KV 2/94 – KV 2/99

Dr. Walter Schellenberg

Survey

It has to be noticed, that currently we have to deal with the conversion of the German military Abwehr into the S.S. controlled Amt VI Mil. Amt. The triggering event was the defection of the couple Vermehren to the British in Istanbul, on 7-8 February 1944. Hitler responded (on 12 February) furiously and ordered:- that from- now-on the Abwehr should become headed by the R.S.H.A. Admiral Canaris was instantly dismissed, and a merging period being initiated. The big blow was the failed assassination attempt on Hitler, on 20 July 1944. Because the Abwehr was heavily involved in this plot against Hitler, its leadership was liquidated. Now considering my current ethic dilemma: We encounter quite trustworthy statements. Though, some men have been, in a period of their lives, more or less, engaged in atrocities; or at least being responsible for it. For whatever reasons, they (often) have become involved in so-called “Einsatz-Gruppen” in Russia. Their doings have been well documented. Though, my problem:- they constitute, quite often, the only reliable source of eyewitnesses information; in the fields we are currently dealing with. Astonishing, quite many of these men were in the possession of an University Degree and often received a PhD as well; we have to bear this always in mind. Which, by the way, being much easier - than to step-down at crucial moments in life; of which’s implications they might not have been aware of, when it actually occurred. Albeit, that the sphere in which it all happened - should have triggered deep moral considerations. Ignorance? Are they the only ones to be blamed? On the other hand, there were also (some) personalities concerned in this bleak environment, whom, for what ever circumstance, weren’t directly involved in crimes against humanity; for instance:- Schellenberg and Wirsing; but they bore, nevertheless, responsibility. Therefore: our engagement - in unrevealing dark aspects of history - does still make sense.

What has been reproduced, is my selection, out-off the huge pile of pages!

I have added, on places where, in my perception, it is necessary comments. These are always recognisable by, for instance: (xxx) or (AOB, xxx); albeit that sometimes I use red or green text colours.

By Arthur O. Bauer

Please do not reproduce the content of this document, as partially Crown Copyright is still due; and when, do it for your private use only.

Schellenberg Dr. Walter KV 2/94 PF 600561 Notice also: https://de.wikipedia.org/Walter_Schellenberg_(SS-Mitglied) *16 Januar 1910 in Saarbrücken; † 31 März 1952 in Turin, Italien https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Schellenberg

KV 2/94-1, pages 2 + 3

28.7.42 Extract from R.S.S. (Radio Security Service) note on the German S.D. mentioning Schellenberg 2.11.42 Extract from “Who’s Who in Group 13” giving info: om Schellenberg @ Jurgenssohn,

29.1.43 M.S.S. (Most Secret Source = Enigma related source) History sheet re Schellenberg Filed 3.3.47 27.8.43 Extract from Memorandum of Information on Sicherheitsdienst obtained from Major Melland (M.I.14) 30.8.43 Extract from Interrogation of Rockstroh. Giving inf: on Mayr Group (Franz Mayr in Persia: http://www.cdvandt.org/mayr-case.htm), and mentioning Schellenberg,

24.11.43 Extract from R.I.S. (Radio Intelligence Service) Report on Sicherheitsdienst (Amt VI) Operations, mentioning Schellenberg.

29.11.43 Extract from letter from S.I.S. (M.I.6.) re Hellmuth (http://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-1722-1724-hellmuth.htm), mentioning Schellenberg.

9.12.43 Extract from Interrogation of Franz Mayr (http://www.cdvandt.org/mayr- case.htm) giving information on S.D. and from Amt VI, (?) Col. (SS- Brigadeführer = Generalelutnant)

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KV 2/94-1, page 7

21.11.44 Copy of report on the Venlo Incident (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venlo- Zwischenfall ) (AOB, of 9 November 1939)(the capture of Major Stevens and Captain Payne Best) forwarded by Camp 020 re Schellenberg KV 2/94-1, page 9

D.D.G. Please see 50a. It is I think important that Schellenberg should be brought here if and when he is captured, as he is undoubtedly in possession of information of the highest importance. I do not think that there could be any sort of repercussion in higher circles to many of whom he would not even be a name. He is not as far as I know on the list of War Criminals but even if he were subsequently put on it this would not really effect the situation. In the case of Kaltenbrunner I consulted the F.O. (Foreign Office) and H.O. (Home Office)(Innenministerium). The F.O. expressed complete indifference, and Maxwell saw no possible objection to our bringing any characters of this kind to Camp 020. Schellenberg is of course of outstanding importance from our point of view but is not as public a figure as Kaltenbrunner, whose ultimate transfer to this country has been approved. (AOB, please bear in mind: that always U.S. acknowledgement was necessary, implying that these men came to England for a restricted “time-slot”, thereafter they must return to US custody again!) As I shall be away, perhaps you could kindly let Mr. Milmo know whether Schellenberg’s transfer is approved (AOB, by US controlled Authorities (SHAEF) in occupied Germany?) D.B. Sgd. G.M.L. 1.6.45

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KV 2/94-1, page 9

5.6.45 B.1.W. note to D/WR (War Room) re approval of transfer to U.K. of Schellenberg. KV 2/94-1, page 10

15.6.45 Cable from 12th A.G. re Sandberger (KV 2/ 105, should likely follow after the closure of our Schellenberg Survey) and Schellenberg.

27.6.45 Copy of interrogation of Schellenberg by U.35 (AOB, = Klop Ustinov, the latter proved, in my perception, on quite many occasions being not the smartest Crown civil servant) KV 2/94-1, page 11

30.6.45 Copy of 12th A.G. report on Schellenberg from the interrogation of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl (KV 2/412). KV 2/94-1, page 14

Source: Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, Group (Amt) VI E, R.S.H.A. (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) 2. Some sort of collaborations appear to have existed between Schellenberg and Obst. Masson, Chief of Swiss military intelligence, scope and implications of which cannot be gauged on the basis of information available at this intelligence Centre. Quite possibly it never went beyond the customary courtesies extended between the intelligence services of the two nations not at war.

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KV 2/94-1, page 17 + 18 + 19

A. Second interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, source U.35 (was this because to spoke the German language?) Date 28 June 1945. B. Good progress was made with detailed up to date chart of Amt 6 (VI) organisation including names and personnel. This chart comprises the military department with recent additons such as “Mil Roman I” (“Roman” was always to indicate the style, I = 1) that is the deception section, the “Regiment 1001” in which now German members of the Wehrmacht were trained for intelligence work also the “Kommandomeldegebiete” (K.d.M.)(formerly called Ast or KO) inside Germany and abroad. As soon as this chart is complete and properly executed it will be forward to you. C. Information was obtained on Ludwig Neuburg Chief of Spanish desk Amt VI described as “unimportant man” and Carl Arnold who organised and ran from Spain whole messenger service to South America and to whom it was due that Amt VI received its South American Bag till the very end. Arnold whose agents were mostly Brazilians or Argentineans sent valuable intelligence regarding United Kingdom. He had contact inside British Embassy Madrid. Joseph Gottlob in Lisbon obtained intelligence from English girl friend there. D.Fidrmuc (Ostro) had a group of 10 to 12 men working form him in London. (Likely not true!) They reported on Army, Navy and Air Force matters. They were mostly Spaniards and Portuguese. One English businessman. Belonged to this group. A number of V.1 and V.2. hits were reported almost immediately and found to be correct. Schellenberg says that both Steimle and Carnap (Ostro’s guiding officer at Skarupa, via HIOB) know names of these agents (which they did not!). Advice questioning them if captured.

E. Fritz Cramer (Amt VI, III F VI/2) had also “good men” in England mostly Swedes who reported chiefly on Aircraft Industry. (AOB, likely pointing at Karl-Heinz Kraemer, who possessed very good information in these fields) F. Kuehlenthal (the guiding Sdf. of “Garbo”, the British did “everything possible” (but in vain) to get him expelled from Spain. Which ultimately did not commence) received United Kingdom reports (AOB, this concerned Garbo, who was Double-Cross and guided by M.I.5 and M.I.6) from two Spaniards one probably a South American Diplomat. These reports were purely military character. G. General political reports from England were obtained by bribing Portuguese and Spanish consulates and copying reports available there. H. ”Friend Charlie” was Cumano at whose house in Lisbon Schellenberg stayed in 1940 under name of “Schenkendorff” Cumano received “much money”, so did catella whilst Lorenco was not paid and on the contrary suspected working for British. Nuno Almada was paid for by Otto Wolff. I. Agent T100 was Chilean white Russian Petroff in Switzerland who was also used by Kaltenbrunner to transfer his funds there. J. Hans Brandes (half Jewish, but also working for the Abwehr, likely because “the family” possessed a mechanical Factory in Germany; therefore he could frequently travel between Lisbon and Germany) chief Agent (known as: Ballhorn and later cover-named Feder) covering UK intelligence was Swiss Burkhard(t?) his symbol is “Ex-Quadrat” Burkhardt was nothing to do with Red Cross man. K. (Johann) Jebsen was kidnapped (on 29 April in the KO office, in Lisbon) in a trunk by Hansen (the latter might have given an order to do so; because he was heading still section Abwehr within the OKW) and Kieffer with Schroeder’s assistance (When Jebsen arrived) In Berlin handed to Mueller as accused working for Britain (which was true). Schellenberg attributed suspicion against Jebsen to fact that he sent conflicting reports to different departments amongst Amt IV (S.D.) but thinks that Jebsen had not been killed. (Jebsen was kept at Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp, was collected in February 1945 from there and since disappeared). (AOB, considering the circumstances, it must have been concerted by Amt VI (headed by “Gestapo Mueller” and the overall responsibility was Kaltenbrunner’s)

L. Questioned regarding possible present Abode of Amt IV files Schellenberg stated that Amt IV was first transferred to Burg Lauenstein near Prostzella then to Marquardstein near Munich (München). Schellenberg’s wife is in her ninth month with fourth child is also there.

KV 2/94-1, page 21

Original of U 35 (= Klop Ustinov) report on the First Interrogation of Schellenberg At SHAEF on 27.6.45 (thus not yet in the U.K.) KV 2/94-1, page 33

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (military intelligence) Main Headquarters GBI/EPES/322-21/11 (Schellenberg) 23 June 1945 Subject : Schellenberg To : Major P.M. Wilson 1. Approx. a fortnight ago the allied press reported the arrival in Sweden of the German general Schellenberg or Schellenburg. 2.This is most likely the SS. Gruppenführer (Brigadeführer) Schellenberg, one of Himmler’s subordinates, member of the SD and Chief of Amt VI (Foreign espionage), since summer 1944, also head of part of Abwehr which was incorporated (amalgamated into) in or attached to Amt VI (AOB, the reason was the failed assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944; Hansen was engaged within it and arrested and on 9 September executed at Plötsensee Prison, with others. Since ca. late July 1944 the Amt VI became known as Mil Amt) 3. Until summer 44 Amt VI concerned itself only with foreign (as well military) espionage and counter espionage (in the regular Abwehr Section III) We now know that Schellenberg tried also to take over internal counter espionage, hitherto only in the hands of the Gestapo (Amt IV!), SD, and, for industry, directed by Abwehr (I Wi; H, M, L) 4. Through Buetefisch he tried to contact Schmitz and take over Ilgner’s I.G. (Likely pointing at I.G. Farben industries the huge chemical agglomerate) espionage organisation. Correspondence between Schellenberg and Schmitz on this subject was discovered in latter’s private office in Heidelberg. Buetefisch has explained how Schellenberg intended to build up an organisation for external and internal espionage and counter espionage through industry. 5. Ohlendorf has revealed the presence in Sweden of one Kersten, Himmler’s “masseur”, who posed as an industrialist and dabbled in politics. . (Felix) Kersten now poses as “Finnischer Ministrialrat”. It is likely that Kersten and Schellenberg are collaborating in Sweden, as there were many links between them under Himmler, It may be presumed that they are forming the nucleus for German resistance movement in Sweden. Schellenberg’s plan envisaged long term training of spies in industry and of industrialists, salesmen, etc. in espionage. Operations were intended to start in 1946. 6. An attempt should be made to have both Schellenberg and Kersten extradited as two of the most obvious ware criminals (strange, because Kersten, was mainly Himmler’s “masseur”) and to have them brought to Dustbin (Camp 020 in the UK?) for an examination of their connections with the industrial leaders and their plans of espionage through German industry. After a thorough examination they should be passed on to ASHCAN for further treatment. E. Tilley Major GS G-2, F.I.A.T. Please notice: that within the KV 2/xxx series the date-successions are running in reverse, thus backward in time

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KV 2/94-1, page 45

For me most relevant, is: that TAR was by then Director of War Room

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KV 2/94-1, page 53

Extracted for File No.: P.F. 600561 Name: Schellenberg Original in File No.: PF 66365 Kraemer Original Camp 020 Dated 25.5.45 Extracted from Camp 020 internal memorandum re Karl-Heinz Kraemer (Sweden) Abwehr Officer at the German Legation, Stockholm, now in Camp 020. Abwehr personalities. Kraemer’s closest contacts were with Hansen, Metzner, Piekenbrock and Ohletz. He (K-H Kraemer) had met Schellenberg on two occasions, but never worked for Amt VI (AOB, incorrect, as Ohletz, to whom Kraemer was partially subordinated was engaged at Amt VI; albeit that up to 12 February 1944 he was subordinated to Abwehr I in Berlin) Questioned with regard to cover names of various Abwehr officials, Kraemer has given the following information:- Senior cover name for Schellenberg

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KV 2/94-1, page 57

Original in File No.: PF 601862 Salzinger Original from : 14th Army Group 13.5.45

Extract from interrogation report on Hans Salzinger former Abwehr Officer. Personalities. …. SS Brigade General (likely meant Schellenberg), Chief of Amt VI (VI Z)(Z meant often Zentralamt, or administration) and Militärische Amt (Mil Amt) KV 2/94-1, page 58

Original in File No.: PF 601840 (no longer existing) Wulf/Friedmann 17.5.45 Original from: 7th Army Group Extract from the 307th CIC Det. Interrogation of Friedmann, Karl Hermann, reported date 13 May 1945. (Friedmann = RSHA, Amt Vi-Kult)

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KV 2/94-1, page 59 + 60 + 61

Schellenberg’ views on espionage 3. In Nov 44 Brigafü Schellenberg and General d. Nachrichtentruppe Praun met for the first time in the offices of RSHA/Amt VI (Berlin-Schmargendorf, Berkärstrasse 23-26 (AOB, this might point at the very fact, that the premises was divided in to sections, as in other references higher street-numbers were quoted) 4. At this meeting Schellenberg explained his views on espionage. He stated that in Great Britain espionage is considered to be an occupation of gentlemen of high social standing, whereas in Germany the worst and most corrupt elements are recruited as agents. 5. He laid the blame for this on the policy of Admiral Canaris and said that, as a result, eight of the best German agents had gone over to the Allies in the past year. 6. He proposed to train men of good repute to act as agents and announced that he would endeavour to place espionage on a higher social footing. 7. Schellenberg was further concerned with the construction of a small W/T set, which should be simple to operate, for the use of agents. He had entrusted this work to Dr. Esau of Jena University.

Use of W/T sets for agents. 8. In December 44 the new transmitters were demonstrated by Schellenberg to Gen. Feldm. Keitel and Genobst. Jodl, and it was suggested that they might be used to maintain communication with groups of the German Army that had been cut off from the main force. With this object in mind experiments were conducted in Jan 45 in the sector were to be repeated in Mar 45. 9. It was also intended to equip these sets with a dial on the automatic telephone system to facilitate the sending of morse signals by agents unskilled in W/T transmission. 10. Agents’ W/T sets in Rome. It was mentioned that the Allies had cut off electricity supply in Rome in order to put out of operation the W/T sets of the German agents in the city, as these were all worked off the mains current. 11. Schellenberg; Brigafü Head of RSHA Mil Amt VI. Is about 40 years … 12. Kaltenbrunner was at Rastenburg (Wolfschanze) for the greatest part of the time in the months Aug and Sep 44. He personally the case of 20 July 44 and once showed General Praun, Chef der Wehrmacht Nachr. Verbindungen und des Heeres Nachr. Wesens, the statement of Goerdeler, which he had annotated. 13. When incidents took place of OKW telephone lines being tapped and conversations being interrupted by calls to lay down arms, Kaltenbrunner asked Gen. Praun to carry out investigations. 14. Kaltenbrunner also approached gen Praun on the subject of the reports of Hitler’s daily conferences, which were given sometimes with a fair degree of accuracy in the Swedish Afton Tidningen. 15. Kaltenbrunner, Ogruf Dr. Ernst, Is about 55 years of age …

RSHA/Mil Amt Signals. 16. The Gruppe RSHA/Mil Amt responsible for signals communication of the Amt is Gruppe Mil E.

17. Group Mil E controls 506 Signals Regiment, which was formed out of some FAKs Frontaufkläungskompanie), which had been taken over from OKW Amtsgruppe Ausland (Obst Süsskind), which in return had inherited them from the former Abwehr. The final organisation of 506 Signal regiment was submitted to Gen Praun in the autumn of 1944 and approved by him. 18. In addition, Referat Mil A 1/N is responsible for the telephone communications for the Amt. 19. In Feb 45 HQ of 506 Signals regiment was at Belzig. This confirms Revision Notes No. 1 to “SHAEF –EDS/G/7 – “The German Intelligence Services” of 6 Dec 44). 20. In Febr 45 Major Poretschkin, commanding 506 Signals Regiment, was ordered to move from Belzig to Ohrdruf in Thuringa, to fit in with the general; move of the OKH and OKW. He was given no facilities whatever for the move, simply being told on the typical SD manner, “You’re a good type, you will be able to manage it somehow”. He therefore appealed to Gen. d. Nachr. Tr. Praun for assistance, Praun promised the necessary means of transport and also agreed to find the necessary means of transport and also agreed to find a new location for Mil Amt Signals in the Thuringia (Thüringen). 21. Poretschkin, Maj. Commanding 506 Signals Regiment of RSHA/Mil Amt E/ Formerly in 39 Panzer Signal Unit of 3. Pz. Division, and at one time in Heeres Nachrichtenwesen Tall and slim, very fair, fresh complexion, curiously pointed mouth, can be described as handsome. Very unhappy about working at Mil Amt. (later he became a general-major within the German Bundeswehr) Hardtke, Hptm: Adjt. 506 Signals Reg. Like Poretschkin, he has been seconded to Mil Amt by Gen. Praun. Has long service on Eastern Front. 27 years of age, small, broad shoulders, slim build, long narrow face. Wolte, Hptm.: Head of RSHA/ Mil Amt/Mil A 1/N.

Obstlt. Name unknown Signals: accompanied Schellenberg on visits to Zossen. Formerly a Krimminal Kommissar. Very fat, besotted face. The bane (omen) of Poretschin’s life. Activities of Gruppen IV S and Mil/Amt D of RSHA (Skorzeny)

. . . KV 2/94-2, page 5

Original in File No.: PF 600570 (no longer available) Nebel/Zeller/Martin Dated: 4.1.45 Extract from report of an interview with Ostrich (cover-name for Nebel, German S.D. agent) giving his impressions of the S.D. (SD) Ostrich, in an interview on 4.1.45 gave the following miscellaneous information about the Sicherheitsdienst; he was not systematically questioned on any of these points. 2. The offices of Amt VI. The main offices of Amt VI in May 1944 were still in the Berkärstrasse, in spite of the bombing of the Berkärstrasse, VI F was still in the Delbrückstrasse, and special false passport section under Stubaf, Kruger (Krueger) in the Baymestrasse. But Schellenberg himself had an office at Zossen with the O.K.W..

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KV 2/94-2, page 11

Questionaire. 9. Does Schellenberg make habit of seeing new VI recruits? 10. Who is Siepen’s immediate superior? 30. Where does the Schellenberg-Eggen-Frank combine live? 34.How, in the view of the RSHA, does the Russian intelligence service compare with its british counterpart? Memorandum of Answers. 9. Schellenberg is in the habit of interviewing all officer recruits of Amt VI. 10. Schellenberg is Siepen’s immediate superior. 30. It is not known where Schellenberg, Eggen and Frank live. It is believed they have a residence in Berlin and another in the country near Wannsee. 34.The RSHA have a high opinion of the British Intelligence Service. They consider the Russian Service is better. Schellenberg stated that the German espionage was not very good, the S.D. was too young but it would improve/ The Abwehr had done good work but in itself it had been rotting for some time. KV 2/94-2, page 32 + 33

.. But the Abwehr’s economic observer, Harnisch, who works alone under direct orders from Abwehr I Wi in Köln (Cologne), boasts that during his last visit to Germany he became a friend of Schellenberg, the head of Amt VI. He did not follow Becker’s (SD) example and leave the Abwehr; but he undertook to pass his political intelligence to the S.D. …

KV 2/94-2, pages 61 RSS intercepts

ISOS Peninsula Manually decoded messages Schellenberg, Walter ISOS Diplomatic Not machine codes @ Juergens Junior; Senior XIII/12 SD directed towards South America, etc. @Juergenssohn (see air II/1 Berlin towards South America etc. passenger list, Lisbon) II/129 Madrid – Tangier Berlin to Tanger

2.12.40 Result of consultation with Juergens (Schellenberg) was that a visit by 7592(V-Mann number) would only be desirable in January as he was booked up for the whole of December. 14.12.40Juergens approves 7691’s visit for the beginning of January (1941). 5.7.41 Berlin – Spain. Consultation Gonzalo in Bromberg (Poland?) in accordance with Juergen’s orders. 9.8.41 Berlin-Spain. Juergen’s order will be made with consideration of possible measures of the Hochland vis a vis Saxony and Liechtenstein. 22.8.41 Berlin-Spain. Re consultation between chief business friend’s representative, Dauf and the representative Juergens and Erber T 111 is to come to Basel (Switzerland) for reporting. 4.10.41 Berlin-Vichy. In view of advice from Consulate No. 299. Juergen’s deputy was informed at once. 21.1.42 Berlin-Lisbon, Upon instruction of Juergens Jun. discontinue Dienststelle without asking questions and begin journey home for good as soon as possible. Erbe (Abwehr Berlin, or Abwehr channel) 11.2.42 Berlin-Lisbon. Meeting Enzmann Juergenssohn to day, Friend (Freund?) now definitely remaining in Hamburg (Lisbon) Financial question also cleared up for Rico. Details through Enzmann. 16.2.42 Berlin-Lisbon. Our honorary collaborator Schweig will arrive in Hamburg (Lisbon) on the 16th. On Juergenssohn’s instructions Schweig will call on Enzmann. I request you to note and collaborate this. Schweig will explain the purpose of this journey personally. Erbe. (Stahnsdorf or Belzig channel) 17.4.42 Berlin-Lisbon. From Head Office (RSHA?) Pay Office (Abteilung Kasse). Juergens Senior (Schellenberg) The difficulties existing between two people in the matter of the reserve accout became greater shortly before your departure. Although the matter of the reserve account has been settled, your presence in Berlin would without question alleviate these difficulties considerably. I propose that if possible you fly back immediately. Instruction requested. Erbe. 17.4.22 Madrid-Berlin. Message from Tangier. To Erbe, for (Admiral) Buerkner (Leiter Amtsgruppe Ausland of the Abwehr) Arrived (with his wife, spending some day off there) in Tangier. To Erbe for Buerkner. Arrived in Tangier. Please inform Schellenberg that I shall be in Madrid from 21 to 23/4. Guillermo (=Canaris)(There might have occurred a mixing; but from other files we know that Admiral Buerkner stated also in Tangier) KOS.P (KO Spain) 17.4.42 Tangier-Madrid. Message id/with that of the same date above. 20.4.42 Berlin-Lisbon. Pass at once to S.S. Obersturmbannführer Schellenberg (the latter was thus in Lisbon or at least Portugal). Intervention at Luther’s via Picot at midday on 20/4 was unsuccessful; Luther (Kaltenbrunner or Mueller of RSHA Amt VI?) insists on von Foerster’s return. Picot sees at last chance in Schellenberg’s sending a telegram immediately to Luther via the Auswärtiges Amt (A.A.) once more laying down the cogent reasons for leaving him where he is. Proposal that Foerster be left at your end until return Schellenberg also refused by Luther (might the latter otherwise have been Ribbentrop?). Confidential measures and Picot’s name must not be mentioned vis-à-vis the Minister (the Ambassador in Lisbon) and A.A. Rauff. 22.4.42 Lisbon-Berlin. Erbe (Abwehr Berlin. Juergens (Schellenberg?) Son left by air on the 22nd. Will leave Madrid by air on Friday or Saturday. Please meet with Mercedes (car). 15.6.42 Berlin-Lisbon, I confirm arrival 10-102. To Erbe (Abwehr I Berlin) Conduct of negotiations so far fully approved. Exercise restraint until the arrival of further instructions following Juergen Junior’s decision. Otherwise everything clear. The sum will be forwarded from Berlin of Thursday. Erbe. 5.8.42 Berlin-Lisbon. Clerk who speaks foreign languages approved by Juergenssohn for Alois. Entry permit will be arranged shortly. Information by Alois. 27.12.42 Madrid-Berlin. Most Secret to Chef Amtsgruppe Ausland (Canaris or Admiral Buerkner). Please point out again to Schellenberg that Schulze (on behalf of the S.D.) is carrying on military intelligence service in Spanish Morocco and is carrying acts of sabotage. (AOB, this later culminated in a raw, for which Canaris had to travel to Spain to solve the irritations, because Schulze rejected orders from KO Sp.). His activities are known to the Spaniards and are prejudicing our work (KO Spain related). Guillermo (= Adm. Canaris Leiter of the Military Abwehr)(Canaris apparently was the sender of this message, who needed Schellengerg to back-off Schulze’s sabotage activities in Spanish Morocco) 10.1.43 Berlin-Lisbon. For Enzmann Ref. Dictator film offer, price rather high. Decision by Juergenssohn will be sent within 24 hours. Gottlob Erbe (Gottlob likely someone of Abwehr Berlin) FIZ? 29.1.43 Berlin-Lisbon. To be passed on to Rodrigo. You cannot have authority at the moment to give Hero another hearing in his house. Contact can be maintained through Martini. Alfons is at the moment on the way to Madrid and has clear instructions. From Madrid he may be sent for to your end. Till then, in no circumstances undertake any new rendezvous in the affair, only ensuring through Martini that the contact does not go dead. Schellenberg.

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↓ KV 2/64-2, page 63

Extract from a copy of a note by R.S.S. (Radio Security Service; which service intercepted German communications) on the German Sonderdienst Dated 28.7.42. Forwarded to Mr. Hart B.1.B. (M.I.5.) for his personal use only. The S.D. 3.Relations with the Abwehr. There is plenty of evidence of liaison at the higher levels between Abwehr and S.D. When Canaris visits Spain, he is normally accompanied by a representative of the S.D. either Schellenberg or Maurer (Obst. Maurer belonged to I H Berlin; they may well be in erroneous, as Maurer was not engaged at RSHA and/or SD)(AOB, I have nowhere found evidence that Schellenberg regularly accompanied Canaris; who did so: was Obstlt. Piekenbrock and later Obstlt. i.G. Hansen; both once were Leiter Abwehr I in Berlin); it is natural that this liaison should exist between Amt VI (Ausland), the State Secret Service (S.D. and inside Germany the Gestapo) abroad, and the Secret Service of the High Command Abroad (OKW Amt/Ausland). One would expect some particular liaison with Abwehr II (Sabotage- operations (Div. Brandenburg, z.b.V. 800), but not like the S.O.E, because they did not assassinate people) in so far as it is concerned with propaganda, Fifth Column activities, But there has been no evidence of this hitherto. 4.Intelligence. The organisation of the Paris Dienststelle can be expected to resemble that which we know in Lisbon.

The most important activity of the Lisbon station seems to be the collection of intelligence from and the nourishing of Fifth Columns in South America and only to a lesser extent the deriving of intelligence from the U.S.A. and England. Unfortunately only a few fragmentary assignments and reports are likely to appear as Isosicless as Amtschef (normally only used in conjunction to Canaris) Schellenberg has ordered that only the most urgent messages are to go by W/T. At the same time we learn that information is flooding in from Brazil. Within a period of a few weeks we have heard of two agents from South America. It enjoys excellent relations with the Chief of the International Police, Lourenco, who helped to secure a visa for Nassenstein, an important Gestapo (Amt IV) personality. There is no doubt that the Lisbon station serves the interest both of Amt IV and Amt VI: Amt VI is represented by “Enzmann”@ Schroeder, Amt IV by Nassenstein and probably Rheinbaben.

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KV 2/95 Schellenberg, Dr. Walter Supp for Autobiography M.S.S. History Sheet KV 2/95-1, page 8 An uncomfortable traumatic aspect.

Kaltenbrunner must have known all about Jewish questions as he was very friendly with Eichamnn of Amt IV, who attended to such matters. Eichmann was frequently with Kaltenbrunner. In February 1945, Steimle (KV 2/966) during one of the luncheons, had authorised Müller to proceed with the execution of ten persons. Schellenberg was himself was a winess at one of these luncheons when Müller asked what was to be done with one Dohnany (he was together with General Oster taken prisoner in Spring 1943, and after Himmler’s intervention, dismissed, but not yet trialled; this changed after the assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944) connected with the July plot, and Kaltenbrunner’s answer was “Shoot him”. Kaltenbrunner took particular sharp action against officers and troops who had joined the Seydlitz committee in Russia after their capture. He gave orders to the police attachés abroad to find out full details and ordered the families of these persons to be taken into Schutzhaft. In connection with the 20th July plot many arrested persons were not brought before court, i.e. Admiral Canaris. (AOB, Schellenberg might not have been informed about the fake trial at Flossenbürg on 8/9 April 1945, where Canaris and famous Bonnhöfer had been trialled and hung, among some others). .. KV 2/95-1, page 14 + 15

Amt VI and Mil Amt Daily Situation Reports Schellenberg claims that Kaltenbrunner always showed great interest in the daily report which was compiled by Amt VI and the Mil Amt. This was a summary of the most important reports coming in during the day, but which had not yet been collated. The summary was originally intended to be for purely internal purposes and to give the central office a sort of pre-view of the general situation. The Wehrmachtführungsstab and later on Hitler himself showed an interest for the uncollated summary with the result that Schellenberg had it extended to a certain extent. Kaltenbrunner apparently never really understood its purpose and, with these undigested reports, he started to carry out politics. Necessarily he had setbacks which he then blamed on this ‘idiotic service’. Every fortnight or three weeks the central office compiled a summary of all important political reports of the Ländergruppen which were written by Dr. Wirsing in conjunction with Schellenberg. These were the so-called Egmont reports. http://www.cdvandt.org/wirsing-gieselher.htm , (AOB, very intriguing reading!) The whole object (Ziel or Nutzen) of these reports was an attempt to alter the entire German foreign policy and an alteration to interior politics was also hinted at.

Kaltenbrunner forwarded these reports to all kinds of people, i.e. Jodl, Hewel, Fegelein, his friend Seyss-Inquart (then the Reichskommissar in the Netherlands), and Schellenberg had the greatest difficulty in preventing their being forwarded to: Goebbels (+ Ribbentrop the Foreign Office Minister as well as Goering) by Kaltenbrunner. It was Schellenberg’s idea that, with this material at disposal, Kaltenbrunner should have been able to carry out politics but apparently he failed utterly in this respect and did nothing. (Kaltenbrunner had to be incorporated, because he was Schellenberg’s Chief, but he did not know who created it!)

Dismissal of Canaris. Whilst Kaltenbrunner claimed that he was really responsible for Hitler’s decision at the beginning of 1944 (actually 12 February 1944) to dismiss Canaris and entrust Himmler with the Military Intelligence sector, Schellenberg states that this claim was completely unjustified. He says that quite apart from Hitler’s declining regard for Canaris personally, this question had often been the subject of long discussions between Hitler and Himmler, mostly on account of the alleged and actual failures of the German Secret Service. The Vermehren incident in Turkey (Vermehren and his wife defected to the British about 8-9 February 1944 in Istambul (Istanbul)) was only really the superficial reason for finally concluding matters which had been developing for a long time.

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KV 2/95-1, page 36 + 37

Schellenberg was very anxious to know if the “Circero” material that is, that stolen from Ambassador Knatchbull Hughessen’s safe in Ankara, was real or British deception material. A wax model of the key had been sent by plane to VI F. In Berlin where the key was reproduced. It fitted. Schellenberg says that if the material in question was a fake then he could only take his hat off to the British for producing such convincing intelligence. At moments, especially when he once received a photograph showing a right hand thumb and a left hand thump on it, Schellenberg had his doubts. He summoned Moyozisch from Ankara to Berlin in order to clear the matter up. In the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) a Committee of three ministers (Gesandte) was formed in order to study the material. Moyozisch in Ankara, who ran the Turkish valet (Kammerdiener) who stole the material from his master’s safe, received the “Kriegsverdienstkreuz” for his success. The Turkish valet received £.Turkish 300,000. He asked to be given the latter instalments in English instead of Turkish bank notes.. His whish was granted and he received the rest of the money in faked by Amt F. (thus German forged notes)

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KV 2/95-1, page 38

2. The “Geheime Meldedienst”, the new name chosen by Schellenberg for the old designation “Abwehr” which he thought had fallen into dispute owing to its inefficiency and the low intellectual and moral standard of most of its members, was the task entrusted to ”Amt VI”, which was joined by the “Mil Amt” when the incorporation of the Abwehr in the RSHA took place. (AOB, think mainly after the failed assassination attempt on Hitler on 20 July 1944) The “Geheime Meldedienst” in its present shape and composition represented by no means Schellenberg’s ideal of a future German Secret Service. If Schellenberg had had his way and if defeat had not put an end to his grandiose, not so very megalomaniac, plans, which provided the participation of more or less the whole educated part of the nation in secret service work, he would have branched out in time into a social, cultural, economic, scientific and even artistic manifestations of German life at home and abroad in order to permeate them with “collaborators” (honorary and paid) and “runners” (Zuträger) of the “Geheime Meldedienst”. KV 2/95-1, page 44

They were printed on thin white paper and carried a broad red edge. Schellenberg had established relations with the deciphering department of the OKW in 1942, because he wanted to exploit the experiences of the Wehrmacht both in “W/T Abwehr” as also in the development of German coding “methods” for his own use. Schellenberg made very contact with General Fellgiebel, chief of the Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen (in the OKW) as well as General Thiele, department chief under Fellgiebel. Both these men were killed in connection with the 20th July. Schellenberg’s relations with Thiele were very good/ They had come close to one another through their joint work in the board of Directors of the Standard Electric (Elektrik) company (since early 1930 owned by I.T.T.)(the former American Holding Company). Thiele after the arrest of Fellgiebel had become Fellgiebel’s successor. In this capacity he wanted to bring a long discussed plan to fruition, i.e. unite all deciphering services of the Reich in one hand and to put them at the exclusive disposal of the Geheime Meldedienst (Amt VI) for systematic interpretation and use.

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25. Apart from the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) which possessed an extensive deciphering service, the (Goering’s) Forschungsamt was above all the organisation which had not only an extensive – one could almost say 100% - telephone monitoring service, but also a very large deciphering department. It also monitored normal broadcast services. (This was done too by the Foreign Office, the (Goebbel’s) Propaganda Ministry and The OKW!). The Forschungsamt also embraced an extensive press and publication interpretation department as well as one of the best archives. Schellenberg maintains that apart from the obvious reasons of saving personnel and other grounds of economy, the Amt Ausland together with the deciphering department of the Forschungsamt, was really a domain of the Geheime Meldedienst. Schellenberg also saw there was no need for the telephone monitoring service to the independent, but that itr really belonged to the domain of Amt VI. Since 1942 Schellenberg insisted that Himmler should speak with Goering who had served the Forschungsamt for himself (typically Goering) as his purely personal field of work and to insist that he (Schellenberg) should take the Forschungsamt over. (Quite naïve, considering Goering’s character (attitude)) KV 2/95-1, page 46 + 47

The Work of Amt VI C Z (“Unternehmen Zeppelin”) and the officers concerned with it. The basic idea of this enterprise was, to try and establish in the widest possible shape the use of Russian prisoners of war for purposes of the “Meldedienst”. The object (das Ziel) was to secure through mass deployment maximum achievement. A great number of “duds” was consciously allowed for. The procedure was as follows: So called “Aussen Kommandos” tried to select from freshly captured Russians (aus dem Gefangenenlager) those who seemed best suited for future training owing to their experience and personal aptitude.(Zweckmässigkeit)

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There a continuous sifting occurred conditioned by strict military service with the object of maintaining discipline and spirit as well as by special training in W/T and Intelligence work. The best amongst these Russian prisoners of war reached in most cases a so-called “Final Camp”. There an effort was made for moral and “Weltanschaung” affiliation. The decisive factor remained however in Schellenberg’s view “the human and personal tie with the men trained them”. (AOB, a good friend of mine once told me, that they even slept for months in the same room!)

Those who had been earmarked for future use returned in separate groups well equipped to the from where they were dropped by parachute or smuggled through (durchschlüpfen) through the enemy lines. All were equipped with W/T sets. The whole enterprise entailed, owing to the mass deployment which was adhered to, the application of great numbers of men.

Those chiefly responsible for the “Unternehmen Zeppelin” at Amt VI C Z were: the late Dr. Graffe, Dr. Hengelhaupt, Dr. Lumm, Dr. Schindowskim, Dr. Krauss, Dr. Roeder and Standartenführer Dr. Rapp.

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The work of the Police Attachés. The names of the Police Attachés in foreign capitals are following: Lisbon: Schroeder. He had four or five police Kommissars and secretaries to assist him. Amongs them were Haack, Henss and Ruh. Madrid: Winzer. He also had two or three police secretaries as assistants. Winzer whose plane war reported missing on the way from Germany to Spain, was succeeded by Police Kommissar Hammes from Barcelona, Athens: Kommissar Bach. Sofia: Dr. Hoffmann. His predecessor was Wipper. Bucharest: Originally Geissler, a drunkard. He was condemned to concentration camp for life owing to sadist indulgences in the course of interrogations. He was given the choice of rehabilitation by unscrewing five unexploded landmines. He did not service this vocation. His successor was Boehme who was in turn succeeded by Richter. Agram (Zagreb): Helm Budapest: None Berne: None Stockholm: None Ankara: None Istambul (Istanbul) Wolf, who was accredited as Police Attaché, but all the same originated from Müller’s (Gestapo Müller) Amt IV. Vichy: ? Tokio: Meisinger (the disgusting war criminal!). He had two deputies in Shanghai: Huber in Bangkok?

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KV 2/95-1, page 60

Amt VI representatives and agents in neutral countries. Schellenberg supplied the following names. The spelling and sequences is his: Portugal: Friderici (Leiter KOP since Ludovico was forced to return to Germany July/August 1944, code-name Forros, used until the final days of the war in May 1945, last telegram found: 3.5.45 in a message Lisbon to Madrid), Cramer, Soko, Bendixen, Kaulbauch Schroeder, Nassenstein, Vollbrecht, Berner, Breisky, Schmidt, Gottlob, Henns, Catela, Cumano, Burckhardt, Brandes ( Half-Jewish; code- name Ballhorn and finally Feder; he was involved in some respect involved in the abduction of Johann Jebsen from Lisbon on 29 April 1944, the latter disappeared after February 1945) Jebsen (see foregoing), Mario, Seeligo, Koster, Plivio il Saldago. There were two Hungarians introduced by the Hungarian General Staff under diplomatic cover and who were in W/T contact with London – source Nero”?. Lormeyer and Eltze. All Poruguese Consular reports from England, Canada and sometimes also the U.S.A. were available. There existed also good connection with Liverpool which Karsthoff (Ludovico) had built and also a wide flying weather service and port intelligence. Wolfram mines (Portugal and Spain exported “illegally” at least against the will of the Allies, Wolfram (Tungsten) to the Germans), firms and companies were honeycombed with German Intelligence agents. KV 2/95-1, page 60 + 61

Madrid. Kleyenstüber (Obst. since about July/August 1944 the latter replaced the former Leiter KO Spain Fregatten-Kapitän, Ernst Wilhelm Leissner; albeit that he did stay in Madrid, but no longer in charge of the KO Sp), Rohrscheidt, Lenz (incorrect because this was one of the aliases of Leissner), Winzer’s successor from Barcelona (Hammes?), Singer, Kuehlenthal (Sdf. who half-Jewish, but Canaris had sanctioned his conversion into an Aryan! Very much opposed by the SS, which had finally taken away from the charges and investigation on behalf of Himmler himself)(but Kuehlenthal himself is quite a tragic person, as his “famous” Spanish agent “Garbo” possessing sound contacts in England; in reallity he was a British Double Cross agent in the general Operation Fortitute; they named him Garbo (Pujol); their aims were to mislead the Germans as to where the Allied invasion should take place), Mosig, Bernhard(t)? (comprehensive economic organisation)(= Sofindus (Sociedad financiera e Industrial) Director Bernhardt (Bernhard) .. HISMA also linked this complex), Wiedemann, Ziegra, Podewils, Maywald, Schmidt (or Schmitz), de Pompo, Fidrmuc (AOB, Paul Georg Fidrmuc, came from Sudetenland, he was de facto no SD nor Abwehr agent; he was a fully sponsored but freelance agent. He was NOT regularly engaged in Spain, but in Lisbon, though lived actually at Estoril in Chalet Iglo. His famous cover-name was Ostro! He was guided via HIOB and Skarupa by Lt. Wilhelm von Carnap) http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm; his story is covered somewhere in the middle between Klatt and Karl-Heinz Kraemer) Kramer (Fritz Kramer Leiter III KO Portugal, his less smart brother was engaged at KO Spain), Barth, A.O. (= Auslandorganisation; was an organisation controlling Germans living abroad but outside Germany controlled countries; headed by Admiral Buerkner in Berlin) (whose name Schellenberg has forgotten). Alish, Kranel, Schade, Dollar. There were many more in Barcelona (among it Frederico = Consul Rüggeberg). There was also contact with the Spanish S.S. (Secret Service) who supplied reports, and contact with the Spanish Foreign Office. Many diplomatic reports and nearly all those Duke of Alba were available. There were numerous reports from the Spanish Deciphering Department. These included observation of Gibraltar, extensive weather service and local German deciphering department. There was monitoring of the whole South American Service. The majority of the German firms in Spain were working for Amt VI – such as Telefunken Lorenz who worked with the Reichspost. Cultural relations (Ibero-American institute Faupel etc.) also served Geheimdienst purposes, On the Franco-Spanish frontier Irun and Hendaye strong Amt IV detachments were active. (AOB, please do not generalise this statement, because, say, before the end of 1943 the Abwehr ruled the matters mainly) In Spain use was made of French, Hungarians, Rumanians, Belgians and also Dutch.

Sweden. Wagner (Leiter KO Sweden), Finke, Kraemer (Karl-Heinz, a most successful agent http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm (last part after the closure of Ostro, chapter), Count Douglas, Golcher, Von der Goltz, von Knorr (DNB)(Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, Germany’s Press Agency), Frau Knyphausen, Krueger, Kleist, Von Goßler, Johansson, Von Koenigseck, Wahlerst, Becker, Dankvort run by Finke), VonGienand(t?), Thorner (run by Six), Prenzlin, Bauersfeld, Klaus (AOB, I doubt that he was after 5th July 1943; first name Edgar, Jewish and consider also: http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro- josephine.htm now in chapter I on Klatt), Rasch (Swedish Jew who lived in Russia) and Prince Melar-Sakomelski.

Switzerland.: Meisner (Leiter KO in Switzerland)(his agent was an officer in Swiss General Staff called Jakob), Daufelt, Von Pescatore (Hans, a friend of Meisner, both knew each other from South-East Asia), Sonnenhol (who worked with Steimle Dr. Eugen Amt VI B), Bohlen, Stengel, Rheinbaben, Professor Koch (or something similar. He came from the U.S.A.), Dr. Bitter, Petrof(f?) wife Fastnacht (Vastnacht?)), Barwirsch, Ita, Messerschmidt, Pater Nikolaus (contact with Edda Mussolini, his daughter) Von Neurath (he was formerly engaged in the Protektorat and was succeeded by Heydrich) Ashton, Maurer, Frank von Ilsemann?, Telschown Engelbrechten, Brettschneider, and the Chinese General Coue who later transferred to London. Contact with him then stopped. KV 2/95-1, page 63

Rost van Tonningen, a notorious Dutch Nazi, was for some time Director of the Nederlandsche Bank.

↓ KV 2/95-1, page 67

The Germans never succeeded in breaking the British diplomatic or Intelligence Service code. General Thiele, department chief under General Fellgiebel, chief of the Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen in the OKW, stated that the British use a code machine similar to the German Enigma machine. The German broke the American code. Messages sent by Harrison, U.S.A. Minister in Berne, to Washington, lay daily deciphered on Schellenberg’s desk. These message sometimes contained intelligence service material. Schellenberg also received Turkish, Polish and French, Swiss, South American, Spanish and Portuguese Ambassador in the U.S.A. From an intercepted and deciphered message sent by the Turkish Foreign Office to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Schellenberg learned that the Russian Ambassador in Ankara had lodged various complains regarding the support the Turkish Police and the Turkish Secret Service had been giving to the Germans in their effort to sent to send agents to Russia through the Caucasus. The Turks always denied rendering such support. Loose cooperation was however maintained with the Germans to the end.

According to Schellenberg, South Africa was mainly covered by the A.O. (Auslandorganisation; controlling politically (Nazi correct) Germans living abroad. (most of the time it was guided by Admiral Buerkner’s Amtsgruppe/Ausland; a very curious context) http://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-1487-wolf-argentine.htm and http://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2757- 768-trompke.htm KV 2/95-1, page 67

Schellenberg maintained friendly relations with Prince August Hohenlohe whom he considered “particularly important” from the point of politics. Schellenberg intended using him for the purpose of contact with Lord Templewood. The mother of Schellenberg’s secretary, Miss Schinke, was evacuated to Hohenlohe Castle in Czechslovakia.

A W/T post in Cairo was manned by four or five men (Greeks and Cretan). Ohletz knows the case well. Towards the end, money had to be sent by sailing boat from Athens and considerable difficulties arose.

Paeffgen despatched to England, shortly before the end of the war, a British prisoner of war, who had been working for the British Intelligence Service in Estonia, equipped with W/T PF 600264 (AOB, a huge file comprising 752 pages!) KV 2/95-1, page 68

Amt VI (AOB, incorrect it was RPF!) monitoring of the Trans-Atlantic telephone service between London and Washington was very successful. This monitoring was effected from Holland (Forschungstelle Langeveld), and highly complicated machinery was used for that purpose, Before the Teheran conference, Schellenberg received a report of a conversation between Churchill and Rooseveldt. Most trans-Atlantik calls referred to questions of supply. Decoding of these talks was difficult as the essential words were coded twice. Oberpostrat Vetterlein (Notice the word Oberpostrat which is pointing at: RPF (Reichspostforschunsanstalt) supervised the monitoring service in Holland. The Service offered great difficulties from the technical side.

Both Schellenberg’s former secretaries, Frl. Schinke and Frl. Erdmann are in Stockholm.

The representative of the A.O. (Auslandorganisation) in Spain was an Amt VI agent.

The Culture and Propaganda Department in the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges- amt) were placed under Professor Six who was in direct contact with Schellenberg. Six had originated from the S.S. and Himmler himself had placed Six in the Foreign Office in order to keep a finger in the pie. Schellenberg transmitted orders to Breisky in Lisbon through Six. KV 2/95-1, page 69

Schellenberg says that the British “Soldaten Sender West” (Soften Delmar’s) was very successfully directed and had a most demoralising effect, at the end of the struggle, on Germans, civilians and soldiers alike.

One of Amt VI’s most important W/T nets was in the Argentine where Becker was the principle man. On the whole? Schellenberg never considered South America important from the intelligence point of view and only as a stepping-stone to the U.S.A. via Mexico. http://www.cdvandt.org/KV-2-1489-2-Part-II-General-Wolf-Argentine-Becker-and-Utzinger-V2.pdf KV 2/95-1, page 70 + 71

Dr. Karl-Heinz Kraemer (Stockholm) was formerly a lawyer in Hamburg. Schellenberg heard his name for the first time from Daufeld(t?) from whom he had occasionally worked. (Lt. Kraemer formerly Ast-X Hamburg) Dr. Paeffgen and Schuddenkopf (AOB, not entirely true: also one of Kraemer’s former colleague Major Friedrich Busch; it was Ohletz who solved the raw) were very critical saying that he took his reports from British Press or from the British Intelligence Service. (AOB, I did a comprehensive study on Kraemer’s doings in Stockholm. M.I.5 was heavily annoyed about Kraemer’s information on England, that of a Double Cross is out-of-the-question) (http://www.cdvandt.org/klatt-ostro-josephine.htm consider the last chapter on Kraemer)(AOB, Kraemer belonged originally to I L, as go get stationed in Sweden, he was made “Luft Attaché”, possessing therefore a diplomatic status)(AOB, diplomats are regularly linked onto the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) we can learn from the latter Weblink, that this caused delays in transferring intelligence, as it had to be addressed onto the “Auswärtigesamt” and from there transferred onto the Abwehr and later onto Amt VI; all by means of telex (teletype)). On the other hand, Dr Wirsing, one of Schellenberg’s most able collaborators who was chief of the “Zentralbüro” thought a great deal of Kraemer. Schellenberg was struck by Kraemer’s reports for Amt Mil. They were political reports and concerned the U.K and the U.S.A. For this reason Schellenberg thought closer contact with Kraemer. In the political domain he collaborated closely with Dr. Wirsing. Kraemer needed a great deal of money. Schellenberg’s view this was the reason for the suspicion that existed against Kraemer for a long time. Kraemer was first “run” by Kleyenstueber (also I L, but Berlin headquarters) and later by Obstlt. von Dewitz who was formerly in the Lutwaffenführungsstab, and there had difference of opinion with the Ic Obst Wodrag. Wodrag’s opposition to Dewitz was transferred to Kraemer. From this chiefs of sections Wodrag ordered a comprehensive memorandum saying that the reports of Kraemer represented conscious deception by the enemy, or fraud. This memorandum, comprising nearly eighty pages, was given to Müller by Wodrag, without consulting Schellenberg, with a request to start proceedings for espionage against Kraemer. Müller (Amt IV Gestapo/SD) put two of his best specialist on the job. There now began a dispute between Müller and Schellenberg about Kraemer. There were a number of weak points in Kraemer’s military reports. He had, for instance, reported British aircraft factories which, according to the evidence of prisoners of war, did not exist at all. Another mystery was the time factor in the transmission of Kraemer’s reports. Often, for instance, counter enquiries referring to some remote place were answered within 10 hour. After many discussions and negotiations, Schellenberg was himself obliged to summon Kraemer to Berlin. Müller’s (Gestapo Müller) plan was not to let him depart again but to arrest him. Schellenberg prevented this by telling Müller that he had succeeded a personal talk with Kraemer, in clearing up the issues that were most doubtful, and that for technical reasons he could not renounce Kraemer’s collaboration. Schellenberg allowed Kraemer to leave Germany again. In fact, Kraemer was important to Schellenberg owing to to his political reports. He was forbidden to be in direct contact with the Luftwaffenführungsstab, or other military departments, in order that Schellenberg should not be reproached with the fact that Kraemer secured at the source of important material for a possible exchange of intelligence undertaken by him. In the talk Schellenberg had with Kraemer, the latter declared that he would not reveal to Schellenberg the names of his collaborators unless Schellenberg was prepared to dispense with his services in future. At the same time. Kraemer offered plausible explanations for his cooperation with Swedish friends. The only thing he revealed was that some of his friends were in the Swedish Foreign Office. Kraemer sent good political reports about England, about the situation in the British Foreign Office and about the views of the “Conservative Opposition within the Inner Circle” (Anderson) Schellenberg says that it was Kraemer’s mirror of events which confirmed him in his intention to do everything in Germany itself in the question of Jews and the church policy, in order to prepare the way for the creation of a Western Bloc of states under the leadership of Britain, of →

Which later a crippled Germany should from part. Schellenberg assumed that there must be contact between the “Conservative Opposition in England” the Vatican and a Conservative group in France under Bideaux. This contact could be exploited by a cleaned Germany. Thereby the basis could be created for a compromise. All this happened in 1944.

Karl Arnold (Madrid). This man is about 38 years old. He was formerly an export merchant. He returned from South America (Argentine or Brazil). He was trained by Dr. Paeffgen personally. Arnold became the specialist for the whole courier service to South America. He directed and supervised all “Postanlaufstellen” and had established a wide system in Spanish ports. He enjoyed his work always described by Paeffgen as a reliable and painstaking worker. It was due to him that Amt VI received its courier mail until the end, Arnold had built up his own system. He ran lines of his own, mostly to the Argentine and to Brazil. He also provided good ports about the United Kingdom. Schellenberg asserts that he had a contact inside the British Embassy in Madrid.

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KV 2/95-1, page 72

Obstlt. Freund. This officer of Amt VI Z (counter espionage) worked under Rohleder (medio 1938 up to 1944 part of OKW Abwehr III/Ausland, part of OKW, thus finally engaged within Amt VI) and dealt with questions affecting the Balkans. In this subject he was at home and knew all the lines there. Schellenberg says that he chose him for counter- espionage work because he was less obstinate and disputatious than Rohleder. He collaborated closely with Dr. Schmitz of the Secretariat because Schmitz also made use of Freund for counter-espionage at home. Freund was a valuable colleague vis a vis Amt VI that is against “against (Gestapo Amt IV) Müller”. From Müller nursed the plan to take over the world of counter-espionage as a domain for the Staatspolizei (Stapo). Abroad he wanted to hand over the desk of the Police Attachés. In Section VI Z Freund was still a new-comer. His special success in former times must have been the Balkans. Schellenberg did no know much about them. He thinks that Freund must always have been very efficient because he was recommended by everybody. Other special territories of Freund were Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. In Switzerland, the solution of the “Agent 509” was his particular hobby. In Portugal Freund maintained close contact with Fritz Cramer and in Spain with Rohrscheid(t?). Freund must know many names in Spain, Portugal and Switzerland. In Spain Freund worked against (Otto) John and Ledebur (http://www.cdvandt.org/rudolph-ledebur-case.htm) in Switzerland against ?Auersperg and Gisevius and Waetjen. Freund also had an interesting case in Turkey. A very good agent worked there whom the British Intelligence Service called “Professor”. Leverkuehn reported this case (thus before ca. 12 February 1944) In Istambul (Istanbul) Freund dealt with another big case. It concerned the Austrian Freedom Movement (Independent Austria) and their ramifications in Vienna and to the former Semperit Works there.

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KV 2/95-1, page 75

Zentralbüro Mil Amt/Amt VI VI A … VI Z Left Mil Amt on the right-hand side Amt VI KV 2/95-1, page 77

PF 600613 Meisner (Leiter KO Switzerland for sometime even the Minister in Berne). Extract from report from DB001, interrogation of Hans meisner, Hans Pescatore (friend of Meisner), Willi Piert and Hans Wolfram. Meisner was stubborn and uncooperative. He denied all personal contact with Colonel (Obst) Masson; said the latter was in touch only with Schellenberg, but through whom he prevented not to know.

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↓ KV 2/95-2, page 12 10th July, 1945

Schellenberg’s statements about Himmler’s masseur, (Felix) Kersten, will not be included in U 35’s report because they arose from a casual question which I put myself. Schellenberg said that he first met Kersten in 1943 when he, Schellenberg, was ill and required treatment. After this treatment he became a close friend of Kersten and used him as a means influencing Himmler, particularly when Kaltenbrunner was attacking him, Schellenberg.

Schellenberg stated that he never used Kersten as an agent or any intelligence duties.

Kersten shared his, Schellenberg’s, political view; that is, he believed that German would lose the war and consequently was dissatisfied with the regime.

Kersten was rich as a result of his practice.

Schellenberg saw him for the last time in Sweden before Schellenberg’s surrender to the Allies, He had resumed his practice there.

You will find references to Kersten in Schellenberg’s account of his life. SNH/PGOE

↓ KV 2/95-2, 29 - 38

1.Subject: A Character Sketch of Schellenberg; chief of Germany’s Espionage Service. 2.Source: SS-Sturmführer Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, chief referent Group VI-E, RSHA

1. Schellenberg’s meteoric rise to power, despite the initial handicap of youth and a high party number, (he did enter the Nazi Party at a later date and not in their early days) has been considered a remarkable feat by his admires as well as by his detractors. To a very large degree it can be attributed To sheer ability and indomitable industry, the hallmarks of success in all free countries, but not necessarily in Nazi Germany where the accidents of race and political background weigh heavily. 2. Schellenberg had his start in politics in his home town Saarbrücken, where he taught “Weltanschauung” in the local unit of the Allgemeine SS. In 1934 he was taken on by the Sicherheitsdienst and posted to the personnel department of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Amt I). At that time the SD was still in its formative stage and consequently Amt I was of pivotal importance. Beyond the narrow confines of a second-string position, Schellenberg held the first, he soon began to exert considerable influence. His conspicuous talent for organization did not escape the attention of the all-powerful chief of the Sicherheitspolizei, Heydrich, who soon took him under his wings. In the course of time the relationship Schellenberg-Heydrich deepend and besides being counted amongst Heydrich’s most trusted co-workers, he enjoyed the rare privilege of invitations of his chief’s home. He stood high in the favour of Frau Lina, (Heydrich’s wife whose from suffered to make the Hangman shake in the boots)(AOB, rumours were around that some kind of affair between Lina and Schellenberg occurred), so much →

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→so that it was generally expected he would marry the widow after Heydrich’s death (in June 1942) Alas, with her husband’s timely demise Frau Lina Heydrich had outlived he usefulness for Schellenberg. 3. Schellenberg’s career took a decisive turn in the direction of where his real talents lay when he was transferred to Amt IV E (Ausland SD). IV E later IV A 3) was the counter-intelligence branch of the RSHA, the ideal proving ground for new and untried methods of espionage. (AOB, consequently Amt VI did not yet existed) Schellenberg never busied himself with routine Gestapo (Stapo?) matters and his most outstanding attainment in that period, the abduction of the two prominent British agents Best and Stevens (Venlo - Unternehmen)(Venlo-incident), was an Amt VI undertaking, with Schellenberg as the only Amt IV man taking a decisive part in the planning. At the time he moved to Amt IV, his reputation as a “Nachrichtenmann” was established and, besides, he had worked himself up to a position of the, next to SS-Gruppenführer Müller (chief Amt IV) (later known as: Gestapo-Müller), most powerful man in Amt IV. 4. It seems worth while describing the circumstances surrounding Schellenberg’s accession to power in Amt VI at some length, because they conspicuous absence of moral scruples in pursuing his ends. Already in 1940 Heydrich had made up his mind to oust the then chief of Amt VI- SS-Brigadenführer Jost – of whose abilities he had a low estimate. At that time the main stumbling block was SS-Brigadeführer Dr. Stahlecker, the most serious candidate a vacancy left by Jost. Heydrich who feared that Stahlecker cast his net even wider, decided for the lesser evil and →

→on to Jost while waiting for more propitious circumstances in which to effect the change-over. 5. In Autumn 1941 the time appeared ripe. SS-Sturmbannfüher Schellenberg was appointed deputy chief Amt VI (he signed all official documents as ‘Chef VI/V) and given the specific mission by Heydrich to build up a damaging case against Jost. Schellenberg want about this task with his customary circumspection (Vorsicht). Regierungsrat Sebastian who, together with Dr. Haeugh (chief investigator of the RSHA), had been told to concoct the frameup and put in on a legally sound basis, was attached to Schellenberg. The three let no grass grow (Gras wachsen) under their feet and in due time managed to ‘uncover’ certain misdemeanours on the part of Jost. Jost, as it turned out, has been wanting to build a little house for himself in Berlin. He lacked ready cash and accepted the offer of SS Obersturmbannführer Vollheim, group chief VI C. to arrange for a cheap credit with a banking house in Prague. This rather innocuous transaction emerged, after the trio had given matters a proper slant, as a full-fledged case of bribery, implications besides Jost, SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Filbert and SS- Sturmbannführer Lapper? Pending investigations they were to drag on for years, Jost was relived of his post and, in October, Schellenberg appointed deputy chief Amt VI. 6. Schellenberg’s appointment was to be a milestone (Meilenstein) in the history of the German espionage service. He has set his sights (Ziele) high: his aim was no less (nicht weniger) than the creation of an all- inclusive Espionage service in Germany, doing away with the nefarious duality of political and military espionage, the latter the exclusive domaine of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKM) through its Amt Abwehr. His endeavours towards that aim were at first none→

→too successful. Schellenberg himself was to blame for that. In his eagerness to clean the Augeab stables (Augiasstall) of Amt VI innate distrust of man and man’s motives drove him too far. He purged most of the experienced group chiefs from the staffs and replaced them by young inexperienced men whose talents lagged considerably behind the enthusiasm they brought to the job. 7. In 1943 the personnel crisis had been finally overcome and the ascendancy of Amt VI within the RSHA began to make itself felt. It coincided with the appointment of Dr. Kaltenbrunner to Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo). In contradiction to Heydrich, Kaltenbrunner evidenced a lively interest in foreign espionage branch of the RSHA (AOB, Kaltenbrunner was an Austrian Nazi Party member, whereas Heydrich started as a Naval Officer; by the way - once was Canaris the commander of the Schleswig, whilst Heydrich a subordinate), putting the full weight of his position behind the expansion of Amt VI and the improvements of its services. (AOB, Schellenberg was a subordinate of Kaltenbrunner and both men did not like one another). As a matter of course, the preferential treatment accorded Amt VI came into the open, and the former had to be handed a sizable sop in form of Abwehr III (count-espionage), in spring 1944, after the merger with the military Abwehr had been consummated (AOB, this amalgamating lasted since 12 February 1944 longer than that; the abrupt end came after the failed attempt on Hitler of 20th July 1944), Schellenberg had risen to a position of uncontested power in RSHA (albeit Kaltenbrunner was the Leiter of all), a position he managed to reinforce in the aftermath of the 20th July. 8. To form a correct estimate of Schellenberg’s character one must have known him, it it were not for the fact that his character is of inordinate complexity, masterfully disguised. Snap judgements are bound to be either superficial or erroneous. E.g. to cast Schellenberg in the common mould of a Nazi youngest carried up through a vagary of fate, would be missing the main point. Neither he nor Kaltenbrunner confirm of Type, they are sui generis.→

→Schellenberg is a consummate actor. He can turn on the charm and when he does, the impression of being face to face with a nice, harmless and quite ingenious young man is all be irresistible, Schellenberg has a habit of looking the person he talk to deep into the eyes as if he were trying to convey: “look, what I am telling you here really springs from the depth of my heart; since you caught me in a weak moment I might as well confess it”. In real life Schellenberg is an ice-cold, ever calculating realist, who leaves nothing to chance and even in his “weak moments’ knows how to regulate the impression he sees fit to give. Schellenberg knows what he want (weiß was er Will), he knows how to get there if need to be over corpses (über Leichen). For Schellenberg the words ‘friendship’ and ‘loyalty’ bear no meaning, nor does he expect them from others. 10. The dream in Schellenberg’s life was the creation of one single espionage system omnipotent (alles Umfassend) in the field of political decision and comparable to what he conceives the British Secret Service to be. To make his dream come true, he was willing to sacrifice everything, not excluding his health and family life. He knowingly drove himself to the physical collapse and his gall bladder ailment is primarily due to overstrain (AOB, he dies on gall bladder cancer in 1951, in Turin Italy). 11. Schellenberg’s private life, is there is such a thing (wenn es dass überhaupt gab), is impeccable. He neither smokes, nor drinks, nor carves female companionship. He lives as ascetic’s life and the emoluments of his position have never temped him. He lived within the limits prescribed by his ration coupons and if his private secretary had not taken care of him, of malnutrition might have taken in serious proportions. His asceticism, however, did not stem→

→ from and higher ethical motives. He merely felt that continence (Ausdauer) would be his most powerful weapon in holding off his detractors who would gladly have seized upon just any circumstance liable to reflect upon his integrity. 12. Schellenberg was inconsiderate not only to himself but also to his family. He divorced his first wife when her age made it appear likely that she would be unable to bear any more children. By all means he had to please his great protector Himmler, who liked to see his subordinate spawn in a big way. In short order he begat three children in bland disregarded of his wife’s poor state of health. After the last child had been born – the deliver happened to be particularly difficult. Kaltenbrunner had to give a direct order to bring Schellenberg to his wife’s bedside. 13. His rivals, potential and actual, Schellenberg fought with incredible pertinacity, single-mindedness and deliberation. In order to gain control over the military espionage system (Abwehr) Schellenberg patiently went about gathering incrimination evidence against Admiral Canaris and his closest collaborators, At the same time he went out his way to prove to Canaris that despite the prevailing spirit of competition, his feelings were those of a friend dealing with friends. No doubt Schellenberg can claim major credit if, in the wake of the Vermehren incident (desertion of the Abwehr personnel in Turkey to the British)( -couple about 7/8 February 1944, which fact became known to Hitler on 12 February, causing a blow, where Hitler instantly decided that the Abwehr had to amalgamate into Amt VI), Kaltenbrunner was able to dethrone Canaris and annex the Abwehr (peu à peu). After all it was Schellenberg who had systematically gathered evidence to prove that close connections between the Abwehr and the enemy powers had grown beyond the experimental stage. 14. Schellenberg never confided in the new chief of Amt Mil (the successor of the Abwehr), Obst. i.G. Hansen. He either must have known about Hansen’s England connections or must have→

→suspected their existence. His conduct, after the plot of 20 July blew up, was certainly not prompted by disapprobation. As one of the very few leading men in Germany Schellenberg clearly perceived that Germany’s military fortunes were on the wane and would not have hesitated to act on that conviction and strike a bargain with his opposite numbers. Therefore his dominant reaction upon 20 July was one of petulance rather than of downright indignation. What irked him most was Hansen’s double-cross and to have been accorded pride of place on the liquidation roster of the new government. 15. Schellenberg’s relations with Kaltenbrunner were short of cordial, as a type he did not appeal to Kaltenbrunner, but that did not deter him. By every manner of means he tried to ingratiate himself with Kaltenbrunner. In his personal contact with the Commander-in-Charge he frequently displayed a rather disgusting servility. In that respect he was typical product of the Heydrich ear: Never talk back to a superior (niemals widersprechen) and avoid telling him all the bad news. Needless to emphasize, Schellenberg did not feel bound by any obligation of loyalty towards his chief. 16. Himmler entertained great personal esteem for Schellenberg. He even nicknamed him: Benjamin. Whenever a suitable opportunity offered (bei gegebener Gelegenheit), Schellenberg reported to Himmler direct. Kaltenbrunner did nothing to stop that practice. He was much to phlegmatic to make an issue of a ‘trifle’ and, besides, he did not consider Schellenberg a serious opponent, although he suspected him of hatching out a plot in conspiracy with SS Obergruppenführer (Gottlob) Berger, Kaltenbrunner’s implacable enemy.→

→17. To what extent Schellenberg was actually able to influence Himmler’s decision is difficult to guage. Although he was intellectually far superior to Himmler, his natural inclination not to come out into the open with his true convictions tended to minimize his influence. At the same time he developed a remarkable skill in instilling certain beliefs or opinion into Himmler, making him think that it was actually his own original idea which Schellenberg had merely put into words. 18.As an established fact Schellenberg fanned Himmler’s strong dislike for Kaltenbrunner. His weapons: the sly innuendo in preference to blunt accusations. An aside comment on Kaltenbrunner increasing powers and independence, a passing remark upon his strong Austrian proclivities worked wonders with Himmler, and Schellenberg knew it. 19. Schellenberg had nobody in the world he could call a friend. When Regierungsrat Sebastian, one of the oldest friends, was subject of criminal investigation, Schellenberg dropped him like a hot potato. All chiefs of the Abwehr were Schellenberg’s sworn enemies, especially (Gestapo)Müller of Amt IV (But he was Stapo or SD and not in any way connected onto the Abwehr!) who could not forget that Schellenberg at one time had been his subordinate. Schellenberg’s colleagues were of course keenly aware of his intellectual superiority. Moreover, they began to feel the predominance of Schellenberg’s two Ämter (Vi and Mil Amt) in the RSHA. In the daily meetings of the Amts chiefs, Schellenberg was the but of their merciless attacks and frequently he came back to his office like a broken man. Even in his own Amt nobody fully trusted him; with one exception: his faithfully secretary Fräulein Schienke.

→20. Schellenberg’s enemies in Amt VI were SS- Sturmbannführer Skorzeny (VI S) and Waneck (VI E), SS- Standartenführer Dr. Knochen and Rauff. Skorzeny and Waneck were undoubtedly in good graces of their fellow Austrian Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg felt this very keenly. At the time Schellenberg never hesitated to ask for their help whenever he wanted something from Kaltenbrunner which he dared not to ask himself. Then again he played Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny out against each other with so much skill that he actually got close to bring about Skorzeny’s downfall. Quite likely Schellenberg will claim now that he was a prisoner in his own Amt, a mere puppet in the hands of Kaltenbrunner’s henchmen Waneck and Skorzeny. That is not true, however. Both believed in direct action, disregarding channels and banking on Schellenberg’s notorious disinclination to face an issue squarely. If he had been less of a coward, he could have forced both Waneck and Skorzeny into line by the sheer weight of his superior intellect and undoubtedly he would found the backing of Kaltenbrunner. 20. Despite his manifold talents and his unabashed self-esteem, Schellenberg suffers from a bad case of inferiority complex. This is important to bear in mind. In a great many respects Schellenberg is unfit to stand on his own legs. What the casual observer may possibly take for feigned modesty, is in may instances due to lack of self-assuredness. Schellenberg is unable to cope with many of their demands the routine of daily life raises and certain of his mannerisms typical for the ‘weltfremde Wissenschaftler’ are not put genuine. 22. From the point of view of professional accomplishment, Schellenberg must be rated as belonging to the top layer of Germany’s leading →

Intelligence men, in fact, he probably heads the list. As a matter of fact his forte is not intelligence work as such, for which he lacks the practical foundation, but his outstanding knack for organization and imparting constructive ideas. Schellenberg has made an exact science out of his intelligence work. He would be the man to teach this science in a university. In spite of the above-mentioned limitations Schellenberg has been most successful in organizing and maintaining his own information net, notably in Switzerland and in Sweden. His lack in practical experience, it seems, has been amply compensated for by his acumen in judging people and by his judiciousness in dealing with them. 23. To strike the balance on the various elements that make up Schellenberg’s character: Professionally highly gifted, though not devoid of imperfections. (no one in the world is entirely a perfect entity) By all counts, a low character without standards of loyalty and co common decency. A man who under no circumstance can be trusted. (AOB, whose words are this? Sandberg’s or MFIU 3’s or HDH’s?. I suppose the latter two) German communications map

KV 2/95-3, page 20: the succession used in the file is incorrect, we follow the logical succession

II/126 Abwehr Madrid –Tanger/Tetuan, actually also transfer: Berlin-Madrid (transfer) - Tanger/Tetuan II/1 Abwehr Berlin – for instance: Madrid, but also to Argentina before Amt VI possessed its Havel Institut Werner Sdf. of Brussels if I H (pointing at purely Abwehr I H communications Stahnsdorf/Belzig). * = Isos, decrypt serial number, manually handled ** Isk, Enigma decrypt. 13.3.42 Madrid-Tangier (Tanger). Bruno I H (I espionage Heer) Bruno enquiries whether, and how 22464* far, preparations for the operations planned from your end against Golfplatz (England) have prospered. Suitable agents ate at our disposal. Hoping to have a complete report. 2.5.42 Madrid-Tanger. Bruno I H to Straubinger (likely member of the consulate staff, in Tanger or 26331 Tetuan) via Toni, Secret. Werner ready to travel in two weeks. Please let me know when you wish his visit to take place. 4.5.42 Tangier (Tanger)-Madrid. For Bruno I H Report requested whether Werner is bringing and 26528 people along on the journey planned, and if so how many. Earliest possible departure is desired. Give exact details about his arrival in Madrid and plans for continuing his journey. 5.5.42 Madrid-Berlin. Hermano (Kiekenbusch member of KOSp) to Erbe (Abwehr I Berlin) for 7463** Bruno (hence a member of that office) I H (next above relayed) 5.5.42 Madrid-Tanger. Ref. your 666 of 4/5 (isos 26528) Who are B (Berta is the mean by which a 26633 single letter was being transferred) I H (Heinrich) and Werner sgd Roller 5.5.42 Tanger-Madrid. For Roller. Ref. your (isos 26633) Contents concern (Isos 26331) 29.5.42 Berlin-Madrid. From Bruno (office Abwehr I) from Straubinger. Arrival of Werner with 9839** Gauleiter not possible before the middle of June; more detailed reports will in good time (bei Gelegenheit) 30.5.42 Madrid-Tanger. Message above relayed. (weiter gegeben) 28660 31.5.42 Brussels-Chamaeleon. Expect us Sunday 13 hrs. Viktor Hugo No. 1. sgd Werner. 30109 5.6.42 Brussels-ZB. Search urgently for a garden to let in Furnes with lockable summer house or 37012 small house. Cost no object. Report result Sunday evening. Werner 22.6.42 Madrid-Berlin. From Hermano. Ref our FS (Fernschreiben) 917 (ISK 7463) of 5.5. in re Sdf. Werber, Ast Brussels, If arrival is not possible before 5th July, Kruse (Krüger in Tetuan) prefers postponement till his own returning beginning of August. 1.7.42 Ranger-Madrid. Werner to Erbe (Abwehr I Berlin) Abwehr Ausland for Aussenstelle Rome, 31740 Obstlt. Helfrich (Abwehr Leiter in Italy). In order to carry out the task assigned it will be necessary to remain in Tangier. I shall arrive on 9.7.42, same aerodrome. 6.7.42 (my birthday) Brussels-Wimereux. Werner signals: - Expect you Wednesday 8th July in 32293 Brussels. Bring with you vouchers for expected 40,000 French frs. Confirm receipt of this message. 2.8.42 Brussels - ? Am arrival towards noon Tuesday. If not present in house leave add of work place. Werner.

AOB, I have the very strong impression, that these RSS series do not belong to the file on Schellenberg. I therefore will skip it further.

Part I has been interrupted on 20 May 2019 at KV 2/95-3, page 21