DOCSLIB.ORG

Is the EU Losing Credibility in Palestine?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Is the EU Losing Credibility in Palestine? > > POLICY BRIEF ISSN: 1989-2667 Nº 50 - JUNE 2010 Is the EU losing credibility in Palestine? Daniela Huber The Israeli attack on the Gaza Flotilla and the resulting diplo- >> matic reverberations have engendered clear international agreement on one subject: that the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip has to be lifted. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, was HIGHLIGHTS quick to condemn the attack and urged Israel to lift the blockade, call- ing it ‘unacceptable’ and ‘counterproductive’. This move would be a • The EU should actively first step to improving the deteriorating living conditions in Gaza. But it must be remembered that the Middle East Quartet contributed support a Palestinian to the current impasse through its political boycott of the elected reconciliation process, Hamas government and, perhaps more crucially, of the National Uni- resulting in elections without ty Government, which would have provided an opportunity for Pales- further delay tinian reconciliation. • The EU has lost credibility The divide in Palestinian society prevails. In 2009, national elections as a normative actor since originally scheduled for January 2010 were postponed to an unknown its political boycott of date. This postponement counted with the EU’s silent support. Now Hamas: it should re-energise President Abbas has also delayed the municipal elections planned for its approach to democracy July 2010. The elections had already been boycotted by Hamas and promotion, focusing on were to take place in the West Bank only. Palestinian civil society capacity building The postponement of the elections comes in the wake of the Flotilla attack with mounting calls for Palestinian unity to bring about an end to the blockade of the Gaza Strip. Fatah was afraid that elections • For Palestinians, democracy would compromise its credibility. In addition, divisions within Fatah promotion also means that have been deepening. The municipal elections were seen as an impor- the EU should be more tant test-run for the national elections, which now seem to have been assertive towards Israel even further deferred to a date in the unforeseeable future. The con- regarding occupation policies tinuous postponement of elections obviously subverts a precarious democratic process. IS THE EU LOSING CREDIBILITY IN PALESTINE? 2 >>>>>> The EU should now actively support a reconcili- prime minister; by fostering the rule of law with ation process, which must result in elections with- an independent judiciary and the call for the out further delay. This could provide a way out of abolition of the infamous state security courts; by the EU being limited to dealing with Fatah fighting corruption within the PA through the instead of an elected, representative Palestinian introduction of auditing mechanisms; by placing government – an important condition for any revenues under the auspices of the ministry of attempt to reinvigorate credible peace talks. finance; and through an attempt to enhance the oversight capacity of the Palestinian Legislative And, crucially, this must kick-start a re-energised Council. EU approach to building democracy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). I car- This approach was reversed after the 2006 elec- ried out a large number of interviews with Pales- tions, when the office of President Abbas was tinian politicians, civil society representatives, strengthened again relative to the office of Prime academics, activists and artists in the West Bank Minister Haniyeh. EU aid was once more distrib- and East Jerusalem in 2010: these show that the uted in opaque ways. EU is fast losing goodwill among key sectors of the Palestinian population. In addition, the majority of EU aid (approxi- mately EUR 530 million in 2007) is dedicated to short-term socio-economic relief, instead of sus- THE EU’S APPROACH TO DEMOCRACY tainable, long-term support for institution build- BUILDING ing. An even smaller amount is allocated to civil society capacity building. In recent years, funds The EU’s democracy building agenda in the for democracy have been modest and have con- Mediterranean started with the Barcelona Process centrated on fighting corruption in the executive and the establishment of the European Instru- (EUR 27 million from 2004–2008), election ment for Democracy and Human Rights support (EUR 20 million from 2000–2006), and (EIDHR). However, it experienced a slow start. on fostering the Palestinian judicial system (EUR Following the Oslo Accords and the establish- 8 million from 2004–2008). Bottom-up democ- ment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the EU ratisation through civil society bodies receives a was willing to tolerate authoritarian rule and maximum of EUR 1.2 million per year through human rights violations by President Arafat for the EIDHR. the sake of keeping alive the peace process. This changed with the second Intifada, and the 9/11, London and Madrid terrorist attacks. Both the PALESTINIAN PERCEPTIONS Bush administration and the EU changed course. While the policy had hitherto been built on the Palestinians see the Western political boycott of belief that successful peace was a condition for Hamas as highly hypocritical, negatively colour- democratisation, this assumption was now ing their image of the EU and its democracy reversed. Subsequently, the democracy agenda agenda in the region. Although in the past received a boost with the introduction of the decade the EU constantly tried to disassociate Action Plans in the frame of the European Neigh- itself from American democracy promotion in borhood Policy (2004) and an upgrade of the the Middle East, it is perceived in a similar way EIDHR (2006/07). to the US. The new approach also meant a change of stance Indeed, there is a striking gap between the EU’s towards the Palestinian Authority. In 2002, the perception of itself as a ‘normative power’ and EU set out to limit Arafat’s presidential powers the Palestinian perception of the EU as a tradi- by urging the PA to introduce the office of a tional power, which – in the words of Saman POLICY BRIEF - Nº 50 - JUNE 2010 3 Khoury, General Manager of the Peace and Thirdly, many NGO representatives, including Democracy Forum – ‘deals with autocrats and Walid Salem, Director of the Center for Democ- dictators whenever it serves its interests’. Further- racy and Community Development, complain more, several of my interviewees claimed that that they receive ‘peanuts’ as the EU prefers to what really underlies the double-standard in the work with ‘the men in ties’. In addition, Hakim EU’s application of democratic values is a dis- Sabbah, Director of Project Hope, pointed out criminatory approach towards the Palestinians. that several grassroots organisations even prefer As Mustafa Barghouti, Founder and Director of not to apply for EU aid. Palestinians are general- the Palestinian National Initiative (Al-Mubadara) ly proud that they are building democracy by observed, ‘why do they not see us as equally capa- themselves. Mustafa Barghouti even claims that ble of being democratic?’ the bottom-up development of Palestinian democracy provides an inspiration for the entire Thus, if the EU is serious about building democra- Arab world. Many interviewees wonder why the cy in the Palestinian quasi-state, an honest encour- West does not acknowledge this achievement. agement of Palestinian national reconciliation Many Palestinians stress that they do not under- – including some kind of engagement with Hamas stand why their democratic achievements are – appears to be crucial. This would not only ignored, as they associate themselves with a com- support the EU’s democracy agenda and restore its mon heritage in the Mediterranean and feel close image, but also pro- to European values. Palestinians vide an important pre- condition for reviving This represents an important perception of own- do not understand peace talks and help- ership of Palestinian democracy, as well as a sense ing the conflicting of association with European values on the part of why their democratic parties out of the cur- civil society, which the EU should build on. A achievements are rent deadlock. bottom-up approach in EU democracy building would make Palestinian democracy more sustain- ignored by the EU Secondly, Palestinians able and turn the EU into a credible actor that barely distinguish de - works in partnership with Palestinians, instead of mocracy promotion from the EU’s general foreign imposing democracy from above, which is per- policy towards Israel and the OPT. Many intervie- ceived as ‘patronising’ (Sari Nusseibeh) and wees, including Sari Nusseibeh, Palestinian aca- ‘preaching’ (Saman Khoury). demic and Director of Al Quds University, claimed that they are living under an ‘unfolding Fourthly, many lean towards a tolerance-based reality of Apartheid’ and that the two-state solu- model of democracy. For example, Adly Yaish, the tion is on the verge of collapsing, which makes Mayor of Nablus, commented that, ‘Democracy European democracy promotion towards the PA for us means mutual respect and a harmonious all rather pointless. Palestinians expect the EU to coexistence of different religions’. Also repeatedly exert more pressure on Israel, particularly regard- invoked was the rule of law as a central aspect of ing the application of different laws towards set- democracy, as well as the demand for more partic- tlers and Palestinians (Israeli versus military law), ipatory models of democracy. Almost all intervie- the constraint on the freedom of movement, and wees stressed the importance of social justice and the holding of elections in East Jerusalem in accor- a more egalitarian or social model of democracy. dance with the Oslo Accords. Rami Hamdallah, This idea is perceived by some to contrast with Secretary General of the Palestinian Central Elec- the liberal model of democracy, which the EU is tions Commission, and many others, referred to seen as promoting in Palestine. As many of the the difficulties of carrying out elections under the European member states – such as the Scandina- restraints of occupation.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Teaching Plato in Palestine: Philosophy in a Divided World
    © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. 1 TEACHING PLATO IN PALESTINE Can philosophy save the Middle East? It can. This, at least, is the thesis of Sari Nusseibeh as I learn from a friend upon arriving in Israel in February 2006. Nusseibeh is not only a prominent Palestinian intellectual and the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s former chief repre- sentative in Jerusalem, but also a philosopher by training (and, I think, by nature, too). “Only philosophy,” the friend tells me he argued during the Shlomo Pines memorial lec- ture in West Jerusalem three years before (aptly titled “On the Relevance of Philosophy in the Arab World Today”). By the time I leave Israel, I’m convinced that he’s on to something. I am here to teach a seminar at Al-Quds University, the Palestinian university in Jerusalem, together with Nus- seibeh, who has been president of Al- Quds since 1995. My idea is to discuss Plato’s political thought with the students and then examine how medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers built on this thought to interpret Islam and Judaism as philosophical religions. I hope to raise some basic questions about philosophy and its rela- For general queries, contact [email protected] Fraenkel.indb 3 2/17/2015 8:56:12 AM © Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratizing the PLO
    PRIO POLICY BRIEF 03 2012 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 gate Hausmanns Address: Visiting NO Grønland, 9229 PO Box (PRIO) Oslo Institute Research Peace Democratizing the PLO Prospects and Obstacles - 0134 Oslo, Norway Oslo, 0134 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 gate Hausmanns Address: Visiting NO Grønland, 9229 PO Box War (CSCW) Civil of Study the for Centre While the PLO has been recognized both by the international commu- nity and by Israel as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the organization remains undemocratic. Its leadership is not elected. The PLO represents the secular resistance groups of the past, - 0134 Oslo, Norway Oslo, 0134 not the political reality of today. In 2011, however, an agreement was reached between the main Palestinian political groups to hold elections for the PLO. It is planned that these elections will include all Palestini- ans, regardless of their location, in accordance with the principle of ful- ISBN: 978 ISBN: www.prio.no ly proportional representation. Recent Arab uprisings for democracy make regional conditions favourable for the holding of such elections. - 82 - 7288 Meanwhile, Western governments fear that the PLO could come to be - 408 dominated by Islamists who do not recognize the State of Israel. In the - 5 (online); (online); past, such considerations have discouraged the PLO from opening up 978 for democratic reforms. However, the fall of President Hosni Mubarak - 82 - in Egypt has acted as a warning to PLO leaders that sustaining an un- 7288 - 409 democratic and secular PLO could hit back with a vengeance. - 2 (print) Dag Tuastad Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) The Legitimacy Crisis tation might be in the context of Palestinian Palestinian people at large.
    [Show full text]
  • Once Upon a Country: a Palestinian Life Free Ebook
    FREEONCE UPON A COUNTRY: A PALESTINIAN LIFE EBOOK Sari Nusseibeh,Anthony David | 560 pages | 03 Sep 2009 | Halban Publishers | 9781905559145 | English | London, United Kingdom Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life by Sari Nusseibeh Conflicting or irreconcilable narratives mean that works which tell the story of, and from, both sides, are rare. Here are ten others which in different ways and at different times have made a significant contribution to illuminating this unending story. Storrs was the first British military governor of Jerusalem after the Ottoman surrender in December His memoir is elegantly if pretentiously written. Storrs was in Palestine at the time of the Balfour Declaration and in the early Mandate years. Benvenisti, who was born in Palestine inis one of the most astute Israeli Jewish writers about the conflict. His father was a geographer who instilled a deep love for the country in him. Rather than ignoring the Palestinians, as many Jews do, he focuses intensely on them and especially on how the landscape of his youth was transformed as Arab villages were destroyed or renamed in Hebrew. Benvenisti served as deputy mayor of Jerusalem after He was also an early proponent of the argument—from the s onwards—that the occupation was irreversible and a two-state solution unachievable. He was attacked for this, but events in recent years seem to be proving him right. This autobiography is by the son of a patrician Jerusalem Arab family. The Oxford-educated philosopher taught at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank, where resistance to occupation was the norm.
    [Show full text]
  • The Palestinians: Background and U.S
    The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs August 17, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL34074 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations Summary This report covers current issues in U.S.-Palestinian relations. It also contains an overview of Palestinian society and politics and descriptions of key Palestinian individuals and groups— chiefly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Authority (PA), Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestinian refugee population. The “Palestinian question” is important not only to Palestinians, Israelis, and their Arab state neighbors, but to many countries and non-state actors in the region and around the world— including the United States—for a variety of religious, cultural, and political reasons. U.S. policy toward the Palestinians is marked by efforts to establish a Palestinian state through a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; to counter Palestinian terrorist groups; and to establish norms of democracy, accountability, and good governance within the Palestinian Authority (PA). Congress has appropriated assistance to support Palestinian governance and development amid concern for preventing the funds from benefitting Palestinian rejectionists who advocate violence against Israelis. Among the issues in U.S. policy toward the Palestinians is how to deal with the political leadership of Palestinian society, which is divided between the Fatah-led PA in parts of the West Bank and Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) in the Gaza Strip. Following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007, the United States and the other members of the international Quartet (the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia) have sought to bolster the West Bank-based PA, led by President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.
    [Show full text]
  • Sympathy for the Other
    Sympathy for the Other By Leon Wieseltier April 1, 2007 How does one regard a good man in a dark time? With joy, obviously, but also with sorrow. Seneca said in one of his letters that you must either hate the world or imitate it, but there are few things in this world so stirring as a man who neither hates it nor imitates it, but in the name of what is best in it resists what is worst in it. Such a man secures hope against illusion, and by example refutes any argument against the plausibility of historical action. It would be too hard to act if decency itself had still to be invented. And yet the uncommonness of such a man casts a long shadow over the faith in eventual justice or eventual peace, because the figure is so lonely against the ground. The good man in a dark time is the unrepresentative man. He has the honor of an anomaly. He marks the distance that still has to be traveled. And how much, after all, can a single individual accomplish, all the uplift notwithstanding? Heroes are not policies. Sari Nusseibeh’s book provokes such an ambivalence — more precisely, such a double-mindedness — about the malleability of history, but not an ambivalence about itself. “Once Upon a Country” is a deeply admirable book by a deeply admirable man. It is largely a political memoir, about a reluctantly political Palestinian trying to bring politics to his people, as the forces of occupation, religion and terrorism interfere with the very possibility of politics.
    [Show full text]
  • Contextualizing Palestinian Political Succession
    Viewpoints No. 130 After Abbas: Contextualizing Palestinian Political Succession Hillel Zand Wilson Center December 2018 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Until Death Do Us Part “It’s possible that this is my final meeting with you. No one knows how long [I] will live. No one can force a political plan upon me that I don’t want. Only what I want will happen; I will not end my life with betrayal!”1 These are the words reported to have been spoken by Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas at the Fatah Revolutionary Council’s meeting in March 2018. While details of the Council’s meetings are normally publicized, those from this most recent meeting were not. What is clear, however, is that the ailing, 83-year-old Abbas is keen on orchestrating what Palestinian leadership will look like immediately after he no longer holds the presidency. Equally clear is that, almost fourteen years into his four-year presidential mandate, and despite the fact that more than 60% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza want him to resign, Abbas will only yield power upon his own death or incapacitation.2 The question of Palestinian succession remains an enigma, one characterized by speculation and hypotheticals, largely due to the legal ambiguousness that faces Palestinian politics. Numerous analysts have posited possible presidential contenders — from the establishment to the radicals to the wild cards — and ranked their likelihood of accession.3 Yet the identification of potential successors is immaterial in the absence of a more robust contextual framework. The most significant questions surrounding the issue of Palestinian succession are not about who could succeed Abbas, but rather, what will be the conditions in which the successor accedes to power and what factors will determine their success.
    [Show full text]
  • Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
    The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Founded by the Charles H. Revson Foundation Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Editor: Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov 2010 Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies – Study no. 406 Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Editor: Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. © Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Israel 6 Lloyd George St. Jerusalem 91082 http://www.kas.de/israel E-mail: [email protected] © 2010, The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies The Hay Elyachar House 20 Radak St., 92186 Jerusalem http://www.jiis.org E-mail: [email protected] This publication was made possible by funds granted by the Charles H. Revson Foundation. In memory of Professor Alexander L. George, scholar, mentor, friend, and gentleman The Authors Yehudith Auerbach is Head of the Division of Journalism and Communication Studies and teaches at the Department of Political Studies of Bar-Ilan University. Dr. Auerbach studies processes of reconciliation and forgiveness . in national conflicts generally and in the Israeli-Palestinian context specifically and has published many articles on this issue. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov is a Professor of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and holds the Chair for the Study of Peace and Regional Cooperation. Since 2003 he is the Head of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. He specializes in the fields of conflict management and resolution, peace processes and negotiations, stable peace, reconciliation, and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. He is the author and editor of 15 books and many articles in these fields.
    [Show full text]
  • Sari Nusseibeh: a Palestinian Looks Back the Life of "Others" Sari
    Sari Nusseibeh: A Palestinian Looks Back The Life of "Others" Sari Nusseibeh's account of his life in Palestine is a story which goes well beyond the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Andreas Pflitsch says the book is a multi-faceted portrait of its times The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, seen through the eyes of someone who lived through it On his return flight to the USA after Yassir Arafat's funeral in Ramallah, Sari Nusseibeh read a book that proved to be "a kind of revelation" for him – Amos Oz's autobiography "A Tale of Love and Darkness." Both men had occasionally encountered each other in the past at peace demonstrations and round table discussions. The milieu in which Oz grew up in the early 1950s, just after the founding of Israel, was an unknown parallel world for Nusseibeh. It opened his eyes to the mutual ignorance of Israelis and Palestinians. "As there were practically no Arabs in the childhood experiences of Amos Oz, I was prompted to think about how I grew up. What did my parents know of his world?" He asks himself if it is not this "inability to imagine the lives of 'others'" that is, in the final analysis, at the "core of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict." And so he began to write. The book presents the reader with the political memoirs of a member of one of Jerusalem's most prominent families in the person of Nusseibeh. Born in 1949, the year in which the state of Israel was founded, he was witness to the increasing decline of the influence of the old city elite.
    [Show full text]
  • Palestinian Factions
    Order Code RS21235 Updated June 8, 2005 CRS Report for Congress .Received through the CRS Web Palestinian Factions Aaron D. Pina Analyst in Middle East Religious & Cultural Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary Palestinian factionalism continues to dominate the political landscape in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The manner in which competing nationalist, socialist, Islamist, and democratic-minded Palestinians vie to control the direction of any future Palestinian state may influence United States objectives in the region. These include ending anti- Israeli violence, supporting Palestinian reforms, and bolstering Palestinian democratization and civil society. Some factions are designated foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department. One of these, Hamas, is building on recent electoral successes and may soon join the Palestinian parliament. This report describes the dominant Palestinian factions, and will be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks. Overview Recent and upcoming Palestinian local, municipal, and legislative elections are drawing the attention of policymakers to Palestinian factions.1 The purpose of this report is to describe dominant Palestinian factions and some of the challenges that factions present. For decades, Palestinian factionalism has dominated the political landscape in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. With Hamas, a dominant faction, faring well in local and municipal elections and poised to gain parliamentary representation, the United States and Israel, in all likelihood, will be faced with a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in a position of political authority. Also, during the current Palestinian uprising that began in September 2000, violence and terrorism against Israelis has been conducted not only by Hamas, but also factions related to the PLO, and Fatah in particular.
    [Show full text]
  • The Palestinian National Initiative and Dr. Mustafa Barghouti
    Factsheet: The Palestinian National Initiative and Dr. Mustafa Barghouti Factsheet Series No. 80, Created: May 2010, Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East The Palestinian domestic political landscape has been tarnished by partisanship, infighting and corruption. Yet as with the politics of any nation, there is a spectrum of views and opinions on the domestic agenda, foreign policy, and vision for the future. Most Western media depict a simplistic choice in the Palestinian political scene between caricatures of a “moderate, pro-Western” Fatah, and caricatures of a “violent, extremist” Hamas. This skewed two-choice perspective has been reinforced by Israeli and North American political discourse and has become increasingly institutionalized by the functional and political separation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories between the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, Palestinian political discourse is nuanced, dynamic and engaged – a fact illustrated by the emergence of sophisticated political alternatives despite the pressures of the occupation and international patronage. Are Palestinians interested in new political options? Why? The 1993 Oslo Agreement created the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the Palestinian political entity to develop state institutions and represent Palestine in negotiations with Israel and the international community. The PA was dominated by Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which transformed itself from a predominantly military organization into the political coalition Fatah. The post-Oslo period also saw the creation of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Palestinian National Council – allowing the Palestinian people to engage in democratic politics for the first time as a coherent national group. Fatah dominated the PA and marginalized other political positions: Arafat’s tenure tolerated widespread corruption and PA leaders tended to marginalize the Legislative and National Councils.
    [Show full text]
  • Palestinian Defiance
    A Movement of Movements?—17 mustafa barghouti PALESTINIAN DEFIANCE Interview by Éric Hazan Could you tell us about your origins and early trajectory? was born in Jerusalem, in 1954, but I spent my childhood here in Ramallah. My family is from Deir Ghassaneh, a village about fifteen miles away, near Bir Zeit; but after 1948, my father became the municipal engineer for Al Bireh, adjoining Ramallah. The IBarghouti family, a large one, has always been very political, very active. Under the Mandate, my grandfather and his brother were jailed by the British. During the 1950s, the whole village was part of the left opposition to Jordanian rule. It was the beginning of the Nasserite movement, of Pan-Arabism; the influence of the Jordanian Communist Party and other left forces was also very strong. I grew up surrounded by internationalist, progressive literature—our family’s viewpoint was always shaped by opposition to social injustice, rather than by nationalism. My father used to speak to us of his Jewish comrades in Tiberias or Acre. All through my childhood, I heard talk of prisons. I’ve been told that the first time I went to a prison I was two years old, taken to visit one of my uncles who’d been jailed—for political reasons, of course. Then during the 1960s there were many waves of mass demonstrations and protests. You were fourteen at the time of the 1967 war. What were its effects for you? Those few days reshaped me. I felt a huge amount of responsibility. My childhood ended then.
    [Show full text]
  • Healing the Holy Land: Interreligious Peacebuilding in Israel/Palestine
    Healing the Holy Land Interreligious Peacebuilding in Israel/Palestine Yehezkel Landau United States Institute of Peace Contents Summary 5 Foreword by David Smock 7 1. Introduction 9 2. Religion: A Blessing or a Curse? 11 3. After the Collapse of Oslo 13 4. The Alexandria Summit and Its Aftermath 16 5. Grassroots Interreligious Dialogues 26 6. Educating the Educators 29 7. Other Muslim Voices for Interreligious Peacebuilding 31 8. Symbolic Ritual as a Mode of Peacemaking 35 9. Active Solidarity: Rabbis for Human Rights 38 10. From Personal Grief to Collective Compassion 41 11. Journeys of Personal Transformation 44 12. Practical Recommendations 47 Appendices 49 About the Author 53 About the Institute 54 Summary ven though the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is primarily a political dispute between two nations over a common homeland, it has religious aspects that Eneed to be addressed in any effective peacemaking strategy. The peace agenda cannot be the monopoly of secular nationalist leaders, for such an approach guarantees that fervent religious believers on all sides will feel excluded and threatened by the diplo- matic process. Religious militants need to be addressed in their own symbolic language; otherwise, they will continue to sabotage any peacebuilding efforts. Holy sites, including the city of Jerusalem, are claimed by both peoples, and deeper issues that fuel the conflict, including the elements of national identity and purpose, are matters of transcendent value that cannot be ignored by politicians or diplomats. This report argues for the inclusion of religious leaders and educators in the long-term peacebuilding that is required to heal the bitter conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
    [Show full text]