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KV 2/94 – KV 2/99 Dr. Walter Schellenberg Survey

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KV 2/94 – KV 2/99 Dr. Walter Schellenberg Survey It has to be noticed, that currently we have to deal with the conversion of the German military Abwehr into the S.S. controlled Amt VI Mil. Amt. The triggering event was the defection of the couple Vermehren to the British in Istanbul, on 7-8 February 1944. Hitler responded (on 12 February) furiously and ordered:- that from- now-on the Abwehr should become headed by the R.S.H.A. Admiral Canaris was instantly dismissed, and a merging period being initiated. The big blow was the failed assassination attempt on Hitler, on 20 July 1944. Because the Abwehr was heavily involved in this plot against Hitler, its leadership was liquidated. Now considering my current ethic dilemma: We encounter quite trustworthy statements. Though, some men have been, in a period of their lives, more or less, engaged in atrocities; or at least being responsible for it. For whatever reasons, they (often) have become involved in so-called “Einsatz-Gruppen” in Russia. Their doings have been well documented. Though, my problem:- they constitute, quite often, the only reliable source of eyewitnesses information; in the fields we are currently dealing with. Astonishing, quite many of these men were in the possession of an University Degree and often received a PhD as well; we have to bear this always in mind. Which, by the way, being much easier - than to step-down at crucial moments in life; of which’s implications they might not have been aware of, when it actually occurred. Albeit, that the sphere in which it all happened - should have triggered deep moral considerations. Ignorance? Are they the only ones to be blamed? On the other hand, there were also (some) personalities concerned in this bleak environment, whom, for what ever circumstance, weren’t directly involved in crimes against humanity; for instance:- Schellenberg and Wirsing; but they bore, nevertheless, responsibility. Therefore: our engagement - in unrevealing dark aspects of history - does still make sense. What has been reproduced, is my selection, out-off the huge pile of pages! I have added, on places where, in my perception, it is necessary comments. These are always recognisable by, for instance: (xxx) or (AOB, xxx); albeit that sometimes I use red or green text colours. By Arthur O. Bauer Please do not reproduce the content of this document, as partially Crown Copyright is still due; and when, do it for your private use only. Schellenberg Dr. Walter KV 2/94 PF 600561 Notice also: https://de.wikipedia.org/Walter_Schellenberg_(SS-Mitglied) *16 Januar 1910 in Saarbrücken; † 31 März 1952 in Turin, Italien https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_Schellenberg KV 2/94-1, pages 2 + 3 28.7.42 Extract from R.S.S. (Radio Security Service) note on the German S.D. mentioning Schellenberg 2.11.42 Extract from “Who’s Who in Group 13” giving info: om Schellenberg @ Jurgenssohn, 29.1.43 M.S.S. (Most Secret Source = Enigma related source) History sheet re Schellenberg Filed 3.3.47 27.8.43 Extract from Memorandum of Information on Sicherheitsdienst obtained from Major Melland (M.I.14) 30.8.43 Extract from Interrogation of Rockstroh. Giving inf: on Mayr Group (Franz Mayr in Persia: http://www.cdvandt.org/mayr-case.htm), and mentioning Schellenberg, 24.11.43 Extract from R.I.S. (Radio Intelligence Service) Report on Sicherheitsdienst (Amt VI) Operations, mentioning Schellenberg. 29.11.43 Extract from letter from S.I.S. (M.I.6.) re Hellmuth (http://www.cdvandt.org/kv-2-1722-1724-hellmuth.htm), mentioning Schellenberg. 9.12.43 Extract from Interrogation of Franz Mayr (http://www.cdvandt.org/mayr- case.htm) giving information on S.D. and from Amt VI, (?) Col. (SS- Brigadeführer = Generalelutnant) ↓ KV 2/94-1, page 7 21.11.44 Copy of report on the Venlo Incident (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venlo- Zwischenfall ) (AOB, of 9 November 1939)(the capture of Major Stevens and Captain Payne Best) forwarded by Camp 020 re Schellenberg KV 2/94-1, page 9 D.D.G. Please see 50a. It is I think important that Schellenberg should be brought here if and when he is captured, as he is undoubtedly in possession of information of the highest importance. I do not think that there could be any sort of repercussion in higher circles to many of whom he would not even be a name. He is not as far as I know on the list of War Criminals but even if he were subsequently put on it this would not really effect the situation. In the case of Kaltenbrunner I consulted the F.O. (Foreign Office) and H.O. (Home Office)(Innenministerium). The F.O. expressed complete indifference, and Maxwell saw no possible objection to our bringing any characters of this kind to Camp 020. Schellenberg is of course of outstanding importance from our point of view but is not as public a figure as Kaltenbrunner, whose ultimate transfer to this country has been approved. (AOB, please bear in mind: that always U.S. acknowledgement was necessary, implying that these men came to England for a restricted “time-slot”, thereafter they must return to US custody again!) As I shall be away, perhaps you could kindly let Mr. Milmo know whether Schellenberg’s transfer is approved (AOB, by US controlled Authorities (SHAEF) in occupied Germany?) D.B. Sgd. G.M.L. 1.6.45 ↓ KV 2/94-1, page 9 5.6.45 B.1.W. note to D/WR (War Room) re approval of transfer to U.K. of Schellenberg. KV 2/94-1, page 10 15.6.45 Cable from 12th A.G. re Sandberger (KV 2/ 105, should likely follow after the closure of our Schellenberg Survey) and Schellenberg. 27.6.45 Copy of interrogation of Schellenberg by U.35 (AOB, = Klop Ustinov, the latter proved, in my perception, on quite many occasions being not the smartest Crown civil servant) KV 2/94-1, page 11 30.6.45 Copy of 12th A.G. report on Schellenberg from the interrogation of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl (KV 2/412). KV 2/94-1, page 14 Source: Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, Group (Amt) VI E, R.S.H.A. (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) 2. Some sort of collaborations appear to have existed between Schellenberg and Obst. Masson, Chief of Swiss military intelligence, scope and implications of which cannot be gauged on the basis of information available at this intelligence Centre. Quite possibly it never went beyond the customary courtesies extended between the intelligence services of the two nations not at war. ↓ ↓ ↓ KV 2/94-1, page 17 + 18 + 19 A. Second interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, source U.35 (was this because to spoke the German language?) Date 28 June 1945. B. Good progress was made with detailed up to date chart of Amt 6 (VI) organisation including names and personnel. This chart comprises the military department with recent additons such as “Mil Roman I” (“Roman” was always to indicate the style, I = 1) that is the deception section, the “Regiment 1001” in which now German members of the Wehrmacht were trained for intelligence work also the “Kommandomeldegebiete” (K.d.M.)(formerly called Ast or KO) inside Germany and abroad. As soon as this chart is complete and properly executed it will be forward to you. C. Information was obtained on Ludwig Neuburg Chief of Spanish desk Amt VI described as “unimportant man” and Carl Arnold who organised and ran from Spain whole messenger service to South America and to whom it was due that Amt VI received its South American Bag till the very end. Arnold whose agents were mostly Brazilians or Argentineans sent valuable intelligence regarding United Kingdom. He had contact inside British Embassy Madrid. Joseph Gottlob in Lisbon obtained intelligence from English girl friend there. D.Fidrmuc (Ostro) had a group of 10 to 12 men working form him in London. (Likely not true!) They reported on Army, Navy and Air Force matters. They were mostly Spaniards and Portuguese. One English businessman. Belonged to this group. A number of V.1 and V.2. hits were reported almost immediately and found to be correct. Schellenberg says that both Steimle and Carnap (Ostro’s guiding officer at Skarupa, via HIOB) know names of these agents (which they did not!). Advice questioning them if captured. E. Fritz Cramer (Amt VI, III F VI/2) had also “good men” in England mostly Swedes who reported chiefly on Aircraft Industry. (AOB, likely pointing at Karl-Heinz Kraemer, who possessed very good information in these fields) F. Kuehlenthal (the guiding Sdf. of “Garbo”, the British did “everything possible” (but in vain) to get him expelled from Spain. Which ultimately did not commence) received United Kingdom reports (AOB, this concerned Garbo, who was Double-Cross and guided by M.I.5 and M.I.6) from two Spaniards one probably a South American Diplomat. These reports were purely military character. G. General political reports from England were obtained by bribing Portuguese and Spanish consulates and copying reports available there. H. ”Friend Charlie” was Cumano at whose house in Lisbon Schellenberg stayed in 1940 under name of “Schenkendorff” Cumano received “much money”, so did catella whilst Lorenco was not paid and on the contrary suspected working for British. Nuno Almada was paid for by Otto Wolff. I. Agent T100 was Chilean white Russian Petroff in Switzerland who was also used by Kaltenbrunner to transfer his funds there. J. Hans Brandes (half Jewish, but also working for the Abwehr, likely because “the family” possessed a mechanical Factory in Germany; therefore he could frequently travel between Lisbon and Germany) chief Agent (known as: Ballhorn and later cover-named Feder) covering UK intelligence was Swiss Burkhard(t?) his symbol is “Ex-Quadrat” Burkhardt was nothing to do with Red Cross man.
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