The Biden Administration and US Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Case Analysis | 15 December 2020

Joe Macaron The Biden Administration and US Foreign Policy Decision-Makin

Series: Case Analysis

15 December 2020

Joe Macaron

A Resident Fellow primarily focusing his research on US strategy, international relations, and conflict analysis in the Middle East. He pays particular attention to the countries of the Levant and Iraq. Macaron’s previous analyst roles include the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the Issam Fares Center in Lebanon, and the Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies at the City College of New York. A former journalist, he also advised the International Monetary Fund on public engagement in the Middle East and served in different capacities in the United Nations system. Macaron contributes his analysis widely to Arab and international print, online, and broadcast media. He holds a MA in International Relations from the City University of New York.

The Arb Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences.

TheCenter’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective.

TheCenter publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non- Arab researchers.

The Arb Center for Research and Policy Studies

Al-Tarfa Street, Wadi Al Banat

Al-Dayaen, Qatar

PO Box 10277, Doha

+974 4035 4111 www.dohainstitute.org The Biden Administration and US Foreign Policy Decision-Makin

Series: Case Analysis Table of Contents

15 December 2020 Trump and the “Deep State” ...... 1

Joe Macaron What Biden Would Do Differently: Back to the Interagency Process ...... 2 A Resident Fellow primarily focusing his research on US strategy, international relations, and conflict analysis in the Middle East. He pays particular attention to the countries of the Levant and Iraq. Macaron’s previous analyst roles include the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the Issam Fares Center in Lebanon, and the Implications for the Middle East ...... 3 Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies at the City College of New York. A former journalist, he also advised the International Monetary Fund on public engagement in the Middle East and served in different capacities in the United Nations system. Macaron contributes his analysis widely to Arab and international print, online, and broadcast media. He holds a MA in International Relations from the City University of New York.

TheCenter publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non- Arab researchers.

The Arb Center for Research and Policy Studies

Al-Tarfa Street, Wadi Al Banat

Al-Dayaen, Qatar

PO Box 10277, Doha

+974 4035 4111 www.dohainstitute.org The Biden Administration and US Foreign Policy Decision-Makin

President-elect Joe Biden’s coming administration will have a lasting impact on American foreign policy decision-making process, most notably when it comes to the Middle East. President Donald Trump’s White House marginalized both the Department of Defense and the State Department and undermined thhe ersBieroe ihiutBsce Beshtriheice icerdBii.e The Bihee idBeBistrsBiee Bie hxphishie sie thisithe shis institutional aspect of the US bureaucracy, which does come with its own set of disadvantages.

DespBshe re sumultuouie streiBsBiee phtBiie ohriBeie sie she January 20, 2021e Beruguration,e shhe Bihee transition team is in full preparation mode to take over at a time when staff morale remains low at the Pentagon and the Department of State after four years of tension with and neglect from the White House. Meanwhile, Biden has selected his core national security team, most notably long- time adviser Antony Blinken as Secretary of State, retired General Lloyd Austin as Defense Secretary, and Jake Sullivan as White House National Security Adviser. Three mainquestions in this context suiihise shemselves: howe shhe ihparting Trumpe idBeBistrsBiee ueihtdBehie shhihe ahce ersBieroe security agencies; what the incoming Biden administration might do differently; and what impact might this shift have on American foreign policy in the Middle East?

Trump and the “Deep State”

Since taking the oath of office in January 2017, President Trump has publicly shown disdain for the Washington establishment, which was clearly reflected in his governing record regarding federal staffe surnovers, proposed buiihse iuts,e reie oriae ife Beshtriheice processes.e ie ife hihdber 4th, the total turnover among members of President Trump’s executive office was 91 percent, compared to 71 phtihese iutBeie she Obrdre idBeBistrsBie,e reie 63 phtihese iutBeie she George W.e ush Administration. Meanwhile, the total turnover at the cabinet level was at 11 compared to three under Obama and two under Bush.

During former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s tenure, “60 percent of the State Department’s top- ranking career diplomats resigned and new applications to join the foreign service fell by half.” Last October, Trumpe Biiuhie reehxecutivhe itihteiBving himself wBihe ruthitBsce sie hBthe reie fire federal employees in a final attempt to reshape the federal bureaucracy; however Biden is now expected to rescind the order. Since the US election on November 3rd, Trump has fired four top officials at the Pentagon, including Defense Secretary Mark Esper who last June disagreed with him on using active- duty troops to quell street protests during the country’s racial tensions. On the other hand, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last week forced the early exit of the State Department’s Acting Inspector General Matthew Klimow, who had replaced the original watchdog Steve Linick, himself fired last May. Trump has gradually installed loyalists after purging leaders in both the Pentagon and State Department’s civilian hierarchies.

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The State Dpartment has long struggled for relevance, most notably in the past four years even after Secretary Pompeo took over in April 2018. Pompeo’s own clout increased in the Trump Administration rathhte shree Bee shhe riheice hhe ohrii; he was called the “Uhithsrtce if Trump,”e hipBshe she Trump Administration’s proposed cuts to the State Department’s foreign operations annual budget to nearly $40 billion, Congress has pushed back in a bipartisan fashion to maintain a level of spending above $54 billion. The signficant damage, however, was rather policy oriented given that Trump conducted a self-centered turbulent foreign policy via his inner circle and Twitter handle, which marginalized career diplomats doing their job on the ground and undermined the interagency process.

Moreover, civil-military relations have been strained during this Trump’s presidency. The cirumstances behind the exit of former Defense Secretary James Mattis, himself a retired general, were difficult for the Pentagon after the latter challenged Trump’s abrupt decision in December 2018 to pull American troops out of Syria. While Trump ultimately did not withdraw from Syria, he has ongoing plans to significantly cut the number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq before leaving office, a move that was long rejected by US military leaders. Trump has ordered the pullout of American troops in Somalia and their relocation to Kenya at the beginning of 2021. He said last September that US soldiers are “in love” with him but “the top people in the Pentagon probably aren’t, because they want to do nothing but fight wars so that all of those wonderful companies that make the bombs and make the planes and make everything else stay happy.” However, his administration’s actions reflect a militarized federal budget. According to an analysis by the Washington Post, the White House Office of Management and Budget projected that military spending for the 2021 fiscal year compared to the 2016 levels would increase by 29 percent (or some $164 billion). Trump also boasted about the technology and job growth factor of the US military complex during his military sales pitches with some Middle East leaders.

What Biden Would Do Differently: Back to the Interagency Process

Following his win, President-elect Biden announced that “America is back” and affirmed that “we’ve been through a lot of damage done over the last four years, in my view. We need to rebuild our institutions.” However, his national security appointments came as no surprise with both Blinken reie Uullivree iidBeie rie fitdhte Bihee rivBiitie reie Obama veterans.e -Bihèohe oiurnoy, whie iin founded withe oBeahee re pioBsBiroe istrshice firm (WestExhie ivisors), wrie iieiBihthie fite shhe sip Pentagon job but not chosen, apparently because of her ties with consulting and investment firms (Blinken reportedly hrieiBdBorte sBhi) as well as becauihe if her endorsement as ueihtihithsrtce if defense in 2009 of the surge of US troops in Afghanistan, which Biden rejected.

The President-elect seems keen tohave a team with whose views he feels comfortable and with whom he prefers to work. Blinken and Sullivan are known to have a close relationship, and the latter

2 The Biden Administration and US Foreign Policy Decision-Makin

wrie ihohishie rie White Houihe ersBieroe ihiutBsce riviser becauihe if hBie iidptidBihe ihhaBeie reie inclusive approach. Biden is a believer in the interagency process of consultations across concerned federal agencies and he seems to bet on Sullivan to revive this national security process. Moreover, having former Secretary of State John Kerry as a cabinet level climate czar with offices in both the State Department and the White House might also complicate the interagency process given the wide portfolio Biden has given to Kerry. It remains unclear yet how successfully the young Sullivan can assume that leadership role in managing this complicated process and the different personalities involved.

Biden made a rare move of writing an op-ed for The Atlantic defending his choice of the first African American to lead the Pentagon. The recently retired generalwill need a waiver from Congress to become defense secretary, since he has not been out of uniform for the required seven years. Some in Washington are concerned about having a trend of recently retired generals running the Pentagon and how this might impact civil-military relations. Only twice before has Congress granted such a waiver, for George Marshall in the 1940s and James Mattis in 2017. The Wall Street Journal’s Editorial Board called Austin “another General of Defense.” Biden came to know Austin from the White House briefing rooms during the Obama Administration when he was leading the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and overseeing Middle East operations against the so-called Islamic State. Austin was once described as “the invisible man” due to his low profile approach in dealing with the media and public engagement. Another connection between the two men is that Biden’s late son Beau once served as an attorney on Austin’s military staff in Iraq.

Implications for the Middle East

It became evident recently that the Trump Administration is setting the stage to force new regional dynamics before Biden takes over with increasing pressure on Iran, new sanctions on Turkey, and a series of Arab-Israeli normalization deals in the final stretch of Trump’s presidency. Pompeo told Fox News about Biden’s national security appointments: “I know some of these folks, they took a very different view, they lived in a bit of a fantasy world. They ledfrom behind, they appeased. I hope they will choose a different course.”

It is true that the Biden’s team comes with their own background and experiences that will shape their views on the Middle East. Sullivan played a key role in paving the way for the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. Blinken contributed to shaping the umbrella of over 60 countries to combat the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and was called Biden’s “alter ego”; he believes that “as geopolitical competition intensifies, we must supplement diplomacy with deterrence” and said in a speech in June 2015 “American leadership has a unique ability to mobilize others and to make a difference.”

Iee Uhptember 2015, whhee ihtvBeie rie CENTCO-e iiddreiht,e ustin wrie rirBeise shhe itiwing consensus in Washington to establish no-fly zones in Syria and he told the Senate Armed Services

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Committee hearing: “it will take a ground force to be able to protect the refugees if we do that. I don’t see the force available to be able to protect them currently…So I would not recommend it at this point in time.” The late SenatorJohn McCain was critical of Austin’s views, telling him: “I have never seen a hearing that is as divorced from the reality of every outside expert and what you are saying.” Austin believhie Bee shhe striBsBieroe uihe ife dhtBiree power bce drBesrBeBeie dBoBsrtce ihployments overseas. He said during an interview in 2018: “I believe we should be doing all we can to preserve our current forward presence to the greatest extent possible rather than cede ground and regional partnerships.”

Ife shhce rthe bothe iiefirmed bce shhe Ue Uhersh,e oBeahee Bie hxphishie sie havhe iidhe Beshtventionist inclinations when needed while Austin is most likely reserved on the potential use of US military power.e Uullivan wouoie shoroughoce heirihe shhihe ihbates while havBeie shhe ioiihe hrte ife thiBihese Biden. Austin’s highest priority would be the protection of US soldiers in the battlefield, mainly in the Middle East. However, given his combat experience in counterinsurgency, there are those who are questioning whether he can maneuver the challenges of deterring traditional foes like Russia and China. This hould not be a disqualifying challenge given that he will run an agency and a team that will be well versed in these daunting issues.

The asumption that Biden’s will be a third Obama term might not be entirely accurate even with Obama vhshtreie ihtvBeie Bee shhe ehxse ridBeBistrsBie. There whthe ohiiieie ohrtehie Bee she past four chrtie reie Trump hrie ithrshie ehwe icerdBiie Bee shhe -Biiohe Erise shat will be hard fite shhe Bihee Administration not to recognize. Most importantly, Middle East leaders will have to navigate this divhtiBsce Bee shhe Beshtriheice ptiihiie Beishrie ife iiBeie shroughe re pthiBihesBroe rivBiite oBahe Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner as they did in the past four years. Thisbureaucratic shift is a return to the inherent institutional rivalry in Washington, which means that the US decision-making process will be thorough and slower compared to Trump’s impulsive governing style.