Harvard International Review

What is Nuclear Superiority? Author(s): Robert Bathurst, Albert Carnesale, Richard Garwin, Stanley Hoffmann, Steve Miller, , Richard Pipes, Bruce Porter, Scott Thompson and Adam Ulam Source: Harvard International Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (SEPTEMBER 1980), p. 1, 14 Published by: Harvard International Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42762057 Accessed: 30-12-2015 22:00 UTC

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INTERNATIONAL

REVIEWm Ě mm w W m mam W W September i980, volume 3, number i

recentmonths, we haveseen Secretary of Defense interestswere challenged with conventional forces by the Harold Brown warn that our land-basedInter- on a numberof occasions, and those continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are challengescontinued during the entireperiod of Soviet vulnerable to Soviet attack, the ratification inferiority. In of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Apparently,there is a dimensionof nuclearsuperiority Treaty(SALT) languishin the Senate,President Jimmy whichdoes notháve to do withnumbers or throwweight; Carter'sDirective 59 emphasizecounterforce targeting, ithas to do withmen's minds. There is an Americanway of and theRepublican platform call for some form of military thinking,and it demands specificanswers to such superiority.All theseevents direct our attentionto two questionsas the one posed in the symposium."Who is importantquestions: What is nuclearsuperiority? What is ahead?" and "How muchdoes it cost?"seem absolutely its militaryand politicalimportance? The International essential to our comprehension.For example, at Review solicitedbrief re- enormous expense and sponsesto thesequestions waste of manpower,the froma group of Harvard Central Intelligence A- professors and fellows gency must describethe with a broad range of cost of the Soviet mili- viewpoints.Their responses tarybudget with a perfectly constitutethis year'sIR What meaninglessfigure because symposium. Congresscannot function withoutit. America'smor- ale could not Robert probably survive very negative Bathurst: is answersto thesequestions. In any case, we would The answerto thissym- soon havea newpresident. posium's inquiryis that (Rememberthat John F. no one knows and that Kennedywas electedwith of a fictitious even if we could say to- Nuclear the aid day that it is X2,tomor- missilegap.) row it would be different. This affectsour foreign For one thing,nuclear su- relationsas well. A per- periorityis a stateof mind. vasive perceptionabroad France,for example, has a of American weakness force de frappe that Superiority? would unravelwhat is left is distinctlyinferior, but of worldorder. The results finds sufficientsecurity of this perception of in otherways to eschewan i i weakness are something activerole in the North At- thatwe are destinedto ex- Robert Bathurst/Albert Carnesale/Richard lanticTreaty Organization. perience,so itseems, in the Hoffmann/Steve To complicate the Garwin/Stanley Miller/Joseph 1980s,so we may all find question,nuclear superior- Nye/Richard Pipes/Bruce Porter/Scott outthe answer to theques- ity changes relative to Thompson/Adam Ulam tion posed in this sym- technical and scientific posium. achievements,economic strength, and industrialcapacity. Anotheraspect of the question that we have to deal with We gavethe Soviets superiority in SALT I becausewe told is thenature and relevanceof war because that is whatwe themthat we wereahead of themin severalimportant are really discussing.There are now tactical nuclear ways.This condition changed in lessthan six months.The weapons, chemicalwarheads, and biologicalweapons. criticalfactors of changein weaponsare notjust thoseof New technologynow enables us to solverather simply and speed, distatice,accuracy, and numbers.They are also quicklymany formerly complex military problems. For electro-optical,related to warningtimes, decision-making example, a small force can disable and in two days capacity,courage, resoluteness, and perception.So whatit confiscatean aircraftcarrier. One shell can eliminate comes down to is thatnuclear superiority is not greatly masseddivisions of armoredtroops. differentfrom other kinds of militarysuperiority in the Thereare manywho thinkthat the best way of dealing recentpast. At the end of World War II, forexample, althoughthe UnitedStates had nuclearsuperiority, its (continuedon page 14)

This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Wed, 30 Dec 2015 22:00:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions to damagethe Soviet Union to an extentunacceptable to its leaders.For thispurpose, it mattersnot whetherthe U.S. forceislarger or smallerthan the Soviet force. What Symposium mattersmost is whetherthe Americannuclear forces, afterabsorbing a preemptiveattack, could delivera retaliatoryblow of sufficientenormity to discouragethe (continuedfrom page 1) would-beinitiator of theexchange. Extended deterrence also restsupon thecapability of thesurviving U.S. force withthis terrible game is toannounce that you will not play ratherthan upon a comparisonbetween our forcesand it. Those peopledo notread Russian. They live in a world theirs. of theirown fantasy,a schizophrenicworld. History does Escalation controlcan be achievedin eitherof two notpermit us to takethat course. Like slave-gladiators, we ways. Deny the adversarymilitary superiority at every are pushedinto the arena. levelof conflict- an expensiveif not unattainablegoal. My answeris not intellectuallyneat, but then neither is Alternatively,maintain the capability to threatencredibly history. □ to escalatethe conflict from a levelat whichthe adversary has a usefulmilitary advantage to oneat whichit does not. Damage limitationand war-fightingcapabilities are RobertBathurst is an associateof theRussian Research enhancedas the size and qualityof our nuclearforces Centerat . increasein relationto the size and qualityof theirs. However,the improvementsobtainable are marginalat best.We knowof no plausibleimprovements inAmerican nuclear forces which could nullifyor even decrease substantiallythe Soviet Union's ability to inflict enormouslevels of damage to theterritory, forces, and Albert Carnesale : populationof the UnitedStates. Nor could the Soviet Union preventus frominflicting comparable levels of damageon itssociety. The notionof "winning" a nuclear To understandthe importanceof America'snuclear war is a subjectfor philosophersrather than defense forces,consider first the purposes which they are intended analysts. to serve.There appear to be at least six such purposes: Finallywe come to thepolitical sufficiency criterion for basic deterrence,extended deterrence, escalation control, establishingthe requiredlevels of nuclearforces. Surely damage limitation,warfighting, and politicalsufficiency. superiorityby any measureis morelikely than inferiority By basic deterrencewe meandeterrence, by meansof a to meetthe test of politicalsufficiency - a testcommonly crediblethreat of a devastatingretaliatory^ blow, of any applied both in Washingtonand in Moscow. But both nuclear attack upon the . Extended sides are unlikelysimultaneously to considertheir own deterrenceis the extensionof this "umbrella"of basic forcessuperior. A race for"mutual superiority" has no deterrenceto cover attacksupon our allies and others finishline: therecan be no winners.Either both sides whose securityis importantto us. Escalation control eventuallywill settle for some kind of "rough equivalence" requiresthe ability to denyan adversaryany advantage in ofnuclear forces or bothsides will lose the race, and much raisingthe level of hostility in an armedconflict. Damage more. □ limitationrefers to the destructionof, and/or defense against,an adversary'sforces in orderto limitthe extent of damage to the U.S. and its allies. A war-fighting AlbertCarnesale was recentlyappointed Chairman of the capabilitywould enable us to conducta nuclearwar, NuclearRegulatory Commission. preferablywith an outcomeno moreunfavorable to us thanto our adversary. Politicalsufficiency is the fuzziest, yet perhaps the most effective,of thejustifications offered in recentyears for thecontinued growth of our nucleararsenal. There is no generallyaccepted measure of "sufficiency,"political or otherwise,and viewsinevitably will differ on "How much Richard L. Garwin: is enough?" Yet, most foreignpolicy analystswould expect the U.S. to be at a politicaldisadvantage if the Americannuclear arsenal were substantially smaller than Logically,"nuclear superiority" might be whateverwe thatof the Soviet Union. say it is; the question should be, rather,"Under any If nuclearsuperiority is to mean anything,or to be reasonableinterpretation ofthe term 'nuclear superiority,' worthanything, it mustenhance our abilityto meetthe is such a capabilityof value?" objectivesserved by our nuclear forces. Basic deterrence is I havealways felt that the Soviet Union would destroy accomplishedby a survivablenuclear force large enough theUnited States if it could do so withouthazard to itself

14 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

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