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Parliamentary Delegation to Lebanon February 2011 Parliamentary Delegation to Lebanon February 2011 The Council for European Palestinian Relations The Palestinian Return Centre Written and edited by Tom Charles Additional photos by Tom Charles and Nicolette Petersen Contents Background 2 Inside Lebanon 3 Some Key Definitions 3 The Delegation 4 Day One Briefing with Angelina Eickhurst, head of EU Delegation in Lebannon 6 President Michel Suleiman 7 Foreign Minister Dr Ali Chami 8 Deputy Speaker of the House Abdellatif Al Zain 9 Bourj al-Barajineh refugee camp 10 Sabra and Shatila massacre memorial 12 Shatila refugee camp briefing with UNRWA 13 Prime Minister Saad Hariri 14 Palestinian political factions 15 Day Two UNRWA Lebanon Director Salvatore Lombardo 16 Nahr el-Bared refugee camp 18 UNRWA Head of Reconstruction Charles Higgins 19 Popular Committee 20 Tour of temporary accommodation 21 Thabit Women’s Centre 22 Prime Minister Najib Miqati 23 Palestinian Ambassador Abdullah Abdullah 24 British Ambassador Frances Guy 25 Head of Hamas Foreign Affairs Division Osama Hamdan 26 Conclusions 28 Recommendations 29 © 2011 Palestinian Return Centre & Council for European Palestinian Relations 1 Background For over 60 years, millions of Palestinians have been living as refugees in areas of the occupied Palestinian territories and in surrounding countries. The UN Refugee Agency describes their plight as “by far the most protracted and largest of all refugee problems in the world today”(1)v Three quarters of Palestinians from a global population of 11 million are refugees.Their plight is at the core of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. All other issues, political and humanitarian, arose as a consequence of Israel’s denial of the right of refugees to return to their land. Multiple international treaties and conventions recognise the inviolable characteristic of the right to return including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. The Right of Return for refugees is guaranteed under Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and countless UN resolutions. Uniquely to the Palestinians, the UN has affirmed the right of return through Resolution 194 on 122 occasions. The UN also, after recognising the growing humanitarian disaster as Palestinians were expelled from their land in 1948, set up two different institutions to deal with the humanitarian challenges and implement the right of return. Six decades on, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) remains the sole provision. Despite these facts, in the West little is heard of the refugees, who have been relegated to ‘final status negotiations(’) during the Middle East peace process. The ‘Palestine Papers’ released by al-Jazeera in 2011 revealed that the Palestinian Authority (PA) was willing to virtually give up the right of return, save for the symbolic return of 10,000 refugees. Israel rejected this offer on the grounds that it did not satisfy their demands. Palestinians from the North of Palestine, namely Haifa, Safad and the Galilee were forced from their homes due to Israeli attacks and ethnic cleansing in 1948. Around 100,000 fled to Lebanon, approximately 14 percent of the total number who became refugees that year. Initially Palestinian refugees fared relatively well in Lebanon, but their position weakened dramatically by the 1960s when Israeli refusal to accept the right of return and Lebanese sectarianism and fear of Tawtin began to take hold. Since then multiple civil wars, Lebanon’s fragile geopolitical position and the failure of the Lebanese and Palestinian leaderships to enshrine Palestine rights in Lebanese law have combined to leave the Palestinian refugees in a precarious position that has seen little improvement. (1) The State of the World’s Refugees 2006, UNHCR Chapter 51 2 Inside Lebanon Over 400,000 Palestinians live in Lebanon’s 12 ‘official’ (UNRWA-run) and its many v‘unofficial’ refugee camps, amounting to approximately 10 percent of the country’s population. Lebanon is the host country in which history and politics have most exacerbated the difficulties faced by Palestinian refugees. Politically marginalised, without basic social and economic rights, trapped in often squalid camps, and without hopes for the future, Palestinian refugees suffer more in Lebanon than in any of the other countries that host Palestinian refugees. In August 2010 a law (the 17th August law) was passed in the Lebanese parliament that slightly improves the rights of Palestinians to work. The law still excludes them from many professions, and has yet to be put in to practice. The delegation visited Lebanon at an opportune moment, with public understanding of the position of refugees in peace talks at a high point and with historic changes taking place across the Middle East. Advocates of justice have the chance to put the refugee issue back in its rightful place as the key to bringing peace to the region. Some Key Definitions Tawtin: Literally the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees, refers to fears about naturalisation or granting of citizenship to refugees. Confessional System: The highest offices of government in Lebanon are constitutionally reserved for representatives of certain religious communities. Lebanon’s constitution dictates that the President is a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of the House a Shia Muslim. 3 The Delegation The delegation was led by former British government minister Sir Gerald Kaufman MP and included four members of the European Parliament and three members of the British Parliament. The delegation’s purpose was to assess the humanitarian situation faced by Palestinians living in Lebanon’s refugee camps, although separating this from issues of internal Lebanese and international politics is impossible. The delegation was able to raise the issue at the highest levels of Lebanese politics in a series of meetings. During an intense two days that included 18 meetings and visits to three camps, common themes could be identified along with practical steps to be taken to improve the dire situation. Sir Gerald Kaufman MP and Alexandra Thein MEP Derek Vaughan MEP Michael Connarty MP Jeremy Corbyn MP Nicolette Petersen (right), Office of Jeremy Corbyn MP Frank Engel MEP 4 Robert Goebbels MEP Majed al-Zeer (left), Director, Palestinian Return Centre Dr Arafat Shoukri (left), Director, Council for European Tom Charles, Palestinian Relations Parliamentary Officer, CEPR “When I went to Gaza in 2010 I thought I had seen the worst that could be seen of the appalling predicament of Palestinians living in conditions which no human being should be expected to endure. But, what I saw in the camps in Lebanon is far worse and far more hopeless. The conditions are unspeakable, but for over 400,000 of our fellow human beings this is their life: Today, tomorrow and for a future that cannot even be foreseen. At least in Gaza, frightful though the situation is, the people are free within the confines of their blockaded prison. In the camps of Lebanon they are not free and this is, to a very considerable degree, the responsibility of the Lebanese government which could allow conditions to improve and could allow the victim freedom of movement, but specifically refuses to do it. Yet, culpable though the Lebanese government undoubtedly is, the real culprit is the Israeli government, which by refusing to come to a settlement with the Palestinians, is directly and horrendously responsible for the plight of those immured in the camps. It makes me more determined than ever to fight for the rights of the Palestinian people and to campaign against the deliberate decision of the Israeli government to perpetuate the hell in which so many Palestinians are living”. Sir Gerald Kaufman MP 5 Day one Briefing with the EU Delegation in Lebanon, led by Angelina Eickhurst, Le Commodore Hotel, Hamra Street, Beirut Referring to the law passed in the Lebanese parliament on the 17th August 2010, Ms Eickhurst stated that the EU’s position is that “it is not sufficient, as access to many professions and the right to own property are denied. Nevertheless, if the proposed changes are implemented, we welcome them”. The EU plays a key role for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, donating to NGOs and focusing on the Nahr EL Bared camp, destroyed in 2007. Money given by the EU to UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) focuses on education and infrastructure. Delegation leader Sir Gerald Kaufman MP said that the “the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon lead a totally unnatural life, with no integration in to any community”. The EU briefing highlighted a key question: Are the changes proposed in the 17th August law an important first step or the limit to the concessions to be offered by the host country? Meeting with EU Delegation in Lebanon, led by Angelina Eickhurst 6 Meeting with President Michel Suleiman, Lebanese Parliament President Suleiman welcomed the delegation and gave an overview of the Lebanese political situation and how it affects the refugees: “Lebanon does not have the capacity to absorb 400,000 people; we simply cannot offer them a good life. The truth is that we will not see peace in the Middle East without the implementation of the refugees’ right of return”. President Suleiman explained the political dilemma that exists in Lebanon regarding the refugees: “Lebanon’s sectarian cultural diversity makes it difficult to believe in improvements as each party is afraid they will lose ground to their opponents if they advocate improving Palestinian rights”. Asked about the role of the International community, the President said that the EU and European states should not just focus on humanitarian aid, but “support the right of return for refugees and reconciliation between Palestinian political factions in order to create a real peace process”. “The Israeli fear of demographic change is unfounded; the refugees surrounding Israel will keep revolution in their hearts until they return.
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