————————— 1987-1993 — The Intifada: The Palestinian Resistance Mo(ve)ment ————————— 7. 1987-1993 — The Intifada: The Palestinian Resistance Mo(ve)ment1 I. Introduction The Israeli polity saw two major structural changes during the post- colonial era: the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the insti- tutionalization of the dual democratic/ military regime after 1967. Despite these two tremendous transformations in terms of popula- tion, economy, territory and bureaucracies, the colonial Zionist Labor Movement (ZLM) proved strong enough to maintain its institutional structure and power. The only long-term political development occurred gradually, with the transition from a monopoly of a single ruling party to a bipartisan “left/right cartel” (see Chapter 5) made up of two Zion- ist party blocks. Although these two blocks competed for power, tribal channeling of polarized hostile feelings closed political space to new actors, while in fact both implemented similar economic policies and supported the dual regime (Ben Porath, 1982; Grinberg, 1991, 2010). The ruling Labor Alignment, in cooperation with the Histadrut and the security establishment, institutionalized the dual regime designed to maintain control of the economy and population on both sides of the Green Line separating sovereign Israel from the Occupied Territories. The Labor Movement ideology, however, was unequipped to legitimize the military occupation or reassert the state’s institutional autonomy after 1967. The Likud government elected for the first time in 1977 was able to legitimize the occupation but unable to control the economy due to the lack of state autonomy and its incapacity to articulate economic interests, which became its most critical obstacle (see Chapter 6). It is therefore no coincidence that precisely as a result of the state’s newly established autonomy in 1985, in the context of profound eco- 1 This chapter is based on my research published under the title Politics and violence in Israel/Palestine (Grinberg, 2010). — 217 — —————————————————— CHAPTER SEVEN —————————————————— nomic and political crises (hyperinflation and the aftermath of the First Lebanon War), the two parties of the dominant cartel became weakened vis-à-vis the state technopols. The National Unity Government’s (NUG, 1984-1990) neutralization of the traditional hostility between the two mythological parties enabled the state bureaucracy to act autonomously without any significant differences between the two parties. Shimon Peres (Labor party), as Prime Minister (1984-1986), dealt the worst blows to the Histadrut and its firms, ultimately weakening his own party in the process.2 Evidently, the policies of the two blocks, particularly when in power together, were not as different as experienced by their constituents on election days. The real decisions were not made by the voters or repre- sentative party organs, but were rather dictated by circumstances and bureaucracies. In that sense, the Israeli imagined democracy could never be materialized (Grinberg, 1999). Before 1967 a transition process to democracy started with the working class resistance mo(ve)ment and the empowerment of the middle and upper classes, but it was reversed by the institutionalization of the dual democratic/military regime (Grinberg, 1993, 2008). Since 1967, political space for mediation be- tween civil society and state was closed by political actors who carefully manipulated national myths to mobilize social groups without actu- ally representing their interests, identities, and political views (Shapiro, 1996). The actors in the political field were exposed as unable to resolve the country’s problems and as the “left/right” cartel waned, two new autonomous forces emerged. The first was a vibrant civil society in the form of protest movements against the Lebanon War and class struggles against the economic policies. The second was the state’s autonomous bureaucracies—most notably the Bank of Israel and the technocrats in the Ministry of Treasury (see Grinberg, 1991; Maman and Rosenhek, 2011). The specific role of political parties in democratic processes—to act as a bridge between civil society and the state and represent new ideas, agendas and identities—was not fulfilled.3 However, the shrink- 2 I thank Shaike Gavish (general manager of Koor) for this insight in an interview in 1988 (Grinberg, 1991). He explained that only a leader of the Labor party could dismantle the Workers Society, exactly as only the Likud leader could withdraw from Sinai and make peace with Egypt. His point was that they faced no serious opposition to their policies. 3 The combined power of Likud and Labor in the Knesset fell from 95 delegates in 1981 to 85 in — 218 — ————————— 1987-1993 — The Intifada: The Palestinian Resistance Mo(ve)ment ————————— ing of political space was manifested clearly by the formation of the NUG which was detached from the Israeli civil society and crucially, prevented the opening of political space to the violently oppressed Pal- estinian civil society. This chapter will analyze the opening of political space by Palestinian resistance in the Occupied Territories, demanding recognition of their legitimate claims, representation and negotiations. I will show that the Palestinian resistance mo(ve)ment succeeded in opening political space both for recognition and representation due to the demarcation of bor- ders and a balance of power, and immediately opened political space also to class, ethnic, and civil society claims within sovereign Israel. It was the political failure to synchronize and coordinate the three political arenas (within either sovereign Israel or the Occupied Territories (OT) as well as between them) that ultimately led to the violent closure of political space in the three arenas. II. The Intifada Resistance Mo(ve)ment In the two and a half years ever since the inflation was halted, Israel’s economy became stabilized and the NUG held fast. However, the growth promised by neo-liberal theory to follow stabilization never came. In- stead, a popular Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, broke out, with mas- sive demonstrations against the military government, accompanied by attempts to break free of the economic dependency on Israel by disrupt- ing the exchange of workers and goods. Hence the resulting stagnation in the Israeli economy was not attributed to the economic plan, but to the inevitable “costs of the Intifada.” Undoubtedly, economic hardship was one of the main causes of the Intifada,4 which broke out in December 1987, caused by the recession in Israel and the Gulf countries. It was pushed by the poorest elements in the refugee camps, who often forced the shopkeepers to strike and con- tribute to the national struggle.5 Two additional contextual factors were 1984, and has continued falling ever since. 4 After October 2000 this was renamed the First Intifada. Elsewhere, I have analyzed both events as diametrically opposed, despite their misleadingly similar names (Grinberg, 2010, 2013a). 5 For more on the First Intifada, see Gilbar and Sesser (1992); A. Shalev (1990); Nassar and Heacock (1990); Schiff and Ya’ari (1990). — 219 — —————————————————— CHAPTER SEVEN —————————————————— related to the lack of political space for the Palestinians in the OT, not only vis-à-vis the State of Israel but also within the PLO. First, the IDF’s success in removing the PLO offices from Beirut to Tunis—far away from Israel and the West Bank—was a key element in the uprising. The feeling that the PLO was incapable of coordinating a national struggle from across the Mediterranean galvanized the popular uprising. Second, the lack of any political initiative for peace from the Israeli side and the expansion of the Jewish settlements at the heart of the West Bank also contributed to a general sense of despair.6 Civil society mobilization against the background of hopelessness wasn’t new in the OT. After the signing of the 1978 Camp David Accords with Egypt, which would eventually lead to the peace treaty between the two countries, the IDF attempted to impose a civil administration aiming to unilaterally implement the so-called “autonomy plan” rejected by the PLO. In order to confront IDF plans, an autonomous Palestin- ian civil society began to emerge, organizing trade unions, women’s and students’ organizations, youth movements and national committees during 1980-81.7 Opposition to the unilateral Israeli imposition of civil administration fuelled a non-violent resistance movement (Younis, 2000). This civil society mobilization gained prominence especially after a cease-fire agreement signed indirectly between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon in July 1981, because the agreement did not include the Pales- tinian struggle against military occupation in the OT.8 For almost one year, no violent struggle against the occupation took place, and almost all protests took the form of non-violent civil resistance (Younis, 2000). This period of autonomous organization and mobilization of Pales- tinian civil society came to an abrupt end in June 1982 with the occupa- tion of Southern Lebanon by the IDF and its siege of Beirut. The war and the ensuing three years of occupation of Southern Lebanon formed the immediate political context for understanding the Israeli reaction to the Intifada. Two main consequences of the war were particularly relevant to the outbreak of the Intifada. The first was the PLO’s inability to attack 6 On the atmosphere of despair among the Palestinians on the eve of the Intifada, see Kimmerling and Midgal (1999: 222-32). 7 On the Intifada’s organizational basis, see Luckman and Beinin (1990); Nassar and Heacock (1990); and Schiff and Ya’ari (1990). 8 The cease fire agreement included only the mutual firing in the North of Israel, namely Israeli air attacks in Lebanon and PLO Katyusha rocketing of the Galilee (Schiff and Ya’ari, 1984) — 220 — ————————— 1987-1993 — The Intifada: The Palestinian Resistance Mo(ve)ment ————————— Israel directly due to the distant location of its headquarters in North Africa. This situation empowered the Palestinian civil society in the OT with its non-violent resistance strategy.