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Critical Analysis of German Operational Intelligence Part II

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Critical Analysis of German Operational Intelligence Part II UNCLASSIFIED Critical Analysis of German Operational Intelligence Part II Sources of Intelligence work, and many German field orders stress the impor­ tance of the capture, preservation, and quick evalua­ The study of sources and types of intelligence tion of enemy documents; but they paid scant atten­ available to the Germans shows clearly how the inher­ tion to adequate training of personnel, and no ent weaknesses· of their intelligence system extended outstanding work seems to have been done. During the to their detailed work. The insufficient importance second half of the war, the amount of captured they attributed to intelligence meant that all its documents in German hands decreased, owing to the branches suffered from shortage of personnel and nature of their defensive warfare, and the opportunity equipment; and, although in some fields there was an for good document work became fewer. approach to German thoroughness, in the main the That the Germans were capable of good detailed lack of attention to detail was surprising. work is shown by their practice in the Internment The interrogation of prisoners of war, which they Center for Captured Air Force Personnel at Oberursel, regarded as one of their most fruitful sources of where all Allied air crews were first interrogated. The information, is a good example. In the beginning of German specialists here realized the value of combined the war, their need for detailed and comprehensive document and interrogation work, and devised an interrogation was small; but even later, a standard excellent system of analysis. In order to identify the OKH questionnaire was still being used and at no time units of their prisoners - a matter of the highest was much initiative shown on the part of interrogators. importance to the Germans so as to analyze the Only later, in the Russian campaign, did it become steadily increasing size of Allied air fleets - they obvious to the Germans that their system was not went so far as keeping card files on the types of ration nearly flexible enough and that more individual atten­ cards issued to the Americans, or the type of photo­ tion had to be paid to the problem of exhaustive graphs used for their identification papers, etc. Gen­ interrogations. Even so, it seems clear that Allied erally speaking, so exhaustive a study was unknown in interrogation methods, employing more and better the Army. interrogators and producing competent work at all A major contributory cause of the weakness of levels down to battalion, were probably far superior to German intelligence was their loss, toward the end of anything the Germans ever knew. the war of an important source of intelligence - air The same holds true for work on captured docu­ reconnaissance. The failure of the German Air Force to stay in the air during the last two years of the war, ments. The Germans realized the value of document meant an almost paralyzing loss of eye-sight to the German Army. The Germans expended much ingenuity From German Operational Intelligence, Military Intelligence in the development of other sources of intelligence, Division, War Department, Washington, D.C., 1946. but for the long-range exploration of enemy intentions, 16 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED the loss of air reconnaissance, both visual and photo­ the entire subject of photographic intelligence was left graphic, remained a severe handicap. There was prac­ in the hands of Air Force personnel. This meant that tically no air reconnaissance over England prior to D­ the air liaison officer and his staff not only arranged day, with great consequent advantages to the Allies at for the flying of the missions, but were responsible for a time when their preparations and concentrations the developing, interpretation, and reproduction of could hardly have been concealed from the air. photographs as requested by the Army G-2, with This failure was a purely physical one, for the early whom the air liaison worked closely. The implication campaigns of the war, when the Germans had air of this must be immediately apparent, for such coop­ superiority, showed that they fully realized the value eration presented the problem of training Air Force of serial photographs as a source of intelligence in the personnel in interpretation for use in ground force planning of tactical operations. In the planning of the operations. campaign in France, the field echelons were given That this was realized can be established by the aerial photographs of the Maginot Line, both verticals existence of a photographic intelligence school located and obliques, in sufficient quantities for distribution at Hildesheim. Significant is the fact that emphasis down to companies. This undoubtedly helped their was laid on studying photography, the technique of air successful campaign against the line. photography, and the handling of cameras; interpre­ As the war progressed, there was a definite shift of tation was taught to a limited extent. It was only in emphasis in photographic interpretation from tactical the officers' course that the subject of enemy Army to strategic considerations, i.e., to photographic re­ organization and tactics were stressed. Though ad­ connaissance and interpretation of enemy air forces, vanced courses were offered, specialists were developed air fields (France), enemy navies, ports and shipments only through actual experience, and more in the (England), air fields and landing places for parachute various practical aspects of photographic reconnais­ troops (Crete), roads and supply routes (Russia). Until sance than in interpretation itself. late 1942, photographic reconnaissance planes re­ Over-all policy and direction for the training of mained under the commander of the air support interpreters were lacking. Although there were other (Koluft), the officer who was responsible for supplying schools of limited duration instituted by the higher photographic coverage to field units. After 1942, such air echelons of the various theaters, the need for available planes were taken over by the Air Force and, courses in ground tactics, enemy Army organization, though theoretically they were to function as previ­ etc., was never fully realized. ously, flight missions for photographic reconnaissance With this thought in mind, the limitations of were no longer automatic but had to be requested. photographic interpreters attached to army (the lowest Not only did the quantity of necessary photographic level at which interpretation was carried out) must be missions decrease, but the quality of photographic realized. The tactical problems of one division, the reconnaissance also deteriorated rapidly when Allied need for minute study and interpretation of its sector air strength forced photographic reconnaissance planes as seen from verticals (scale 1: 10,000), obliques, and to be equipped to fight and to be flown by men who from semi-oblique stereographic pairs, could not be were primarily fighter pilots. taken care of at army. Along with the reorganization, useful experiments To illustrate this important point, let us consider which were in progress ceased altogether. Develop­ the problem of a division. Since a mission could be ments in night photography, so important in Russia, flown by neither division nor corps, the request was infra-red photography, and penetration of non-trans­ passed on through the chief intelligence officer at parent intermediaries were either curtailed or stopped army, who stated his request to the air intelligence altogether. Technically trained civilian personnel (e.g., officer indicating the limits by coordinates. The latter from the Hansa Luftbild Company j were absorbed prepared the mission and coordinated it with the elsewhere, and there was no one left who had either reconnaissance section which carried it out. The inter­ the technical knowledge or the energy to pursue further pretation was done by the photographic reproduction developments in this field. Because of lack of super­ section (Stabia), which returned the interpreted pho­ vision, the entire field of photogrammetry, with the tographs with annotations to the air intelligence officer exception of rectification, was ignored. Finally, there responsible for their sorting, filing, and distribution. was no ~oordinating authority, nor anyone of suffi­ Through intelligence channels, four or five copies were ciently high rank to sponsor air photographs at higher forwarded to the division in question which distributed headquarters. Such were the conditions on the higher the photographs to the various commands. Interpre­ levels. It must be emphasized that, fundamentally, tation at army obviously could not be so efficient as at UNCLASSIFIED 17 UNCLASSIFIED the division concerned, where so much more was known the intercept and evaluation units at or near unit of the terrain and the local problems; and it was often headquarters. In addition - and this was probably necessary to refer back a questionable interpretation the key to their ultimate success - the Germans to the photographic reproduction section at army realized at an early date, through practical experience, (Stabia) to clear it up. Systematic and continuous that the greatest gains could be achieved only through coverage, so necessary for a proper interpretation, was a physical dispersal of the actual intercept stations seldom possible, in view of the many limitations, as coupled with a strictly centralized direction and eval­ well as the lengthy front of an army and, correspond­ uation of the results. They learned that in this field ingly, the sector of a division. a correct picture could be obtained only by assembling On the eastern front, the Germans attributed the all the intercepted messages at higher headquarters shortcomings of their photographic intelligence to the and by disseminating intelligence from the top down, skillful camouflage of the Russians, their excellent rather than from lower echelons up. This avoided the road discipline, and their ability to transport great danger of overestimating the value of a single message numbers of troops at night. Perhaps a more accurate and insured that it received its proper place in the explanation was the lack of planes and equipment in over-all picture.
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