]~>{Q {Q A>=[`{Q P>=|~>`Y[?>| actor in crisis management. Along with these consensus in favor of a comprehensive ap- changing circumstances—or perhaps because proach re*ects the operational lessons of of them—there is a noticeable lack of appetite post-con*ict reconstruction. Lacking politi- on the part of the transatlantic community to cal will and leadership, along with +nancial engage as a full-bore crisis manager, partly due constraints on the other hand, represent the to lack of political will to utilize the signi+cant pull factors—both at the level of nation-states capabilities that have been created over the as well as international organizations—that
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