Source: NARA, Series T-315, Reel 1621, 210 Inf. Div. Anlage 2 to KTB 3, Folder 45787/3, first frame 000443

210 Infantry Division O.U., am 21.August 1943 Abt. 1c 146/43 geh. Subject: Varanger area agent counter-action To: Commanding General, XIX (Mtn.) Army Corps

Final Report I. 1.) The suspected Russian−Norwegian agent activity in the Varanger area gained firm form for the first time through a statement of a prisoner of war (interrogation record No. 5001, 210 Inf. Div., of 20.4.43). In connection with the fact that about 60 communist Norwegians had emigrated from the Kiberg area to Russia before the beginning of the Russian campaign, it was to be assumed that the enemy would drop and maintain agent teams on the coastline of the Varanger region, consisting of those from Norway who had been lured to Russia and usually one Russian radio operator, and associated with a portion of the Norwegian population, especially in remote harbors, fishing houses, etc. (Order "Midnight Sun," paragraph 1). With regard to this, the division responded with the letter of 22.4.43 to Commander, Maritime Defense Kirkenes, A.O. [Abwehr Office] and S.D. [Security Office] Kirkenes, calling for urgent action to be taken jointly to combat enemy agents. With regard to this, radio direction-finding units available to the A.O. Kirkenes were successfully deployed to the remote portion of the Vardö area. 2.) However, the radio direction-finding reported only Finnish groups, which have now turned out to be the sought agent call signs, but were always rejected as such by the radio control center Berlin. Therefore, the direction-finding station remained the most appropriate means for finding agent stations, and they failed. 3.) The division addressed it in writing on 31.5.43 to the A.O. Kirkenes, again with the request for immediate increased agent monitoring of Syltefjord, as the suspicion grew stronger that the unoccupied space served by its troops served as a haunt [for agent activity]. 4.) When this, too, did not materialize, Operation Midnight Sun was carried out by the division with the request for support from Commander, Maritime Defense Kirkenes of the maritime sector. Here, the entire Varanger peninsula was combed through, the population was registered by name, and the males searched. At the same time, an urgent request was made to all visited parts of the population to report any suspicious observations in return for a reward from the nearest military service. [frame 000444] The action resulted in the arrest of 4 suspects, but only possession of prohibited weapons could be proven. In addition, a handwritten inflammatory leaflet was found with the "10 Commandments in the Middle of Norway" on it in Syltefjord, which was later also found at radio stations 1 and 2. In addition, during the inspections of the boats N K J 10 and 11 in Kongsfjord, Batsfjord, and Syltefjord, agitated behavior of some Norwegians was noticeable. The action lasted from 2.−9.7.43. II. On 10.7.43, a meeting was held at Maritime Command Kirkenes on the 9.7.43 order of Admiral Polar Coast. There were Luftwaffe observations (straight into Kongsfjord, flights of enemy aircraft in fjords) and the fact that enemy attacks on convoys in Syltefjord were often carried out by submarines from the landward side. Result: Operation "Wildente [wild duck]," which was commissioned by the head of the port security flotilla, with participation of 4/448 in coordination with 210 Inf. Division from the landward side. Start: 12.7.43, 00.00 hours. III. Finding the radio stations: 1. A search of Kongsfjord led to the discovery of radio station 4 on 13 and 14 July by naval forces of the harbor protection flotilla. 2. On 13.7.43, at 01.10 hours, observation of parachute jumps or parachute drops in Syltefjord near the populated area Ut-Syltefjord. Norwegian citizens Anna Mathisen in Ut-Syltefjord made a telephone call to the garrison commander at Havningberg. Thereupon Operation "Wild Duck" was extended from Syltefjord by the participating Havningberg battery into the countryside. This search led to finding radio station 2 on March 14, 1943 by marine troops. 3. Radio station 1. Through an MPHS [acronym for radio intercept service] -intercepted evidence pointing to an enemy radio station in Persfjord, a search was conducted at Persfjord. The apprehension of the Russian radio operator Jessipov, who was moving suspiciously on the shore at Seeglodden, led to the detection of the radio station 1. 4. Radio station 3: Based on the statement of the captured Loe, the transfer of radio station 4 from the west bank of Kongsfjord to the east bank of Kongsfjord had to be assumed. With regard to this, on 22.7.43 the eastern shore Kongsfjord was searched by two 210 Inf. Div. infantry squads from the landward side, with the requested participation of two outpost boats from the sea side. An infantry squad found radio station 3 on 23.7.43. 5. Radio station 5: The enemy parachute drop and message from three Norwegian workers from the Kongsfjord Electric Works led to the concentric use of three infantry squads around Buevandet [high ridgeline in central Varanger Peninsula]. Result: Detection by the infantry search unit of radio station 5, consisting of a shelter made of stone and tar paper [frame 000445] with mattresses, kitchen appliances, canned goods and 9 new and 9 nearby hidden anode batteries. Apparently prepared by hand from a soft spot. [This might be “dug by hand in a soft spot” – trans.] 6. The realization of the close connection between radio stations and the population caused 210 Inf. Div. ostentatiously to withdraw the infantry squads used at radio stations 1 and 2, in order for the returning displaced agents to recover. Results: On 26.7.43, 21.00 hours, an encounter occurred at radio station 1 between marine scout troops landed ashore and 3 agents who had returned to radio station 1. The agents opened fire and were killed. Two additional radio sets and important radio recordings were recovered. 7. At the northeast exit of Syltefjord, infantry search squads found parachutes and other booty objects on 21.7.43, confirming the observation of parachute drops. 8. The 210th Inf. Div. further conducted the following: a) Combed the entire coastal strip of the northern shore of Varanger Peninsula in depth and placed ambush scout squads in the spaces of the revealed radio links. b) Conducted raids along the southeast coast of Varanger Peninsula, Kiberg−Vadsö. Combed the interior of Varanger Peninsula, with a focus on the Buevandet−Skibskjollen massif, which is to be regarded as alternative spaces for agents, according to the statement of prisoner Loe. c) Ambush scout squads along dirt paths in the interior of Varanger Peninsula. d) Roadside checks from Svartnes–Vadsö–Tana. e) Inspection of boats in Tanafjord. f) Engagement of reindeer herd guides inside Varanger Peninsula and other people for rewards. II. Carrying out the actions in close cooperation between Marine and 210 Inf. Division, since 15.7.43, a communications center was created in Vardö by 210 Inf. Div. under the division Ic with the order: central viewing and evaluation of the booty material, captive interrogations, and uncovering the spy network in depth. At this facility were the AO of the Maritime Command, Kirkenes, Capt. Lt. Axmann, and head of MPHS, Capt. Lt. Bankstahl. In the course of the investigations carried out in cooperation with SD, the main contributors to radio stations 1, 3, and 4 were identified. The informers to radio station 1 were identified by the division while using infantry squads from sea and landward sides. [frame 000446] The entire male population of Persfjord was detained and by comparison with the [account of] prisoner Jessipov and discovered radio conversations, the informants were identified. In total, 41 Norwegian nationals were arrested. The investigation led to clear conviction for 16 of them. The result of the investigation is referenced in the content of the verdicts given on 17.8.43 and on 18.8 with regard to the death penalty, which fully covers the result of the investigation. The remaining arrested have been transferred to a labor camp of SD Lerpolen. It is not sufficient for a perfect judicial sentence. However, the suspicions are so urgent that release is no longer in question. This also applies to the detained district Doctor Bremer and Constable Rabas from Berlevaag. Both were found by surprise raid [to be in possession of] extensive communist material. Dr. Bremer adds that the informer Ananiassen from Berlevaag has carried out trips on his behalf, during which he witnessed espionage results. Despite sustained, in-depth hearings, both are stubbornly denying each other’s account. With this, the actions have found their provisional conclusion. Five agents are still at large. It can be assumed that the Russians still have a considerable number of agents available. When it comes to the meaning of the matter, the use of new agents can certainly be expected. With this in mind, the following requirements must be met in large- scale preventive measures for the future: 1. Abwehr offices. a) Radio direction finding. Despite the failure of the AO Kirkenes radio-intercept effort, which is not least due to the negative opinion of radio center Berlin back to the intercepted radio messages, it is stated that the best means for detecting hostile radio stations is radio direction finding. The rough tracking must be done by the MPHS. According to information from the head of the MPHS, recovery of the DF station is expected in about one week. In addition, the results of the radio equipment of the Luftwaffe will be used. Building on this, the radio-direction-finding unit of AO Kirkenes, which is intended for close and precise direction finding, will be set up. All this requires the constant, closest personal contact of these agencies to ensure success. b) Agent use. With regard to the use of agents, a fundamental change must take place, in accordance with our specification of the current Abwehr Office. Although Kirkenes has about 50 of its own agents in the Kirkenes area, only 2 or 3 are on the Arctic Sea coast, otherwise known as V.S. Its members are dispassionate. The investigation has shown that even women came to visit the radio station 4, and adolescents had access and were used as messengers, in addition to a lot of drinking and relaxed life! With regard to radio station 2, the arrested Harald Thorbjensen even stated that in winter ‘42, the existence of the radio station was already being openly discussed among the Norwegian Wehrmacht employees in Havningsberg. [frame 000447] Under these circumstances, it would have been an easy task to get the radio station by the track with well-organized use of its own agents. The construction of such an agent network requires a doubly long time, which unfortunately has gone unused. Whether it is possible to attract a few but good agents in a short time seems doubtful. However, given the urgency of the task, the Abwehr Office will have to consider whether it is not the case in this situation to proceed according to the principle "a lot if less well," rather than the principle otherwise in German agent use: "little and good." Expect at least a constant turnover of the enemy agents. In any case, it is to be demanded that a V-man [informant] is present in each small settlement of the Varanger area. Regardless of this, the AO will not be afraid to seek out a suitable man among those who are imprisoned, who will be left out in the world, but in reality will be employed as a paid agent. 2.) R.K. Kirkenes Department (S.D.) a) Evacuation: The agents have always been in contact with population centers. That would be impossible if the entire north Varangian coast were evacuated. This would make the information network in the depths of the country difficult, but not impossible. It is certain that the agents themselves were often away from their radio stations for days on the go, to gather information from far away. Moreover, the evacuation of the traffic is in no way suitable. On the other hand, an evacuation would have to be consistently carried out, as in the settlements burned down or removed; otherwise they are the best havens for enemy agents. The following express the reasons against an evacuation: aa) Complete occupation of the northern Varanger Peninsula coast by German troops is not possible. bb) Then, moreover, the enemy is offered the vast empty space for operational activities and the establishment of hideouts as before, where he has to reckon with population centers that betray him. cc) It is also a fact that the agents have taken heed to individual parts of the population, both in Persfjord and in the Kongsfjord area. dd) However, the following should be decisive: 1.) Radio station 2 on (Syltevik) would never have been discovered, if the message about parachute drops had not come from the population. Likewise, radio station 5 on the Buevandet would not have been found, unless the report of three Norwegian workers from the Kongsfjord Electric Works about parachute drops that had taken place in this area. 2.) In addition, it has to be stated that in several cases since the beginning of this year, both Russian airmen and escaped prisoners of war have been seized by reports from the Norwegian population. [frame 000448] It is best to grasp the perfectly existing parts of the population, who are well-disposed to us, in a correct way to draw closer to us, without exposing them to differently minded people. To this are called: 1.) The Abwehr services, 2.) The R.K. Department Kirkenes (S.D.) 3.) The Wehrmacht. The best remedy here is to grant rewards in the form of currency and enjoyment in abundant amounts. However, without consideration and without naming the public in order to avoid fear of reprisals of other-minded people. Dissemination of the fact that this type of adversary is defeated, anyway, is best done by whispering propaganda, as in the Varanger area a rumor grows from mouth to mouth with almost uncanny speed. The division hereby declares against such a measure by weighing all the factors that favor evacuation. The principle must be: "Not hostile and without the population, but with the population, fight against the enemy agents." b) Partial evacuation: 1.) Local, partial evacuation around Persfjord and Syltefjord is prohibited for the same reasons as a total evacuation of the north coast of the Varanger Peninsula. After evacuation of the civilian population, these fjords offer themselves as hiding places. 2.) An absolute requirement, however, is the complete cleansing of the Varanger area: a) Arrest all family members of the 41, as all are suspected that they have been in contact with agents and are reconnecting with agents during these agents’ re- establishment. b) Completely clear the entire Varanger area of all elements of communist nature. It is imperative that these requirements be met, as agents apparently come over from Russia with addresses of communists and other compliant elements. c) By means of monitoring the population of the coastal area: On the entire north coast of the Varanger Peninsula, thus far only Vardö has an S.D post. In order to be able to register this space effectively, the creation of one post in each of Berlevaag and Mehavn may be too high as a minimum requirement.

3.) 210 Infantry Division: General surveillance of the coastal area: a) The coastal scout teams constantly being sent out by coastal batteries have failed. It is not acceptable that for a year and a half, only a few kilometers away from the Kongsfjord battery, an enemy radio station would pass unnoticed, which, moreover, was relocated just before the battery was moved from one shore to the other. [frame 000449] The same applies to radio station 2 (Syltevik) for Battery Havningsberg. This can only be explained by the fact that the scout troops’ actions were carried out mechanically, while in this case hunting-like execution using all lists is necessary, whereby searches of the house cannot be limited to short greetings of the inhabitants and verification of the identity cards that each agent has. Rather, it requires an in-depth search of the properties under confiscation and examination of every piece of paperwork found. Furthermore, the environment of the houses and the pursuit of every beaten path and every trace that leads away from the house. Only then can [success] be expected. In addition, individual elements of the population are attracted by gifts of all means of enjoyment, in the same way as the agents have done. This must be in the hands of the battery chiefs, whose task area also includes this path of the depiction of the points of interest.

b) On the basis of these experiences, the coastal scout teams should be utilized in reinforced strength. c) In addition, unannounced operations of army and navy assets rooted in concrete indicators by radio-bearing or other observations. d) Occupation of Persfjord: Persfjord is an ideal place for the enemy, both for landing operations and for the construction of radio shelters. Good landing possibilities, excellent hideouts. Suitable as a base: Proestnaeringen on the east bank of Persfjord – good possibility of observation: good possibility of evasion, possibility of accommodation. Mission for base: monitor Persfjord for landing attempts and agent operations. Strength: 2 groups. Telephone and radio connections to the Smelrören base. In case of a stronger enemy strike: avoid the Smelrören base. e) Syltefjord: Not suitable for landing operations due to steep slopes and insurmountable backcountry terrain. Offers only a hiding place. Therefore, military occupancy cannot be justified. Occupation by infantry for training for several days at irregular intervals is likely to be sufficient and suitable means to control the population. 4.) Corps information officer: a) Basic restriction of Norwegian language to constables, doctors, and exchanges with the Wehrmacht (notice 1). b) Leaving Hamna without military protection is not possible, c) Sufficient control of the telephone network on the Arctic Sea coast can be achieved: 1.) Suspension of Norwegian telephone service in Persfjord. Surveillance has shown that the switchboard is almost only used by one family for superfluous calls. 2.) Three Norwegian telephone lines run via Hamna (Syltefjord): nr. 841, 830, 873, and a further 83. Line 841 [goes to] Vardö-Havningsberg-Makur to Wehrmacht / Norwegian subscribers. Havningsberg-Makur [subscribers] can talk about the German Wehrmacht. Disconnect Hamna and Syltefjord. 3.) Hamna-Nastefjord is also dispensable, thus switch [that line] off. 4.) For Norwegian intervention of Hamna and Syltefjord remain thus 830 Vardö- Hamna and 836 (Hamna-Syltefjord). In regard to Hamna-Syltefjord, with the current occupation of Syltefjord by the Mathisen family, an excellent impression is made and the reported parachute drops in Syltefjord are harmless. For the rest, interruption only via the administration of Hamna-Vardo (830) is therefore necessary in Vardö. It is carried out by A.O. Kirkenes according to the regulation in the Hammerfest area, where the use of three monitoring inspectors by A.O. is set up. 5.) Commandant, Kirkenes Maritime Defense: a) Constant monitoring of the coasts of the Varanger Peninsula, approaching remote fishing villages which are not accessible from land side. b) Logging of all seagoing vessels by port captains and ensure the control of all voyages. Constant checks! c) Fast, seaworthy vessels for harbor commanders at Vadsö-Vardö-Berlevaag to follow suspicious vessels. (d) Establishment of port monitoring centers in Havningsberg-Batsfjord-Berlevaag and Hamvik. e) Participation in large operations on the sea front. 6) Aviation Leader North (east): a) Conduct clearance flights along suspicious trails [wakes] in clear winter weather. b) Report suspicious convoys or boats [moving toward] Fisher Peninsula or vice versa. c) Report of submarine hiding places. d) Report observations of the measuring instruments with regard to impacts in fjords, etc. Aerial photographs! 7) Rescue Service: Rescue area Kirkenes reaches to Nordkyn. A rescue cutter with three-man Norwegian crew available. Radiotelephone with 200 km range. Control only by means of a testing. Fixed speaking times. However already 2 x transmission outside the time established. With regard to this, uncontrolled voice traffic is prohibited. Intent – A.O. Kirkenes, do not to complain about it. V-man [German informant] as radio operator on the boat. Do not complain about it. Do not expect any other surveillance of the radio-telephone traffic at the moment of transmission by the Norwegians. Unannounced interrogation of the crew by S.D. Kirkenes on the boat upon return of the boat Then there is a proposal for basic regulation on the whole of the Norwegian area, which must be enforced if other successes of all other measures of abatement are not to be called into question. VI. Norwegian Wehrmacht Employees: After the investigations, these are to be considered as particularly dangerous. Either they betray secrets themselves or agents that have become accessible to them get out of them what they need. They therefore have to be subject to considerably stringent and not solicitous control. The current regulation is that in case of doubt, the services which employ the Norwegian workers contact the SD. It is to be required that in each case the personal belongings of the employed Norwegian workers are reported and in the same way by Wehrmacht, Organization Todt, and other services. [frame 000451 Independently of this, the employing service itself must constantly monitor the workers. This is especially true for those workers who frequently change their job! (compare Hakon notebook, page 3). Surprise searches, monitoring of traffic of Norwegian workers. For troops of the 210 Inf. Div., until further notification of all Wehrmacht workers to Division Ic. VII. Norwegian female employees: Call for extra caution on this! As far as employment requires, more frequent change! No less dangerous is contact of German soldiers with Norwegian female persons! Transport will not be stopped, with some regard for the psychologically detrimental effect of such a ban on the Norwegian population. However, the unit leader tirelessly demands all the more, against the trustworthiness that is so peculiar to the German soldiers. VIII. Telephone connection service: Noteworthy are the multiple agents' announcements contained in the Hotel Germania senior officer facilities in the in Vardö. This is consistent with the statement last made by the Commander-in-Chief in Kiberg that the enemy conducts an attack on higher officers at the time of the announced visit. Requirement: Notifying higher officers only by g.Kdos [secret, matter pertaining to the command], Telex, or under pseudonyms, as do the Russians. IX. Proposals for future operations: 1.) According to the available documents, there can be no doubt that a large number of informants are still to be found in the Kirkenes area. It is also certain that informants are also in other places. However, handout transfer orders for selected persons are not available. The investigations will continue to be carried out by the SD, with ongoing notification of the division's Ic. Conducting new searches is not possible at the moment. According to the findings made, the chilling effects of the reported verdicts on the population are great. In view of this, it is quite likely that a number of informants will cease activity. This calls into question any raids that only drive such elements into the arms of the enemy. This does not hinder the fact that, without being noticed by the public, the investigations will be continued and the personal data initiated and recorded by the 210 Inf. Div. is completed. On the contrary, this inconspicuous continuation of investigations puts the hostile intelligence service in doubt about the intended purposes. In due course, an unannounced review of the dock workers in Kirkenes harbor and the cutter pilots, who point out some suspicions, will be taken into consideration. 2.) There are no concerns about operations to detect further radio links on the coast. [frame 000452] The following operations are postponed: 1. Northwest exit of Petsamo fjord. It is very likely that a Russian agent is positioned there. In addition to the frequent flashing signs that were observed there, a low-flying airplane with a drop was observed in the autumn of the year, without any further sightings. These are quite like similar observations in Syltefjord. (Kong Oskar II Chapel). 2. Jakobselven area: Known communist hideout. Listed as an intermediary radio station for the monitoriing of Petsamo [vessel] traffic. 3.Nordkyn area: In as much as radio station 4 had espionage sections up to and including Tanafjord, it seems reasonable to assume that additional radio stations are set up in the Nordkyn area for the purpose of convoy detection. 4. Probable three operations are likely to be larger operations with the simultaneous use of land and sea. X. Control of enemy intelligence. Irrespective of this, the available radio texts provide a wealth of possibilities for determining whether and to what extent hostile after-hours service still exists or revives and where enemy informants are placed. Faked transmission of incorrect séance and lead times, pending open telephone notification of the arrival of senior officers, etc., can only succeed in close agreement between all three parts of the Wehrmacht and the Abwehr Center. Basis of discussion for Abwehr clearance at the general command. XI. Finally, in the context of the total defense of the corps area, it should be noted that the agents positioned at the radio stations of the Varanger area are deployed by the former Border Guards Regiment 82, as are the agents who have been attacked on the southern flank of Litsa front and the Eismeerstrasse. In view of this, it can be assumed that the enemy maintains a similar network on the Eismeerstrasse, in accordance with the network of hideouts on the Arctic Sea coast, so that he has a complete control of the entire supply traffic on the two access roads to the corps. It should be considered to carry out a search for radio stations along the Eismeerstrasse in accordance with the actions at the Arctic Sea coast.

/signature/ Lieutenant Colonel