The Latin Union Experience and the Lolr: the French Position
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Annual ESHET Conference Nicolas Barbaroux Antwerp - 2017- May 18-20 (First Draft- Do not quote) The Latin Union experience and the LoLR: the French position "These movements in the market for precious metals became the immediate cause, in 1865, of the so-called Latin Currency Union between France, Belgium, Switzerland and Italy (...) Other European countries had at that time, either a silver currency, as in Germany and Scandinavia or a depreciated paper currency, as in Austria and Russia. If those countries had gradually attached themselves to the Latin Union, with its free minting of silver and gold at a legally established ratio then the traditional ratio between gold and silver might possibly have been preserved. Adhesion to the Latin Union was, in fact, contemplated by Germany shortly before the outbreak of the war in 1870, but owing to the war the plan never came to fruition." (Wicksell, 1935 (1906): 38) 1. Introduction In the aftermath of the E.U sovereign debt crisis, a central bank's duties debate emerged among bankers and policymakers mostly in E.U. This fundamental debate started in 2013 when the Bundesbank appealed the European Central bank (ECB) to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) owing to the adoption of the 2012 Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. Despite the 2015 June (16th) decision from ECJ, the German central bank saw this freedom of central bank's action as incompatible with the Maastricht Treaty, namely the no bailout rule (art.12). Beyond the ECJ's decision, the Germans (re)opened a structural controversy on the central bank's duty, among them the one of Lender of Last Resort (hereafter LoLR) when a monetary union is concerned. The concept of LoLR is a tricky one as it encompasses a double facet understanding. On one side, it can be seen as a safety measure or a liquidity constraint that whatever monetary union should adopt so as to limit the increasing systemic risk (particularly when the number of inter-related banks grows). And, on the other side, it can be seen counter efficient rule owing to the increasing risk of 'moral hazard' behaviour it encourages. The later argument has numerous supporters in Europe in the aftermath of the great financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. The European Monetary Union from the famous Maastricht Treaty in 1992 is not the first eXperiment of monetary union between national countries and currencies. The 19th century gives us a stimulating field to clarify our focus on LoLR. Central banking theory has a quite short history as regards to economic theory at large. Anyway, many of the up today structural issues that central banks have to face were already debated in the two preceding centuries. It is common ground to quote Walter Bagehot as a due father for central banking preoccupations, mainly with his proposed (eponymous) set of rules which encapsulated principles for successful lending of last resort in "The Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market" (1873) book. Bagehot, a former editor of "the Economist", wrote at a time in which recurrent money market 1 Annual ESHET Conference Nicolas Barbaroux Antwerp - 2017- May 18-20 (First Draft- Do not quote) crisis threatened the British economy with on going financial collapses and dislocations. The 19th British school played a leading role in monetary theories. Among them, the "Currency school vs Banking school" divided the economists concerning the necessity (or not) to impose a gold ratio to the monetary mass into circulation. Even though the adoption of the Act of Peel (also known as the "bank act") in 1844 ended de juro this controversy, de facto, the debate kept on feeding central bankers' discussions even recently (Goodhart and Jensen, 2015). The 19th century was the heyday of the central banking preoccupations, however, it still have strong reminiscences in the post 2008 great financial crisis. In fact, the 'currency vs banking' controversy raises a core issue for the banking system: the necessity to define precisely an institutional setup to secure the international banking (and financial) system. The same thing happened following the sovereign debt crisis in E.U. The creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2013 was an answer to the 'black swan' phenomenon which hit the interbank money market (Taylor and Williams, 2009). The quotation in the introduction from Wicksell's "Lectures on Political Economy" is crystal clear concerning the conteXt in which the Latin (monetary) Union started. It is also enlightening concerning the internal failure and difficulties to set up monetary unions at large. In fact, a few European countries decided to set up a monetary union in 1865 in order to solve the problems inherited from the bimetallism functioning. However, the way those laws and conventions had been adopted gave us some insights on the way economists saw and solve liquidity and systemic risks. Those later problems emerged in many monetary unions such as the Latin Union, Zollverein or Scandinavian Monetary union. It was for that reason an international conference on Bimetallism had been organized in London in may 1894 by the Bimetallic League. The works of Professor Hans-Michaël Trautwein were forerunning in this topic. At the ESHET annual conference in Rome in 2015, he demonstrated to what eXtent the 19th century German economists (Adolph Wagner, Erwin Nasse, Carl Knies, Karl Helfferich and Friedrich Bendixen) were more progressive rather than today when LoLR issue is questioned within a monetary union system. The present article is a modest contribution to the article written by Hans-Michael Trautwein in 2015. As he did on the German and Swedish sides, we will do the same but on the French side. The article concentrated itself on the contributions driven by two very little known French scholars: Henri Cernuschi (1821-1896) a former Parliament deputy; and Albert Aupetit (1876-1944), a former Walras' 1901 PhD student. In fact, the article focuses on the LoLR within monetary unions by inquiring in the Latin Union experience.. In fact, we will see to what eXtent the various arguments of current debate are reminiscence (or not) of the ones from the French economists during the Latin Union era. It is worth (re)considering how French economists at that time discussed banking crisis and LoLR by Bank of France. Those reflections may be of some interests for current ECB's issues, notably as regards to its role of LoLR. The article will be structured as follows: section 2 provides a brief history of the Latin Union functioning and its failures. The section 3 will present some French comments and opinion on the Latin Union functioning and conteXt, as they were made at the time 2 Annual ESHET Conference Nicolas Barbaroux Antwerp - 2017- May 18-20 (First Draft- Do not quote) the Latin Union was facing some internal disequilibrium. The contributions by Henri Cernuschi and Albert Aupetit will be eXposed. Section 4 will conclude by providing some reflections for the current ECB issues. 2. The Latin Union: from a monetary integration de facto to a monetary integration de juro The monetary integration process in France was not the result of enthusiastic men and politics but rather the outcome of the economic hazard. As mentioned by Wicksell in the introduction, the Latin monetary Union was the result of the market failures within the Bimetallic system which had forced a few European countries to speak the same currency. It was under the strong influence of the young Bank of France, not to say under the influence of Napoleon Bonaparte, that the monetary integration process started in the end of 19th century. In this part, we will not enter into the debate on the stabilty of Bimetallism as a monetary order, nor we will provide a thorough description of the Latin Union stages. For those interested, see the work done by Sédillot (1953), Schumpeter (1954) and Redish (1994). Created by the Emperor Napoleon, the Bank of France was officially born in 1800 (January, 18th). More precisely, the creation of the Bank of France rooted back to 1796 when two bankers, Le Couteulx de Canteleu and Perregaux, decided to set up a private bank in Paris that could discount commercial papers and increase the circulation of money. Unfortunately, this project failed and it was only after the state strike by the first Consul Bonaparte that the Bank of France was officially born. Another financial institution, called ‘Caisse des Comptes Courants’ (which also provided quasi-central banking functions including notes’ issue) preceded the Bank of France. The 'Caisse des Comptes Courants' merged with the new Bank of France. The same scenario happened with the other French note issuing banks in that time, such as the 'Caisse d'Escompte de Commerce'. Due to this oligopolistic strategy and owing to the weight and size of the Bank of France's networks and branches, many others private banks were forced to closed during that time. The Bank of France was no more than a joint stock company with a share capital of 30 millions francs, part of which was subscribed by Napoleon Bonaparte himself and several members of his entourage1. The private ownership of the Bank of France was not particular to France, the same situation eXisted in Great Britain or in Sweden for instance2. The Bank of France received, in 1803, the privilege of issuing bank notes in 1 The ownership of the Bank of France was really diffuse: for instance, in 1911, the shareholders amounted to 30 000 people among them one third owning only one action. This situation remained until the nationalization of the bank on December, 2nd in 1945. 2 From its creation in 1694 until now, the Bank of England (BoE) has acted, and still does, as the Government's banker and debt manager.