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SPLIT RANKS of WORKERS I in PORTUGAL Intercontinental Press Africa Asia Europe Oceania the Americas Vol. 13, No. 29 ' 1975 by Intercontinental Press July 28, 1975 STALINISTS SPLIT RANKS OF WORKERS i IN PORTUGAL Workers Press CARVALHO: General on a white horse? Angolans on Brink of Civil War other Articles Demands Mount for Ouster of Peron GiA: 20 Years of Spying on SWP 100,000 in Madras Protest Gandfil's Coup The Famine in Haiti Zionists Step Up Coionization of West Bank iranian CP Hails Shah's Betrayal of Kurds What Happened to Cambodia's Cities? Free the Political Prisoners in Dominica! important, the United States and its NATO allies need to make it plain to Moscow that the Soviet Union will be held responsible if Portugal's Communists continue on their ,;* present path and that the West's democracies cannot accept imposition of Communism there by force or subversion." So, the Times recommended keeping a Portugal: The Imperialists Play a Waiting Game wary eye on the Portuguese CP and Moscow but did not raise an alarm or begin to prepare the American public for "drastic action." Throughout the third week in July, most more by the attempts of the Stalinists and Some columnists thought that even if the commentators in the international capitalist ultralefts to identify socialism with dictator worst happened, it would be no disaster. press were speculating that a "Communist ship, it would presumably be easier to offer Clayton Fritchey said in the July 17 New take-over" could be imminent in Portugal. aid "with strings of democracy." York Post: But they did not seem to get very excited If one of the most authoritative voices of "Portugal may or may not go Marxist, but about it. British capital—which has substantial in even if it does there is no reason to believe it The British Economist seemed to feel it vestments in Portugal—was not particularly will necessarily end up a satellite of Moscow. could afford to take a rather detached and upset about the prospect of a "red take-over," If the radical left wing takes over completely, self-satisfied attitude, considerably cooler the capitalist press in the main imperialist Portugal (like Yugoslavia, Romania, China than the blasts offire and brimstone inspired country, which generally has a shorter and Cuba) will probably turn into an inde by the "selfishness" of the British labor temper than its British counterpart, seemed pendent Communist country, with unions. hardly more unnerved. nationalism—more than ideology— The headhne in its July 19 issue struck a The New York Times did not comment dominating Portuguese foreign policy." philosophical note: "Soldiers don't let go." editorially for a week after the military's In its early days the Cuban revolution That is, once the military has power,they will announcement of its "grass-roots democra presented quite a different problem. Then, not relinquish it. This was followed by such cy" plan. When it finally did in its July 17 the rebel regime threatened to inspire revolu nostrums as: "The longer Portugal remains issue, it took a reserved tone. The editorial tion throughout the hemisphere. The liberal on its present course, the likelier it is that one presented a careful brief against the Portu columnist did not really look at the question form of authoritarianism or another will be guese CP: from a consistent capitalist point of view, but there to stay." "The resignation from the Government of he understood that Stalinism poses only a Although the situation in Portugal was Mario Soares' Socialists and ofthe center-left limited problem for imperialism. disagreeable, all was not necessarily lost, Popular Democrats—parties supported by and there was a salutary lesson to be learned: about two-thirds of the voters in April— The right-wing New York Times columnist ". for the Portuguese majority either a dramatize for the world the widening gap C.L. Sulzberger could be expected to have a Communist outcome or a Carvalhoist one is between the Portuguese people and the sharper nose for a "Communist threat." He likely to seem very much the same dictator Moscow-backed military-civilian minority was the one who first blew the whistle on the ship in the end. that has seized most of the levers of power." liberal Papandreou government in Greece in "For democratic Europe as a whole, that The attack on the democratic rights of the the mid-1960s and helped prepare the way for outcome in Portugal will be a signal defeat. It SP was cited: "The seizure of Republica the military take-over. may yet be that the early hopes for a clearly was the means chosen by the Commu However, in his column in the July 19 democratic Portugal will return—if Russia nist leader, Alvaro Cunhal, to force a show Times Sulzberger, not without a certain really has pulled the financial rug from under down and military repudiation of the April sympathy, painted a picture of a moderate the soldiers' feet; if popular support for the Constituent Assembly elections, which gave reform experiment sinking under the pres communists continues to plummet as it has the Communists and their fellow-traveling sure of economic crisis: done in recent weeks; if Angola weakens party together only 18 per cent of the vote." "Economically the country is hard hit. Portuguese military strength and nerve. But Although wages have been doubled,they still those are long shots. Many months ago the Also noted were statements by Alvaro Cu average little more than $40 weekly because European Economic Community had the nhal indicating a contempt for elections. For this is an underdeveloped land. Assorted chance to give financial aid to Portugal tied this, the Times drew on an interview Cunhal labor troubles have caused shutdowns; up with strings of democracy. The chance gave to the notorious Italian poison pen production has suffered; some foreign plants was missed and its floundering over the issue Oriana Fallaci, an interview it featured in its have closed; and the A.F.M.[Armed Forces in Brussels this week was too late to affect Sunday magazine of July 13. Cunhal claims Movement]decrees that workers shall not be anything that was happening in Portugal. this interview was doctored, and that is not discharged. The chance may just come again.Let us hope unlikely. However, similar statements were "As a result, factories produce goods they Europe meets it." recorded by more reputable journalists in Le cannot sell; inventories have climbed to an Of course, after the socialist-minded Monde. unhealthy degree; and firms threatened with masses in Portugal were demoralized a little Thus, the Times was able to portray the bankruptcy are bailed out by nationaliza Portuguese Stalinist leader as a cynical, tions. Workers are still on payrolls but the sinister subversive, confident of his ability to Government is acquiring ownership of unec impose a dictatorship over the masses. onomic properties as long-term disaster Summer Schedule But it was a horror movie with the promise shapes up." The last Issue of Intercontinental Press of a happy ending:". .the struggle between Sulzberger even took a friendly attitude before our summer break will be the issue Portugal's democrats and totalitarians is not toward the junta's nationalizing Portugal's dated August 4. We will resume our over." reactionary financial institutions: ". the regular schedule with the Issue dated The Times recommended making it clear A.F.M. has taken some genuine revolution September 8. that economic aid would be "conditional on ary steps. It nationalized banks and insur continued freedom." However: "Even more ance companies which loomed large on the Intercontinental Press dictatorship's horizon because of Salazar's financial bias." In fact he portrayed the military as rather sluggish and conservative: "This move was well received; most people In This Issue Closing Date: July 21, 1975 correctly blamed giant private institutions for Portugal's over-all backwardness. The A.F.M. also began land reforms. "But few important other social or econom FEATURES 1090 Out Now.'—Chapter 7: SDS Default and the Birth of the National Coordinating ic moves have been made and freedom is Committee—by Fred Halstead vanishing. There are increased mutterings PORTUGAL Stalinists Split Ranks of Workers asking what the revolution is about." —by Gerry Foley Sulzberger's conclusion was that the mili What Stand to Take on "Republica" tary was going to the right and not to the left: Seizure?—by Dick Fidler New CIA Documents: 20 Years of Spying "Because of these factors the revolution the SWP—by Caroline Lund marks time as the A.F.M. seemingly consoli Watch Out When Eating Grain From U.S. dates military dictatorship while talking ANGOLA Nationalist Groups on Brink of Civil War about austerity, wage restraints and the —by Ernest Harsch ARGENTINA production battle." Demand Mounts for Ouster of Perdn —by Judy White One bourgeois editor, Dieter Wild of Der 100,000 in Madras Protest Dictatorial Spiegel, did paint a frightening picture of Rule—by Ernest Harsch developments in Portugal. He focused on the CAMBODIA What Happened to Cambodia's Urban Population?-by Peter Green ultraleft demonstration July 16 at the Pala- ISRAEL Lessons of the Ashkelon Dockers' cio Sao Bento: Strike—by M. Halevy "The tightly packed crowd . chanted "You Cannot Have a Humane Zionism" not only'Long live the working class!''Death Zionists Step Up Colonization of to fascism!' and 'Strengthen the AFM!' but West Bank CHILE Parties of the "Popular Unity" Continue also 'Dissolve the Constituent Assembly!' to Flounder—by Jean-Pierre Beauvais This slogan was also on some signs, and no DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Union Leaders Face Frame-up doubt was left that this was the real aim of —by Judy White the demonstration.
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