Southern New Hampshire University Woodrow Wilson’s Diplomatic Agenda and Strategic Military Interventions: How They Affected the Russian Civil War 1918-1920 A Capstone Project Submitted to the College of Online and Continuing Education in Partial Fulfillment of the Master of Arts in History By Richard A. Rinehart Killeen, Texas June 2017 Copyright © 2017 by Richard A. Rinehart All Rights Reserved ii Student: Richard A. Rinehart I certify that this student has met the requirements for formatting the capstone project and that this project is suitable for preservation in the University Archive. October 3, 2017 __________________________________________ _______________ Southern New Hampshire University Date College of Online and Continuing Education iii Abstract This thesis aims to understand the factors that affected Woodrow Wilson’s foreign and military policy actions, which subsequently led to decisions that dictated United States’ intervention into the Russian Civil War, 1918-1920. The background information discussed demonstrates the importance of the Russian Civil War. This chaotic time in history surrounding World War I caused much of Woodrow Wilson’s dilemma and consequentially changed future of Soviet-American relations. It details how it would take numerous foreign policy shifts to convince Mr. Wilson to send U.S. troops to intervene into North Russia and Siberia. Lenin’s opposing perspective will encompass what is contained in much of the supporting information surrounding this thesis. In conjunction with military operations there, the allies attempted to broker peace with Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the form of the Prinkipo Proposal, the Bullitt Mission, and the Hoover-Nansen Proposal. The concluding question that frames the argument of this research will answer what happened because Wilson intervened on Russian soil and how it affected the Communist world revolution. What positive results, if any, can be discovered? iv Dedication For my wife, Barbara Ann v Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv Dedication………………………………………………………………………………………....v Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………………vi Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………vii Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Historical Background of the Russian Civil War .........................................................12 Chapter 2: Wilson’s Dilemma .......................................................................................................19 Chapter 3: The U. S. Interventions North and Siberian .................................................................37 Chapter 4: Lenin’s Changing Perspectives on World Revolution .................................................50 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................64 Appendix: A: Aide Memoire .........................................................................................................79 Appendix: B: Foreign Relations, Russia 1918 ...............................................................................81 Appendix: C: The Seattle Star March 16, 1918 .............................................................................84 Appendix: D: Foreign Relations Documents 1918* ......................................................................85 Appendix: E: President Wilson’s July 4 1918 Address .................................................................87 Appendix: F: The New York Sun 5 July 1918 ..............................................................................88 Appendix: G: The New York Sun July 6 1918 ..............................................................................89 Appendix: H: The New York Sun July 8 1918 ..............................................................................90 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................91 vi Acknowledgments I would like to thank Dr. Stephanie McConnell, who was my Russian Revolution and Research Seminar professor. The astronomical amounts of questions I have asked are worth their weight in gold. Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. Charles Reed. He has helped push the project forward and keep me motivated. In addition, I would certainly be remiss if I did not thank my Military Learning Community Advisor Thomas Leamy, as well as Dr. Robert Denning, and all my Southern New Hampshire University professors, and colleagues. Lastly, I would be in the doghouse forever if I did not thank my wife for her support in getting this paper typed, proofed, and common sense tested. Thank all of you for a challenging, yet wonderful, experience. vii 1 Introduction The sheer complexity involved in diplomatic foreign relations while coordinating military operations would present a daunting task; yet, if properly managed could be expected to accomplish the intended missions. Additionally, the important reasons behind this research hinges on the necessary interaction between all agencies concerned and how they would assist in bringing stability to Russia without embroiling the forces of the United States in partisan political and military struggles. America’s entry into World War I in April 1917 gave the Army its first taste of sustained conventional warfare in a half century. Andrew Birtle stated, “Yet, even as America’s soldiers entered the largest military conflict the world had ever known, they could not escape from performing the type of unconventional, politico-military operations that typify small wars and contingency operations.”1 Nowhere was this more apparent than in Russia, where the Army became bogged down in the chaos of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. In the winter of 1917–1918, Bolshevik revolutionaries seized control of the Russian government and withdrew Russia from the Allied coalition. During the first six months of 1918, Wilson was inundated with constant requests for military intervention in Siberia. Calls came from his Allies, the Supreme War Council, and his own diplomatic staff abroad. This investigation provides new ways to consider how this virtually unknown U.S. military operation, a military intervention that has influenced future U.S. Soviet foreign relations and U.S. global policies for seventy-five years. The situation in Europe radically changed with 1 Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941 (Washington D.C., Center of Military History Publications, 2009), 208. 1 2 the elimination of Germany as a combatant force and interventionist fronts in Russia could no longer be regarded as part of the general front against the Central Powers. The insistent question arose, was it to be war or peace with Soviet Russia? The relevant argument follows the evidence that Woodrow Wilson’s diplomatic foreign policies agenda and strategic military interventions were directed toward the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War 1918-1920, and helped delay the spread of the Bolshevik world revolution in Europe. Every version behind the Russian Revolution and subsequently the Russian Civil War tells the story of a Marxist revolution intended to transform the world. To gauge a starting point, it is readily acknowledged that the dawn of social and political upheaval in Russia began with the ouster of the Emperor Nicholas II, which coincides with the February Revolution of 1917. What ideological interpretation would become this revolution? There were at least eleven different political parties vying for control. In the end, the Bolshevik party would take control because of the failure of the Provisional government. Of course, in Sheila Fitzpatrick’s words, “There were revolutionary parties in Russia before there was a revolution; and when the moment came, in the midst of war, these parties competed for the support of ready-made units of popular revolution (soldiers, sailors, and workers), not the milling spontaneous revolutionary crowd.”2 How would this eventually change the historiography surrounding the Russian Civil War? Numerous interpretations of the Russian Civil War have presented an overview of how different historians have investigated these changing perspectives involved in this examination. George Kennan and Evan Mawdley’s objectives on the foreign relations/military lens will expose new ideas as a basis for the study of the strategic effects on global politics and diplomatic 2 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9. 2 3 relations. These changes would all be related to the interactions between the political, military, and social lenses. The search of all available collections at the National Archives, Library of Congress, and Defense Technical Information Center, have yielded numerous references discovered that are relevant to this work. Concurrently, memoirs and official communications of key players like Woodrow Wilson, Newton Baker, Robert Lansing, George F. Kennan, General Peyton Conway March, General Tasker Bliss and General William S. Graves have been examined and by gaining access to some of the archival papers have proven beneficial. The use of primary sources enhanced the availability of resources that supported this argument. The inability