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Democratizing the PLO PRIO POLICY BRIEF 03 2012 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 gate Hausmanns Address: Visiting NO Grønland, 9229 PO Box (PRIO) Oslo Institute Research Peace Democratizing the PLO Prospects and Obstacles - 0134 Oslo, Norway Oslo, 0134 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 gate Hausmanns Address: Visiting NO Grønland, 9229 PO Box War (CSCW) Civil of Study the for Centre While the PLO has been recognized both by the international commu- nity and by Israel as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the organization remains undemocratic. Its leadership is not elected. The PLO represents the secular resistance groups of the past, - 0134 Oslo, Norway Oslo, 0134 not the political reality of today. In 2011, however, an agreement was reached between the main Palestinian political groups to hold elections for the PLO. It is planned that these elections will include all Palestini- ans, regardless of their location, in accordance with the principle of ful- ISBN: 978 ISBN: www.prio.no ly proportional representation. Recent Arab uprisings for democracy make regional conditions favourable for the holding of such elections. - 82 - 7288 Meanwhile, Western governments fear that the PLO could come to be - 408 dominated by Islamists who do not recognize the State of Israel. In the - 5 (online); (online); past, such considerations have discouraged the PLO from opening up 978 for democratic reforms. However, the fall of President Hosni Mubarak - 82 - in Egypt has acted as a warning to PLO leaders that sustaining an un- 7288 - 409 democratic and secular PLO could hit back with a vengeance. - 2 (print) Dag Tuastad Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) The Legitimacy Crisis tation might be in the context of Palestinian Palestinian people at large. Through the quota politics. The crisis has been further aggravat- system, the guerrillas – not representatives of The Palestinian National Initiative (PNI) has ed by the ‘Arab Spring’ and related calls for the Palestinian communities in various geo- tried hard to join the Palestinian Liberation democratization in the Arab world. The PLO, graphic areas – were given the power of deci- Organization (PLO). ‘We don’t understand ‘the sole legitimate representative of the Pales- sion-making within Palestinian politics. why there is this insistence on not opening tinian people’, is in acute need of democratic Moreover, the quota system meant that the up’, says its leader, the respected Palestinian reform. leaders of individual factions, responsible for democracy activist Mustafa Barghouti. ‘They negotiating their quota, were preserved as Charter and constitution/sole representative have every opportunity. For instance, we don’t MANDATE Palestinian People leaders of their respective factions. Although have differences with their political pro- Fatah was criticized from time to time by Chairman gramme. We have applied to be members of Palestinian other PLO factions for the lack of proportional elects National Fund the PLO since November 2004, and, up till EXECUTIVE representation within the PNC, such criticism supervises Palestine Liberation Army now, we do not have an answer.’ Executive Committee made little impression, as the guerrillas (PLA) themselves appeared to be marked by the very The experience of the PNI is symptomatic of a Palestinian National Fund ills they were attempting to criticize, having crisis within Palestinian politics. The PLO was PLO Central Council Presidium elects undergone no changes in terms of internal recognized as ‘the sole legitimate representa- elects leadership since their founding. ‘It is survival tive of the Palestinian people’ by the Arab LEGISLATIVE Palestinian National Council for them,’ said Mahdi Abdel Hadi, director of League and the United Nations in 1974, and the Palestinian Academic Society for the by Israel and the USA in 1993. When the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) in Palestinian Authority (PA) was established, it Figure 2. Political structure of the PLO Jerusalem. ‘They are happy with the status was defined as being subordinate to the PLO. quo. Look at [PLO General-Secretary] Yasser Yet, while democratic elections have been The Quota System Abed Rabbo. For 40 years, he has been there.’ held for the PA, its legislative council (PLC) Historically, the principle for political repre- and president, no such elections have ever Models for PNC Elections been held for the parliament of the PLO (the sentation within the PLO has been that of Palestinian National Council, PNC) or for the inclusion. The various Palestinian guerrilla ‘The PNC does not need reforms, we need a position of chairman of the PLO. The startling groups needed income to pay their fighters new election,’ said PNC speaker Salim al- lack of a popular mandate for the PLO leader- and were therefore vulnerable to external Zanoun in Amman. Osama Hamdan, a ship was highlighted by the PLC elections in pressure. Two of the guerrilla groups included member of the Hamas politburo (the execu- 2006. A group of small parties that together in the PLO – Saiqa and the Arab Liberation tive organ of Hamas) with responsibility for gained 1.5% of the seats on the PLC in the Front – were founded by Syria and Iraq, re- the organization’s foreign relations in Damas- elections controlled a majority of the party spectively, to enable those countries to main- cus, concurred: ‘We believe if we took the step seats of the Executive Committee (EC) of the tain a presence and exert their influence with- to reform the PLO, that means an elected PLO. Meanwhile, the party that had won the in the PLO. To preserve PLO autonomy, the council, an elected leadership, a leadership elections in the Palestinian territories in 2006 challenge of the organization was to withstand which can be questioned, so you will have a – Hamas – was not a PLO member. such interventions by various Arab states. As democratic process inside the Palestinian a result, the principle of majority rule was nation. You will have an elected leader who 60 abandoned in favour of rule by consensus. could be questioned all the time, so you can- Majority rule could make it possible for a 50 not make decisions just because of what Ha- group that had been outvoted to mobilize both 40 mas needs or what Fatah needs, but according external and internal support and thus threat- to what the people need.’ 30 en the PLO’s claim to be the Palestinians’ sole 20 representative. Consensus rule entailed find- Elections to the PNC are prescribed in the 10 ing the lowest common denominator, which PLO Constitution (Article 5, Chapter II). Since 0 meant that the smallest Palestinian groups such elections have never been held, the need were granted disproportionate influence in to elect a new PNC is the main issue in dis- the decision-making process. The question of cussions on reforming the PLO. In the May political representation thus became an issue 2011 Cairo Agreement between the main of negotiation between the various factions, Palestinian factions, it was finally agreed that where the threat that one might leave the elections to the PNC would be held. Article 1c Figure 1: PLO representation (black) versus elected repre- sentation for the PLC (grey), percent of seats organization could threaten them all. This of the agreement stated that ‘legislative, presi- opened for the cementation of a quota system dential, and the Palestine National Council This discrepancy between representation among the PLO members, where the constit- elections will be conducted at the same time within the PLO and representation resulting uent PLO groups were represented irrespec- exactly one year after the signing of the Pales- from the Palestinian elections in 2006 has tive of their size or popularity among the tinian National Reconciliation Agreement’. created a crisis over what legitimate represen- But, what would elections to the PNC look PRIO POLICY BRIEF 03 2012 www.prio.org like? design of Hamas was to take over the PNC wish. We have UNITA in Angola, Zulu in and the PLO, especially since the members of South Africa. We believe that Hamas is one Interviews with academics and political lead- the PNC from inside Palestine was supposed strata of the Palestinian people and, irrespec- ers from Hamas, Fatah, the Popular Front for to be the elected members of the PLC, where tive of our evaluation of their programme, the Liberation of Palestine and the PNI in Hamas now had a majority. Hamas was ask- some of us – I included – do not believe that Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and ing for the same ratio outside, reflecting the they have a national agenda; they want to Gaza suggest that the electoral system adopt- Hamas majority in the PLC elections, so build if not an Islamic state so an Islamic ed for the PNC elections will ostensibly in- probably also that was a factor in delaying an society. Of course, they quote popular slogans, volve direct elections and fully proportional agreement.’ Today, there appears to be con- but theirs is not parallel to our goal.’ representation, multiple-winner electoral sensus within Hamas on joining the PLO divisions (constituencies) and a closed-lists In 2006, the Quartet (consisting of the EU, the unconditionally. ‘We can not have the PLO system. Voters will vote for one party list in USA, the UN and Russia) demanded that implement our opinions before we are in,’ each constituency (country), and number of Hamas renounce violence, recognize Israel commented Yahia Moussa, a PLC member seats allocated to each constituency is propor- and explicitly declare that it respected previ- from Hamas in Gaza. ‘Hamas is outside the tional to the population of that constituency. ous Israeli–PLO agreements as a condition for PLO and wants to be inside. This is one of the recognizing a Palestinian unity government. For a PNC composed of 250 representatives steps which all of us agree on,’ declared the In July 2011, the US State Department issued (50 additional seats are reserved for the Israeli foreign minister of the Hamas government in a statement saying that no country could be Palestinians), the approximate geographic Gaza, Muhammad Awad.
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