DOCSLIB.ORG

Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION April 2015 De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION April 2015 De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures Copyright © 2015 by Global Zero All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without written permission of the copyright holder. Global Zero assumes full responsibility for the analysis and recommendations contained in this report. www.globalzero.org GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION April 2015 Chair Gen. (Ret.) James E. CARTWRIGHT, Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Fmr. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf, United States Members Amb. K. Shankar BAJPAI, Fmr. Chairman, National Security Advisory Board; Fmr. Secretary of the Ministry of External Afairs, India Amb. Richard BURT, Fmr. United States Chief Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Evgeny P. BUZHINSKY, Senior Vice President, PIR Center; Fmr. Head, International Treaty Directorate, Main Department of International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Amb. Ivo H. DAALDER, President, Te Chicago Council on Global Afairs; Fmr. Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vincent DESPORTES, Senior Military Advisor, Panhard General Defense; Fmr. Director of the Joint War College (College interarmée de defense, CID), France Adm. (Ret.) Giampaolo DI PAOLA, Fmr. Minister of Defence, Italy; Fmr. Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Mahmud Ali DURRANI, Fmr. National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan; Fmr. Ambassador of the Republic of Pakistan to the United States Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vladimir DVORKIN, Main Researcher, Center of International Security, Te Institute for World Economy and International Relations; Fmr. Director, Research Institute No. 4, Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Gen. (Ret.) Jehangir KARAMAT, Founder and Director, Spearhead Research; Fmr. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf, Pakistan; Fmr. Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States Vice Adm. (Ret.) Yoji KODA, Fmr. Vice Admiral of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Vice Adm. (Ret.) Verghese KOITHARA, Independent Strategic Analyst; Fmr. Vice Admiral, Indian Navy Amb. Yuji MIYAMOTO, Chairman of Miyamoto Institute of Asian Research; Fmr. Ambassador of Japan to China; Fmr. Director of Disarmament Afairs of the United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Afairs, Japan Gen. (Ret.) Klaus NAUMANN, Fmr. Chairman, NATO Military Committee; Fmr. Chief of Staf, Bundeswehr, German Armed Forces Gen. (Ret.) Bernard NORLAIN, President, Conseil d’Administration, Committee for the Study of National Defense; Fmr. Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander, French Air Force Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Osamu ONODA, Asia Center Fellow, Harvard University; Fmr. Lieutenant General, Japan Air Self Defense Force Maj. Gen. (Ret.) PAN Zhenqiang, Deputy Chairman, China Foundation for International Studies; Fmr. Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, China Amb. Tomas PICKERING, Fmr. Undersecretary of State for Political Afairs, United States; Fmr. Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations, Russia, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan Min. Paul QUILÈS, Fmr. Minister of Defense, Transport, Interior and Public Security, France Gen. (Ret.) Lord David RAMSBOTHAM, Fmr. Commander Field Army and Inspector General of the Territorial Army, United Kingdom Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm RIFKIND, Fmr. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Afairs; Fmr. Secretary of Defense, United Kingdom Amb. Yukio SATOH, Vice Chairman, Japan Institute of International Afairs; Fmr. Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations Gen. (Ret.) John J. SHEEHAN, Fmr. Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command Vice Adm. (Ret.) Vijay SHANKAR, Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence, United Services Institute India; Fmr. Commander in Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command; Fmr. Commander in Chief, Strategic Forces Command of India Min. SONG Min-soon, Chair Professor, Kyungnam University; Fmr. Minister of Foreign Afairs and Trade, Republic of Korea Air Chief Marshal (Ret.) Shashindra Pal TYAGI, Member, National Security Advisory Board; Fmr. Chief of the Air Staf, Indian Air Force Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Noboru YAMAGUCHI, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan; Fmr. Commanding General of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force Research and Development Command Maj. Gen. YAO Yunzhu, Director, Center for China-America Defense Relations; Director, Academy of Military Science, People’s Liberation Army, People’s Republic of China Maj. Gen. ZHU Chenghu, Director General and Professor of Academic Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army, People’s Republic of China Baron Karl-Teodor ZU GUTTENBERG, Fmr. Federal Minister of Defense; Fmr. Federal Minister of Economics and Technology, Federal Republic of Germany Advisor Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Uzi EILAM, Senior Research Fellow, Te Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University; Fmr. Director General of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission; Fmr. Chief Scientist and Director of Research and Development in the Ministry of Defense, Israel Study Director Dr. Bruce BLAIR, Co-Founder, Global Zero TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 1 Overview 5 Introduction 12 Still An Anarchic System 15 Escalation: General Risk Factors 16 Escalation: Specifc Risk Factors Among the World’s Nuclear Postures 20 Toward Bilateral and Multilateral De-Alerting Agreements 37 De-Alerting and National Security Interests of Other Key Nations 39 A U.S.-Russia Executive Agreement to De-Alert Nuclear Forces 50 Overall Evaluation Based on Five Criteria 57 U.S.-Russia Joint Project on De-Alerting 62 Toward a Global Multilateral De-Alerting Agreement 62 De-Alerting and National Security Interests 69 21st Century Nuclear Strategy, Force Posture and Employment 70 Guidance of the United States TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Te Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction 85 Policy Recommendations 5 Appendix A: Illustrative De-Alerting Measures 91 12 Appendix B: Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin’s Draf 106 15 Executive Agreement 16 Appendix C: U.N. Resolutions and Working Papers 108 20 Appendix D: U.S.-Russian Memorandum of Agreement 114 on a Joint Data Exchange Center 37 Appendix E: Nuclear Weapons States: Military Incidents 116 39 Appendix F: Nuclear Weapons Arsenals by Country 132 50 57 62 62 69 70 GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION REPORT DE-ALERTING AND STABILIZING THE WORLD’S NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURES I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Troughout the nuclear age the development, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons purportedly adopted a set of “best practices” – policy prescriptions designed to An arc of potential nuclear instability stretches around the strengthen strategic stability, and a set of standards designed globe. From Central Europe through South Asia to Northeast to minimize the risks of their accidental, unauthorized, and Asia and into the seas surrounding China, the nuclear weap- inadvertent use, or thef. ons countries, or their close allies, are involved in geopolitical, territorial and other disputes that have the potential to erupt Foremost among the policy aims was survivability. Survivable and escalate. Under the right conditions, any of the hotspots forces and command, control, and communications were along this arc could expand by design or inadvertence into a necessary to project credible threats of second-strike retali- nuclear crisis. ation, considered the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. Besides underwriting deterrence, survivability would relieve the pres- Tis report identifes ways to control crisis escalation and re- sure to “use or lose” nuclear forces, thus extending the time duce the myriad risks of the deliberate or unintentional use of available for deliberation and increasing the latitude for re- nuclear weapons. It is both diagnostic in that it examines the sponding fexibly. risk of nuclear weapons use, as well as prescriptive in ofering some remedies. It discerns an overall pattern in which risks Second, sound nuclear policy dictated that national leaders are generally trending in the wrong direction in today’s secu- maintain frm and exclusive control over nuclear weapons at rity environment of proliferation, nuclear build-ups in Asia, all times to ensure that nuclear operations always carried out spreading extremism, burgeoning cyber warfare, exploitable their orders and intentions, and never carried out actions that nuclear command and control networks, vulnerable and in- were not intended. Tis policy aim demanded resilient com- secure nuclear weapons storage sites and delivery platforms mand and control capable of fexibly directing nuclear forces (particularly silo-based strategic missiles), and de-stabilizing to coherent national purpose in all peacetime and confict global military competition featuring rapid innovation in conditions. It also demanded high safety standards to prevent weapons technology and modalities of warfare. In the current accidental detonations and strict safeguards to prevent unau- environment, much needs to be done to reduce nuclear risks. thorized use. Te slope from a crisis to nuclear brinksmanship to escalation to the
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Open Letter in Support of Amb. Bonnie Jenkins to Help Lead U.S. Efforts on Arms Control and International Security
    Open Letter in Support of Amb. Bonnie Jenkins to Help Lead U.S. Efforts on Arms Control and International Security June 21, 2021 As President Biden's Interim National Security Strategy notes: "Global dynamics have shifted. New crises demand our attention.” It is a "moment of accelerating global challenges — from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear proliferation .…" This means that our nation has no time to lose when it comes to putting in place the leadership team in government that can harness America's diplomatic power, which is essential to advancing effective solutions to address the most difficult security and foreign policy challenges. As arms control, international security, and foreign policy experts with years of experience in and out of government, we believe President Joe Biden — or any president — needs a strong and experienced team in place to address issues of international security, particularly the difficult and urgent challenges posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the countries that possess them or that could develop them. Five months since inauguration day, the president’s nominee for one of the most important positions in this area — Amb. Bonnie Jenkins for Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security — has yet to be confirmed. Further delays of this nomination will hamper our nation’s ability to put its best diplomatic foot forward at a critical time. In the coming weeks and months, her leadership will be important to help the State Department and the White House:
    [Show full text]
  • “Why Are They Leaving?”
    “WHY ARE THEY LEAVING?” RESIDENTIAL SATISFACTION AND PROPENSITY TO MOVE AMONG THE INHABITANTS OF TWO COMMUNITIES IN THE PROVINCE OF MURMANSK Fabio Facoetti Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University Student number: 3319997 ([email protected]) Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ronald van Kempen Utrecht, 13 December 2011 I. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research would have not been possible without the valuable help and cooperation of a number of people. In first place, this research is dedicated to my family, and especially to my parents, who never ceased to support me and to whom goes all my gratitude. Moreover, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Ronald van Kempen for the useful comments and suggestions, and for the patience and understanding demonstrated in these long months. Also, I would like to thank the University of Utrecht, and especially Prof. Dr. Martin Dijst, for the financial support provided for the conduction of the field work in the Province of Murmansk. Furthermore, I am very thankful to Rimma Belogurova, Maria Sidorina and Yelena Lebedeva of School Nr. 7 in Kirovsk for helping me in the translation and distribution of the questionnaires, and to Denis Shirshov, for the valuable information about Nikel that he shared with me. Finally, I would like to thank my friends: Matte Hartog, for helping during the statistical analysis of the results; and Renske Duns, Geoffrey William Bowes, and Tair Bilyalov, for being a continuous source of distraction. 1 II. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS I Acknowledgments p. 1 II Summary of contents 2 III Summary of figures
    [Show full text]
  • CRUISE MISSILE THREAT Volume 2: Emerging Cruise Missile Threat
    By Systems Assessment Group NDIA Strike, Land Attack and Air Defense Committee August 1999 FEASIBILITY OF THIRD WORLD ADVANCED BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE THREAT Volume 2: Emerging Cruise Missile Threat The Systems Assessment Group of the National Defense Industrial Association ( NDIA) Strike, Land Attack and Air Defense Committee performed this study as a continuing examination of feasible Third World missile threats. Volume 1 provided an assessment of the feasibility of the long range ballistic missile threats (released by NDIA in October 1998). Volume 2 uses aerospace industry judgments and experience to assess Third World cruise missile acquisition and development that is “emerging” as a real capability now. The analyses performed by industry under the broad title of “Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat” incorporate information only from unclassified sources. Commercial GPS navigation instruments, compact avionics, flight programming software, and powerful, light-weight jet propulsion systems provide the tools needed for a Third World country to upgrade short-range anti-ship cruise missiles or to produce new land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) today. This study focuses on the question of feasibility of likely production methods rather than relying on traditional intelligence based primarily upon observed data. Published evidence of technology and weapons exports bears witness to the failure of international agreements to curtail cruise missile proliferation. The study recognizes the role LACMs developed by Third World countries will play in conjunction with other new weapons, for regional force projection. LACMs are an “emerging” threat with immediate and dire implications for U.S. freedom of action in many regions .
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Weapon Producers
    Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapon Producers Nuclear weapon producers in this report Aecom (United States) Alliant Techsystems (United States) Babcock & Wilcox (United States) Babcock International (United Kingdom) BAE Systems (United Kingdom) Bechtel (United States) Bharat Electronics (India) Boeing (United States) CH2M Hill (United States) EADS (Netherlands) Fluor (United States) Gencorp (United States) General Dynamics (United States) Honeywell International (United States) Huntington Ingalls (United States) Jacobs Engineering (United States) Larsen & Toubro (India) Lockheed Martin (United States) Northrop Grumman (United States) Rockwell Collins (United States) Rolls-Royce (United Kingdom) Safran (France) In some of the nuclear-armed states – especially the SAIC (United States) United States, the United Kingdom and France – Serco (United Kingdom) governments award contracts to private companies to Thales (France) ThyssenKrupp (Germany) carry out work on their nuclear arsenals. This report URS (United States) looks at 27 of those companies providing the necessary infrastructure to develop, test, maintain and modernise nuclear arsenals. They are involved in producing or maintaining nuclear weapons or significant, specific components thereof. The 27 companies described in this chapter are substantially involved in the nuclear weapons programmes of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, India or Israel and themselves based in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and India. In other nuclear-armed countries – such as Russia, China, Pakistan and North Korea – the modernization of nuclear forces is carried out primarily or exclusively by government agencies. In those countries, the opportunities to achieve divestment through public campaigning are limited. A potentially more effective way to challenge investments in these nuclear industries would be through influencing budgetary decision-making processes in national legislatures.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Zero NATO-Russia Commission REPORT REMOVING U.S
    GLOBAL ZERO NATO-RUSSIA COMMISSION REPORT REMOVING U.S. AnD RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPEAn COMBAT BASES FEBRUARY 2012 GLOBAL ZERO NATO-RUSSIA COMMISSION REPORT Removing U.S. and Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons from European Combat Bases PREPARED FOR THE 48TH MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE GLOBAL ZERO NATO-RUSSIA COMMISSION REPORT REMOVING U.S. AnD RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPEAn COMBAT BASES GLOBAL ZERO NATO-RUSSIA COMMISSION REPORT Removing U.S. and Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons from European Combat Bases Copyright © 2012 by Global Zero All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without written permission of the copyright holder. Global Zero assumes full responsibility for the analysis and recommendations contained in this report. www.GLOBALZERO.ORG i GLOBAL ZERO NATO-RUSSIA COMMISSION REPORT REMOVING U.S. AnD RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPEAn COMBAT BASES Global ZERO NATO-RUSSIA COMMISSION AMB. RICHARD BURT, CO-CHAIR AMB. WOLfgAng ISCHIngER, CO-CHAIR COL. GEN. (RET.) VIctOR ESIN, CO-CHAIR SIR MALCOLM RIFKIND, MP, CO-CHAIR MIN. HIKMET ÇETIN AMB. THOMAS PICKERIng GEN. (RET.) AnATOLY KULIKOV AMB. StEVEN PIFER COL. GEN. (RET.) EVGENY MASLIN GEN. (RET.) JOHN SHEEHAN SEN. MIKHAIL MARGELOV COL. (RET.) VALERY YARYNICH GEN. (RET.) KLAUS NAUMAnn MAJ. GEN. (RET.) PAVEL ZOLOTAREV GEN. (RET.) BERNARD NORLAIN Global Zero is the international movement for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. It has grown to 300 leaders and more than 450,000 citizens worldwide, developed a step-by-step plan to eliminate nu- clear weapons, built an international student movement with 100 campus chapters in ten countries, and produced an acclaimed documentary film, Countdown to Zero.
    [Show full text]
  • Amerykański System Obrony Antybalistycznej Oraz Faktyczne Źródła Rosyjskiego Sprzeciwu
    Amerykański system obrony antybalistycznej oraz faktyczne źródła rosyjskiego sprzeciwu Leszek Pawlikowicz1 Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, Wydział Prawa Zakład Historii Prawa i Doktryn Polityczno-Prawnych Abstrakt: Amerykański program BMD jest formalnie postrzegany jako największe – obok rozszerzania NATO na Wschód – wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyj- skiej od chwili powstania państwa w końcu 1991 r. Jednak ze względu na mające miejsce w ciągu ostatniego ćwierćwiecza w Rosji zaniechania modernizacyjne (w odróż- nieniu od imponującego skoku technologicznego dokonanego w Chinach) – zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do sfery gospodarczej – faktycznie może on stanowić znacznie większe potencjalne wyzwanie dla rosyjskiej ekonomii, geopolityki i prestiżu niż dla jej zdolności obronnych. Stąd próba ambitnej odpowiedzi, polegającej na forsowaniu kosztownych programów zbrojeniowych, może być – paradoksalnie – taką samą pułapką, jak próba utrzymania parytetu w odpowiedzi na mityczny program SDI ze strony ZSRR. Wystar- czającą pod względem efektywności militarnej (efektu odstraszania), a przy tym rela- tywnie najtańszą ekonomicznie odpowiedzią jest utrzymywanie przez Rosję strategicz- nych sił jądrowych na obecnym pułapie ilościowym. W długofalowej perspektywie de- cydujące dla przyszłej pozycji oraz siły tego państwa, a także jego „atrakcyjności” i „siły 129 przyciągania” w przestrzeni międzynarodowej będzie znaczące podniesienie potencjału gospodarczego, zwłaszcza w sferze wysokich technologii oraz w branżach odpowie- dzialnych za zaspokojenie szeroko
    [Show full text]
  • Nuñez Angles
    5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean Multi-Dimensional Security Reports (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - [email protected] (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. [email protected] Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: An omnidirectional threat. Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde, Balder Hageraats and Ximena Valente - Calle Elisabets, 12 08001 Barcelona, España Tel. Fundación CIDOB WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN OMNIDIRECTIONAL THREAT Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde Co-director of the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action, IECAH Balder Hageraats Researcher at IECAH Ximena Valente Researcher at IECAH Introduction 1. Similar to the first report, the concept of WMD is used in its general understanding of having the Similarly to the first report on Weapons of mass destruction in the three basic components of nuclear, Mediterranean: current status and prospects, released in 2005, this chemical and biological weapons. In practical terms, however, the main second report (Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: an focus of this report is on nuclear omnidimensional threat) is the result of an initiative – responding to a weapons given that these are the sustained interest in matters of security and defence in the Mediterranean only ones that true fit the profile of WMD at the moment. - by the CIDOB Foundation. It is therefore fitting to mention the annual seminars on security and defence that are held in Barcelona since 2002. In line with the decision taken at the third of these meetings, the aim of this report is to facilitate – both for those attending the sessions directly as well as the wider security community interested in the region - the analysis of one of the most pressing problems on the international agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • 280419 EU Project Kepler
    EU Project Kepler: Community-Based Observing and Societal Needs Work Report, April 2019 1 Tero Mustonen (editor) with regional coordinators and authors Kaisu Mustonen Jan Saijets Pauliina Feodoroff Jevgeni Kirillov Stefan Mikaelsson Camilla Brattland 2 Contents I. Introduction and Scope 4 II. Materials and Methods 6 III. Needs 13 Sweden 13 Finland 18 Norway 30 NW Russia 32 IV. Gaps 43 Sweden 43 Finland 43 Norway 50 NW Russia 55 V. Priorities 59 Sweden 62 Finland 64 NW Russia 64 VI. Conclusions 69 References 73 3 I. Introduction and Scope Participants of the Inari Kepler Workshop: Stefan Mikaelsson, Pauliina Feodoroff, Kaisu Mustonen, Tero Mustonen, Eirik Malnes, Jevgeni Kirillov. Snowchange, 2019 4 The purpose of this report is to review the stakeholder needs and community-based observations for the EU project “Kepler”1. It will focus on the remote sensing needs of the local and Indigenous communities of NW Russia, Sweden, Finland and Norway. The approach includes a discussion of cryospheric hazards and traditional weather observation and prediction materials from the Sámi communities. It has been produced to capture the results of the WP 1 of the Kepler project. Regional Coordinator Jevgeni Kirillov discusses land use changes in Ponoi watershed. Snowchange, 2019 The science lead for the report has been Tero Mustonen from Snowchange Co-op. Co-authors for the regional chapters and cryospheric hazards include 1 https://kepler-polar.eu/home/. KEPLER is a multi-partner initiative, built around the operational European Ice Services and Copernicus information providers, to prepare a roadmap for Copernicus to deliver an improved European capacity for monitoring and forecasting the Polar Regions.
    [Show full text]
  • Depleted Uranium P 4 We Talk a Lot About the Loyalty of These Daisaku Ikeda P 5 2 Pm Animals, and Their Willingness to Serve Gyosei Handa P 5 Us
    ABOLISHABOLISH WARWAR Newsletter No: 9 Autumn 2007 Price per Issue £1 Remembrance Day - What will you be doing? Whether you wear red poppies, white poppies or both, whether you take part in a Remembrance service or The MAW AGM not, or you organise an event to question the fact of war, the day we Saturday 10th November remember those who have died in 11 am - 3 pm war is the day when MAW’s message should be loud and clear - war must Wesley’s Chapel 49 City Road end if we are not to add yet more London EC1Y 1AU names to our memorials. (nearest tube station Old Street) Animals in War Among the innocents we should Speaker: Craig Murray remember in November are the Craig is well known as the UK Ambassador to Uzbekistan who highlighted the human rights abuses he found there, millions of animals that took part in embarrassing the proponents of the ‘War on Terror’ with the and died for our political failures. result he is no longer in the Diplomatic Corps. He is a In 2004 a new monument appeared in fascinating, informative and funny speaker, with a wealth of London - the Animals in War experience to draw on. “Craig Murray has been a deep Memorial, inspired by Jilly Cooper’s embarrassment to the entire Foreign Office.” Jack Straw book of the same name. It ‘honours The AGM is open to all and is free. If you can get to the millions of conscripted animals London, then get to the AGM. And bring your friends.
    [Show full text]
  • Globalizing Nuclear Zero: Is a World Without Nuclear Weapons Really Attainable? GÖTZ NEUNECK
    Globalizing Nuclear Zero: Is a World without Nuclear Weapons Really Attainable? GÖTZ NEUNECK Introduction After years in the doldrums, there is once more wind in the sails of nu- clear arms control. Important aims and proposals of the arms control community, which in recent decades have been worked out by non- governmental organizations, think tanks, and commissions (Palme 1982, Canberra 1996 and the Blix Commission 2006), are once again an inte- gral part of world politics. During the eight years of the George W. Bush administration the arms control and disarmament process, which was launched after the Cold War ended, was systematically neutered, en- feebled, and reversed. A un commission warned in 2004 that »we are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation« (un 2004). us President Obama, in his Prague speech of April 5, 2009, de- clared – to widespread astonishment – that America was committed »to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons« (Obama 2009). He laid particular emphasis on the usa’s great moral responsibil- ity: »As a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.« Con- crete proposals were pledged. In June 2009, President Obama’s Repub- lican opponent for the us presidency, John McCain, recalled Ronald Reagan’s dream of a world free of nuclear weapons and he too demanded a dramatic reduction of nuclear arsenals across the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Status Report Additional Nonproliferation Resources
    NUCLEAR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FISSILE MATERIAL, AND STATUS EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION REPORT NUMBER 6 JUNE 2001 RUSSIA BELARUS RUSSIA UKRAINE KAZAKHSTAN JON BROOK WOLFSTHAL, CRISTINA-ASTRID CHUEN, EMILY EWELL DAUGHTRY EDITORS NUCLEAR STATUS REPORT ADDITIONAL NONPROLIFERATION RESOURCES From the Non-Proliferation Project Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Russia’s Nuclear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation Valentin Tikhonov Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction with Routledge Joseph Cirincione, editor The Next Wave: Urgently Needed Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Materials with Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom Matthew Bunn The Rise and Fall of START II: The Russian View Alexander A. Pikayev From the Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Solutions Jonathan Tucker, editor International Perspectives on Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Defenses Scott Parish, editor Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control UN Institute for Disarmament Research William Potter, Nikolai Sokov, Harald Müller, and Annette Schaper Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes Updated by Tariq Rauf, Mary Beth Nikitin, and Jenni Rissanen Russian Strategic Modernization: Past and Future Rowman & Littlefield Nikolai Sokov NUCLEAR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FISSILE MATERIAL, AND STATUS EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION REPORT NUMBER 6 JUNE
    [Show full text]
  • Kamchatka Free
    FREE KAMCHATKA PDF Marcelo Figueras,Frank Wynne | 312 pages | 19 May 2011 | Grove Press / Atlantic Monthly Press | 9780802170873 | English | New York, United States Kamchatka Krai - Wikipedia It is geographically located in the Far East region of the country, and it is administratively part of the Far Eastern Kamchatka District. Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky is the largest city and capital of Kamchatka Krai, and home to over half of Kamchatka krai's population. The okrug Kamchatka the status of a special administrative division of the krai, Kamchatka the name of Koryak Okrug. The remainder is formed by a minor Kamchatka mainland Kamchatka, Karaginsky Island and the Commander Islands in the Bering Sea. It is bordered by Magadan Oblast to the west and Chukotka to the north. Kamchatka Krai is an active volcanic zone Kamchatka is home to Kluchevskayathe Kamchatka volcano in Eurasiaand the Decade Volcanoes of Avachinsky and Koryaksky. Kamchatka Krai occupies the territory of the Kamchatka Peninsulathe adjacent part of the mainland, the island Karaginsky and Commander Islands. Kamchatka belongs to the zone of volcanic activity, there are about large and medium-sized volcanoes, 29 of them are active. With the volcanic activity associated with the formation of many minerals, as well as a manifestation of hydro geo thermal activity: education fumaroles, geysers, hot Kamchatka, etc. Despite Kamchatka lying at similar latitudes to Scotlandit is mostly subarcticmore continental in the hinterland and more maritime and prone to monsoons on the coast. Most of the peninsula is covered with forests of stone birchwhile alder and cedar elfin are commonly found at higher altitudes.
    [Show full text]