Civil liberties at the crossroads: Libertarian and illiberal attitudes among politically charged online groups
Angelo Fasce1 and Diego Avendaño2
1 University of Coimbra – [email protected].
2 University of Pamplona.
Pre-print first posted: 04/25/2021
Civil liberties and rights such as freedom of expression, press, thought, religion, association, lifestyle, and equality against the law are being subjected to fierce controversies within the socio-political landscape of Western developed countries. Based on a literature review, we develop two working hypotheses aimed at explaining divergent attitudes toward civil liberties among politically charged online communities on each side of the political spectrum. First, a “libertarian attitude” among rightist groups, in which economic conservatism suppresses the illiberal tendencies of social conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism. Second, a “illiberal attitude” among leftist groups, elicited by the rise of authoritarian forms of social justice-seeking within some influential left- wing ideologies. We report a correlational study using a cross-sectional sample (n = 902), whose results support both hypotheses. Lastly, we discuss these results in relation to polarization over civil liberties and perceived power imbalances between conservatives and liberals.
Key words: Civil liberties, authoritarianism, economic conservatism, social justice, feminism. CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 2
Political positions are becoming increasingly partisan and close-minded in Western countries, with people describing their political systems in terms of "Us" versus "Them”, and political parties more internally homogeneous and ideologically distant from each other (Twenge, Honeycutt, Prislin, & Sherman, 2016; McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018).
This article aids understanding of endorsement of civil liberties and rights among individuals engaged in leftist and rightist online groups, as previous results suggest that strong political identification makes citizens prone to prefer their electoral choices over democratic principles, thus justifying anti-democratic attitudes within their affinity group
(Graham & Svolik, 2020).
Based on a literature review, we hypothesize two opposed situations, one for each side of the political spectrum. On one hand, a “libertarian attitude” among right-wing groups elicited by economic conservatism, which would motivate conservatives to increase their support for civil liberties. On the other hand, we hypothesize a “illiberal attitude” among leftist groups, which would lead them to endorse authoritarian agendas at the expense of civil liberties. We report an empirical study using a large cross-sectional sample of Spanish-speaking subjects, recruited from online forums on political issues with distinctive ideological backgrounds. Results support both the libertarian attitudes among conservative groups, mediated by neoliberal ideology, and the illiberal attitudes among leftists, mediated by the acceptance of authoritarian conceptions. Lastly, we discuss our results in relation to the role of civil liberties in explaining the upsurge of culture war in developed Western societies.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 3
Civil liberties and authoritarianism
Within liberalism, the political tradition that shapes contemporary liberal democracies, the development of a country is conceived as a process of expanding people’s freedoms (Sen, 1999). Therefore, states aiming at achieving economic and social development should strive to eliminate major sources of repressive politics, whose removal influences the level of subjective well-being of citizens in a positive way
(Bjørnskovm, Dreher, & Fischer, 2010; Nikolova, 2016). This central conception of liberty has given rise to more comprehensive and accurate forms of measuring democracy
(Lindberg, Coppedge, Gerring, & Teorell, 2014), focused on a broad category of regulations with various objects of protection, namely civil liberties and rights, which not only guarantee but expand human rights—e.g., regarding physical security, material subsistence, personal liberty, elemental equality, and social recognition (Orend, 2002).
Civil liberties play a key role in developed democracies, assuring liberty of expression
(including freedom of press, assembly, speech, and protest), freedom to choose one’s lifestyle (including freedom of religion, of conscience, and privacy), and equality rights
(such as equal treatment under the law and right to a fair trial; Fenwick, 2007).
Civil liberties do not always have an obvious identifiable beneficiary, although they primarily benefit those who are not privileged in society, being largely unnecessary for the existing elite. Accordingly, opposition toward them is typical of dominant groups seeking to control society and political power through authoritarian agendas (Altemeyer,
1998; Mukand & Rodrik, 2020). To illustrate this, a recent study found that both left- wing and right-wing authoritarians endorse illiberal policies intended to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as restrictions to the rights to protest against the government, to trial by jury, to free press, and to economic liberty (Manson, 2020). As a result, de facto civil liberties protection, resulting in a more inclusive model of political CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 4 citizenship, has been seen to be determined by power imbalances between liberalism and authoritarianism, whether in national contexts or among culturally proximate countries
(Lewczuk, 2020).
Libertarian attitudes within groups of rightists
In line with Feldman and Johnson’s (2013) distinction between social and economic ideology, social and economic conservatism are considered the most prominent ideological trends within contemporary right-wing parties and movements (Johnson &
Tamney, 2001; Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008, Beattie, Bettache, & Ching Yee Chong,
2019). Both forms of conservatism show striking differences, which make them not only mutually independent, but contradictory in relation to core ideological assumptions
(Crowson, 2009; Costello & Lilienfeld, 2020; Fasce & Avendaño, 2020). Social conservatives are prone to interpret political problems in moral terms and to be committed to the preservation of ancient institutions, roles, and traditions, thus being linked to traditionalism, orthodox religiosity, and nationalism. In contrast, economic conservatism primarily promotes laissez-faire capitalism and private enterprise, being opposed to governmental involvement in the private life of citizens, favoring instead unrestricted competition among individuals, market deregulation, free trade between countries, and privatization of public services to reduce public spending. Some authors argue that, despite their differences, the existing alliance between both forms of conservatism would be explicable as social conservatism promotes the preservation of a predictable social structure that assures certainty for investors (Johnson, 2013; Simpson & Laham, 2014;
Fasce & Avendaño, 2020). CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 5
Even though economic conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism tend to be positively correlated (Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund, & Sterling, 2019), previous studies have found that social conservatism acts as a confounder variable in the association between both constructs (Everett, 2013; Fasce & Avendaño, 2020; Costello & Lilienfeld, 2020).
Indeed, there is theoretical compatibility between being economically conservative and socially liberal, as the liberal values lying at the root of neoliberalism prioritize the need to promote social stability through mutual understanding, individual freedom, and perspective taking between ideological counterparts, considering it the cornerstone of public reason (Van Zomeren, Fischer, & Spears, 2007; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008;
Crowson, 2009; Torcello, 2020)1.
In this regard, Costello and Lilienfeld (2020) found that economic conservatism tends to prevent authoritarian attitudes within social conservative agendas, suppressing its positive direct associations with dogmatism, political intolerance, lessened sympathy towards suffering of political opponents, rationalization of harm towards political opponents, preferences for state control, and perceived intergroup threat. Accordingly, the increasingly fundamental search for economic freedom within politically-centered communities of conservatives could have resulted in both a substantial reduction of prejudice toward outgroup members and a heightened acceptance of the open marketplace of ideas and lifestyles (Johnson & Tamney, 2001; Hackett, Gaffney, & Data, 2018).
In accordance with the rise of economic conservatism among right-wing parties and movements, and its concomitant liberal values, we hypothesize higher support for civil liberties within online groups of rightists. In this nomological network, represented in
1 Despite the well-documented proneness among economic conservatives to endorse conspiracy theories around climate change (van der Linden, Panagopoulos, Azevedo, & Jost, 2020), recent results suggest that their general disposition to engage in cognitive reflection is particularly optimal (Yilmaz, Saribay, & Iyer, 2020). CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 6
Figure 1, social conservatism would mediate between right-wing authoritarianism and economic conservatism, while economic conservatism would mediate between social conservatism and support for civil liberties. In addition, economic conservatism would suppress the negative association between right-wing authoritarianism and support for civil liberties.
Figure 1. Nomological network of the libertarian attitude among groups of conservatives. Dashed lines denote suppressed or mediated relationships.
Illiberal attitudes within groups of leftists
Recent research has gathered evidence of authoritarian dispositions among left- wing voters in populations from the Spanish-speaking context (Fasce & Avendaño,
2020), Europe (Van Hiel, Duriez, & Kossowska, 2006; De Regt, Mortelmans, & Smits,
2011), the United States (Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2017; Federico, Fisher, &
Deason, 2017; Conway & McFarland, 2019), and worldwide (Conway, Zubrod, Chan,
McFarland, & Van de Vliert, 2021), generally with lower prevalence than in the right- wing (Nilsson & Jost, 2020). Recent work by Costello, Bowes, Stevens, Waldman, and
Lilienfeld (2021) suggest that left-wing authoritarianism is composed of three factors: CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 7
Revolutionary aggression—a disposition to violently overthrow and punish the established figures of authority and power; top-down censorship—the motivation to exert group authority to regulate right-wing or deviant ideology and behaviors; and anti- conventionalism—a sense of moral superiority and absolutism, with a corresponding dismissal of conservatives as inherently immoral and a need for ideological homogeneity in one’s environment.
Left-wing authoritarianism is linked to variables that were once thought to be distinguishing marks of right-wing authoritarians, such as low openness, dogmatism, cognitive rigidity, high threat sensitivity, political intolerance, free-speech suppression, social vigilantism, and partisanship (Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2017; Conway,
Zubrod, Chan, McFarland, & Van de Vliert, 2021; Costello, Bowes, Stevens, Waldman,
& Lilienfeld, 2021). Therefore, despite well-documented differences between right-wing and left-wing voters (e.g., Jost 2017), previous research outcomes provide evidence of a relative symmetry in the psychological profiles of far-left and far-right extremists
(Crawford, 2012; Conway, Gornick, Houck, Anderson, Stockert, Sessoms, & McCue,
2015; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017; Rollwage, Dolan, & Fleming, 2018; Crawford &
Brandt, 2020).
This intriguing view captures a potential phenomenon that has been regarded as a
“reactionary drift” within the left wing (Ovejero, 2018; Babones, 2018; Lukianoff &
Haidt, 2018), which would be characterized by increasing abandon of public reason, open deliberation, and liberal values, preferring instead a rather paradoxical endorsement of illiberal identity politics and political correctness (Strauts & Blanton, 2015; Clayton,
2018; Conway, Zubrod, Chan, McFarland, & Van de Vliert, 2021). This reactionary drift would be explicit in recent incidents in which left-wing activists, counting on political and institutional support, have exerted repressive actions of censorship (e.g., The Atlantic, CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 8
2015; The New York Times, 2017; CBC News, 2017; Inside Higher Ed, 2019), often exhibiting violent behaviors (e.g., CNN, 2017; Fox News, 2020)—also in the Spanish- speaking context (e.g., Clarín, 2017; El Mundo, 2019; La Vanguardia, 2019). In the view of Haslam et al. (2019), these incidents would constitute consequences of semantic broadening of harm-related concepts and aggrieved social identities in the left wing, which are prone to engage in competitive victimhood (Noor, Vollhardt, Mari, & Nadler,
2017; Solomon & Martin, 2019).
Under conditions of competitive victimhood, repressive actions against alleged perpetrators of structural oppression tend to be conceived as moral imperatives and regarded as a form of retributive social justice that facilitates empowerment (Rectenwad,
2018)—often resulting in demands of safe spaces free of dissenting others and limitations on free speech (Chemerinsky & Gillman, 2017). Concept creep within leftist groups may be importing punitive responses from the original meaning of justified concerns (e.g., racism, homophobia, and sexism) into wider concepts—e.g., microaggressions, cultural appropriation, micro-inequities, rape culture, white privilege and covert racism
(Campbell & Manning, 2018; Sunstein, 2018). As a result, semantic expansion of harm- related concepts may be triggering disproportionate reactions among mobilized leftist groups, thus aggravating culture war in relation to the scope and benefits of civil liberties
(Haidt, 2016).
The preceding account of the rise of authoritarian trends within salient left-wing ideologies allows us to hypothesize that current groups of individuals committed to left- wing political networks are expected to exhibit higher disavowal or limitation of civil liberties and rights, with this behavior being mediated by endorsement of left-wing authoritarianism. CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 9
Empirical study
Working hypotheses
First working hypothesis (illiberal attitude within groups of leftists): Left-wing authoritarianism mediates the negative associations of support for civil liberties with left- wing self-identification and ideology.
Second working hypothesis (libertarian attitude within groups of rightists):
Economic conservatism explains support for civil liberties and rights among conservatives.
Sample
A sample of 902 Spanish-speaking subjects from Spain and Latin America was recruited for a voluntary online fulfillment of the set of scales. We used Facebook and
Twitter groups with distinctive political profiles on social conservatism, feminism, and neoliberalism, and also received help from several political journalists and YouTubers, which kindly invited their followers to participate. 223 (25%) were women and 679 (75%) were men, with an average age of 35 years (SD: 12); 668 (74%) self-identified as non- religious and 234 (26%) as religious; lastly, 256 (28%) had pre-university education and
646 (72%) had university education.
Measures
We included both left-wing and right-wing measures of authoritarianism. On one hand, a 39-item scale on Left-Wing Authoritarianism (M = 77.80; SD = 23.64; α = 0.94;
Costello, Bowes, Stevens, Waldman, & Lilienfeld, 2021). It measures a 3-factor model: CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 10 revolutionary aggression (e.g., “political violence can be constructive when it serves the cause of social justice”), top-down censorship (e.g., “when we spend all of our time protecting the right to ‘free speech’ we're protecting the rights of sexists, racists, and homophobes at the cost of marginalized people”), and anti-conventionalism (e.g.,
“conservatives are morally inferior to liberals”). This scale was previously validated for the Spanish-speaking population in Fasce, Avendaño, and Adrián-Ventura (2021). On the other hand, to measure Right-Wing Authoritarianism, we used the aggression- submission-conventionalism scale (M = 46.53; SD = 8.26; α = 0.75; Dunwoody & Funke,
2016), an 18-item measure of Altemeyer’s (1981) model of authoritarianism (e.g., “strong force is necessary against threatening groups” and “traditions are the foundation of a healthy society and should be respected”). CFA revealed excellent fit indices, supporting the same 3-factor solution in the Spanish version: X² (102) = 191.70, p < 0.001, CFI >
0.98, TLI > 0.97, RMSEA = 0.03 [0.024, 0.038], SRMR = 0.04.
To measure the two main forms of conservatism, we used Everett’s (2013) 11-item measure of Social (M = 21.11; SD = 6.13; α = 0.85) and Economic Conservatism (M =
12.71; SD = 3.60; α = 0.67). Participants indicated the extent to which they felt positive or negative regarding issues related to each form of conservatism (e.g., traditional values and limited government). CFA revealed satisfactory fit indices for the same 2-factor structure in our Spanish version: X² (30) = 33.23, p = 0.31, CFI and TLI > 0.99, RMSEA
= 0.01 [0.000 – 0.028], SRMR = 0.02. In addition, to assess an instance of leftist ideology, we used the short forms of the Radical and Cultural Feminism subscales from the feminist perspectives scale (Henley, Spalding, & Kosta, 2000) 2. Radical feminists see women as
2 It would have been interesting to conduct parallel measurements on social and economic ideology among left-wing participants. Nevertheless, there are no validated scales, and lack of theorization, distinguishing between social and economic leftism. CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 11 a marginalized class, conceiving Western society as a patriarchy and women’s exploitation as the most fundamental form of oppression, while the central focus of cultural feminists is on the promotion of "women's values" such as caring for others, emotionality, beauty, peace, cooperation, and gentleness. Due to their shared ideological background and exploratory factor analysis, both subscales were unified into an 11-item single factor scale (M = 21.08; SD = 9.12; α = 0.91; e.g., “marriage is a perfect example of men’s physical, economic, and sexual oppression of women” and “putting women in positions of political power would bring about new systems of government that promote peace”). CFA supported this single-factor solution: X² (22) = 39.93, p < 0.05, CFI and
TLI > 0.99, RMSEA = 0.03 [0.014, 0.045], SRMR = 0.02.
We developed a 15-item scale to measure Support for Civil Liberties and Rights (M
= 55.25; SD = 10.90; α = 0.86). It includes three items expressing fundamental civil liberties and rights: Freedom of expression and press; freedom of thought, belief and religion; freedom of assembly and association; right to a fair trial and equality against the law; and right to privacy and lifestyle (Table 1). Lastly, Political Self-Identification, a measure of participants' placement in the left-right axis, was assessed through a 10-point
Likert scale representing the political spectrum—with 1 representing the far-left and 10 the far-right.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 12
Table 1 Support for Civil Liberties and Rights Scale with standardized factor loadings. Item Loading 1 All voices should be allowed to participate in public debates, even 0.65 those that I consider intolerant and promote hatred. 2 Freedom of expression must have clear limits to prevent attacks against 0.75 certain minorities and the best moral values (R). 3 It would be better for everyone if the promotion of certain ideas in the 0.70 media, social networks, movies and music was forbidden (R). 4 Some religions that are contrary to the values and principles that should 0.55 govern our society must be strongly regulated or prohibited (R). 5 People should be free to believe what they want, regardless of whether 0.61 it is immoral, offensive, absurd or prejudiced. 6 People must not oppose the values and beliefs that would lead us to 0.52 build a better society (R). 7 Certain political parties should be banned (R). 0.63 8 Associations that promote ideologies based on hatred, prejudice and 0.70 resentment should not be allowed (R). 9 Certain protests and demonstrations should not be allowed (R). 0.68 10 Frequently, presumption of innocence only serves to prevent victims 0.59 from being recognized as such (R). 11 Above all, judges must base their verdicts on the common good to 0.43 educate society (R). 12 Given that certain kinds of people commit more crimes, their arrest 0.34 should be made easier and they should receive stiffer sentences than the rest (R). 13 We must be free to educate our children according to our own values 0.45 and ideology. 14 All lifestyles are to be respected, regardless of whether they are 0.55 traditional, modern, offensive or immoral. 15 As long as it is legal, people should be able to earn a living the way 0.58 they want, including prostitution and financial speculation.
Note: 1, 2, and 3 = Freedom of expression and press; 4, 5, and 6 = Freedom of thought, belief and religion; 7, 8, and 9 = Freedom of assembly and association; 10, 11, and 12 = Right to a fair trial and equality against the law; 13, 14, and 15 = Right to privacy and lifestyle; (R) = Reversed encoded. Item loadings represent standardized beta coefficients. Answer options were presented in a 5-point Liker scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 13
Exploratory factor analysis on the support for civil liberties and rights scale
We carried out an exploratory factor analysis to test the psychometric soundness of the scale on Support for Civil Liberties and Rights. Initially, maximum likelihood method suggested a 3-factor solution with numerous cross loadings. Based on the observation of the scree plot, we opted for a single-factor solution as only one of the factors had an eigenvalue above 1: Both KMO index (0.91) and Barlett’s sphericity test [X² (105) =
3896.4, p < 0.001] were satisfactory, and it explained 30% of the variance with an overall
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86. All factor loadings were above the threshold of acceptability
(0.32) described in Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), except for item 12 (0.30) whose elimination did not improve the internal consistency of the scale, so we opted for retaining it (see Table 1).
Results
Sociodemographic results
Participant’s age was significantly correlated to Economic Conservatism (r = 0.10, p < 0.01). Regarding sex, levels were higher among men in Support for Civil Liberties and Rights [t (900) = -6.71, p < 0.001, d = -0.51] and Right-Wing Authoritarianism [t
(900) = -2.50, p < 05, d = -0.19], and higher among women in Left-Wing Authoritarianism
[t (312.2) = 5.80, p < 0.001, d = 0.50]. Regarding Religion, levels were higher among religious participants in Right-Wing Authoritarianism [t (900) = -9.60, p < 0.001, d = -
0.69], while Left-Wing Authoritarianism was higher among non-religious participants [t
(483.6) = 6.00, p < 0.001, d = 0.41]. Regarding Education, levels were higher among pre- university education in Right-Wing Authoritarianism [t (429.4) = 3.4, p < 0.01, d = 0.26]. CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 14
Linear and cubic regressions between political self-identification and support for civil liberties
A simple linear regression [F (1, 900) = 178.7, p < 0.001] confirmed Political Self-
Identification as a significant predictor of Support for Civil Liberties and Rights
(Adjusted R² = 0.17). Nevertheless, a cubic regression model [F (3, 898) = 74.5, p <
0.001] accounted for a higher percentage of the variance (20%; ΔR² = 0.03), with a significant change with respect to the linear estimation (ΔF = 27.1, p < 0.001). These results suggest that the association between both variables is better understood as non- linear, with Support for Civil Liberties and Rights showing a drastic downturn in the far- left, followed by a stabilization in the center and moderate right-wing self-identification,
and, lastly, a slight rise in the far-right.
Civil Liberties andLibertiesRights Civil
Supportfor Political Self-Identification
Figure 2. Linear (solid line) and cubic (dashed line) reggressions, with Political Self-Identification as the independent variable and Support for Civil Liberties and Rights as the dependent variable. Polirical Self- Identification: 1 = Far-left, 10 = Far-right.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 15
First working hypothesis (illiberal attitude within groups of leftists)
Correlations between leftism-related variables and support for civil liberties and
rights
As can be seen from Table 2, and as expected by our first working hypothesis,
leftism-related constructs have strong negative correlations with Support for Civil
Liberties and Rights: Left-Wing Authoritarianism (r = -0.75, p < 0.001) and Radical and
Cultural Feminism (r = -0.63, p < 0.001).
Table 2 Correlation matrix between variables. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1. Political Self-Identification - 0.41** -0.62** 0.45** -0.56** 0.63** 0.63** 2. Support for Civil Liberties and Rights - -0.75** 0.06 -0.63** 0.31** 0.51** 3. Left-Wing Authoritarianism - -0.30** 0.77** -0.55** -0.60** 4. Right-Wing Authoritarianism - -0.33** 0.59** 0.28** 5. Radical and Cultural Feminism - -0.50** -0.56** 6. Social Conservatism - 0.50** 7. Economic Conservatism -
Note: All significant values were corrected by FDR method for multiple comparisons. * = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.001.
Mediation analyses on left-wing authoritarianism
Mediation analysis is intended test if the relationship between an independent and
dependent variable is influenced by a mediator variable (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz,
2007). Mediator variables explain a causal sequence whereby the independent variable
predicts indirectly the outcome on the dependent variable—the so-called “indirect effect”. CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 16
In other words, this data analysis method reveals if mediator variables intervene in the relationship between the independent and dependent variable.
We used the SPSS PROCESS macro (v3.4; Hayes, 2017) to estimate the indirect effect through bootstrapping (95% confidence intervals; number of bootstrap samples:
5000). As expected by our first working hypothesis, these analyses, depicted in Figure 3, confirmed Left-Wing Authoritarianism as a mediator for the positive relationship between leftist Political Self-Identification and Support for Civil Liberties and Rights
(standardized β = 0.41, p < 0.001; direct effect: -0.10; indirect effect: 0.50; CI: 0.46,
0.56)3. Left-Wing Authoritarianism also mediates the existing negative direct effect between Radical and Cultural Feminism and Support for Civil Liberties and Rights
(standardized β = -0.62, p < 0.001; direct effect: -0.12; indirect effect: -0.50; CI: -0.56, -
0.45). These results indicate that, besides leftist self-identification and radical/cultural feminist ideology, participants high in Left-Wing Authoritarianism are those who tend to show strong opposition toward civil liberties and rights4.
3 As in the Political Self-Identification scale 1 = far-left and 10 = far-right, the positive indirect effect between Political Self-Identification and Support for Civil Liberties and Rights means that stronger leftist self-identification (or, in other words, less rightist self-identification) correlates with less endorsement of civil liberties.
4 We are not suggesting a rigid causal pathway between radical/cultural feminism, left-wing authoritarianism and rejection of civil liberties. Instead, we hypothesize and test in correlational terms that far-left ideologies may constitute a cognitive framework that facilitates the endorsement of certain authoritarian attitudes; these, in turn, may boost the existing negative association between far-left ideologies and support for civil liberties. We consider that, although other potential causal pathways are feasible, our mediational model is particularly promising for explanation purposes: ideologies, as sets of interpretations, values and political goals, promote specific socio-political attitudes. The observed mediations aid understanding of the primary focus of our first working hypothesis: far-left ideologies as a motivational context in which left-wing authoritarianism and illiberalism may thrive. However, as mediation analyses alone cannot be used to make causal inferences, confirmatory experimental approaches, framed in terms of causation rather than prediction, would be very welcome.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 17
LWA LWA
-0.62** -0.81** 0.77** -0.65**
PS-I (-0.10**) SCLR RCFEM (-0.12**) SCLR 0.41** -0.62**
Indirect effect: 0.50 Indirect effect: -0.50
Figure 3. Values represent standardized beta coefficients (* = p < 0.01; ** = p <0.001). Direct effect between parentheses. LWA = Left-Wing Authoritarianism; PS-I = Political Self-Identification; SCLR = Support for Civil Liberties and Rights; RCFEM = Radical and Cultural Feminism. The positive indirect effect between PS-I and CLR means that more leftist self-identification correlates with less endorsement of civil liberties.
Second working hypothesis (libertarian attitude within groups of rightists)
Correlations between conservatism-related variables and support for civil liberties and rights
As expected by our second working hypothesis, conservatism-related constructs showed no significant correlation (Right-Wing Authoritarianism: r = 0.06, p > 0.01), positive medium size correlation (Social Conservatism: r = 0.31, p < 0.001), and large positive correlation (Economic Conservatism: r = 0.51, p < 0.001) with Support for Civil
Liberties and Rights. In addition, Right-Wing Authoritarianism was strongly and positively correlated to Social Conservatism (r = 0.59, p < 0.001). These results are displayed in Table 2.
Mediation analyses on economic conservatism
In order to test the hypothesized mediational role of Economic Conservatism— from a correlational point of view, without making strong causal inferences—, we conducted a series of mediation analyses using the same bootstrapping method previously mentioned (95% confidence intervals; number of bootstrap samples: 5000). In line with CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 18 the nomological network represented in Figure 1 (i.e., second working hypothesis), these analyses revealed that endorsement of Economic As can be seen from Figure 4, conservatism suppresses the direct negative association between Right-Wing
Authoritarianism and Support for Civil Liberties and Rights (standardized β = 0.06, p >
0.01; direct effect: -0.08; indirect effect: 0.15; CI: 0.11, 0.18), and that Economic
Conservatism acts as a mediator between Social Conservatism and Support for Civil
Liberties and Rights (standardized β = 0.31, p < 0.001; direct effect: 0.08; indirect effect:
0.23; CI: 0.20, 0.27). Lastly, in line with prior findings, Social Conservatism mediated between Economic Conservatism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (standardized β =
0.30, p < 0.001; direct effect: -0.02; indirect effect: 0.28; CI: 0.25, 0.35). These results indicate that, despite their association with socially conservative or authoritarian ideology, participants high in Economic Conservatism tend to manifest moderate levels of Support for Civil Liberties and Rights.
ECON
0.28** 0.53**
RWA (-0.08*) SCLR 0.06
Indirect effect: 0.15
ECON SCON
0.50** 0.47** 0.50** 0.60**
SCON (0.08) SCLR ECON (-0.02) RWA 0.31** 0.30**
Indirect effect: 0.23 Indirect effect: 0.28
Figure 4. Values represent standardized beta coefficients (* = p < 0.01; ** = p <0.001). Direct effect between parentheses. SCON = Social Conservatism; ECON = Economic Conservatism; RWA = Right- Wing Authoritarianism; SCLR = Support for Civil Liberties and Rights. CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 19
Confirmatory regression analysis
A multiple linear regression was conducted to confirm the previously mentioned results (Table 3). Multicollinearity was assessed using variance inflation factor and tolerance statistics: all VIF values were below 3.0 and tolerance statistics were above
0.33. We entered the following variables: Age, Sex, Education, Religion, Social
Conservatism, Economic Conservatism, Radical and Cultural Feminism, Left-Wing
Authoritarianism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. As a result, this model [F (9, 892) =
157.60, p < 0.001], explained 61% of the variance and confirmed Economic Conservatism as the only positive predictor of Support for Civil Liberties and Rights, while Radical and
Cultural Feminism, Left-Wing Authoritarianism, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism were confirmed as significant negative predictors—with Left-Wing Authoritarianism exhibiting a particularly large effect size (standardized β = -0.67).
Table 3 Multiple linear regression with Support for Civil Liberties and Rights as dependent variable. Civil Liberties and Rights R² = 0.61 Age -0.05 Sex 0.05 Education -0.01 Religion -0.01 Social Conservatism -0.08 Economic Conservatism 0.11** Radical and Cultural Feminism -0.12** Left-Wing Authoritarianism -0.67** Right-Wing Authoritarianism -0.17**
Note: Sex was coded as 1 = women, 2 = men; Education as 1 = Pre-university, 2 = University; and Religion as 1 = Non-religious, 2 = Religious. R² displays the adjusted value. All regression coefficients are standardized β. * = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.001.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 20
Discussion
Our results revealed higher illiberal attitudes among groups of leftist individuals, as left-wing self-identification and radical/cultural feminism exhibited large negative associations with support for civil liberties and rights, being both associations mediated by left-wing authoritarianism. Moreover, the reported results also suggest a nomological network that we characterize as a “libertarian attitude” among groups of rightists, with economic conservatism both suppressing the direct negative association of right-wing authoritarianism and mediating the direct positive association of social conservatism with support for civil liberties and rights. In our view, these results reflect the major impact of economic conservatism and left-wing authoritarianism on the current political scenario, in which politically charged online communities, like the ones analyzed in this study, play a key role.
Limitations
We would like to remark on some limitations of the present study. These results were obtained through a theory-driven correlational approach that does not allow us to draw causal inferences between the tested variables—although it does suggest promising research pathways for future experimental approaches. Moreover, even though the number of participants allowed us to carry out intergroup comparisons, the sample was composed by a higher number of males, university educated, and non-religious participants. These asymmetries should be taken into consideration for future studies. In addition, 79% of the sample stems from Spain, which is among the Western, Educated,
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic countries (WEIRD; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010). The positive association between social and economic forms of conservatism found in our sample is in line with previous findings from cross-national data reported in CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 21
Malka, Soto, Inzlicht and Lelkes, (2014), and Beattie, Bettache and Chong (2019), which suggest that this pattern is characteristic of developed countries. Therefore, the extrapolation of the reported results to non-WEIRD populations should be addressed with caution. Lastly, although indirect evidence can be found in Graham and Svolik (2020), more research is needed to know if political engagement moderates the observed associations between ideology and support for civil liberties—which would set additional constraints on the generalizability of these results regarding representative samples of voters.
Civil liberties at the center of political polarization
Civil liberties constitute a source of polarization in our sample of ideologically motivated online communities, with conservatives showing a libertarian attitude elicited by economic conservatism, and leftists showing heightened opposition toward the recognition of civil liberties among their ideological counterparts. We believe that the widely documented expansiveness of leftist people’s concepts of harm (Haslam et al.,
2019) could be functioning as a cognitive basis for an aggrieved worldview, in which illiberal forms of empowerment are deemed social justice. This partisan interpretation of democracy would be offering moral and ideological justification to authoritarian forms of repression, discrimination, and punishment toward groups perceived as privileged. As a result, groups constructed around certain left-wing ideologies, particularly those arising from cultural studies (Longhurst, Smith, Bagnall, Crawford, & Ogborn, 2015), may be promoting a morality-dependent conception of civil liberties—characterized by a willingness to impose limitations on them when behavior deviates from their moral standard (Pluckrose & Lindsay, 2020). CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 22
Political polarization around civil liberties could be reflecting participants’ concern about power imbalances within society, as left-wing groups may be perceived by conservatives as having more influence within public services, government structures, and mass media—consequently, they would be carving a niche for themselves in the public sphere through the vindication of their civil liberties. Many scholars have suggested this explanation for the worrying upsurge of right-wing populism in Western countries, particularly in relation to Donald Trump’s rise to power and European far-right parties such as Rassemblement National (France), VOX (Spain), Alternative für
Deutschland (Germany), and Partij voor de Vrijheid (the Netherlands). Under this interpretation, the rise of right-wing populism would constitute a backlash from large sections of the population who feel abandoned and aggrieved by highly educated liberal expert classes (e.g., Packer, 2013; Hochschild, 2016; Isenberg, 2016; Free, 2017)— through perceiving that they are being denigrated as “oppressors” or “white trash”, accused of sexism, racism, and homophobia due to politically incorrect behaviors, and threatened by retributive forms of social justice promoted by populist left (Damiani,
2020).
A similar situation, although in the opposite direction, occurred during the second half of the 20th century in Western nations, when conservatives dominated key dimensions of the public sphere while left-wing movements were the ones vindicating civil liberties and rights—e.g., the civil rights movement, second-wave feminism, May
68, the gay liberation movement, and the sexual revolution. At that time, right-wing parties were highly influenced by authoritarian agendas of social conservatism and traditionalism (Kirk, 1953), whereas the left-wing was predominantly led by social democratic movements advocating liberal democracy and the implementation of welfare states (Hicks, 1999; Berman, 2006). CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 23
Even though we support this potential explanation (i.e., self-defensive endorsement of civil liberties boosted by the perception of power imbalances), we also consider that philosophical analyses of contemporary political ideologies could add explanatory power.
Beyond self-defensive cognition, there is a direct and positive relationship between the doctrinal content of economic conservatism and classical liberal values (Johnson &
Tamney, 2001; Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008, Everett, 2013; Fasce & Avendaño, 2020;
Costello, Bowes, Stevens, Waldman, & Lilienfeld, 2021). At the same time, there are explicitly illiberal conceptions within salient leftist identity politics based on a radical dialectic between structural oppression and empowerment (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018;
Pluckrose & Lindsay, 2020). This can be seen from the results reported in this empirical study: the mediational and suppression effect of economic conservatism regarding right- wing authoritarianism and social conservatism, and the mediational effect of left-wing authoritarianism between radical/cultural feminism and rejection of civil liberties and rights.
Hence, besides the motivational dimension of polarization over civil liberties, there may be an ideological aspect reflecting how these guarantees of freedom are integrated, whether positively or negatively, in the mainstream ideological systems of contemporary
Western societies. Both explanations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they could work together to facilitate a more comprehensive account: the socio-political context would generate power imbalances and that would explain why certain ideologies, and not others, gain relevance within politically charged groups, depending on their account of civil liberties.
CIVIL LIBERTIES AT THE CROSSROADS 24
Concluding remarks
We confirmed our hypotheses expressing higher libertarian attitudes among rightist online communities than within leftist ones, respectively mediated by economic conservative ideology and left-wing authoritarianism. These results suggest that partisan standpoints on the polarizing struggle around civil liberties need renewed attention and updated data, as leftist movements were once the advocates against conservative restrictions of individual autonomy.
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