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NARA, Series T-315, Reel 1621, 210 Inf. Div. Anlage 2 to KTB 3, Folder 45787/3, First Frame 000443

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NARA, Series T-315, Reel 1621, 210 Inf. Div. Anlage 2 to KTB 3, Folder 45787/3, First Frame 000443 Source: NARA, Series T-315, Reel 1621, 210 Inf. Div. Anlage 2 to KTB 3, Folder 45787/3, first frame 000443 210 Infantry Division O.U., am 21.August 1943 Abt. 1c 146/43 geh. Subject: Varanger area agent counter-action To: Commanding General, XIX (Mtn.) Army Corps Final Report I. 1.) The suspected Russian−Norwegian agent activity in the Varanger area gained firm form for the first time through a statement of a prisoner of war (interrogation record No. 5001, 210 Inf. Div., of 20.4.43). In connection with the fact that about 60 communist Norwegians had emigrated from the Kiberg area to Russia before the beginning of the Russian campaign, it was to be assumed that the enemy would drop and maintain agent teams on the coastline of the Varanger region, consisting of those from Norway who had been lured to Russia and usually one Russian radio operator, and associated with a portion of the Norwegian population, especially in remote harbors, fishing houses, etc. (Order "Midnight Sun," paragraph 1). With regard to this, the division responded with the letter of 22.4.43 to Commander, Maritime Defense Kirkenes, A.O. [Abwehr Office] and S.D. [Security Office] Kirkenes, calling for urgent action to be taken jointly to combat enemy agents. With regard to this, radio direction-finding units available to the A.O. Kirkenes were successfully deployed to the remote portion of the Vardö area. 2.) However, the radio direction-finding reported only Finnish groups, which have now turned out to be the sought agent call signs, but were always rejected as such by the radio control center Berlin. Therefore, the direction-finding station remained the most appropriate means for finding agent stations, and they failed. 3.) The division addressed it in writing on 31.5.43 to the A.O. Kirkenes, again with the request for immediate increased agent monitoring of Syltefjord, as the suspicion grew stronger that the unoccupied space served by its troops served as a haunt [for agent activity]. 4.) When this, too, did not materialize, Operation Midnight Sun was carried out by the division with the request for support from Commander, Maritime Defense Kirkenes of the maritime sector. Here, the entire Varanger peninsula was combed through, the population was registered by name, and the males searched. At the same time, an urgent request was made to all visited parts of the population to report any suspicious observations in return for a reward from the nearest military service. [frame 000444] The action resulted in the arrest of 4 suspects, but only possession of prohibited weapons could be proven. In addition, a handwritten inflammatory leaflet was found with the "10 Commandments in the Middle of Norway" on it in Syltefjord, which was later also found at radio stations 1 and 2. In addition, during the inspections of the boats N K J 10 and 11 in Kongsfjord, Batsfjord, and Syltefjord, agitated behavior of some Norwegians was noticeable. The action lasted from 2.−9.7.43. II. On 10.7.43, a meeting was held at Maritime Command Kirkenes on the 9.7.43 order of Admiral Polar Coast. There were Luftwaffe observations (straight into Kongsfjord, flights of enemy aircraft in fjords) and the fact that enemy attacks on convoys in Syltefjord were often carried out by submarines from the landward side. Result: Operation "Wildente [wild duck]," which was commissioned by the head of the port security flotilla, with participation of 4/448 in coordination with 210 Inf. Division from the landward side. Start: 12.7.43, 00.00 hours. III. Finding the radio stations: 1. A search of Kongsfjord led to the discovery of radio station 4 on 13 and 14 July by naval forces of the harbor protection flotilla. 2. On 13.7.43, at 01.10 hours, observation of parachute jumps or parachute drops in Syltefjord near the populated area Ut-Syltefjord. Norwegian citizens Anna Mathisen in Ut-Syltefjord made a telephone call to the garrison commander at Havningberg. Thereupon Operation "Wild Duck" was extended from Syltefjord by the participating Havningberg battery into the countryside. This search led to finding radio station 2 on March 14, 1943 by marine troops. 3. Radio station 1. Through an MPHS [acronym for radio intercept service] -intercepted evidence pointing to an enemy radio station in Persfjord, a search was conducted at Persfjord. The apprehension of the Russian radio operator Jessipov, who was moving suspiciously on the shore at Seeglodden, led to the detection of the radio station 1. 4. Radio station 3: Based on the statement of the captured Loe, the transfer of radio station 4 from the west bank of Kongsfjord to the east bank of Kongsfjord had to be assumed. With regard to this, on 22.7.43 the eastern shore Kongsfjord was searched by two 210 Inf. Div. infantry squads from the landward side, with the requested participation of two outpost boats from the sea side. An infantry squad found radio station 3 on 23.7.43. 5. Radio station 5: The enemy parachute drop and message from three Norwegian workers from the Kongsfjord Electric Works led to the concentric use of three infantry squads around Buevandet [high ridgeline in central Varanger Peninsula]. Result: Detection by the infantry search unit of radio station 5, consisting of a shelter made of stone and tar paper [frame 000445] with mattresses, kitchen appliances, canned goods and 9 new and 9 nearby hidden anode batteries. Apparently prepared by hand from a soft spot. [This might be “dug by hand in a soft spot” – trans.] 6. The realization of the close connection between radio stations and the population caused 210 Inf. Div. ostentatiously to withdraw the infantry squads used at radio stations 1 and 2, in order for the returning displaced agents to recover. Results: On 26.7.43, 21.00 hours, an encounter occurred at radio station 1 between marine scout troops landed ashore and 3 agents who had returned to radio station 1. The agents opened fire and were killed. Two additional radio sets and important radio recordings were recovered. 7. At the northeast exit of Syltefjord, infantry search squads found parachutes and other booty objects on 21.7.43, confirming the observation of parachute drops. 8. The 210th Inf. Div. further conducted the following: a) Combed the entire coastal strip of the northern shore of Varanger Peninsula in depth and placed ambush scout squads in the spaces of the revealed radio links. b) Conducted raids along the southeast coast of Varanger Peninsula, Kiberg−Vadsö. Combed the interior of Varanger Peninsula, with a focus on the Buevandet−Skibskjollen massif, which is to be regarded as alternative spaces for agents, according to the statement of prisoner Loe. c) Ambush scout squads along dirt paths in the interior of Varanger Peninsula. d) Roadside checks from Svartnes–Vadsö–Tana. e) Inspection of boats in Tanafjord. f) Engagement of reindeer herd guides inside Varanger Peninsula and other people for rewards. II. Carrying out the actions in close cooperation between Marine and 210 Inf. Division, since 15.7.43, a communications center was created in Vardö by 210 Inf. Div. under the division Ic with the order: central viewing and evaluation of the booty material, captive interrogations, and uncovering the spy network in depth. At this facility were the AO of the Maritime Command, Kirkenes, Capt. Lt. Axmann, and head of MPHS, Capt. Lt. Bankstahl. In the course of the investigations carried out in cooperation with SD, the main contributors to radio stations 1, 3, and 4 were identified. The informers to radio station 1 were identified by the division while using infantry squads from sea and landward sides. [frame 000446] The entire male population of Persfjord was detained and by comparison with the [account of] prisoner Jessipov and discovered radio conversations, the informants were identified. In total, 41 Norwegian nationals were arrested. The investigation led to clear conviction for 16 of them. The result of the investigation is referenced in the content of the verdicts given on 17.8.43 and on 18.8 with regard to the death penalty, which fully covers the result of the investigation. The remaining arrested have been transferred to a labor camp of SD Lerpolen. It is not sufficient for a perfect judicial sentence. However, the suspicions are so urgent that release is no longer in question. This also applies to the detained district Doctor Bremer and Constable Rabas from Berlevaag. Both were found by surprise raid [to be in possession of] extensive communist material. Dr. Bremer adds that the informer Ananiassen from Berlevaag has carried out trips on his behalf, during which he witnessed espionage results. Despite sustained, in-depth hearings, both are stubbornly denying each other’s account. With this, the actions have found their provisional conclusion. Five agents are still at large. It can be assumed that the Russians still have a considerable number of agents available. When it comes to the meaning of the matter, the use of new agents can certainly be expected. With this in mind, the following requirements must be met in large- scale preventive measures for the future: 1. Abwehr offices. a) Radio direction finding. Despite the failure of the AO Kirkenes radio-intercept effort, which is not least due to the negative opinion of radio center Berlin back to the intercepted radio messages, it is stated that the best means for detecting hostile radio stations is radio direction finding. The rough tracking must be done by the MPHS. According to information from the head of the MPHS, recovery of the DF station is expected in about one week.
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