Democracy, Identity and Security in Israel's Ethnic Democracy
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DEMOCRACY, IDENTITY AND SECURITY IN ISRAEL’S ETHNIC DEMOCRACY: THE IDEATIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE By Dubi Kanengisser A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Dubi Kanengisser, 2016 Democracy, Identity and Security in Israel’s Ethnic Democracy: The Ideational Underpinnings of Institutional Change, Doctor of Philosophy, 2016, Dubi Kanengisser, Graduate Department of Political Science, University of Toronto Abstract This work expands on the growing ideational institutionalist literature by proposing that institutional change and stability are influenced most substantially by changes to the underlying ideational network which link core societal ideas. These core ideas create the framework on which institutions are built and in which form they are fashioned. Changes to the ideational network lead to adaptive changes in institutions, but the difficulty in completely removing core ideas from these networks protects the institutions from substantial change. The theory is demonstrated using the case of the surprising stability of ethnic democracy in Israel in the wake of the substantial changes to the country’s economic and security realities. Small adaptive changes in the institution of ethnic democracy are traced back to changes in the balance between three core ideas: democracy, Jewish identity, and security. The overall stability of the institution, however, is linked to the enduring linkages of the three core ideas even as they experienced changes in their individual meanings. ii Too many years the Israeli left also accepted the separation between Jews and Arabs. First by looking away, then through submission, and finally wholeheartedly, it adopted the racist world view that the Arabs are not part of the political game. That is why the left in Israel is also responsible for the fact that incitement against the Arabs has reached new heights. We can no longer avoid this. The first message that must come out of this rally is this: There is no Jewish left and Arab left in Israel, there is only a Jewish-Arab left. And within this left wing there can be disagreement, but we no longer accept this separation. Nir Baram, Author, at a rally against the Basic Law: The Nation, November 30, 2014. iii In memory of Yizhak Rabin, a soldier in the army of peace iv Preface For, how could you expect me not to feel uneasy about what that ancient lawgiver they call the public say when it sees me, after slumbering so many years in the silence of oblivion, coming out now with all my years upon my back, and with a book as dry as a rush, devoid of invention, meagre in style, poor in thoughts, wholly wanting in learning and wisdom, without quotations in the margin or annotations at the end, after the fashion of other books I see, which, though all fables and profanity, are so full of maxims from Aristotle, and Plato, and the whole herd of philosophers, that they fill the readers with amazement and convince them that the authors are men of learning, erudition, and eloquence. From the Author’s Preface to Miguel de Cervantes’ Don Quixote The research and writing of this study took place primarily between 2011 and 2014. During these years I have amassed a long list of quotes and anecdotes that, each in turn, appeared at the time to epitomise the road Israel has taken as it navigates between its conflicting commitments to Jewish identity and democracy. Progressively more candid, unabashed statements from leading politicians, bills and motions that sought to disenfranchise Israel’s Arab minority and limit free speech to Israel’s left-wing, all posed almost cartoonish representations of the trend that this study attempts to describe. v Democracy, Identity and Security in Israel's Ethnic Democracy This work would never have been completed were it not for the values, beliefs, ideas, and curiosity instilled in me by my beloved parents from a young age. In a study of my own private ideational network, they would be the point of origin. But the ideas presented in this work were also deeply affected by what I have observed of political life in Israel throughout my life, and particularly during the formative years of this project. I returned to Israel for my field work, after four years abroad, during the hopeful summer of 2011, when hundreds of thousands had taken to the streets to call for social justice, and public discourse took a long overdue reprieve from issues of security and terrorism to discuss the more “normal” politics of economic policy.1 But the core conflicts of Israeli society were never out of sight. Leaders of the movement were immediately labeled radical leftists and their links to pro-peace (or, as they were deemed by the right, “anti-Zionist”) groups were quickly traced and denounced. Those leaders themselves were acutely aware of the dangers of being identified as “Arab lovers” or generally associated with the left-wing side of the debate on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Attempts to include Israel’s Arab citizens in the protest were marginal and marginalized, and absurdly, signs bearing the names of political parties were banned from some of the rallies, due to their organizers’ wish to keep them “a-political”. But the summer of 2011 ended and Israel was soon consumed again by security issues. A flare-up in Gaza in March 2012 and Operation Pillar of Defense in November bookended the failed attempt to re-engage the protest movement in the summer of 2012. 1 That politics is normally primarily about the economy is something I did not fully grasp until I immigrated to Canada. For an Israeli growing up in the shade of the Lebanon War, the first Intifada, the Oslo peace process and its aftermath, thinking about economic policy has always been an afterthought – a luxury. vi Preface By the time of the elections of 2013, the economic debate had all but evaporated, and Israel’s left made only paltry gains. Newcomer populist party Yesh Atid, originally setting as its goal to take care of civil and economic issues, ended up focusing much of its campaign on its promise for “equality of burden” – i.e. the drafting of ultra-orthodox (and possibly Arabs) to military and national service. 2011-2012 also saw a renewed barrage of anti-democratic legislation aimed against Israel’s Arab citizens and left-wing organizations, astride an unprecedented public attack against left wing organizations, most prominently the New Israel Fund. The attack was orchestrated by NGOs with strong links to right wing parties and specifically PM Netanyahu, and posed a threat to the very existence of many of Israel’s aid and advocacy organizations. For a part of this period I worked with the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, and felt the palpable distress such organizations experienced as new bills were introduced to quell their freedom of speech and action. Events kept on piling up. In the summer of 2014, three Jewish teenagers were abducted and, as was later found out, murdered in the West Bank. As Israel began its operation to retrieve the three teenagers, it also began attacking targets in Gaza, in response to rockets fired into Israel.2 Through social media tens of thousands supported calls for revenge. Reports spread of marauding groups walking the streets of Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem seeking Arabs, and physical attacks took place in several cases. On July 2nd, one day after the funeral of the three teenagers, an Arab teenager from East Jerusalem was caught by a gang of Jews and burned alive. Violent demonstrations erupted in Arab towns 2 The rockets were most likely fired in response to Israel’s assassination of a key Hamas activist several hours before the abduction. vii Democracy, Identity and Security in Israel's Ethnic Democracy and in East Jerusalem and met with force from Israeli police, although the events of October 2000, where 13 Israeli Arabs were killed by police gunfire, were not repeated. The public atmosphere had become poisonous. As violence in Gaza escalated, left-wing demonstrators and even those merely expressing their compassion for innocent Palestinians killed in the attacks, reported heretofore unknown levels of hostility and even physical violence. New groups and gangs began organizing with the express intention of hunting down and attacking left-wing supporters and several such attacks materialized, leading many on the left to avoid demonstrations against the war altogether. It became commonplace to express desire for the death of leftists and Arabs alike, and many seemed to feel such exclamations were perfectly normative. One reporter wrote on his Facebook page of a woman who came up to him and asked to be interviewed because she had much to say. When asked what that was, she began wishing for a rocket to hit Tel-Aviv and kill hundreds of leftists “so that they will understand what residents of the south feel”. The woman identified herself as a school teacher. Meanwhile, Israel’s Arab citizens were also threatened. In addition to physical attacks, they were also hurt economically. A call to boycott Arab Israeli businesses received resounding support and one poll found two thirds of Jews in Israel refused to shop in Arab stores. Not all was lost, however. Israel’s police forces managed to contain the bubbling violence and despite claims by the gangs that law enforcement were on their side, the police protected left wing demonstrators and limited bloodshed. The government itself also held fast, although PM Netanyahu had to face increasingly vicious criticism from within his viii Preface coalition and even his own party.