PRIO POLICY BRIEF 03 2012

VisitingAddress: Hausmanns gate 7 Box PO 9229Grønland, NO PeaceResearch Institute Oslo(PRIO) Democratizing the PLO

Prospects and Obstacles

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0134 Oslo,Norway

VisitingAddress: Hausmanns gate 7 Box PO 9229Grønland, NO Centrefor theStudy of Civil War(CSCW) While the PLO has been recognized both by the international commu- nity and by Israel as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the organization remains undemocratic. Its leadership is not

elected. The PLO represents the secular resistance groups of the past, - 0134 Oslo,Norway not the political reality of today. In 2011, however, an agreement was reached between the main Palestinian political groups to hold elections

for the PLO. It is planned that these elections will include all Palestini-

ans, regardless of their location, in accordance with the principle of ful- ISBN:978 www.prio.no ly proportional representation. Recent Arab uprisings for democracy

make regional conditions favourable for the holding of such elections.

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7288 Meanwhile, Western governments fear that the PLO could come to be -

408 dominated by Islamists who do not recognize the State of Israel. In the

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(online); past, such considerations have discouraged the PLO from opening up

978 for democratic reforms. However, the fall of President Hosni Mubarak

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- in Egypt has acted as a warning to PLO leaders that sustaining an un-

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409 democratic and secular PLO could hit back with a vengeance.

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Dag Tuastad Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

The Legitimacy Crisis tation might be in the context of Palestinian Palestinian people at large. Through the quota politics. The crisis has been further aggravat- system, the guerrillas – not representatives of The Palestinian National Initiative (PNI) has ed by the ‘Arab Spring’ and related calls for the Palestinian communities in various geo- tried hard to join the Palestinian Liberation democratization in the Arab world. The PLO, graphic areas – were given the power of deci- Organization (PLO). ‘We don’t understand ‘the sole legitimate representative of the Pales- sion-making within Palestinian politics. why there is this insistence on not opening tinian people’, is in acute need of democratic Moreover, the quota system meant that the up’, says its leader, the respected Palestinian reform. leaders of individual factions, responsible for democracy activist Mustafa Barghouti. ‘They negotiating their quota, were preserved as Charter and constitution/sole representative have every opportunity. For instance, we don’t MANDATE Palestinian People leaders of their respective factions. Although have differences with their political pro- Fatah was criticized from time to time by Chairman gramme. We have applied to be members of Palestinian other PLO factions for the lack of proportional elects National Fund the PLO since November 2004, and, up till EXECUTIVE representation within the PNC, such criticism supervises Palestine Liberation Army now, we do not have an answer.’ Executive Committee made little impression, as the guerrillas (PLA) themselves appeared to be marked by the very The experience of the PNI is symptomatic of a Palestinian National Fund ills they were attempting to criticize, having crisis within Palestinian politics. The PLO was PLO Central Council Presidium elects undergone no changes in terms of internal recognized as ‘the sole legitimate representa- elects leadership since their founding. ‘It is survival tive of the Palestinian people’ by the Arab LEGISLATIVE Palestinian National Council for them,’ said Mahdi Abdel Hadi, director of League and the United Nations in 1974, and the Palestinian Academic Society for the by Israel and the USA in 1993. When the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) in Palestinian Authority (PA) was established, it Figure 2. Political structure of the PLO Jerusalem. ‘They are happy with the status was defined as being subordinate to the PLO. quo. Look at [PLO General-Secretary] Yasser Yet, while democratic elections have been The Quota System Abed Rabbo. For 40 years, he has been there.’ held for the PA, its legislative council (PLC) Historically, the principle for political repre- and president, no such elections have ever Models for PNC Elections been held for the parliament of the PLO (the sentation within the PLO has been that of Palestinian National Council, PNC) or for the inclusion. The various Palestinian guerrilla ‘The PNC does not need reforms, we need a position of chairman of the PLO. The startling groups needed income to pay their fighters new election,’ said PNC speaker Salim al- lack of a popular mandate for the PLO leader- and were therefore vulnerable to external Zanoun in Amman. Osama Hamdan, a ship was highlighted by the PLC elections in pressure. Two of the guerrilla groups included member of the Hamas politburo (the execu- 2006. A group of small parties that together in the PLO – Saiqa and the Arab Liberation tive organ of Hamas) with responsibility for gained 1.5% of the seats on the PLC in the Front – were founded by Syria and Iraq, re- the organization’s foreign relations in Damas- elections controlled a majority of the party spectively, to enable those countries to main- cus, concurred: ‘We believe if we took the step seats of the Executive Committee (EC) of the tain a presence and exert their influence with- to reform the PLO, that means an elected PLO. Meanwhile, the party that had won the in the PLO. To preserve PLO autonomy, the council, an elected leadership, a leadership elections in the Palestinian territories in 2006 challenge of the organization was to withstand which can be questioned, so you will have a – Hamas – was not a PLO member. such interventions by various Arab states. As democratic process inside the Palestinian a result, the principle of majority rule was nation. You will have an elected leader who 60 abandoned in favour of rule by consensus. could be questioned all the time, so you can- Majority rule could make it possible for a 50 not make decisions just because of what Ha- group that had been outvoted to mobilize both 40 mas needs or what Fatah needs, but according external and internal support and thus threat- to what the people need.’ 30 en the PLO’s claim to be the Palestinians’ sole 20 representative. Consensus rule entailed find- Elections to the PNC are prescribed in the 10 ing the lowest common denominator, which PLO Constitution (Article 5, Chapter II). Since 0 meant that the smallest Palestinian groups such elections have never been held, the need were granted disproportionate influence in to elect a new PNC is the main issue in dis- the decision-making process. The question of cussions on reforming the PLO. In the May political representation thus became an issue 2011 Cairo Agreement between the main of negotiation between the various factions, Palestinian factions, it was finally agreed that

where the threat that one might leave the elections to the PNC would be held. Article 1c Figure 1: PLO representation (black) versus elected repre- sentation for the PLC (grey), percent of seats organization could threaten them all. This of the agreement stated that ‘legislative, presi- opened for the cementation of a quota system dential, and the Palestine National Council This discrepancy between representation among the PLO members, where the constit- elections will be conducted at the same time within the PLO and representation resulting uent PLO groups were represented irrespec- exactly one year after the signing of the Pales- from the Palestinian elections in 2006 has tive of their size or popularity among the tinian National Reconciliation Agreement’. created a crisis over what legitimate represen- But, what would elections to the PNC look PRIO POLICY BRIEF 03 2012 www.prio.org

like? design of Hamas was to take over the PNC wish. We have UNITA in Angola, Zulu in and the PLO, especially since the members of South Africa. We believe that Hamas is one Interviews with academics and political lead- the PNC from inside Palestine was supposed strata of the Palestinian people and, irrespec- ers from Hamas, Fatah, the Popular Front for to be the elected members of the PLC, where tive of our evaluation of their programme, the Liberation of Palestine and the PNI in Hamas now had a majority. Hamas was ask- some of us – I included – do not believe that Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and ing for the same ratio outside, reflecting the they have a national agenda; they want to Gaza suggest that the electoral system adopt- Hamas majority in the PLC elections, so build if not an Islamic state so an Islamic ed for the PNC elections will ostensibly in- probably also that was a factor in delaying an society. Of course, they quote popular slogans, volve direct elections and fully proportional agreement.’ Today, there appears to be con- but theirs is not parallel to our goal.’ representation, multiple-winner electoral sensus within Hamas on joining the PLO divisions (constituencies) and a closed-lists In 2006, the Quartet (consisting of the EU, the unconditionally. ‘We can not have the PLO system. Voters will vote for one party list in USA, the UN and Russia) demanded that implement our opinions before we are in,’ each constituency (country), and number of Hamas renounce violence, recognize Israel commented Yahia Moussa, a PLC member seats allocated to each constituency is propor- and explicitly declare that it respected previ- from Hamas in Gaza. ‘Hamas is outside the tional to the population of that constituency. ous Israeli–PLO agreements as a condition for PLO and wants to be inside. This is one of the recognizing a Palestinian unity government. For a PNC composed of 250 representatives steps which all of us agree on,’ declared the In July 2011, the US State Department issued (50 additional seats are reserved for the Israeli foreign minister of the Hamas government in a statement saying that no country could be Palestinians), the approximate geographic Gaza, Muhammad Awad. Ali Baraka, the expected to negotiate with a ‘terrorist organi- proportional allocation of seats would be as Hamas leader in Lebanon, concurred: ‘Since zation’ sworn to its destruction, referring to presented in Figure 3. 2005, Hamas has changed. We do not deny the Fatah–Hamas reconciliation agreement. this. The demand to have 40% representation In 2006, Hamas did not give in to the de- Chairman Charter and constitution was before. We now want to have elections, mands of the Quartet. Will its response be Elect and we will respect the results of elections.’ Executive Committee, different now? 18 PNC members Amend What motivation is there, then, within Fatah On the issue of respecting previous PLO in relation to a possible change to the status 50 seats agreements, Hamas has demonstrated a reserved Israel quo within the PLO? Tawfiq Nasser from 1 500 000 willingness to compromise. Asked whether Elect Palestine National Council Fatah in Jerusalem suggests that Fatah must 250 seats Hamas would accept a PLO agreement with first reform itself: ‘You cannot have Fatah Elect 21 Elect 14 Israel if Hamas lost in the PLO elections, Other leading PLO reforms without first reforming countries Lebanon Osama Hamdan, from the Hamas politburo, 630 000 430 000 itself. If the party reforms, then the PLO will said in Damascus: ‘We respect the results of reform.... But Fatah is not reforming, because Elect 66 Elect 83 Elect 50 Elect 16 elections, whatever they are. We support the Jordan West Bank Gaza Syria everybody is worried that if they open up this 2 000 000 2 500 000 1 500 000 470 000 democratic process, regardless of the results. box, it will hit them back.’ Figure 3. Model of a democratically reformed PLO If there were elections and another party won The resistance towards reform comes from the majority and signed an agreement we Today, owing to the huge pressures for de- Fatah, alleged Mohsen Saleh of the Al- opposed, we would oppose that through the mocratization throughout the Arab world and Zaytouna Centre in Beirut: ‘I feel that when- democratic process. But we will not destroy all the ongoing reconciliation between Hamas ever there is an agreement, you will find that the system just because we oppose this or and Fatah, conditions are favourable for the the PLO leadership will only implement the that.’ actual implementation of PNC elections. On articles regarding the PA in the West Bank On the issue of renouncing violence, Ezzat Al- the other hand, time and again the various and Gaza, but not regarding the PLO. They Rezeq, a member of Hamas’s politburo, re- Palestinian factions have agreed on a path to will postpone this to keep everything under cently stated that Hamas ‘supported peaceful reform. Why is it that such agreements re- their control. So I feel the main obstacles for resistance’ against the Israeli occupation. This peatedly fail to be implemented? reforms are not Hamas but Fatah. If they are was the first time that a Hamas spokesperson genuine, they would at least open the PLO for Obstacles had referred to ‘peaceful’ – as opposed to discussion, whatever percent or proportion, ‘armed’ – resistance. In addition, ‘popular now the PLO is near 100% Fatah.’ According to Fatah leader and PLO diplomat resistance’ – not ‘armed resistance’ – was Nabil Shaath, the main obstacle to the holding However, there are elements within Fatah underlined as a principle in the agreement of PNC elections has been the need ‘to reach that are extremely sceptical about opening up between Hamas leader Khaled Meshal and PA an agreement with Hamas’. However, Shaath the PLO for Hamas. The Palestinian ambas- and PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas following also noted that there was fear within Fatah sador to Lebanon, Abdullah Abdullah, says he their meeting in Cairo on 24 November 2011. that Hamas might take over the PLO follow- agrees with the decision to hold elections to However, when it comes to Hamas unilateral- ing its victory in the 2006 elections to the PLC: the PNC, but has doubts about Hamas’s in- ly recognizing Israel, there are no indications ‘There was a lot of hesitance by Abu Mazen tentions: ‘In every national movement, there of a change in the organization’s position. and Fatah because they were afraid that the are fifth columns, traitors, call them as you

However, it should be noted that Hamas has inevitable implication of democratization, and community may determine Israeli positions, stated that it would accept the outcome of a it is one that is wanted by the Palestinian no one but the Palestinians can determine Palestinian referendum on this issue. But as people. As Graham Usher, a leading expert on their own. If a legitimate representation of long as the USA continues to insist on the Palestinian politics, notes, there is today Palestinian political positions is to be possible, recognition of Israel prior to any such refer- ‘enormous distrust felt by Palestinians – it will require a legitimate, elected Palestinian endum, there will be pressure on Fatah from mainly but not only in the diaspora – toward leadership. An elected PLO would increase external donors that financial support to the an unelected, unaccountable West Bank PA– the likelihood that agreements would be en- PA is withdrawn if Hamas is co-opted in a PLO leadership that takes potentially seismic forced and reduce the spoiling power of rejec- united Palestinian political leadership without national decisions in their name’. To cure tionist groups. Hamas changing its political programme. such distrust, proportional representative ‘Abbas is under American, Israeli and Euro- elections for the PNC will be essential medi- Recommendations pean pressure: no reconciliation, no reform, cine.  Encourage the democratic reconstitution keep the status quo and negotiations,’ said As all the main Palestinian factions have of the PLO. Since the PLO is the supreme PASSIA director Mahdi Abdel Hadi. PNI agreed on reconstituting the PLO democrati- political authority and representative of leader Mustafa Barghouti concurred: ‘90% of cally – having elections facilitated by the Arab the Palestinians, it needs to have a demo- the obstruction to reconciliation between League, of which the PLO is a full member – cratic mandate. An elected PLO may be Hamas and Fatah is from Israel and the Unit- it is a paradox that the largest threat to Pales- regarded as a precondition for any pro- ed States.’ tinian democratization today comes from spective peace agreement. Conclusion Western countries that do not want to deal  Discontinue micromanaging Palestinian with a Palestinian leadership that includes political positions. Western attempts at The PLO is today on the verge of being demo- Hamas. The insurmountable demand from micromanaging Palestinian political posi- cratically reconstituted. Although it might be the Quartet is that Hamas recognize Israel. tions jeopardize long-term Palestinian optimistic to arrange PNC elections already in However, the fact is that the PLO is one of democratic institution-building and the May 2012, the political distance between Fatah only three member-states of the Arab League democratization of decision-making pro- and Hamas has narrowed as internationaliza- that have recognized the Israeli state, and cesses. tion has become Fatah’s new political strategy, Hamas is seeking to join the PLO uncondi-  Palestinian reconciliation should be sup- while Hamas is seeking to express a moderate tionally – which means that it implicitly ac- ported in spite of Hamas’s political pro- face in order to be part of the Islamist demo- cepts the PLO’s recognition of Israel. gramme. Reconciliation between Fatah cratic momentum and not compromise ideo- and Hamas is a precondition for democra- Rather than working against a democratized logical sister parties in the region. That there tization of the PLO. If Hamas joins the PLO within which popular support may make is indeed a common interest in reactivating a PLO unconditionally, the PLO will remain Hamas a main actor, Western governments democratic PLO is indicated by the fact that, the same organization in terms of its polit- might work to facilitate free and fair PLO unlike previous agreements, the 2011 agree- ical programme but will have a wider elections. After all, the PLO has been recog- ment has been followed up with meetings democratic mandate. nized as the sole and legitimate representative seeking to implement it.  Encourage regional states to let Palestini- of the Palestinian people. Changing their ans vote for the PLO without possible re- Democratically reconstituting the PLO would attitudes towards the PLO following elections percussions. The Jordanian authorities, in mean the abolition of the current quota sys- that might actually make it a legitimate repre- particular, should be approached and en- tem for political representation in the organi- sentative would be damaging for these gov- couraged to permit Jordanian Palestinians zation. Palestinian groups that have failed to ernments’ credibility in the Arab world. to vote in PLO elections without fear of make the transformation from armed re- Moreover, an elected legitimate Palestinian having their citizenship revoked.  sistance groups to political parties with sup- leadership may be regarded as a precondition port among the general population will lose for any prospective peace agreement. As little their positions within the PLO. This is an as the Palestinians and the international

THE AUTHOR THE PROJECT PRIO

Dag Tuastad holds a doctoral degree in an- This policy brief is derived from a longer The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is a thropology and is an Associate Professor of PRIO Paper entitled ‘Democratizing the PLO’. non-profit peace research institute (estab- Middle Eastern Studies at the University of It forms part of an ongoing PRIO project on lished in 1959) whose overarching purpose is Oslo. He is currently working as a Researcher ‘Rethinking Middle East Peace Talks’, which is to conduct research on the conditions for at the Center for Islamic and Middle East a continuation of the PRIO project entitled peaceful relations between states, groups and Studies at the University of Oslo on the re- ‘Hamas’s Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire’. people. The institute is independent, interna- search project ‘The New Middle East: Emerg- The project has been funded by the Norwe- tional and interdisciplinary, and explores is- ing Political and Ideological Trends’. He can gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. sues related to all facets of peace and conflict. be reached at [email protected].

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