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Page 1 T I M E L I N E O F P O L I T I C a L TIMELINE OF POLITICAL EVENTS IN THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 1948 Israeli War of Independence / Palestinian nakba (catas- trophe). The founding of the State of Israel results in the exodus of approximately 700,000 Palestinians. 1959 Founding of Fatah in Kuwait. 1964 Founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1964 Arab League summit in Cairo. 1967 Founding of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 1967 Six Day War results in the occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights by Israeli forces. 1968 Battle of Karameh: Jordanian military forces and Fatah militants stand their ground against Israeli forces. The battle results in increased popularity for Fatah. 1969 Split of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—predecessor of PFLP. September 1970 Black September: Heavy clashes between the Jordanian military and the PLO in Jordan result in the expulsion of PLO factions from Jordan. October 1973 Yom Kippur War / October War: 1974 Release of the PLO’s Ten Point Program, calling for the establishment of a Palestinian authority on “every part of the Palestinian territory that is liberated.” 1975–1990 Lebanese civil war. 200 Timeline of Political Events 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon eradicates most PLO forces from southern Lebanon and Beirut. The PLO leadership relocates to Tunis. 1982 Founding of the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP) as Palestine Communist Party (PCP). 1987–1993 The first intifada: Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza engage in demonstrations, civil resistance, and low-intensity violence against the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. 1987 Founding of Hamas in Gaza. 1988 The Palestinian Declaration of Independence is p roclaimed by Yasir Arafat in Algiers. December 1988 Yasir Arafat addresses the UN General Assembly and acknowledges “Israel’s right to exist in peace and security.” 1989 First militant operation conducted by Hamas: two Israeli soldiers are killed. The operation later leads to the arrest and conviction of Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin by Israeli forces. 1990/91 First Gulf War: Yasir Arafat’s solidarity with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein leads to the expulsion of hun- dreds of thousands of Palestinians from the Gulf States. October 1991 The Madrid Peace Conference signifies first formal nego- tiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Palestinians are represented by a joint Palestinian–Jordanian delegation; the PLO participates as an “advisory delegation.” 1993 Letters of recognition exchanged between Israel and the PLO, signed by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chairman Yasir Arafat. 1993/94 The signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 leads to the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). 1996 The first elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem result in a Fatah victory. The elections are boycotted by Hamas, PFLP, and others. Arafat is elected president of the PNA with 88 percent of the total vote. 1997 An Israeli assassination attempt against Hamas leader Khaled Mashal fails in Amman. July 2000 The Camp David talks: US president Bill Clinton, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, and PLO chairman Yasir Timeline of Political Events 201 Arafat fail to achieve a “final status settlement” to the conflict. September 2000 Visit of the Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif triggers the outbreak of the second intifada . January 2001 Taba Summit negotiations fail to achieve a “final status settlement.” 2002 Founding of the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI). March 2003 Yasir Arafat, in response to US pressure, appoints Mahmoud Abbas as first prime minister of the PNA. October 2003 Abbas resigns as prime minister, claiming lack of s upport from Israel and the United States and “internal incitement.” He is succeeded by Ahmed Qurei as prime minister. 2003 The Middle East Quartet, composed of the United States, the EU, Russia, and the UN, proposes the Road Map for Peace, a framework for gradual progress toward a Two-State Solution. March 2004 Hamas founder Ahmad Yassin is killed in an Israeli airstrike. November 2004 Yasir Arafat dies in Paris. 2005 Municipal elections are held in the West Bank and Gaza: results highlight the strength of Hamas and the organi- zational weaknesses of Fatah. 2005 Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli settler community is unilaterally evicted. January 2005 Mahmoud Abbas is elected president of the PNA with 62 percent of the total vote. Hamas and others boycott the elections. March 2005 An informal truce between Israel and 13 Palestinian f actions marks the end of the second intifada. 2006 PLC elections result in a victory for Hamas’s Change and Reform list. Subsequently, Israel and the Middle East Quartet impose a financial and diplomatic boycott on the PNA. June 2006 Lebanon War between Israeli forces and Hizbullah fighters. February 2007 The Saudi-brokered Mecca Agreement to overcome the split between Hamas and Fatah is signed by Mahmoud Abbas and Khaled Mashal. In March, the PLC establishes 202 Timeline of Political Events a National Unity Government, led by Prime Minister Ismail Haniya (Hamas). June 2007 The National Unity Government fails to end frictions in Gaza, leading to full-scale conflicts. Hamas takes control of Gaza. Abbas dissolves the National Unity Government and appoints independent Salam Fayyad to head the emergency government and later the caretaker government in the West Bank. Israel and the Middle East Quartet resume full financial support for the PNA in the West Bank. 2007 Israel and Egypt establish a blockade of the Gaza Strip. 2009 Salam Fayyad is reappointed prime minister and he introduces his state building plan, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State . August 2009 Sixth General Congress of Fatah convenes in Bethlehem. November 2009 Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu issues a ten-month “settlement freeze” in the West Bank. The policy does not apply to East Jerusalem. May 2010 Gaza “Freedom Flotilla.” Israel partly eases its blockade of the Gaza Strip. Exports from Gaza remain impossible. January 2011 Palestine Papers are leaked by Qatari TV channel al-Jazeera. May 2011 Cairo Reconciliation Agreement between Fatah and Hamas sets out a path for the creation of a transitional government and national reconciliation. 2011 Municipality elections are postponed in the West Bank and Gaza. September 2011 PLO applies for full UN membership at the United Nations Security Council. October 2011 In a prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel, abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and 1,027 Palestinian prisoners are freed. October 2011 The UNESCO General Conference admits Palestine as a full member. The United States reduces financial sup- port for the PNA. Israel temporarily freezes the transfer of Palestinian taxes. February 2012 The Doha Agreement between Hamas and Fatah reaf- firms the implementation of the 2011 Cairo Agreement. The parties agree to hold elections in 2012 and to the establishment of an interim government led by Abbas. Timeline of Political Events 203 May 2012 Internal Hamas elections in Gaza strengthen Ismail Haniya’s position. PNA cabinet is reappointed in the West Bank: 13 Fatah members gain ministerial posts in the second Fayyad cabinet. September 2012 Protests against unpopular policies of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad erupt throughout the West Bank. N O T E S 1 Political Factions in Palestine: Stagnation, Ambiguity, and Change 1 . Nathan J. Brown, “Evaluating Palestinian Reform,” Carnegie Papers Middle East Series no. 59 (May 2005). 2 . Helga Baumgarten, “The Three Faces / Phases of Palestinian Nationalism 1948–2005,” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no. 4 ( 2005 ): 25. 3 . As of 2012, the following political organizations are members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), As-Sa’iqa, the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP), the Palestine Democratic Union (FIDA), the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), and the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF). 4 . While these distinct phases of Palestinian factionalism are clearly distinguishable, alterna- tive parallel forms of organization such as elements of traditional leadership have been permanent features of Palestinian politics for decades as well. See Abdelaziz A. Ayyad, Arab Nationalism and the Palestinians 1850–1939 (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1999 ). In this context, also the relevance of independent Palestinian grassroots activism has to be acknowledged. Here, the most prominent example is certainly the Palestinian intifada erupting in 1987. As political scientist Mary Elizabeth King puts it, ultimately the intifada was based on the initiative of activists, who “stopped waiting” for political movements to act and “became involved in the broad, popular mobilization” Mary Elizabeth King, A Quiet Revolution: The First Palestinian Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 102. However, while the established Palestinian factions were clearly at first taken by surprise by this independent activism, they soon managed to regain the initiative and absorbed the unleashed political momentum. 5 . In the text, “Palestinian Territories” is given preference
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