$IULFD$IULFDQ$PHULFDQVDQGWKH$YXQFXODU6DP

$GHNH\H$GHEDMR

Africa Today, Volume 50, Number 3, Spring 2004, pp. 93-110 (Article)

3XEOLVKHGE\,QGLDQD8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV DOI: 10.1353/at.2004.0023

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/at/summary/v050/50.3adebajo.html

Access provided by UNIVERSITY OF (20 Jan 2016 10:15 GMT) Africa, African Americans, and the Avuncular Sam Adekeye Adebajo

This essay investigates U.S. policy toward Africa and high- lights the role that African Americans have played in infl u- encing this policy. It is inspired by the need for an urgent dialogue between Africans and African Americans on U.S. policy toward the continent. It begins by briefl y assessing the ignominious roots of Africa’s relationship with America and pan-Africanist efforts to liberate Africa from alien rule. It then analyzes the destructive effects on Africa of U.S. policies during the era of the Cold War. It criticizes the perni- cious effects of stereotypical and simplistic coverage of Africa in the American media, and assesses U.S. policy toward Africa under the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. It concludes by offering some policy recommenda- tions for a more enlightened U.S. policy toward Africa.

The Ignominious Roots of A Relationship

Four centuries of a sordid trade in human cargo of Africans by American slave masters was followed by a century of colonial enslavement of Africa by European imperialists. These defi ning historical events have shaped the relationship of African Americans and Africans with the West, and no serious examination of U.S. policy toward Africa can avoid focusing on the blighted legacy of slavery and colonialism, both of which created a bond between African Americans and their ancestral home, resulting in their efforts to infl uence U.S. policy toward Africa. Fifteen years after 1885, when European imperial cartographers met in Berlin to carve up Africa among themselves, the Pan-African movement was born, as the Trinidadian lawyer Henry Sylvester Williams organized the fi rst Pan-African Congress in . Between 1919 and 1945, Pan- African congresses were held in Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, New York, and Manchester. These congresses were at fi rst dominated by African Ameri- cans like W. E. B. Du Bois and Afro-Caribbeans like , at a time when and Ethiopia were the only independent African states, and only later did Africans participate in them. The early Pan-Africanists’ ooded ooded rstportrayed itself rst-generation leaders, like like leaders, rst-generation uence the over decisions of suppos- ghtAfrican for Americans’ freedom. fth Pan-African congress, in Manchester in 1945, By the time of the fi By the 1960s, the Cold War’s main antagonists were two superpowers, superpowers, two were antagonists main War’s Cold the 1960s, the By its prophets were boldly demanding African independence from from European Pan-Africanism of powers that exhausted were and impoverished by their center exertions in repel- the shifted Manchester tyranny. Nazi ling and the Diaspora to Africa, as the meeting Kenyatta, dominated was future by Jomo African Banda, Hastings Azikiwe, Nnamdi including leaders, Nkrumah.Kwame Du Bois effectively handed the torch of Pan-Africanism to Nkrumah at Manchester. Several of Africa’s fi Azikiwe and Nkrumah, had studied in the United States and confronted the United States and the Soviet Union. With France, they turned Africa into a strategic playground to conduct their ideological games. fl They Africa with weapons provided to local proxies in Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, and policy elsewhere. U.S. often ignored principles as basic as democracy and and focused development, parochially on contain- North Atlantic Treaty Organizationhelped Portugal continue colonial its presence in Angola, Mozambique, and (NATO) ally Portugal—assistanceGuinea-Bissau until a militarycoup in Lisbon in 1974. that Emperors War of the Cold With Asia. and Africa in decolonization urging IIAfter War the ended, United in States fi 1945, World power, anticolonial an as by the Washington 1950s, the onset War, of the Cold changed anticolo- its nial rhetoric and talked instead of a global struggle for “containment” and longer no urged“anticommunism.” It European its allies—Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain—to surrender their African possessions, came but to regard the ubiquitous presence of France in Africa as a useful of keep- way ing the Soviets of the continent. out France’s neocolonialism in Africa its to included establishing economic, military, and political relations with its assistance former military colonies—a provided strategypuppet regimes, tied the currencies that of these countries to the French franc, allowed Washington it to send troopsand allowed French officials countries. undue to infl prop up or oust sovereign edly the that then pervaded apartheid America. These experiences would would experiences These America. apartheid pervaded then that racism the shape their struggle for political independence and a lasting leave desire to use Africa’s independence fi to pioned the rights of subjugated Central European minorities to national national to minorities European Central American president Woodrow Wilson, meeting with European statesmen in subjugated of Versailles to redraw the map of Europe I, passionately cham- after rights War World the pioned self-determination, Pan-Africanists meeting nearby reminded him of his country’s denial the of fundamental most rights own to its African-Ameri- can citizens. demands limited mostly were to trying to secure education, economic and racialdevelopment, equality for Africans. as the supposedly Even liberal

africaTODAY 94 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM africaTODAY 95 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO shing with him. rigged, American-condoned blatantly by ed The UnitedThe States strongest Doe’s was external supporter. Largely for The casesThe of three American in Africa—Libe- “emperors” War Cold Finally, Somalia’s Siad Barre, the third US-backed Cold War War Cold US-backed third the Barre, Siad Somalia’s Finally, nancial assistance to often brutal and undemocraticclients in exchange “emperor,” followed in followed the repressive footsteps“emperor,” of Doe and Mobutu. Barre now 1987:293). In America’s strategic an interests War, 1987:293). era of Cold now in Liberia appeared important more to Washington than into niceties million human about $500 rights over sank administration Reagan The Doe, democracy. Like and decades. three for Liberia in ally the 1980s. In Zaire the (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), external the United States helped staunchest install Mobutu in power in and with 1965, France, Mobutu’s remained Mobutu closed the Soviet embassy in his country and adopted pro-Israel policies. He imposed a one-party state, rigged elections, and eliminated his rivals. Ronald Reagan described of good voice reason him and as good “a andsense,” Bush fi George went H. W. elections, American officials AssistantCrocker, Secretary for African of State Affairs, rushed described the vote to justify rare achievement inas Africa “a this and elsewhere in the (Liebe- Third World” farcical charade. Chester strategic Cold War calculationsstrategic War Cold and fears of Liberia’s falling into the Soviet rewarded Doe, backed it withcamp, whom it a state visit to Washington in Ronald Reagan 1982. described the Liberian dependable as “a autocrat ally—a friend in need” (Gifford 234). 1993: Doe supported America’s anti- policiesLibya and smuggle helped arms to UNITA (União Nacional para a Independencia de Angola) Total rebels in Angola. After the rigged 1985 assassination. His tactics, typifi tactics, His assassination. elections closed off in peaceful 1985, for dissent avenues and resulted in several military challenges to his regime, which culminated in a bloody seven-year civil war between and 1996. 1989 and 1980 failed to heal the resentment felt by indigenous people against against people indigenous by felt 1944 between resentment Tolbert William and the Tubman William heal presidents Liberian by to failed 1980 and settler domination. Their spontaneous jubilation following coup a bloody in by low-ranking 1980 soldiers, Master-Sergeant by led Samuel Doe, sym- bolized of hostility the level that had welled up against the ruling elite. Over the next four years, Doe eliminated potential rivals through exile and Since 1822, theSince American 1822, Colonization Society had been transporting black American settlers, largely freed slaves from the antebellum South, to Liberia. Abraham Lincoln and other American politicians supported who the repatriation had naively hoped that this resettlement might resolve theirown country’s racial An problems. Americo-Liberian oligarchy, con- stituting only 5 percent of the population,by repressing power held the indigenous Liberian population. Political and educational reforms enacted for political support and military bases. Samuelria’s Doe, Somalia’s Siad Barre, and Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko—are worth studying to illustrate the expediency and cynicism in involved U.S. policy toward Africa during this period. Liberia became a republic in 1847. ing peril” the “red in Africa through protecting and providing military and fi u- uence U.S. imposed a “black uencing U.S. foreign U.S. uencing tfully. Even today, some some today, tfully. Even noblesse obligé ll (Sundquist 1996). (Sundquist ll which his sense of foreignuence U.S. policy requires an understanding of the intricate, Historically, African-American scholars and diplomats, even before Africa had been always a cultural shield behind which African Ameri- cans sought refuge in an idealized past, free of slavery and xenophobia and aggressive efforts by white Americans their to obliterate African cultures and idealized identities. The vision of Africa by many held of Du Bois’s descendants a nostalgic was longing for a return to an invented past, a embarking on their own domestic civil rights struggles, sought to infl to sought struggles, rights civil domestic own their on embarking policy is the Jewish lobby. The fact that The Africapolicy is the Jewish lobby. is a continent rather than a country makes difficult more it for US-based lobbyists to rally support for a diverse group of 53 countries. the criticized oligarchy; Americo-Liberian ence policy U.S. toward Africa. advocated They better treatment of indig- repressive the by people enous brutalities of the Belgian King rule Leopold’s the over Congo; opposed Mussolini’s occupation and, from of Ethiopia the between and 1941; 1936 late 1940s, vociferously condemned the inhumane treatment of blacks in (Harris 1993; Skinner 1992). Though Du Bois his lived out last days in Nkrumah’s Ghana and wrote frequently Africans’ about plight under colonial rule, his heirs in America, preoccupied with continuing struggles to escape from the racism, vicious crime, circle of poverty, and engaged have homelessness, the continent only fi a of need in peoples” policy toward the continent. Du Bois “backward himself as free not was of these of some Africans described often he prejudice: civilisatrice, mission immigration from their ancestral Polish Ameri- homes; and, recently, more cans entry is for Poland’s It generally have lobbied into NATO. believed that, the effective, most powerful, and wealthy group in infl labyrinthine world of policymaking in Washington. A plethora of ethnic ethnic of Of Legislators, and Libels Lobbyists, plethora A Washington. in policymaking of To infl world labyrinthine lobbyists and special interest groups seek to manipulate the policymaking process in their Jewish favor. Americans for Israel; lobby Cuban Americans againstlobby Castro; Mexican and Italian Americans for increased lobby of the senior most African-American officials and intellectuals reveal a stunning ignorance Africa, about limiting their ability to infl enemies in northern Somalia. But the Somali tyrant provided the US with a a with US the provided tyrant Somali the But Somalia. northern in enemies strategic base on the Horn of Africa to protect Middle Eastern oil sea-lanes and to keep an on Cuban eye troops in neighboring Ethiopia. After the of end the Cold War, Barre, Doe andclothes, humiliated Mobutu and of power out abandoned by their errant, avuncular were revealed to beemperors paymaster (Booker 2001; Clough 1992; Schraeder 1996). without became increasingly brutal from the late 1970s, employing assassination assassination employing 1970s, late the from brutal increasingly became squads, massacring hundreds of religious protestors, and bombing count- less villages, towns and cities in campaign” a “genocidal against political burden”man’s on him to fulfi

africaTODAY 96 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM africaTODAY 97 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO uential white cantly, infl cantly, , a hit in movie 2002, produced by ery Louis Farrakhan, Nation whose uence U.S. policyuence U.S. toward Africa. The Barbershop uencing U.S. policy when sanctions were imposed imposed were sanctions when policy U.S. uencing , which depicted an African prince living a palatial In contrast success to its with South Africa in the 1980s, the African- The CongressionalThe Black Caucus (CBC) and TransAfrica had their Leadership struggles and divisions within the African-American elite American spectacularly was lobby ineffectual in efforts to impose sanctions on Nigeria in the 1990s. During the brutal regime of General Sani Abacha possible to rallypossible support for this cause by comparing to an it experience that many Americans recognized. in the forefront of the legislative struggle for sanctions, which eventually dealt a serious to the South African blow Since parts economy. of the United States itself had operated a racist, apartheid system until the was 1960s, it legislators like Edward Nancy Kassebaum, Kennedy, and Solarz Steven were greatest success in infl in success greatest on South Africa’s apartheid regime after in 1986, two-thirds of Congress overrode a reactionary Reagan This veto. result years followed of daily protests in front of the South African embassy in by Washington, led D.C., TransAfrica and involving African-American legislators like Ronald Del- lums, Charles Rangel, and Julian head the drive Dixon. for sanctions To against South Africa, African-American leaders including Randall Rob- Maryinson, Fauntroy, Walter Frances Berry, and Eleanor Holmes Norton, founded the Free South Africa Movement.Signifi of politicians and intellectuals so was great, the yet quality of both groups has been (1993:35). solow” even as leaders like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton are accused of rank oppor- tunism or embroiled in scandals. As Cornell noted: has “There West not been a time in the history of black people in this country the when quantity black leader in America today is the fi perhaps still be seen today in the fact that the charismatic most and popular could also weaken its ability to infl to ability its weaken also could the and Du Bois intellectual the gradualism of the between battle historic radicalism of the activist in the 1920s replicated was in the 1960s by the divergent approaches adopted by Martin Luther King (inte- grationist) and the early (separatist). That historical divide can of Islam preaches a gospel of self-sufficiency and self-pride. is doubtful, It as Henry Louis Gates has noted, that any other black leader could have Million his during achieved Farrakhan that support mass the mobilized Man March in Washington, in October (Gates 1995 D.C., 1998:123–154). In contrast, prominent black intellectuals like Henry Gates, Bell Hooks, and Cornell are West largely armchair revolutionaries in towers,” their “ebony existence in an Africa with complete giraffes, lions, and elephants roaming pets. as backyard his in free therapeutic balm to soothe the pains of racism and powerlessness in their adopted homeland. In American popular culture, comedian Eddie Murphy demonstrated the more absurd America to Coming side of this perceptionof Africa in his movie and starring African Americans, provided the other extreme view of the continent: caricature a negative of a stereotypical African character, a buf- inelegant. was he as inarticulate as foon uencing policy US toward Africa. The rms in Washington, D.C., including sup- including D.C., Washington, in rms ll the vacuum. Senior American officials quietly uence U.S. policyuence U.S. toward Africa, is important it to under- In response to the threat of U.S. sanctions, Abacha hired American American hired Abacha sanctions, U.S. of threat the to response In A national summit on Africa in in Washington, held was Febru- D.C., To infl officials tending to focus strategic on more areas As of the world. Michael Clough noted, Africanists in the Department State often follow three basic rules: create situations don’t spend money; that much don’t could lead to domestic controversies; African let and don’t issues complicate policy in strategicmore parts (Clough of the world 1992: 2). Intelligence Agency the U.S. for International Agency, the Development, InformationU.S. the National Agency, Security Council, and the Treasury Department gather to discuss to act toward Africa. how debates in The these forums are often critical in infl American decision to intervene in Somalia in and 1992 the decision not to intervene in Liberia in 1990 emerged largely from these policy debates. African policy is often officials, left to mid-level with senior administration Policy Coordinating Committee for Africa and the Deputies Committee, at which representatives from the and State Defense departments, the Central public-relations and lobbying fi family Abacha the to liam Jefferson, andother African-American visit members of Congress out spoke ill-advised against sanctions and in of a policy favor of “constructive dialogue” with Mosely-Braun’s regime. Abacha the in effectively was Abuja against deployed senate her lost she seat when her 1998 in ary 2000. This summit government involved officials, sector, the private and civil society actors from across the United gathered, States who after several regional summits, to share perspectives to build on how a viable constituency for Africa in America. stand the different government agencies and departments in involved the process. of the important Some most decision-making bodies include the of the African-American leadership in embracing African who autocrats Africans. brutalize posedly liberal black Democrats, Washington and Christian, an to wage antisanctions campaign. If sanctions imposed, were Abacha threatened to retaliate against American oil companies in Nigeria—Chevron, Exxon, and Mobil. American The oil giants questioned the efficacy of a unilateral oilU.S. embargo and tirelessly their reiterated fears that European compa- fi to in move would nies dropped their previous threats of oil sanctions. Carol Mosely-Braun, Wil- in Nigeria, demonstrating the ignorance and insensitivity members of some (1993–1998), several members the of Congressional Black Caucus cam- paigned to impose oil sanctions Congressman on Nigeria. In Donald 1997, Payne introduced the Nigeria Democracy Act, calling for the freezing of American investments in Nigeria and the imposition William of an oil embargo measure. the opposed CBC the of members some But Nigeria. on Jefferson, for example, described the act as “unimaginative” and “wrong- Senatorheaded.” Carol and Mosely-Braun Louis Farrakhan visited Abacha

africaTODAY 98 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM africaTODAY 99 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO a in Africa Africa in uence of the of uence uence Uncle elds as diverse as Washington Post c policies. To infl c policies. To Out of America: Man A Black Confronts Africa, ght endless wars are hardly likely to encourage support coalitions in support of specifi of support in coalitions xvi). (1998: esh” aw in his ancestors. Richburg’s book provided cover to many many to cover provided book Richburg’s ancestors. his in aw One of the destructive most factors in perceptions U.S. of Africa is There is still a lack of a powerful, cohesive domestic constituency It is hardIt to believe that a Balkan-American journalist covering the ad hoc African Americans have often embraced Bill Clinton as of their one own. A myth has even developed thaton two brief African Clinton diplomatic safaris in and 1998 2000 during which was he one of Africa’s the continent’sfelt pain. is important It to demythologize best Africa Clinton’s friends, based policy that as one in in fact followed the shameful neglect of his predeces- sors; a better not was he friend of Africa than previous presidents. Continu- Africaing Bush’s George the Clinton H. W. policy, White House prioritized Clinton’s African Safari African Clinton’s for Africa from instinctively generous, often but spectacularly ignorant, residents of Peoria. One of the disturbing most publications on Africa in recent times was the often libelous, stereotypical,the American media. Media representations of Africa as a disease-ridden, and facile journalism continent” “dark of primitivewar-ravaged savages and wild beasts where on Africa in fi much “tribes” ignorant of human rights, famine, AIDS, and the environment. tens The of thousands of highly educated Africans in the American Diaspora also must be involved in building a constituency for Africa in the United States. Sam’s policies toward Africa,Sam’s is important it that African-American lobby- ists work more closely with Washington-based NGOs in fi Jewish-American or Cuban-American lobbies. U.S. policy toward Africa toward policy is U.S. Cuban-AmericanJewish-American or lobbies. basednot on consistent Congressional support, and is often based on seek- ing on Africa a constituency in the U.S., that could the wield infl journalistic account by African-American reporter Keith Richburg, who largelyworked as a war correspondent for the andbetween After 1994. 1991 witnessing the horrors and brutalities of civil wars in Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia, Richburg thanks God that his ancestorsslave across made it the Atlantic, wraps himself around the stars and stripes, and launches into a simplistic tirade Africa: about to me “Talk Africaabout and black roots my and kinship my with African my brothers and I’ll throw back in it your face, and then I’ll rub your nose in the images of rotting fl white analysts to peddle their own prejudices Africa, about and added to distorted stereotypes the about continent really without explaining its real The withdiversity. problem this so that book much not was was it controversial, that awful, but simply was it in substance and style. savage warssavage of secession in the Balkans of the 1990s rendered have would such a silly account and linked the brutality of the war inherent to some cultural fl cantly, cantly, ict managementict (Frazer 2003; In the area of development, more than three-quarters of American American of three-quarters than more development, of area the In An important concern of America’s post–Cold-War policy toward Aid for Africa from $802 million in 1995 to $675 million in 1996 and 1997. of conservative ideologues made good promise on its the to cut Development 1997. and 1996 in million $675 to 1995 in million $802 from Africa for Aid numericalThe weakness of the Congressional Black Caucus and the lack of an organized and well-endowed Africa prevented Africa’s lobby friends of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and, more signifi more and, 1998 in Tanzania and Kenya in embassies U.S. of the September attacks Clinton The 2001. of 11 administration bombed what it erroneously described as a chemicalto the East African factory embassy bombings. In Algeria in with Islamist in Sudan 1991, par- in 1998 in responseties poised to win democraticturned a blind Algerian when eye elections, military leaders annulled the democratic George H. W. Bush’selections. Washington has consistently refused to pressure the historically administration repressive regime in Morocco, the so-called gatekeeper of the “moderate” Mediterranean, to accept referendum in a U.N. Western Sahara, a territory unlawfully annexed and occupied by Moroccan military force since 1975. and Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, countries: trade and investment in oil-rich Africa concentrated was during the Clinton era, mostly as four in today, is it South Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa still accounts for less than 1 percent of globalU.S. trade and investment. Newt Gingrich’s “do-nothing” Congress replacing peril” the era, particularly “red War of theCold after the bombings Africa is that menace” a “green (green being the of Islam) color may be in various African countries. Anthony “enlargement” Lake’s soon was replaced by American support for a cantankerous gallery warlord’s that Clinton arrogantly dubbedeni, Zenawi, Meles Ethiopia’s Eritrea’s Isais Africa’s Afwerki, Paul and Rwanda’s “new leaders”: Uganda’sKagame. of these None leaders could Ethiopia be accurately described as operating Yoweri other: Musev- each anything against like a democratic multiparty war political system, and to of them most went they than thinlywere disguised had sooner Clinton No anointed autocrats. them as rulers model Africa’s and Eritrea fought border a bloody war between and 1998 2000, and Uganda and Rwanda, after invading the Congo in Laurent to topple a bid Kabila’s regime in soon 1998, fell strategy over out and the spoils of war in the min- eral-rich country and turned their guns on each A large other. part of U.S. support for these regimes based was need on its to maintain military ananti-Sudan U.S. in million $30 received together nations four All coalition. assistance in alone. 1996 War–era obsession with “containment” to be was replaced National by what Security Adviser Anthony Lake described as a a policy of “enlargement,” policy that envisaged seeking the U.S. to enlarge democracies worldwide, rather than to keep tyrants Sam record Uncle had abandoned brutal Washington clients on whom in had lavished power. democratization Though Clinton’s War, Cold in the during Liberia, dollars of billions Zaire, and Somalia abysmal.was Policy often resembled era, that asWar strategic of the Cold rationalesfound were to justify a failure to support multiparty democracy democratization, development, and confl Khadiagala 2001; Landsberg 2003; Ottaway 1999; Stremlau 2000). Cold The

africaTODAY 100 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM africaTODAY 101 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO ed ed there was absolutely absolutely was there Black Hawk Down,Black ect a strong domestic backlash and prevent could probably have prevented the 1994 genocide. The United The genocide. the prevented have could 1994 probably , In light of these the events, constant depiction of Clinton by many Undoubtedly, the worst failures of U.S. policy toward Africa in recent Six months after the Somali the Clinton debacle, administration African Americans as Africa’s best friend seems puzzling. an At Africa- America Institute dinner in 2000, I attended in York New Clinton was international legal 2002:359). obligation (Power genocide to prevent In a to escape bid pressure Security not for the U.N. Council to mandate ordered a mili- were officials Clinton’s killings, the stop to intervention tary to describe the massacres (Anyidoho 1999; Melvern 2000; as “genocide” Prunier 1995; Suhrke conspicuous The 1997). silence of the Congressional Black Caucus and other African-American lobbyists during this African Holocaust remains of the one mysterious most and disappointing episodes in policy recent toward U.S. Africa. her colleagues—cynical political calculations took precedence over an an over precedence took calculations political African-American Director NSC Susan Rice reported was reminded to have colleagues—cynical her but merely to mandate the U.N. to take action to save helpless victims victims helpless save to action take to U.N. the mandate people. Washington to being was to provide asked not peacekeepers in Rwanda, merely but with But of genocide. congressional mid-term elections approaching—as forced the withdrawal of most of a 2,500-strong U.N. peacekeeping mis- peacekeeping U.N. 2,500-strong a of most of withdrawal that, the mission a Rwanda, from forced soldiers) American no included (which sion bolstered if States any response thereby effective blocked U.N. to the killing 800,000 of Republicans from making political capital from these Clinton events, inac- curately blamed the botched mission and withdrew on the U.N. his troops from Somalia, effectively crippling the mission without achieving peace in the country (Boutros-Ghali Hirsch 1999; Clarke and Herbst 1997; and Oakley 1995; Kornegay 1993; Sahnoun 1994). to rewrite history in the revisionist nothing killing about heroic thousands of civilians, a large number of them andwomen children. defl To Nations deployed peacekeepers, deployed Nations by 25,000 led American troops, to establish order and feed a starving population. After Clinton office, took the U.S. reduced forces its to 4,000, pursued but increasingly aggressive Moham- tactics, warlord, brutal the for hunt a in civilians innocent many killing Farahmed Aideed, had peacekeepers. murdered who U.N. In October 1993, in a secret, botched mission down to hunt Aideed, planned entirely by the knowledge, eighteen AmericanPentagon without the U.N.’s soldiers and thousand one about Somalis killed. were Despite Hollywood’s later efforts Mogadishu. With an impending humanitarian catastrophe, the United United the catastrophe, humanitarian impending an With Mogadishu. times actions in Clinton’s were Somalia and Rwanda. Somalia’s civil war erupted after in 1991 client, Washington’s Siad Barre, former War Cold fl from restraining Gingrich’s ax. That $2 billion of U.S. aid annually goes to to goes annually aid U.S. of billion $2 That ax. Gingrich’s restraining from Egyptautocratic (Israel receives than more $3 billion) while 48 sub-Saharan African states, comprising that of the some poorest sign countries inhave the clearest world, the is annually, aid US of billion $1 than less share to political and strategic considerations,rather than poverty and democratic considerations, continue to drive aid policy. U.S. ced ced of the dying, while the United most rst sign of ultraconservative opposition, rst president reveals black a certain naïveté. Even of the spending being to avoid drawn into politically some Emphasizing the triumph of symbolism substance, over Clinton was Following the in debacles Somalia and Washington Rwanda, devised Union (AU), the Economic Community African of West States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Community Development (SADC), and the Inter- governmental Authority (IGAD). on Development of Africa’s most Two respected leaders, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and Tanzania’s , rejected ACRI on the basis that Africans had been not consulted risky interventions in an area of low strategic interest. But the $20 million States do would million $20 the But interest. strategic low of area an in interventions risky annual cost of the program is derisory, and ACRI has mostly conducted training of armies in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda, without addressing urgent the more much logistical needs of African armies. The program has been criticized for supporting American key allies bilaterally, rather than the multilateral efforts of African organizations like the African also popular in many parts of Africa. Nigeria’s president, Olusegun Even Obasanjo, immune not was to a certain naïveté hisabout Africa policy. Following visit Clinton’s to the Nigerian capital in of Abuja 2000, the main street leading from the international airport named was after the American president as a tribute to his apparent contributions to Africa. This disappointing have been would act appropriate more for a supplicant banana republic than the biggest black population in the world. It was hard an African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in of strength- as 1996 a way ening the capacity of African armies to intervene in humanitarian crises and(Adebajo O’Hanlon Campbell 2000; 1997; Omach Frazer 2000). 1997; ideaThe that was Africans would do at the altarat of realpolitik. to imagine how the Americanyears earlier, had urged president Abacha, a military brutalizing thug was who his who, during anown (and people had imprisoned Obasanjo Africa himself), his to remove uniform tour only two and become a civilian president, could become now a Nigerian hero. he beathe a speedy retreat the over appointment of prominent black lawyer Lani Guinier as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. These actions demonstrate the opportunism of a political survivor turned who pragma- tism into an art of governance, effectively metamorphosing into a moderate Republican after Gingrich’s conservative troops marched on Congress in Like1994. Jimmy Carter, Clinton another simply was white southern presi- sacrifi often were had Africa grown who dent in up around blacks and could relate to them, whose but ideals policy foreign principled supposedly policy. The otherwise brilliant Toni Morrison’s curious description of of description curious Morrison’s Toni brilliant otherwise The policy. Clinton fi as America’s Clinton shamefully to home, closer surrendered to conservatives on welfare reform in by signing 1996 a bill which will almost certainly throw many andblack women children intopenury without state support and break up black families. In the at fi 1994, presented as friend a close of Africa, and beamed he a videomessage from the White House touting his administration’s apparently successful Africa

africaTODAY 102 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM africaTODAY 103 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO u- rstSecretary of Com- does envisage not AGOA cantly, in Rwanda and backed a sinking sinking a backed and Rwanda in rst seven months of 2002, African apparel génocidaires In Susan 1996, Rice, a 34-year-old Oxford-trained Rhodes scholar at In concluding this section, it is important to highlight the role played Despite these disappointments, the of one few areas policy U.S. of the time, appointed was Assistant Clinton’s Secretary of State for African Affairs. appointment The of such a young and inexperienced Africa hand was seen by many Africans as the clearestto Africa in sign Washington policy circles. Africa Rice’s of experience the seemed to low priority accorded consist largely doctoral of her research on the peace process in Zimbabwe, though had she gained experience some in the National Security Council. Being young and female, did respect she receive much not from several of leaders. sexist octogenarian, Africa’s Mobutu long after politically was it sensible to do Brown so. encouraged American companies to invest in Africa, traveled often to the continent, and credited was with establishing the U.S.–South-Africa business round- He foughttable. consistently to reverse stereotypical views of Africa. In a television before his debate death (in an airplane crash conserva- in April Ghanaian 1996), the he demolish to skills debating formidable employed negative highlighting only of him accusing Ayitteh, George analyst tive events in a diverse African continent and perpetuating the stereotypes that make foreigners wary of investing in the continent. Brown a true was advocate for Africa. merce, an was energetic champion in challenging France’s insistence on maintaining former its African colonies of infl as an “sphere exclusive in Africa was role after became discredited 1990s, it in the France’s ence.” in supporting implicated opening up America’s wasteful and heavily-subsidized agricultural sector sector agricultural Signifi 2000). (Robinson industries African heavily-subsidized and wasteful America’s up opening in which Africa has a comparative advantage, with percent 70 about of its population working in this vital sector. the Americans: African prominent two by administration Clinton the in Brownlate Ron and Susan Rice. Brown, fi Clinton’s exchange tariffs for low and access for American investors to a wide range of exports to the United States exceeded million, $100 while 200,000 new jobs were created in Africa between 2000 and 2002 as a result of increased exports 2003). (Versi from has AGOA been AGOA But criticized as a plan a to access market allowing capitalism, American for safe Africa make to limited number of African goods in selected sectors market of the U.S. in toward Africa in which Clinton deserves some credit is trade. Congress Congress trade. is credit some deserves Clinton which in Africa toward passed the African Growth and Opportunity in May Act (AGOA) 2000, granting generous more access to African goods, like apparel and textiles, in selected sectors of the American appears market. AGOA to be yielding dividends for Africa.In the fi in formulation, its and the plan had also for the included United not a role the bodyNations, primarily responsible for global peace and security. vulnerable be unilateral to to thought therefore ACRI was manipulation by Washington. ed South Africa and Nigeria cation with Africa when questioned by reporters during during reporters by questioned when Africa with cation But the “dovish” Powell has the to contendBut with “dovish” powerful “hawks” and Powell has suffered humiliating some policy failures the at hands of Critics noted Rice’s inexperience in leading negotiations over the the over negotiations leading in inexperience Rice’s noted Critics rst female African-American National Security Adviser, Condoleezza tember a disappointing was 2001, policy defeat. Concerns criticisms over of harshIsrael’s occupation of Palestine last-minute apparently to Powell’s led withdrawal from the conference. This the was clearest sign, if any was needed, powerful of how the Jewish-American is, in lobby stark contrast to members the of white policy establishment in Washington—men like Vice DefensePresident Secretary Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumse- Paul Wolfowitz. All deputy, threefeld’s control took of foreign policymak- ing, and the have led inexperienced Bush down all sorts of dangerous blind alleys. had Cheney against voted Nelson Mandela’s release from prison as a Congressman branding in 1986, the African National Congress (ANC) a Kansteiner III, organization.“terrorist” Walter Assistant Secretary State of for African Affairs, also opposed sanctions against apartheid South Africa in the 1980s, and as late as 1990 considered Mandela’s ANC to be unrepre- sentative of the aspirations South of most Africans. Inthese the “hawks.” African context, his failure to attend, as scheduled, Conferencethe United World against Nations Racism in Durban in Sep- Africa as if it is a country rather than a continent: as Bush noted in June June in noted Bush as continent: a than Rice, his reiterated lack of interest in Africa rather and has since about spoken country a is it if as Africa is “Africa a nation2001, that suffers from incredible disease” (Bruni 2001). Ironically, Bush has an African-American Secretary Colin of State, Powell, seemswho to identify genuinely with Africa. visited Powell the continent within four months of takingas allies key of the United States. During that office trip, vociferously Powell criti- andidentifi cized African Daniel “dinosaurs” like arap and Kenya’s Moi Zimbabwe’s , calling on withited playing in them role a positive the South African–brokered to withdrawal relinquish power.of Rwandan troops Washington from the Congo the at end of 2002. was cred- During the presidential campaign in 2000, Bush, coached George by W. the fi Bush’s Black and White “Hawks” “Dove” Bush’s Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, and Anthony Lake eventually took over over took eventually Lake Anthony and dispute, border Ethiopia-Eritrea mediation efforts (Negashi and 2000, Tronvil especially 59–60 pp. and 72). withinEven own her department, observers some noted that Rice could andbe abrasive insecure in asserting authority her plenipontentiaries over with far experience more than hers. Though intelligence her widely was recognized, regarded was she depth of her as out somewhat in the compli- cated cesspit of African Like Brown, Ron diplomacy. urged she American investors to take Africa consistently she but refused seriously, to see any personal identifi Clinton’s diplomatic safarisClinton’s to the continent.

africaTODAY 104 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM africaTODAY 105 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO imsy and uncon- and imsy dants did entirely he not ect more widespreadect more unease among ed with, African and for, spoken out and African-American Annan, the UN Secretary General, called on rich countries Following the failure strategy of Powell’s of securing support U.N. for One of the urgent most policy challenges for the Bush administration Condoleezza Rice has often been reported to be siding with the the with siding be to reported been often has Rice Condoleezza rst African-American secretary of state so far, I will enthusiastically is the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which killed 2.4 million Africans out of a global global a of out Africans million 2.4 killed which pandemic, HIV/AIDS the is million 17 estimated an 1980s, early the Since 2000. in million 3 2000). of total Peters 2003; (Ala disease this of died have to believed are Africans In Kofi 2001, the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, he has been seen as having having as seen been has he 2003, March in Iraq of invasion American the into themoved camp He seems to be of the endangering “hawks.” his his- torical as seen vividly most legacy, in his presentation of fl 1998; Powell 1995). A controversial and exception notable Powell’s was support for the misguided policy U.S. of “constructive engagement” with apartheid South Africa under Ronald Reagan. engage with Africa on behalf of the American people” (Innocenti 2001:1). 2001:1). (Innocenti people” American the of behalf on Africa with engage He has identifi causes and courageously defended them, even in hostile forums, such as the Republican national convention (Barry and Thomas 2001; Cose 2001; Gates condemnation stinging vincing evidence Security to the U.N. Council in February 2003, to justify Bellafonte’s Harry of Iraq. invasion the U.S. He has since confi told singer and believe the case arguing was he the at UN activist (Keller 2003). African-American civil-rights asof Powell may a “house refl slave” his early supporters that has he become simply a servant used of power, by “hawks” to justify does actions patently believe he not in, as long as can he continue to parade as America’s top diplomat. Africa in May “Africa matters 2001, to America by history and by choice. As the fi “hawks” in the Bush administration. During on the the Race debate con- ference in Durban in September insensitively she 2001, dismissed repara- tions for Africans and their descendants in the Diaspora as an irrelevance of the past, revealing a stunning ignorance by many conservative African Americans, care neither who Africa, about much identify nor with, Afri- can-American causes (Lemann 2002; Staples 2003). Many members this of group steadfastly refuse to acknowledge any sort of African Even identity. liberalmore members of this group, like Susan Rice, seem eager to play down their African heritage. in Powell, contrast, seems to be comfortable in his own skin. son The of Jamaican immigrants, has he embraced a black in but recognitionidentity in not a naïveway, that his African identity does make not him any less American. As during noted he his trip to South mat of the powerful most state in the world—would have sent a strong mes- sage of the of some changes the top at of American society and given Powell the stature to argue America’s case from a positionof moral strength. the powerlessness of the African-American In a global conference lobby. to discuss reparations, slavery, and racism—the issues closest to the hearts of many African Americans—the United States could muster the not will to send a representative to the conference. presence—as Powell’s the top diplo- ict managementict efforts in Africa, In pursuing support its confl for Many Africans have expressed profound concerns that the U.S. war on Washington be must careful to incur not the wrath of other African states by focusing too attention on South much Africa and Nigeria. This support beshould multilateral, bilateral, and simply not and regional organizations SADC, and ECOWAS, IGADlike the AU, badly need strengthening. This does of course, not, bilateral preclude assistance to the South African army of terrorism—such as poverty, injustice, and social inequalities—rather inequalities—rather social and injustice, terrorism will divert poverty, as American and democratizationment to terrorism-related security issues. Many Afri- assistance to Africacan analysts called have on Washington to address urgently the root causes from economic terrorism—such develop-of than launching simply military strikes against an (Baregu enemy elusive or Nigerian police, there but be must a recognition that Africans are striving to establish more legitimate multilateralbe supported. funds The available for ACRI—now security renamed Africa Contin- mechanisms that shouldgency Operations Training Assistance—must be massively increased, and this military cooperation must be extended beyond training to include the of logisticalsupply equipment to regional security organizations. research on African issues and continue to work with the Congressional Congressional the with be supported and brutish work build autocrats shunned. a strong constituency To to continue and for Africa, African-American issues lobbyists support must education more and African on research Black Caucus, Africans in the United States, and NGOs with an interest in Africa. Initiatives such asthe National Summit for Africa, be must sustained, and they build must support for Africa the at grassroots in level America. What Is to be Done? In concluding is important this it essay, to offer recommendations for a more enlightened U.S. policydemocracy consistently more in Africa toward and make not exceptions that are Africa. First,politically Washington expedient for short-term policy gains. Genuine democrats must must support to contribute $7 to $10 billion annually to a global AIDS fund. The United United The fund. AIDS global a to annually billion $10 to $7 contribute to States AIDS announced against a disappointing battle initial global contribution the of $200 to million billion to $15 of pledge Bush’s fund. the (with of this most set aside money for Africa) in January 2003 facing was the prospect of drastic cuts by a penny-pinching Congress the time at of writing. This promise the was main largely focus of Bush’s symbolic visit to Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda, and Nigeria in July 2003. Fail- another yet Africans as many by seen will be pledge this on deliver to ure example of the empty rhetoric of another American president embarking on another diplomatic safari to the continent. Shortly after visit Bush’s to Africa, the United States 200 deployed soldiers to assist a Nigerian-led peacekeeping force in Liberia; the American soldiers withdrawn were after only two months.

africaTODAY 106 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM africaTODAY 107 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO nding rst black presi- black rst ll the vision of a 2002; International Peace Academy

yearsve the was case of Amadou Diallo, dedeji A icker, evenas the heirsicker, of Nkrumah, like men nancial assistance for Africa in exchange gov- for “good the gift of discovering our shared humanity. In I May 1994, The Pan-AfricanistThe torch that Du Bois had handed to Nkrumah in One of the shocking most and horrifying incidents I encountered as Washington must instead support strongly more the Partnership New ame continues to fl ubuntu, 2002; Landsberg 2002). NEPAD itself be must democratized to address the views of African civil society largely activists. United The States was needs to play which debt, billion $230 Africa’s annulling in role a of more effective ways to work together to ensure a more enlightened U.S. policy policy U.S. enlightened more a ensure to together the struggles for racial equality work between Africa to and the Diaspora fi by ways effective toward Africa. American policy be must infused with what South Africans call attended Nelson Mandela’s inauguration as South Africa’s fi Manchester in nearly was 1945 extinguished Nkrumah when dropped it within eight years of increasingly autocratic rule and diplomatic isolation. fl The and Olusegun Obasanjo, to fulfi attempt an African living for fi in York New a Guinean immigrant in to death 2001 shot was who when in York New four white policemen pumped forty-one bullets into his chest in front of his This home. case highlights the continued link between the struggles for racial equality of Africans and African Americans. outrage The that acquittalfollowed the policemen’s in a tragic American history of injustice from the lynching and castration to countless of black men cases of police brutality against unarmed blacks could be heard from the Bronx to Cona- andkry, from Dakar to Harlem. united, peaceful Africa. is important It that Africans and African Ameri- cans surrender not the efforts of Du Bois, Nkrumah, and their heirs to link indent Pretoria. He ended an unforgettable speech by saying, “In the words allow free access to Africa’s agricultural products, so that the continent continent the that so products, agricultural go to health and education continue not must to go to service unpayable Africa’s to debts. African The Growth and Opportunity access be Act must expanded to free allow can garner the resources needed industrial for its takeoff. take This to change but charity, of feeling altruistic an of out just not effected be must advantage of the potential of trade with an African market of nearly one consumers. billion debts that everyone knows can be repaid. never Scarce resources that should ernance” by African leaders ( accumulated by corrupt, monstrous African many autocrats, were of whom fed with western loans during with Even an AIDS War. the Cold epidemic threatening to wipe populations out in many African countries, these gov- ernments are forced to use a quarter of their export earnings on servicing for Africa’s (NEPAD), Development a plan designed by African leaders to fi Western mobilize 2002; Jordan 2003). establishment The military of a U.S. base in Djibouti in 2002 to hunt down terroristconcerns. Antiterrorism, suspects like anticommunism during must War, the Cold in the Horn of Africa becomenot the conditionality new for receiving future American heightened aid. such

15 The The ? Report New York: York: New Occasional Occasional SAIS Review SAIS 86(10):10–14. The New Times, York The Oxford W.E.B. Du Bois South African Journal African Inter- South of New York: Vintage Books. Newsweek 87(10):15. 8:32–47. London: I. B. Tauris. B. I. London: Newsweek Newsweek From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Evolving Africa’s Southern Congo: to Cape From ctural Causes and Behavioral Consequences of of Consequences Behavioral and ctural Causes Doe’s Liberia. Cambridge: Cambridge University University Liberia. Cambridge: Cambridge Doe’s New Agenda New Accra: Woeli Publishing Services. Learning Somalia: From The Lessons of Armed Humanitar- lit Casts Long Shadow on Bush Tour. From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Chal- Security Evolving Africa’s Southern Congo: to Cape From Responding What to Terrorism: Role for the United Nations 4(2):103–118. Guns over Kigali. Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga. Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man. edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg. Boulder and Landsberg. and Boulder Christopher and Baregu Mwesiga by edited edited by Ali A. Mazrui. General History of Africa, 8. Berkeley: University Africa Institute of South Africa. The US Security Doctrine and the Africa Crisis Response Initiative. : Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press. Free atFree U.S. Last? Policy toward Africa and the End of the Cold War. 8(1):1–14 Herbst,rey eds. 1997. airs edited by Eric J. Sundquist. New and York Oxford: Oxford University Press. edited by Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg. Boulder and London: Lynne Africa Since 1935, 1935, Since Africa 17(2):153–164. Security Challenges, In Terrorism. International of an International Peace Academy policy seminar in New York, October, 25–26 pp. 40–44. London: Lynne Rienner. Lynne London: national Aff national In In Press. of California Press. California of paper 62. Pretoria Intervention. ian Brown Journal of World lenges, Rienner. Reader, Council on Foreign Relations Press. June, p. A6. p. June, ord, Christianity Paul, 1993. and Politics in Ala, Jaqui. 2003. AIDS as a New Security Threat. In Giff Campbell, Horace G. 2000. 2000. G. Horace Campbell, Adebajo, Adekeye, and Michael Africa: O’Hanlon. A Rapid Toward Reaction 1997. Force. REFERENCES CITED REFERENCES of the old Negroof the old spiritual, ‘Freelast! at Free last! at Thank God, are we free last!’”at Nothing could better have symbolized the continued relationship between African Americans and their African ancestors than these words, spoken the by prophetic leader of Africa’s last racist enclave. Adedeji, Adebayo. 2002.From Lagos to NEPAD. Barry, John, and Evan Thomas. Colin 2001. Powell: Behind the Myth. Anyidoho, Henry Kwami. 1999. Baregu, Mwesiga. 2002. Beyond September 11: Stru 11: September Beyond 2002. Baregu, Mwesiga. Booker, Salih. US Foreign 2001. Policy and National Interests in Africa. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1999. 1999. Boutros. Boutros-Ghali, Harris, Joseph E., in collaboration with Slimane Zeghidour. Africa 1993. and Its Diaspora since 1935. Clarke, and Walter, Jeff Clough, Michael. 1992. Du Bois, E. B. 1996. W. Manifesto of the Second Pan-African Congress. In Bruni, Frank. 2001. Deep US-Europe Deep Sp 2001. Frank. Bruni, . 2003. The United States. In Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. 1998. 1998. Jr. Henry Louis, Gates, Frazer, Jendayi E. 1997. The AfricaFrazer, Jendayi Crisis E. Response 1997. Initiative: Self-Interested Humanitarianism. Cose, Ellis. The American 2001. Dream in Living Color.

africaTODAY 108 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM africaTODAY 109 ADEKEYE ADEBAJO . 26 The The SAIS Journal Journal . London: Zed Zed London: . Washington D.C.: Financial Times, Financial Report of a policy policy a of Report . New York: Harper January & February, 14 & 21 October, pp. pp. October, 21 & 14 edited by Greg Mills and and Mills Greg by edited San Diego, New York, and 14 June, p. A15. 14 9:10–20. Africa Report,Africa Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy: New and York London: Plume. . New York: Columbia University Press. . Washington D.C.: Insti- Washington United States . The New Yorker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. New Agenda New airs . airs The New Times, York Somalia and Operationections Restore Hope: on Peace- Refl New York: Random House. Brothers at Making War: Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War 99(394):73–95. NEPAD: African Initiative, New Partnership? airs edited by David M. Malone and Yuen Foong Khong. Boulder and and Boulder Khong. Foong Yuen and Malone M. David by edited . Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. of Institute States D.C.: United Washington . The Quest For Democracy.

Somalia: The Missed Opportunities Missed The Somalia: African Aff African 1(2):87–98. Out of America: A Black Man Confronts Africa. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks. Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? Liberia: A People Betrayed: The Role of the in West Rwanda’s Genocide The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional My American Journey. Journey. American My edited by Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild. Boulder and London: Lynne Lynne London: and Boulder Rothchild. Donald and Keller Edmond by edited 21(1):259–273. Security, Rienner. Reality Behind the Rhetoric: The United States, South Africa and Africa, and Africa South States, Reality United The Rhetoric: Behind the John Stremlau. Washington, D.C., and Johannesburg: The Center for Strategic Studies and the South African Institute of International Aff May, p. 1. p. May, Peace. International for Endowment Carnegie 164–179. making and Peacekeeping and making seminar in New July. York, 16 Review Collins. Akron and Oxford: Ohio University Press and James Currey. Interests. National of African Elections Perspectives, International Rienner. Lynne London: Books. pp. 14–17. pp. London: Harcourt Brace. Harcourt London: tute of Peace. of tute Cold In War. Keller, Bill. 2003. The Boys Who Cried Wolfowitz. Khadiagala, Gilbert The M. United 2001. States and Africa: Beyond the Clinton Administration. Lemann, Nicholas. Condoleezza2002. Goes Rice War. to Hirsch, John L., and Robert B. Oakley. 1995. Power, Samantha.Power, 2002. International Peace Academy. 2002. 2000. Linda. Melvern, 1999. Marina. Ottaway, Peters, Beverly. 2000. HIV/AIDS: Uniting and Dividing South Africa and the United States. In Powell, Colin. 1995. Liebenow, J. Gus. 1987. 1987. Gus. J. Liebenow, Innocenti, Nicol Degli. 2001. Powell Condemns Mugabe over Zimbabwe Crisis. Crisis. Zimbabwe over Mugabe Condemns Powell 2001. Degli. Nicol Innocenti, Jordan, Z. Pallo. 2003. A Global Regime Built on Force? Kornegay, Francis A., Africa 1993. Jr. and the New World Order. Prunier, Gérard. 1995. Omach, Paul. 2000. The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of Richburg, Keith B. 1998. . 2003. The United States and Africa: Malign Neglect. In 2000. Tronvil. Kjetil and Tekeste, Negashi, Landsberg, Chris. 2002. From African Renaissance . . . and Back to NEPAD to the Renaissance. Sahnoun, Mohamed. 1994. 1994. Mohamed. Sahnoun, Robinson, Randall. 2000. Schraeder, 1996. Removing Peter. the Shackles? US Foreign Policy toward Africa after the End of the edited edited The New New The 285:12–15. African Business African July, pp. 117–132. pp. July, airs, rmative Action Problem—and Mine. Out of Confl ict: to Peace From War in Africa,Out of Confl Foreign Aff Boston: Beacon Press. Beacon Boston: African Americans and U.S. policy In Defense Africa of Toward Black 1850–1924: Race Matters. Race 1 February, p. A18. . Washington Howard D.C: University Press. by Gunnar Sorbo and Peter Vale. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Nationality York Times, Versi, 2003. Anver. At Last, a Win-Win Formula for African Business. West, Cornell. 1993. Suhrke, Astri. 1997. UN Peacekeeping in Rwanda. In Stremlau, John. 2000. Ending Africa’s Wars. Staples, Brent. 2003. Pondering Condoleezza Rice’s Affi Condoleezza Rice’s Pondering 2003. Brent. Staples, Skinner, Elliot P. 1992. 1992. P. Elliot Skinner,

africaTODAY 110 AFRICA, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE AVUNCULAR SAM