RISK AND SAFETY

INDUSTRIAL NORTH

NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES AND ENVIRONMENT Risk and Safety

Industrial North

Nuclear Technologies and Environment

Moscow 2004 The Industrial North. Nuclear Technologies and Environment. — Moscow, «Komtechprint» Publishing House, 2004, 40 p. ISBN 5-89107-053-7

The edition addresses specialists of the legislative /executive authorities and those of local government of the north-west region; activists of public environmental movements; and teachers and students of higher educa- tion institutes as well as all those who are interested in the problems of stable development of the Russian North. This document is prepared by the Nuclear Safety Institute (IBRAE RAS) under work sponsored by the United States Department of Energy.

Neither the United States Government, nor any agency thereof including the U.S. Department of Energy and any and all employees of the U.S. Government, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or use- fulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe upon privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific entity, product, process, or service by name, trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not neces- sarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the U.S. Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. Government or any agency thereof.

ISBN 5-89107-053-7 Ó IBRAE RAS, 2004 Ó«Komtechprint», 2004 (Design) INTRODUCTION

Industrialization of the majority of Russian regions took part of the brochure is dedicated to the forecast, preven- place during an era when environmental safety was not tion and mitigation of nuclear/radiological emergencies. given proper attention. The country’s defense issues and It is of importance that the population is aware of whom purely economic objectives were prioritized. is responsible for public protection; what public informa- Forced development of the Kola Peninsula’s natural re- tion channels and types of emergency protective actions sources began in the 1930s, and the Soviet nuclear sub- can be; as well as to what extent these or those exposure 3 marine group, the biggest in the world, was created at doses are dangerous. the beginning of the 1960s. The developments defined The brochure from the Risk and Safety Library is com- ecological problems for the Murmansk/Arkhangelsk re- piled on the initiative of the US Department of Energy gions. Today, the public is deeply concerned about safety (DOE) and EMERCOM of Russia within the scope of ac- of base sites and service points for nuclear submarines tivity of the Arctic Council Emergency Prevention, Pre- (NS) and vessels of the North fleet; effects of nuclear paredness and Response (EPPR) working group. The weapons tests on the Novaya Zemlya; including peaceful editorial board of the Risk and Safety Library: academi- nuclear explosions; and safety of the Kola Nuclear cian A. Sarkisov, RAS corresponding member L. Bol- Power Plant (NPP). shov, professor R. Arutyunyan, and Dr. I. Linge. The To what extent are these fears justified from the scien- brochure is prepared in the Nuclear Safety Institute tific point of view? It is possible to get an answer to the (IBRAE) of Russian Academy of Sciences by the team of question, when analysing objectively the three following authors: Dr. E. Melikhova (leader), Dr. I. Abalkina, interrelated issues: L. Vorobyeva, Dr. I. Zaitsev, Dr. S. Kazakov, M. Iva- 1. Where among technogenic risks do radiation risks rank? nov, N. Ugarova, professor V. Logachev (the State Insti- 2.Are severe radiation accidents possible in the region? tute of Biophysics) and G. Dernovoy (the Institute of 3.Are the respective organizations and local authorities High Energy Physics). I. Veselov and T. Marchenko, ready for effective actions to protect the population in representatives of EMERCOM of Russia’s top manage- case of radiation accidents? ment, were actively involved in the discussion of the bro- chure’s concept and content. In the «post Chernobyl» community, potential health risks began to be associated mainly with radiation. Apart from English translation of the brochure is made by A. Troits- that, many other risk factors were considered as minor kaya (IBRAE), edited by Regina Galer from US DOE or were not taken into account. Thus, the first question side and E. Melikova from IBRAE side. Design by M. Iva- is a key to comprehension of an actual environmental sit- nov and A. Pavlov (IBRAE). uation in the region. The authors of this brochure an- The brochure addresses specialists of the legislative/exec- swer the question, having studied plenty of the material, utive authorities and those of Murmansk/Arkhangelsk re- including the data of the state surveillance and environ- gional government; activists of public environmental mental services of the Murmansk/Arkhangelsk regions. movements; and teachers and students of higher educa- Theoretically, the probability of sizable radiation acci- tion institutes, as well as the general public interested in dents may not be excluded. Therefore, a considerable the issues of stable development of the Russian North. TECHNOGENIC RISK FACTORS

Ecological Portrait of the Region

The neighboring Murmansk and Arkhangelsk re- tory is fully affected by anthropogenic impacts and gions have many features in common: big seaports up to 3–8% of the land is in the areas of gas/oil and Navy bases; the shipbuilding industry and and other resource extraction. scale extraction/processing of natural resources. The history of industrial development of the However, compared with the Arkhangelsk region, 4 Arkhangelsk region includes centuries. For centu- the industrial history of the Murmansk region is ries, Arkhangelsk was a vitally important seaport, much shorter. the centre of shipbuilding and trade in Russia. Industrial development of the Kola Peninsula Lacking sizable deposits of minerals, the region’s started in the first decades of the 20th century. basic industries are timber and pulp and paper First, a railroad and a seaport were built, fol- (45%). The region provides more than 10% of lowed by intensive extraction of natural re- Russian production of merchantable wood/lum- sources. More than 60 sizable deposits of various ber, and about one third of market pulp, paper minerals were found in the peninsula’s interior, and paperboard. The Arkhangelsk region’s share including the unique deposit of apatite ore contain- of the Russian export lumber makes up 20%; and ing phosphorus, titanium, iron and aluminium. that of pulp and paper production — 30%. Engi- Ores of copper, nickel, zirconium and other rare neering and metalworking is another important in- materials are being extracted. There are great re- dustrial activity in the region. Industrial oil/gas serves of mica, clays and stuff for building materi- production in the Nenetsky autonomous region, als, and semiprecious and ornamental stones. As and bauxite extraction in the Plesetsky district, is of today, the Murmansk region provides for 100% under way. of Russian production of apatite and 12% of iron ore concentrates, 14% of refined copper and 43% The period of 1970–1980 was characterized by of nickel. The share of metal mining industry and the most intensive environmental impacts both in non-ferrous metallurgy makes up 40%. the Murmansk and in the Arkhangelsk regions. In extreme polar climate, the Murmansk re- Abrupt reduction in production volumes occurred gion’s industry developed through creating the in the 1990s, as all over Russia. For the past 5 city-forming industries. More than 90% of the years, active growth in natural resources extrac- inhabitants live in cities, and more than a half tion has replaced the economic recession. It is of the industrial production is concentrated in only natural that the industrial development of Murmansk, Monchegorsk, Kirovsk, Apatity and both regions, considering their varied histories, Kovdor. In a number of cases, due to the «centers» has involved serious ecological problems associ- of high production, the vulnerability of the north- ated with air and surface water contamination. ern landscape and its weak selfcleaning ability, For instance, the average annual concentration of the local ecosystems’ irreversible degradation benzapilene, a dangerous carcinogenic, reached took place. Approximately 1% of the regional terri- nearly three times the federally established max- imum permissible concentration (MPC)inAr- condensate deposit in the Barents Sea; and khangelsk in 2002. nuclear power development, including the con- The strategic location of the Murmansk/Arkhan- struction of a new line of the Kola NPP, are gelsk regions due to their outlet to the north seas among the key objectives. Reconstruction of the predetermined the deployment on their coast of Joint Stock Company «Pechenganickel» metallurgi- 5 base sites for NS of the North fleet and special- cal production to reduce sulphur dioxide releases ized shipbuilding plants and dockyards. Starting and to recycle industrial waste is planned to im- from 1955, nearly 250 NS and 5 surface ships, prove environmental health. A considerable vol- two-thirds of which are assigned to the North ume of activities has to be performed with respect fleet, were built in the former USSR. The ships of to nuclear submarine recycling and remediation of the nuclear icebreaking fleet also are based in affected lands. Murmansk. Expanded natural resource extraction and in- creased processing efficiency are priorities for Regarding environmental impacts, people often the near future in the Arkhangelsk region. For in- speak of radiation risks associated with the use of stance, preparation for the industrial develop- nuclear technologies. In fact, radioactive contami- ment of diamonds at the Lomonosov deposit, the nation has occurred in some NS base sites. Many third-largest reserve on earth, is in process. A NSs need decommissioning, and sizable accidents floating NPP, the first in the world, will be con- at NPPs and nuclear power installations could in- structed in Severodvinsk to make for solving the volve heavy effects. The fact is, however, that issue of power supply in a major locality. Apart even in the sites of local radioactive contamina- from that, expenses for organic fuel delivery tion, one does not observe such ecosystem damage as in the district of Monchegorsk and in many other industrial centers. Is the risk of using nuclear power in the region justified? Apparently, yes, and the authorities As a result of aerial sulfur dioxide releases by the «Severonickel» metallurgical industrial complex near of the Arkhangelsk/Murmansk regions under- Monchegorsk, a waste area formed, where no moss or li- stand it well. chen are present within 50 km in the direction of the pre- The strategy of economic development worked out vailing wind. The releases bypass the city for most of the by the administration of the Murmansk region year due to local wind patterns. aims at increasing the population’s quality of life Compared with the year 1990, the industrial complex has and at improving environmental health. Increased reduced by five times its sulfur dioxide releases. However, competitiveness in the ore-mining industrial com- it will take tens or, perhaps hundreds, of years to recover the environment. plex, while preserving total extraction volume; initial development of the Shtockman gaseous Ecological Portrait of the Region

and tariff compensation will be abruptly cut is based on scientifically justified estimates of radi- down. A considerable volume of activities on NS ation risks for the public and environment. How- recycling has to be performed at the facilities in ever, projects dealing with nuclear technologies the Arkhangelsk region. After the NS recycling often come across desperate opposition from the lo- programs are finalized, base sites of the peace- cal population. The reason for public disagree- ful/military nuclear fleet will be preserved. The ment can be explained by distinctions in risk 6 decision on additional use of nuclear technologies comprehension and perception.

Varied Risk Perception

Various actions to prevent radiation accidents are implemented at nuclear and radiation hazard facili- ties. They are aimed at increasing operational safety and, ultimately, at risk reduction for the public and environent. For example, let us consider the site storage project at the «Atomflot» repair facility, aimed for spent nu- clear fuel (SNF) from NSs decommissioned. The site storage is essential to speed up the NS decommission- ing. With implementation of state-of-the-art storage technologies and new transport packing containers, safety will increase for SNF temporary location (See more detailed information on p.19). However, the city administration and the inhabitants of Murmansk have desperately opposed the project. Not knowing the details of the technology, people cannot fairly evaluate the actual project advantages. Apart from that, people perceive the word combination «SNF storage» as hazardous waste storing near their homes. Any plans to locate potentially hazardous facilities and entities of national level arouse, as a rule, increased protest activity from local public. The reactions are world-known as the NIMBY syndrome («not in my backyard»). Open public dialogue on more fair distribution of risks and advantages from a new facility pave the only way to achieve consensus. Environment and Health

How great of a hazard is environmental con- In Russia, 4–20% of all deaths are attributed to tamination to human life and health? First, atmospheric air pollution. The main hazard lies in health depends on environmental conditions and non-carcinogenic impacts of dust particles. The lifestyle. According to WHO specialists’ esti- risk is estimated from 10–4–10–3 (from 1 to 10 mates, this factor contributes more than 50%, deaths per 10,000 people annually). As a rule, heredity contributes 15–20%, and medicine con- the carcinogenic risk from chemical air pollutants –6 –4 7 tributes 10%. The rest, 15–20%, depends on envi- is less (10 –10 ). The radiation risk is approxi- ronmental quality, i.e. on sanitary conditions and mately the same level in the Chernobyl zone settle- ment, where cesium contamination in the soil ecological health. This is an average estimate; in 2 exceptional cases, the environment’s contribution exceeds 15 Cu/km and radiation doses range from 1 to 10 mSv/year, exceeding the permissible may run 40%. dose limit by ten times. It is proved that inhalation of polluted air, among other factors, leads to illnesses of the cir- mSv (millisievert) is a dose unit for a person at radiation exposure. culatory system, respiratory diseases, and neo- plasm growth. In Western European nations For residents of the Northwest region, the back- such as Austria, France and Switzerland, where ground exposure from all radiation sources makes the average concentrations of atmospheric par- up 2.9 mSv/year, including that of 0.1 mSv/year ticulates are 5–10 times below the permissible from technogenic sources (consequences of acci- concentration limit (PCL) established in Rus- dents and nuclear weapon tests, the NPP activity, sia, air pollution causes 40,000 deaths per year, etc.). The Russian Federation law specifies the about 6% of all cases, («The Lancet», Vol. 352, permissible extra dose limit for exposure from 2000, pp. 795–801). technogenic sources as 1 mSv/year.

Risk estimation is a probability for occurrence of adverse effects at the impact of a certain factor on the individual. If experts know the statistics of a sickness/death rate caused by that factor, they take an a posteriori frequency of sickness or death in a group numbering to at least 1000 people as the risk estimation. If they lack such data, risks are estimated on the base of certain assump- tions. For example, in case of a chemical risk, chemicals causing cancer among laboratory animals are assumed to be carcinogens for the individual. The linear model is used to evaluate the impact of low radiation doses (See page 9). The risk in this brochure is considered to be a probability of death from this or that impact. The risk of death from natu- ral/technogenic factors may change widely: from a few people per a million of residents (10–9) to several tens of them per 1000 people/year (10–2). The risk of 10–9 corresponds to the probability of death during a tornado or a flood. Representatives of espe- cially dangerous professions, for instance, firemen, are subject to the risk of 10–2. Priorities in Risk Reduction

Scientific methods of risk estimation used in the For example, the PCL-associated risks of chemical radiation safety field since the 1970s have been in- carcinogens are tens or hundreds of times higher tegrated into environmental protection since the than the radiation risks at the level of permissible late 1990s. On the strength of this, approaches to dose limit. Thus, the lifelong carcinogenic risk regulation, methods to define permissible releases from hexavalent chromium, at the PCL level, is es- · –1 and wastes, opportunities to monitor and even the timated as 2 10 (2 cases of death per every 8 10 people). The radiation risk at chronic expo- attitude to observe procedures, appear stricter in sure at the level of permissible limit is no more assessing radiation risk than they do with regard than 5·10–5 (5 cases per hundreds of thousands of to chemical risk. people). As compared with measurements by chemical sub- In the Chernobyl zone, the level of risk is 10–4 at stances, accuracy of measurements in the current the exposure dose of 5 mSv/year and the state radiation monitoring system is several orders pays to rehabilitate the area and protect the popu- higher. The system registers changes in the envi- lation. ronment at levels that are a million times lower Expenditures include pecuniary compensation for than the permissible dose limit (PCL* radiation potential health damage. But state investments in equivalent). It is possible in a number of cases to the decrease of risk for more than 20 million resi- define air and water-borne concentrations of dents of industrial cities of Russia that inhale the chemical pollutants only if the amount exceeds heavily polluted air are not yet envisaged. PCL. Uncontrolled pollutants represent a major hazard for the public: their contribution to the to- Which risk necessitates more immediate reme- tal air pollution risk for human health is estimated diation? With sufficient resources, it is neces- sary to mitigate all risks to an acceptable level. as 70%. However, considering the chronic lack of means As a result, a serious imbalance has occurred in for the most urgent needs, it is important to the methods of handling radiation and chemical spend the available funds to eliminate the most risks. serious risks.

* PCL = Permissible Concentration Limits Radiation and Chemical Risks

The uncertainty affecting the risk estimation re- summing of large number of individuals with low sults at 100 or more times is typical of harmful doses. chemical substances with unknown properties. Be- We will also apply the above procedure, in spite cause the radiation impact on humans has been un- of the fact that the International Commission on der review for more than 100 years, there is Radiological Protection is developing new recom- considerably less uncertainty in such estimations. mendations which directly indicate that such ap- 9 At low doses, exceeding the dose limits by times, proach brings to sufficient overestimation of no reliable medical effects of human exposure radiation risk forecast. have been revealed yet. The conservative method In compliance with Russian Radiation Safety Stan- dictates that all estimates are given with double dards (RSS-99), the level of negligibly low (ac- «safety margins», as minimum considerations for ceptable) radiation risk makes up 1·10–6 (one radiation safety. extra death per a million of people in 70 years). Therefore, the linear hypothesis is used to esti- In the field of chemical pollution, the level of ac- mate risks in the area of low doses. The model as- ceptable risk is not legislatively determined (in a sumes that even the lowest doses may cause number of countries it also is established at the long-term effects. Estimates of so called popula- 10–6 level) and the decisions about environmental tion risks are performed through it. Valuable esti- quality management are supported by hygienic mates of radiation risks are obtained through standards (PCL).

Contamination level in terms of PCL Chemical mixtur Radioactive substances 100 Isolated instances Have not been 10 Are being often observed recently observed 1 Susceptibility threshold for a major part of measurements 10–1…10–8 Are not fixed and discussed in the majority of cases Are fixed and discussed ZONES OF HIGH TECHNOGENIC RISK

Industrial Centers

Let us consider two factors of ecological risk: nearby potentially hazardous nuclear sites related chemical pollution in the air and potential radia- to the Kola NPP and landmarks of nuclear fleets. tion hazards from nuclear facilities. Monitors measure in the open reservoirs; in soil Overall, the harmful air pollution in the Mur- and vegetation; in bottom sediments and surface 10 mansk/Arkhangelsk regions does not exceed fed- air; in the air fallouts and snow cover; and in ex- eral sanitary standards. Due to cyclonic activity isting fish and foodstuffs. The monitoring results with moderate and strong winds, chemical sub- of the 30-year observation certify that the nuclear stances quickly disperse in the air. However in sites’ impact on the radio-ecological situation the cities, the situation is different. Non-ferrous formed previously is, overall, insignificant. processing/emitting facilities mainly contribute Global releases from previous nuclear weapons to the air pollution, the industrial complexes tests, including those ones performed in the «Pechenganickel» and «Severonickel» and the Novaya Zemlya test area, strongly impact the radi- «Kandalaksha Aluminium Plant» being the basic ation situation. Radioactive waste disposal in the sources. The highest chemical risks are in the Barents and Kara Seas did not actually impact the Murmansk/Arkhangelsk regional centers, and in level of radioactivity in the seawater. We immedi- immediate proximity to metallurgical facilities. ately point out that large cities do not differ from The Kola NPP, vessels and coastal bases of nu- other territories of the region by basic radiation clear fleets relate to potentially-hazard sites. Radi- parameters (a dose rate and dose-forming nuclide ation monitoring runs in all environments in content) and they cannot be referred to as zones of high radiation risk. Murmansk Suspended Particulates in the Air Particulate air pollution is the basic health risk Harmful effects: illnesses of cardiovascular system, diseases of factor for 337,000 inhabitants of the city. Data of respiratory system and lungs neoplasms. the State Sanitary Epidemiological Surveillance re- At the dust particle concentration of two times the PCL, the indi- –3 gional centre shows about 220 extra deaths per vidual annual risk of death is 10 . Inhaled particles directly af- year. This corresponds to individual annual risks fect respiratory paths and other organs, due to toxic impact. · –4 · –2 People with chronic lungs abnormalities, cardiovascular dis- of 6 10 , or life risks of 4 10 . (Hereinafter, eases, asthma or frequent chest colds as well as the elderly and the individual annual death risks are given). children, are especially sensitive to fine, suspended particles. Carcinogenic risks from harmful chemical mix- Low cost methods to mitigate risk: Plant trees and gardens in tures in the air are 2 orders of magnitude less. Ac- yards, along streets, and throughout cities; clean with damp cording to Roshydromet’s monitoring data, the towels indoors, etc.; wet and clean municipal roads. carcinogenic risk of nickel compounds is at the level of 10–5 in Murmansk. Monchegorsk According to the Roshydromet’s monitoring data, the individual carcinogenic risk of nickel com- The particulate air pollution, the individual risk pounds makes up 2·10–6 in the city. being about 3·10–4, i.e. nearly 20 extra deaths per year, represents the main health risk for Arkhangelsk 11 57,000 inhabitants of Monchegorsk. The «Severo- nickel» industrial complex functioning near the 355,000 inhabitants of Arkhangelsk live with a city annually releases hundreds of tons of metallic very high level of air pollution. Adverse air condi- nickel into the atmosphere. The estimated individ- tions brought about by the releases from wood- ual carcinogenic risk is 4·10–7. working and pulp and paper facilities located in the city as well as from the Arkhangelsk coal-fired Availability of a waste area in immediate proxim- thermal power plant. ity to the city makes one consider these assess- The particulate air pollution causes approxima- ments minimal. tely 114 extra death cases per year, mainly from Kandalaksha diseases of the respiratory and cardiovascular sys- tems. The individual annual risk makes up 3·10–4. Kandalaksha, where about 45,000 people live, has the highest mortality rate in the Murmansk re- gion. Research at the North-West Hygiene/Public Benzapilene relates to high-hazard substances (the second class Health Research Centre on risk evaluation for the of a hazard) and is a carcinogen for the individual. development of «ecologically» incurred deaths has Nickel is also a carcinogen for the individual. shown that the Kandalaksha aluminum plant is Carbon Disulphide has s strong irritant effect on mucous tunic the basic source of atmospheric pollution. Out of and skin; it impacts the enzymatic systems, vitamin/lipid all harmful substances, the dust particle releases, change and endocrine/reproductive systems. the individual particle size not exceeding 10µ, Hydrogen Sulphide is an irritant and damp gas affecting the mostly contribute to mortality. The individual eyes, and the upper respiratory system and damaging the · –3 risk of their impact makes up 8 10 , i.e. about deeper-lying structures. 370 death cases per year. This value is much Increased concentrations of Methyl Mercaptan entail growth higher than that in Murmansk or Monchegorsk. among the children of the respiratory/otolaryngologic diseases, We should note that the previous work to esti- dermatoses and diseases of the subcutaneous fat, as well as re- mate the risk of suspended particles in Kanda- spiratory infections. laksha gave results of 10 times less. This may Formaldehyde has irritant, allergic, mutagenic and carcinogenic exemplify the fact that more comprehensive re- effects. It increases carcinogenesis caused by other agents, in particular by benzapilene. search drives a considerable increase in chemical risk assessments. Industrial Centers

High concentrations of specific mixtures, such as The power-generating sites in the city (three ther- methyl mercaptan, carbon disulphide, hydrogen mal power plants), draw 50% of their fuel from sulphide and formaldehyde, which are characteris- coal. These plants are responsible for emitting tic of the releases from woodworking and pulp particulates and formaldehyde. Average annual and paper facilities, are registered in the city. formaldehyde concentrations in the atmosphere The airborne methyl mercaptan concentration is make up 2 times the MPC, causing an individual 12 the highest. Its average annual concentrations annual carcinogenic mortality risk equal to 10–6. reached 4–6 times the maximum permissible con- The suspended substance particulates cause centration (MPC) between 1997–2001. Cases of health risks of 3·10–4. extremely high pollution with concentrations 50–100 times higher than the MPC were ob- Severodvinsk served annually. The situation has recently chan- Severodvinsk is the centre of nuclear submarine ged for the better. In 2002, the average annual construction. The nuclear complex facilities, such methyl mercaptan concentration in the air did not as «Sevmashpredpriatie», «Zviezdochka», «Sever», exceed the MPC and the maximum single concen- «Arctica», and «Poliarnaya Zvezda» are located tration was 17 times the MPC. here. However, it is the power utilities, and not There are no reliable risk estimates on methyl the above-mentioned facilities, that contribute mercaptan as yet. The formaldehyde concentrate most to the atmospheric releases of harmful sub- causes an annual carcinogenic risk of 7·10–7. stances. The carcinogenic risk from benzapilene/formalde- Novodvinsk hyde is estimated at 1·10–6. This is a single-industry city where 49,000 people At the same time, by results of radio-ecological live. The Arkhangelsk pulp and paper industrial monitoring run by the radiation safety services, complex produces nearly 100% of all industrial excess control levels at the industrial sites have production in the city. It is also the main source not been fixed for the overall period of observa- for airborne methyl mercaptan, hydrogen sulfide, tion. For instance, volume radioactivity of the wa- and carbon disulphide, specific substances. ter at the «Zvyozdochka» facility ranges within the intervention level. Single methyl mercaptan concentrations exceeding 400–650 times the MPC were observed between 1997–2001. The average annual concentrations made up 6–12 times the MPC. As in Arkhangelsk, the situation has recently improved. In 2002, the The intervention level is the level of radiation average annual methyl mercaptan concentration ex- factor at the excess of which certain protective actions should be taken. ceeded by 1.8 times the MPC and the maximum sin- gle concentration was 42 times the MPC. Poliarnye Zori City (The Kola NPP) (RSS-99). The results of monitoring over the veg- etation soil and other environmental objects show Radiation monitoring within the Kola NPP loca- that the radioactivity levels are same at any dis- tion has been done since 1972. The situation by the main radiation parameters (the dose rate and tance from the NPP. These levels have formed as radionuclide content) is the same as in surround- a result of global releases after the nuclear weap- ons tests. ing regions. 13 Cesium/strontium radionuclide concentration in Estimated values of extra radiation doses for the the surface air within the surveillance zone is be- population in the surveillance zone do not ex- low the susceptibility threshold of the equipment. ceed 0.01 mSv/year (i.e. they are 100 times less than the dose safety margin of 1 mSv/year). The hypothetical, annual risk of the 4·10–7 level Radioactive cesium/strontium are long-lived fission is associated with it. To make use of the method products. Their half-decay period is nearly 30 years; therefore, these radionuclides define mainly long- mentioned on page 9 to assess the population term consequences of accidents at NPPs. risk for 17,000 people in Poliarnye Zori city, we will obtain one extra death from cancer for the period of 100 years. Therefore, one can speak of The water radioactivity is thousands times lower the Kola NPP as a potential source of radiation than the intervention levels established for the risk. Extra radiation risk is negligibly low under drinking water by the radiation safety standards normal conditions.

Radiation impact on the individual depends on the dose received. Low doses are considered to be single doses in the range of 5–100 mSv or annual doses of 5–10 mSv. From the medical and hygienic point of view, there are no proofs of harmful health effects of low radiation doses, though mechanisms of the human biological response to low radiation impacts remain the most intriguing field of investigation for radiobiologists. Neither the doses obtained during the life period, nor single doses below 1000 mSv (moderate doses) cause any acute symptoms. The only possible effect is the cancer risk increase at the later stage of life. The dose of 1000 mSv and above (a high dose) can be obtained only in exceptional cases, for instance, during the ra- diotherapy or in emergency at the nuclear site during a severe accident or in case of a nuclear war. A single dose ranging from 2000 to 3000 mSv inevitably causes a radiation sickness. When getting the doses above 6000 mSv, chances to survive for longer than a few weeks are rather low. Sites of RW Discharge/Burial in the Arctic Seas

Although the arctic seas remain relatively uncontami- lected for discharging liquid RWs (See a diagram on nated compared to other seas, according to Russian page 29). oceanologists’ assessments, some sites of water areas To what extent are the effects of RW discharge/burial in have excess oil products, phenol and heavy metls, above the arctic seas dangerous? Five joint Russian-Norwegian the MPC. Mining and smelting industries; pulp and pa- sea voyages to study the general state of radioactive con- per plants; activity of the North fleet and that of the 14 tamination were done for the recent decade, including transport and fishing fleets; and crude waste water dis- an expedition to the region of the «Kursk» nuclear subma- charges from cities play the greatest role in marine con- rine wreck. tamination of the region. Fuel bases and stores are the main sources for oil product discharge into the sea and in- The expeditions’ results show that the RW burial has ternal ponds. not impacted the general level of radioactivity in the sea- water. Regional measurements around burials of spent At the same time, the environmental public is mostly con- nuclear fuel reveal local centers of increased radioactiv- cerned about possible effects of radioactive waste (RW) ity in bottom sediments of the Abrosimov and Stepovoy discharge and burial in the arctic seas. Solid/liquid RW Bays (the shore zone of Novozemelsky testing area), lo- discharge into the seas started with appearance of the cated a few meters from the sunken objects. Apart from first nuclear submarines. More than 12,000 RW con- that, there are small leaks from the sunken RW contain- tainers and 10 reactor installations from emergency nu- ers in the Abrosimov Bay, where a twofold-fourfold in- clear submarines and the «Lenin» ice-breaker sank from crease of radiocesium content shows up in bay-bottom 1961–1990. sediments. However, the level of radioactivity in the wa- At planned burials, safety measures were envisaged. ter of the bay does not differ from that of the open sea. Hard RW sank in special metal reservoirs, and the NS re- It does not mean that solving the objectives of NS com- actors were filled with a special mixture that prevents ra- plex recycling and coastal bases remediation can be de- dioactive substances from contact with the water within ferred. The volume of accumulated radioactive waste a few hundred years. Specially assigned regions were se- and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is too great.

In 1994, the oil spill occurred in the Arkhangelsk region, nearby the city of Usinsk. The oil reached the Barents Sea by the Pechora River and the oil spot spread for 18 km. Increased sickness rate with regard to the digestion system among the adults was observed for two years in the Kolva settlement af- fected by the accident. Medical supervision over the children showed increased number of diseases of the respiratory system and overall immunity decrease, having entailed the growth of infectious diseases. The oil or its components were revealed in the internal and stom- ach of domestic animals from several settlements located by the Pechora River in the 150-km distance from the site of accident. The number of fish (the white-fish and the European umber) especially sensitive to water contamination has decreased by 100–1000 times in contaminated rivers and lakes. The fish from the Kolva River basin frequently appears to have morphological deviations (abnormali- ties). Ten years after the accident, the river is not yet suitable for industrial fishery. The Novaya Zemlya Testing Area

During the period 1955–1990, nuclear weapons tests that radiocesium concentrations in the reindeer’s meat were conducted on Novaya Zemlya. In total, 130 tests were higher than those allowed at that time by sanitary were carried out. The world’s heaviest airborne nuclear standards. The venison is a basic component of the indig- explosion (50 Mt) was performed in 1961. enous peoples’ diets, thus the harm from its exclusion Tests vary by levels of radioactive contamination in the from the diet could exceed the benefit from the exposure vicinity of the explosion. The highest contamination lev- prevented. Therefore, specialists from a number of coun- 15 els occur in terrestrial and underwater explosions; the tries, including Finland, have concluded that it is expedi- next highest levels of contamination occur with un- ent to mitigate the sanitary standards. planned underground explosions and planned airborne Apart from the underground and air tests, there were explosions. Underground nuclear explosions cause the one terrestrial and three underwater tests run on least amount of contamination, without impacting the ra- Novaya Zemlya. The test intensities were small, and the diation status, even in the test area. radioactive trace actually formed within the prohibited Eighty-five airborne nuclear explosions were carried out test area, not negatively impacting the populations of on Novaya Zemlya. Radioactive contamination of the lo- neighboring countries. cality after air tests mainly takes place in the epicenter The current radiation situation in the Murmansk/Ar- of the explosion. The explosion products rise jointly with khangelsk regions does not have any specific peculiarities a formed cloud to a great height where they disappear dealt with the nuclear weapons tests. forming global fallouts, as a result of which a small radio- The Novaya Zemlya test area has two sites of increased active contamination in the remote zone takes place. To- contamination density. These are on the shore of the tal values of annual doses for the inhabitants of all Chernaya bay, where a terrestrial nuclear explosion was regions of the Russian Federation after the air tests on performed, and a site on the shore of the Matochkin Novaya Zemlya did not exceed federal permissible sani- Shar belt, where steam and gas containing a radioactive tary and hygienic standards. mixture flowed into the gallery during the underground The northern territories, where indigenous people who test. One has given these districts a radiation-control raise deer live, present an exception. The peculiarities of area status, and the rest of the test area is considered to radionuclide migration in the Polar Regions are such be relatively «pure».

More than 400 airborne nuclear explosions were performed in international test areas from 1945 to 1981, a result of which 12.5 tons of fission products were released into the biosphere. Since 1951, global fallouts have increased environmental contamination in the Northern hemisphere. By 1964, the density values reached maximum and began gradually to decrease, mainly due to natural radio- active decay of the explosion products. The present doses from global fallouts in the Northern hemisphere on average make up about 0.015 µSv/year, this being at least sixty times below the does safety margin (1 mSv/year). Sites of Peaceful Comparison of Risks Nuclear Explosions from Different Factors

There were two underground nuclear explosions The suspended particulate air pollution is the in 1972 and in 1984, performed to mill ore body most hazardous among risk factors dealt with the at the Kuelpor apatite deposit, 20 km north of activity of industries in big cities of the Mur- Kirovsk, the Murmansk region. Those explosions mansk/Arkhangelsk regions. 16 were accompanied with a release of radioactive The maximum estimated level of chemical non-car- products and resulted in environmental contamina- cinogenic risk in Kandalaksha makes up 8·10–3. tion by short-lived radionuclides. A few days after- The risk of such a level is considered high; it is ward, when the short-lived radionuclides decayed, close to the value of an individual risk of death the radiation situation in the town of Kirovsk set- from chronic bronchitis or accidental death. tled to normal. On conservative estimates, human exposure doses accumulated during the period Risks of different chemical carcinogens are at the could reach several millisieverts. level of 10–7 up to 10–4. Nickel compounds are the most hazardous — their estimated values for Three nuclear explosions were performed in the Kandalaksha make up 2·10–4. This level is compa- Arkhangelsk region for deep seismic sondage of rable to the risk of death from pancreatic diabetes the earth’s crust and one explosion — for cover- or chronic alcoholism. ing the gas blowout in the Nenetsky Autonomous Region. Radioactive products did not actually ap- The radiation risk in the Kola NPP surveillance · –7 peared on the terrene and the on-site radiation lev- zone is at the lowest level (4 10 ). This risk can els did not increase. be compared to the risk of death from natural ca- tastrophes or to the risk of radiography-based re- As of today, all the galleries and boreholes where search. the industrial explosions took place are suspended; radiation is at natural background level and occa- sional radiation control is under way.

Pollutant Locality Maximum Annual Death Risk Suspended Particles Kandalaksha 8·10–3 Nickel Compounds Kandalaksha 2·10–4 Kola NPP surveillance zone Polyarnye Zori 4·10–7 Radiation Global fallouts Kola Peninsula 6·10–7 Pechenga Nikel Zapolyarny

Severomorsk Murmansk

Konya 17 Kola

Olenegorsk Voronya Lovozero Monchegorsk Ostrovnoy Kovdor Kirovsk Apatity Polyarnye Zori Kandalaksha Krasnoshchelye Ponoy

Zarechensk Kovda Umba Varzuga

Sosnovka

Map Legend Pressure of Ecological Situation Sites of Nuclear Complex Population [T. Makarova, Z. Makarova, G. Kalabin Nuclear Power Installations Uranium More than from the Institute of Industrial Ecology of the North (Sites of Basing) Deposits 100,000 people from the RAS Kola Research Center, Apatity, 2000] RW Surface Burial The Kola Less than Extreme NPP 100,000 people High Sites of Peaceful Medium Nuclear Explosions RADIATION SAFETY STATUS

Kola NPP

The Kola NPP is the first Russian nuclear power events, see page 21), did not impact the current station outside the Polar circle. The station is lo- parameters of the plant radiation safety and did cated on the shore of the Imandra Lake; the NPP not involve exposure of the personnel and the staff includes 3,000 people. The city of Poliarnye public. 18 Zori, where the NPP employees and their families As of today, the plant maintains the western NPP live, is situated 15 km from the station. status, considering the limited number of opera- The Kola NPP has four VVER-440 power units tional failures. It is no wonder. Such results are (similar to PWR type of reactor). The NPP ther- possible due to massive investments into safety be- mal power established is 5500 MW, that corre- tween 1989–2001, that amounting to, at least, sponding to 1760 MW electric power. The first 3.1 billion roubles. Increased safety for the 1st power unit was put into operation in 1973. The generation power units (the first and second others began operation in 1974, 1981 and 1984. units) cost approximately 30 times more than re- VVER-440 water-moderated power reactors have construction of the 2nd generation power units proved, first of all, safe in operation. The same So- (the third and fourth ones). Programs of techni- viet-produced reactors are installed at the Finnish cal assistance from the countries of Northern Eu- Loviisa NPP (which is considered one of the most rope and the USA secured approximately one-fifth reliable in the world) and in the other countries of these funds ($30 million USD). of Eastern Europe, namely in Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Safety Regulation For 30 years of operation, the most vigorous trial The design life of the NPP power units is 30 years. for the Kola NPP was the March 1993 hurricane. Upon comprehensive evaluation in April 2003, The hurricane damaged high voltage lines within the nuclear regulator of Russia (Gosatomnadzor) the Kolenergo power system, and as a result, the confirmed that the plant’s nuclear/radiation/tech- energy supply from external power sources to the nical/fire safety was ensured. The modernization NPP work, failed. The Kola NPP incident, compli- of the 1st power unit, which has worked reliably cated from a technical point of view (the third and without failures through its 30-year design cy- level by INES international scale for nuclear cle, allows operators to extend its operational life

The economic development strategy for the Murmansk region envisages the start up of construction of the Kola NPP first power unit of the second line in 2010–2011 to be put into operation in 2015–2016. Growth of industrial production and power consumption in the region is anticipated by that time. Upon modernization and ex- panding, the Kola power system will be able to provide for favorable sale of electric power excesses in Russia and abroad. for another 15 years. Gosatomnadzor issued to the ern casks is very high. The cask remains sealed plant a license for the 5-year extension of opera- upon extreme impact, including when falling from tion for the first unit. Administrators will con- a great height, at length sinking, and when on sider further extension in 5 years. The activities fire. are presently under way to extend the operational Radioactive waste (RW) generation is inevitable 19 life for the second power unit for the same through NPP activity. Solid wastes (SW) com- 15-year term. The practice of extending the opera- prise spent materials, facilities and equipment, tional life upon expiration of the design term is ac- not for additional use and in which radionuclide cepted worldwide. contents exceed levels established by the federal Spent Nuclear Fuel/Radioactive Waste standarts/procedures. Management The Kola NPP has at its disposal a few SW reposi- tories for low level, intermediate level and high Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) technology for VVER-440 level wastes. The repository construction provides reactors is well developed and the required infra- reliable and safe waste isolation from the environ- structure exists. The Kola NPP RW management ment. Prior to storage, certain SW’s are pro- scheme is the same as that of the other NPPs with cessed by methods of incineration and pressing. As reactors of this kind. of today, the repositories are only half full. Suffi- cient space is left to dispose SW that result from SNF is stored in a special NPP repository for no the overall period of NPP operation. less than three years and then it is shipped in a special transport cask by rail to a processing plant The construction of a technological complex to at the Mayak facility. Travel safety for the mod- process liquid radioactive waste (LW) has been

Extending the life of operating NPPs is one of the most important international trends for the current stage of nuclear power develop- ment. First, to extend operational life is the most efficient financial investment to preserve generating power. Second, the 30-year operational design for the Russian reactors was defined in 1950–1960s, when there was a lack of actual data on the wear of NPP equipment. The experience of NPP operation presently allows specialists to justify review of that term. The two power units of the Novovoronezsh NPP, with similar VVER-440 reactor installations, were the first to get licenses from Gosatomnadzor of Russia, for extended operation. The life extension for nuclear power units is widely used in the world practice of the USA, Great Britain and other countries. France and Japan are preparing for such activities. For instance, in the USA, 30 nuclear power units gained permission from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the last four years (2000–2003), to extend their life from 40 to 60 years. In 2004, another eight owners of NPPs are expected to submit requests. Kola NPP

under way at the NPP. There, operators will concen- discharge activity of such radionuclides as cesium and trate and harden contaminated solutions. LW transfer cobalt was respectively 12 and 20 times less than the to the hardened state decreases opportunities for standard. radionuclide migration into the environment, and greatly decreases radionuclide volume. Part of the complex technological systems will be deliv- Nuclear safety is the status of immunity from an occur- 20 ered to the Kola NPP within the scope of international rence of spontaneous chain reaction or its uncontrolled cooperation (the TACIS program). The complex is passage. planned for commissioning by late 2005. Radiation safety is the status of protection for the per- sonnel, population and environment from harmful radia- Radiation Safety tion effects. Radiation safety at the NPP is assessed, first of all, by personnel exposure level and by radioactive substance re- leases/discharges into the environment. Accident Forecast and Prevention The Kola NPP employees’ exposure doses have regularly decreased for the last 5 years. If the average annual dose When designing the NPP, a very wide range of initial was 4 mSv in 1994 (at the 50mSv/year sanitary stan- events and probable ways of accident development is con- dard for the staff), it decreased to 1.8 mSv in 2002 (at sidered and analysed. For each of them, the design envis- the new standard of 20 mSv/year). The Kola NPP by ages extra safety systems and protective barriers. If an personnel exposure is at the level of the world’s accident takes place due to the events not taken into ac- top-performing NPPs. count by the design, it is called a «beyond-the de- It should be noted that the new sanitary procedures for sign-basis» accident. There is a rule that works for the the NPP design and operation have tightened standards NPP: the more severe effects of the accident, the lesser on the NPP total radiation impact on the public and the the probability of its occurrence should be. environment. The permissible dose load stipulated by gas Five levels of protection are envisaged to prevent severe and aerosol releases or liquid discharges is established as 20 µSv per year. Health risks are considered negligibly emergencies at the NPP: low at such dose. î Automation, technological protection and blockage Gas and aerosol releases from the Kola NPP recently supporting the block under normal operation; have been less than the new permissible values. For in- î Safety systems revealing and preventing development stance, the actual volume of radioiodine release was of deviations from normal working conditions; 23% in 2001 and that of inert radioactive gases was 7% î Technical facilities for accident management and emer- of the permissible standard. gency action procedures designed for various emer- The liquid discharge activity also was less than the gency symptoms provide accident elimination within permissible limit. For instance, in 2001, the water safe operation; Sizeable Accident î Emergency action plans preserving the efficiency of physical safety barriers remained intact after the acci- dent; Severe Accident î Actions to protect the public and environment in case of severe accidents (See page 36). Apart from that, the NPP protective system comprises ac- 21 tions mitigating the probability of the personnel’s errors Accident with a risk outside the site (for instance, appropriate organization of activities and control over operation performance; training; psychophysiological checkups; and safety culture in- crease). Accident without major risk One may find more details about provision of emergency outside the site preparedness in case of radiation accident at the Kola NPP in the Section «Emergency Response». Serious Incident

Incident

Anomaly

Deviation Insignificant for safety; below the scale

International Nuclear Event Scale The NPP accident severity is estimated by the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), the level of hazard being re- ported to IAEA and to the national/international mass media. The INES scale has 7 levels. There is no hazard for the public at level 1 and 2. Safety barriers are considerably damaged at accidents of level 5 and beyond. The Chernobyl acci- dent is related to level 7, the most hazardous. Radiation Monitoring

Regular monitoring of the radiation situation State Sanitary-Epidemiological Surveillance over on the Kola Peninsula and that of the neighbor- the Murmansk region. ing water areas is performed by the Murmansk Information about the current radiation status in territorial subsystem of the unified state auto- the region is available to the public on the mated system of control over the radiation situa- Internet site of the Murmansk territorial environ- tion (ARSCS) on the territory of the Russian mental hydrometeorology/monitoring depart- 22 Federation. ment, (www.murman.ru/kolgimet/). One can The ARSCS Murmansk territorial system ob- find the data on measurements made in immedi- tains data from the Roshydromet regional ser- ate vicinity to nuclear and radiation-hazard facili- vice, the Kola NPP Information/Analytical ties on the site of Situation-Crisis Centre (SCC) Centre and from the ARSCS Federal Centre. Au- of MinAtom of Russia, (www.minatom.ru), in tomatic data acceptance takes place 24 hours a the section titled «Radiation Monitoring». day. The ARSCS system transfers the operative A decision to create the «Arkhangelsk-ARSCS» data to the state authorities concerned, namely: system in the Arkhangelsk region was made in Natural Resources Committee, Civil Defense/Em- May 2003. The Northern territorial environmen- ergency Central Department, and the Centre of tal hydrometeorology/monitoring department presently performs monitoring over the radiation situation on the territory of the region. Regular measurements for the gamma-radiation level are Automated control of the radiation status stability in the made at point 31 of the stationary observation ARSCS system is performed by dosimeters. These devices network. The respective services also perform ob- show the dose rate, i.e. the dose one can obtain for the unit servation at nuclear and radiation-hazard facili- time (more often, for an hour). Up to now, there are de- ties in Severodvinsk («Zvjozdochka» facility and vices measuring the dose rate in the out-of-date units, «Sevmashfacility»). Local sanitary and epidemi- such as «microroentgen/hour» (µR/h). It is very simple to ological services and Research Institute «Pro- convert their indications into modern units, for instance: 1µR/h = 10–5 mSv/h. Dosimeters are widely used, and those metei» run radiological inspections of these who wish may acquire a personal dosimeter. facilities’ radiation-control area and surveil- The exposure dose is estimated by means of multiplication lance zone. When the «Arkhangelsk-ARSCS» sys- of the dose rate by the time during which the individual has tem operates, both state and departmental been under exposure. Let us recall the fact that probable structures that monitor radiation will merge into adverse exposure effects mainly depend on the dose ob- a unified information network that will enter the tained. all-Russian ARSCS system. For instance, the inhabitant of the Monchegorsk city, where the dosimeter showed the dose rate of 11 µR/h during a year, will obtain the 1 mSv dose. The Murmansk Territorial Automated Radiation Status Control System; Data Fragment from the Site: www.murman.ru/kolgimet/

23 Exposure Dose Rate (µR/h) Vayda-Guba in the Murmansk region, Graphical Symbols: as of 11:00 a.m. (September 9, 2004) Tsypnavolok Atmospheric Fallouts Pechenga Station Exposure Dose Rate Atmospheric Aerosols Sites Exposure Dose Rate Code Time Value Nikel Polyarnoe Murmansk Region 91012 11:00 11.4 Yaniskoski Ura-Guba Teriberka Alakurtti 22301 10:00 11 Verh. Lotty Murmansk Apatity 22213 10:00 9.8 Tumanny Padun Barentsburg 20107 10:00 12 island Harlov

Kandalaksha 22217 Svyatoy Nos Kanevka 22249 10:00 15 Monchegorsk Kashkarantsy 22334 10:00 8 Kovdor Lovozero Zasheek Kovda 22312 10:00 8 Iokanga Kovdor 22204 10:00 5 Apatity Kolm-yavr 22232 10:00 15 Kandalaksha Krasnoschelje 22235 10:00 11 Krasnoshchelye Kovda Lovoozero 22127 10:00 5 Zarechensk Lotta 22100 10:00 9 Umba Kanevka Monchegorsk 22212 10:00 11 Kashkarantsy Murmansk 91001 11:00 5.2 Chavanga Murmashi 22114 10:00 11 Pyalitsa Nivankyul 22105 10:00 9 Nickel 22004 10:00 9 Padun 22106 10:00 9 Poliarny 22019 10:00 9 Vaida-Bay 22003 10:00 10 The dose rate on the Kola Peninsula ranges from 3 to 25 µR/h. Yiokanjga 22149 10:00 10 The dose rate within the 100-km zone of the Kola NPP ranges from 5 to Zarechensk 22302 10:00 10 15 µR/h. The parameters of the Kola NPP ARSCS system are estab- Zasheek 22214 09:00 10.1 lished at the levels as follows: alert signal setting — 33.00 µR/h; and emergency signal setting — 2000.00 µR/h. Complex Utilization of Nuclear Submarines

Issues and Solutions ever, heavy economic burdens impeded provision of required resources and proper organization of NS Nuclear submarines ( ) and surface vessels the work. (SV) with nuclear power installations, as any complex equipment, have a defined resource. A special Governmental Decree «On Actions to Ac- Their service life makes up 30–40 years, and celerate the Utilization of NS/SV with nuclear 24 when it expires, they are subject to decommis- power installations decommissioned from the sioning and recycling. The USSR defense pro- Navy as well as the environmental remediation of grams formed during the «Cold War» envisaged the Navy’s radiation-hazard objects» was issued only nuclear-force buildup. NS decommission- in May 1998. The Russian Federation Ministry of ing, SNF/RW management, and the creation of Atomic Energy was assigned as the State customer required infrastructure long remained lesser pri- -coordinator of activities relating to the issue. The orities. situation has radically changed since that time. The situation changed with the end of the arms While until 1998, only one-fifth of the decommis- race, when the USSR assumed the obligations to sioned NS were recycled, almost half from the in- reduce the nuclear arsenal and the military nu- creased number of retired NSs were recycled by clear fleet. Managers were challenged with safe the end of 2003. The potential hazard from a sub- recycling of NS and facilities containing consider- marine subject to recycling is substantially lower able radioactive material amidst drastic funding if its spent nuclear fuel is unloaded. 70 NSs have cuts. At the same time, probability of extraordi- been unloaded in past five years, while only 53 nary occurrences, including those with possible were unloaded during the overall previous period. adverse environmental effects, grew with the The concept for NS complex utilization, as applied time. to the new economic and political conditions, was The work scale, duration and complexity made developed in 2001. It takes into account domestic NS recycling a priority national task in Russia. and foreign experience and meets the interests of The 1995 RF President’s Decree gave the NS both national and international safety, including recycling program a presidential status. How- physical protection and non-proliferation. The new technical policy envisages that utilization of NS and vessels of atomic technological service, as well as remediation of radiation-hazard facilities NS Number Before By End of at coastal sites of basing will operate to mitigate (Nothern and Pacific Fleets) 1998 2003 hazards at all stages of related activities. Opera- Decommissioned 177 193 tion also will involve economic use of the sec- ondary resources and equipment obtained upon With SNF unloaded 53 123 recycling. These activities will be funded out of Recycled 39 94 the federal budget and within the scope of interna- tional cooperation. for processing, to the «Mayak» facility (the Che- Today there are nearly a hundred NS and several lyabinsk region) without intermediary storage in tens of technical service vessels (28 are in coastal sites of basing. emergency status or sunk/half-sunk), subject Since November 2003, an opportunity has arisen to recycling in the North region. The land-based infrastructure that supports NS recycling in the to store the casks at a special land-based site of the «Atomflot» facility. The site was built within region includes floating vessels in the Andreev 25 Bay and Gremikha settlement, and docks of the framework of the «Arctic Military Environmen- Murmansk, Severodvinsk, Poliarny, and Snezsh- tal Cooperation» program (AMEC). The site can nogorsk. simultaneously store 19 casks, which are esti- mated to keep SNF within the period from 5-50 years. After storage, the SNF is transported to «Mayak». The site has a number of advantages, namely: uninterrupted work and increase of the NS Recycling Process NS fuel unloading rate. The program has achieved the optimal SNF unloading rate, at 15 reactors For recycling, nuclear submarines are trans- per year. ported from the berth to the dock. Many NS re- After the SNF unloading, workers cut out the maining on the berth for a long time have lost reactor block (that frequently consists of three their leak-proof seals and in order to transport compartments: the reactor and two adjacent them the flotation recovery or use of special sections). Workers perform the work at a float- docks or pontoons is required. It is a compli- ing dock. Such technology prevents radioactive cated task and, if not properly tackled at the or- contamination of the dock’s water area. A ganizational-technical level, the NS may sink, three-compartment block is launched and as happened with the K-159 vessel, in August tugged to the Saida Bay, where blocks are tem- 2003. porarily stored afloat until special site construc- The initial recycling operation is to unload the tion on land. The construction of such site is presently under way in the Saida-Bay. spent fuel assemblies from NS. This is one one of the important and potentially dangerous opera- tions; therefore, the unloading technologies are agreed with control and supervision authorities. Workers withdraw the fuel assemblies from the NS is no longer a nuclear hazard after SNF unloading. core and place them into casings in a floating re- NS parts remaining after segregation of the reactor pository. The vessel delivers the casings to a rail- block do not represent a radiation hazard either; road terminal, where workers reload them into therefore, they are subject to recycling. shipping casks. Afterward, workers load the casks into special railcars that travel outside the region Complex Utilization of Nuclear Submarines

The reactor block cannot remain afloat infinitely. Possible Emergencies Upon creation of the special site, all reactor blocks will be transferred to the land within a few When using radiation-producing equipment, as years. with any other activity, malfunctions can occur. Malfunctions can be due to equipment failures, or The USA, where the NS utilization also is under personnel errors, or due to natural disasters, etc. way, but the number of submarines subject to 26 If resulting human exposure exceeds established recycling is much less, have accepted a similar standards and/or radioactive contamination of utilization concept. The removed reactor com- the environment occurs, administrators will speak partment (with the preliminarily unloaded SNF) of a radiation accident. What radiation accidents is loaded onto a barge and transported to may occur during NS recycling? long-term storage. There, it is installed on a con- crete base, where it will remain for tens or hun- Loss of control over equipment is the most proba- dreds of years, until its internal radioactivity ble situation. For instance, workers might mistak- decreases. enly scrap radioactive metal. Such an event would After expiration of a long period, it will become be revealed at one of the shipping stages, but un- possible to perform segregation of the reactor safe human exposure could occur in the mean- blocks, i.e. the equipment dismantling and melt- time. Other emergencies do not present such down, to re-use the metal. The longest term for hazards to the public. They may involve personnel intrareactor construction storage until recycling exposure or contamination of the prohibited indus- makes up 700 years. trial site area, where the recycling activities are under way. Being at a special site under control, the reactor blocks present a hazard to neither the public nor What is the basis for such assertions? They are the environment. Therefore, the item of their re- justified by the fact that solid or liquid RW pro- cycling deals with economic expediency (the ra- vide the overwhelming risk of radioactivity. The tio between the term of storage and prices for number of gaseous radioactive substances is metal, etc.). rather low in the recycled objects. The solid RW are localized and cannot, in principle, spread in the environment. The liquid RW spread happens rather slowly. Pure waters quickly dilute them, greatly mitigating the hazard.

At the current rate, by year 2010 all de- Only through airborne radioactive spread may the commissioned NS can be recycled and territories distant from the industrial site be sub- their reactor blocks can be placed in a spe- ject to radioactive contamination. Therefore, the cial repository for long storage. processes owing to which nuclear fuel can be dis- persed (turned into fine aerosols) represent the most hazards. The fuel may happen to be airborne only at se- tive actions to exclude them or mitigate the proba- vere accidents accompanied by an explosion or a bility of their occurrence are developed. conflagration. The potential hazard accident is The scale of emergency effects during the work most likely associated with operations to unload with NS at dockyards can be assessed by the INES spent fuel assemblies from the NS reactor installa- scale. tions. The maximal «design» accident envisages occur- 27 Nuclear accidents at the decommissioned NS are rence of the fire in the reactor compartment dur- hardly probable and their effects cannot reach the ing the vessel recycling at an open stockpile site level of the Chernobyl catastrophe. First, upon (owing to violations in the technology or due to submarine decommissioning, the reactor instal- the personnel’s errors). The effects may reach the lations are blanked-off for a long time. For that 4th level by the INES scale (See p.21). period, the majority of radionuclides decay, in- «Beyond-the design-basis» accidents may occur cluding the short-lived ones. If the spontaneous due to the personnel’s gross errors, sabotages, air- chain reaction happens to take place, the formed craft crash, etc. During the maximal «beyond-the quantity of radiologically-hazard radionuclides, design-basis» accident (occurrence of the fire such as radioiodine, is relatively small. Regarding when the vessel is under recycling at the stockpile radiocesium and other longlived radionuclides, site, or that of spontaneous chain nuclear reaction one can take efficient protective actions. when the vessel is in the plant’s water area) the effects, in principle, might be hazardous to the en- Specialists take into account all types of emergen- vironment (the 5th level by the INES scale). Let cies, including the personnel errors, natural disas- us recall once more that the Chernobyl accident is ters, aircrafts’ impacting the area, etc. Although related to the maximal 7th level of the scale (See the probability of such situations is low, preven- page 21). Other Issues

Surface Nuclear Vessels. As in case with NS, nu- A number of repositories of coastal technical bases clear reactors of surface vessels are located in a do not fully meet current requirements for provi- separate compartment. Special protective barri- sion of nuclear and radiation safety. ers are envisaged, as in the submarine, to prevent The bases often lack technical safety barriers as radioactive substance releases into the vessels’ exist in NS (base structures of the reactor instal- premises and into the environment. Issues of recy- lation/reactor compartment, strong vessel hull). 28 cling for such vessels are similar. Therefore, SNF/RW materials in storage at the Vessels of Atomic Technological Service (ATS) former fleet bases are the most vulnerable with provide the loading of NS and surface nuclear ves- respect to anthropogenic, natural or terrorist sels with fresh fuel and also are used for accep- threats. tance of spent fuel and LRW. In total, 41 ATS Minatom of Russia has started to make active ef- vessels are decommissioned and subject to recy- forts to solve the above-mentioned issues within cling under individual projects and technologies the scope of activities on NS recycling. The follow- that state managers and safety regulators jointly ing has been done: approve. For instance, the «Lepse» mother ship î Commissioning of stationary complexes for has been in operation for more than forty years. solid/liquid RW processing at the «Zvjozdo- It has been used for the past twenty years only as chka» facility (Severodvinsk) supported by the a repository for irradiated fuel and radioactive US program «Joint Mitigation of a Threat»; waste. Long storage has involved metal corro- î Inhancement for the LRW processing installa- sion; therefore, general technologies to extract tion at the «Atomflot» facility (Murmansk) fuel assemblies with spent fuel from the reposi- through financial support of Russia/Nor- tory are inapplicable there. The Lepse recycling way/USA; is estimated as 30 million euro. î Putting into operation of the mobile installa- In 2003, the international program on the Lepse tion to process LRW in the Murmansk region; complex utilization was launched. The countries and of the European community and those from the î Commissioning in 2004 of the first point for Northern ecological financial corporation under- processing vessels’ solid RW at the dock in took funding. French/English/Russian specialists the Poliarny city, under the AMEC military will run the activities on SNF unloading. Com- cooperation program (including Russia/USA/ plete recycling of the mother ship will take three Norway). or four years. Due to commissioning of the above-mentioned RW/SNF Management. The issue of RW/SNF complexes/installations, all LRW forming during management has been neglected for a long time. the recycling of NS and vessels are processed and As a result of nuclear vessels operation and utiliza- conditioned. The total volume of previously accu- tion, the land bases and ATS vessels have a huge mulated waste gradually decreases. Further accu- amount of SNF and liquid/solid RW accumulated. mulation of vessels’ solid RW is excluded, though 12° 24° 36° 48° 60° 72°

The North Fleet Bases: I 1 — Western Litsa Bay; 29 2 — Olenja Bay and Saida Bay; 8 7 3 — Ara Bay; 72° II 4 — Pala Bay; 2 6 — Iokanjga. 4 3 III Site of settling/recycling for 1 72° 2 3 5 the Navy’s decommissioned 1 vessels and ships with nuclear 4 5 6 10 Barents Sea power installations: IV 4 — Poliarny; 7 6 — Iokanjga; 7 — Murmansk («Atomflot» repair fa- 6 cility); and V 8 — Severodvinsk. Sites of SNF temporary 9 storage: 64° 8 1 — Western Litsa Bay; 2 — the Navy’s mother ship to reload the atomic submarine reactors; 36° 48° 60° 6 — Iokanjga; and 7 — Mother ships «Imandra», Location of RW Basic Sources () «Lepse», «Lotta». and Sites of Their Burial ( ) in the North Seas Shipbuilding plants/Dockyards: V.Dovgusha, M. Tikhonov. Radionuclides in the North-West Region 4 — Poliarny (the Navy’s dockyard) //News Summary,CRIatominform,2002 and Viuzshny (the «Nerpa» dock- yard); and 8 — Severodvinsk («Sevmashpredpriatie» facility; «Sever» facility). I–V — Liquid Radioactive Waste dis- charge areas. Other Issues

the items of RW management are still acute. Re- Since 2000, all activities on remediation of gional centres for processing and long-term stor- RW/SNF storage sites in the region have been age of conditioned wastes should be created to conducted by a new facility «SevRAO» (Mur- transfer into a safe condition the low-level and in- mansk) established by Minatom of Russia. In termediate-level solid RW accumulated at the 2001, SevRAO began to recover the physical de- docks and the coastal floating bases. fense systems and to mitigate an ecological hazard 30 To solve the issues of SNF management, the fol- from nuclear- and radiation-hazard facilities lo- lowing has been recently done: cated at the Navy’s former coastal bases (the î Putting into operation of the land-based com- Andreev Bay and the Gremikha settlement). For plex for SNF unloading from NS reactors at the instance, in 2003, detailed radiation survey of the «Zvjozdochka» facility supported by the US pro- lands was performed as well as big-volumed solid gram «Joint Mitigation of a Threat»; RW was fragmented, collected from open sites, î Implementation of the technology for SNF packed and placed into the repository, etc. «dry» temporary container storage. For that purpose, new metal-concrete containers to As a result, SevRAO has succeeded in improving store and transport SNF are produced and a to some extent the radio-ecological situation in site for their temporary storage is built. A site the above-mentioned sites. The facility’s nearest to reload SNF containers is commissioned at plans envisage recovery of the infrastructure pro- the «Atomflot» facility supported by the AMEC viding for safe conditions of the personnel’s work; program; and complex engineering-radiation survey of the build- î To accelerate the SNF transfer to the «Mayak» ings/constructions/sites for subsequent selection facility, the two special trains with the SNF of an optimal and safe option for their reme- containers are produced and commissioned diation; and creation of essential technical means, through financial support of Norway/USA. etc. International Cooperation Programs

Russia is actively involved in the international sys- In 2000, the foreign partners of Russia merged tem of agreements, treaties and conventions. The within the scope of a new initiative titled «Northern involvement covers both general items with regard Dimension Environmental Partnership» (NDEP), to provision of nuclear/radiation/ecological safety, the aim of which is to coordinate international as- when using the atomic energy, and the items di- sistance, define its priorities and finance selected rectly dealt with recycling and remediation of radia- projects. 31 tion-hazard objects decommissioned from the Navy An agreement for implementation of the Global and the nuclear civil fleet. Cooperation in this field Partnership program against proliferation of mass started in 1991. destruction weapons/ materials was achieved at Within the scope of the American-Russian non-pro- the G8 summit in June 2002. The program amount- liferation program launched in 1991, the Navy ob- ing to $20 billion is planned for ten years. NS recy- tained $2.3 billion to eliminate the strategic NS. cling is one of the program trends. By 2020, Russia The governments of the United Kingdom/Norway will have to recycle about 200 NS, including those also rendered a considerable financial and technical available at the Kola Peninsula bases. assistance. Creating favorable conditions for foreign invest- At present, the northern countries are more con- ments into radiological and environmental pro- cerned about problems that originated by mass de- jects requires legislative provisions, for favorable commissioning of the Russian nuclear fleet. Foreign legal and customs procedures. The Agreement on countries invest funds to ensure environmental safety Multilateral Nuclear and Environmental Program when recycling Russian NS, managing RW/SNF, in Russia was signed by Russia in 2003 and rati- and operating the Kola NPP. For the past five years, fied in 2004. The Agreement is aimed at solving Norway, USA, Germany, Finland, UK, France, and legal issues in programs of international coopera- Canada have rendered technical assistance to the nu- tion in the abovemention field. This Agreement clear complex facilities in the Murmansk/Arkhan- is the most significant from the standpoint of or- gelsk regions, within the frameworks of bilateral or ganizing practical activities in the Northwest re- multilateral government agreements. gion.

The Global Partnership Program (NDEP) ranks nuclear and environmental issues very high. Two-thirds from the NDEP Fund are aimed to solve those issues. Apart from that, Russia not only obtains the Fund’s financial support but also invests into it. The first step in that direction has become the development of a strategic plan which defines an overall picture of the work and precisely points out what has been done and what is to be done for each specific project proposed. Development of the plan started in 2004. To secure the most objective picture, the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (RosAtom) involved three different executors, such as the planing research institute NIKIET from RosAtom, IBRAE from the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the independent Kurchatov Institute. Such plan is essential for Russia to accept strategical decisions in the field of RW/SNF management. EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Unified State System

The unified state system for prevention and elimi- neighboring countries, the RF Government Inter-de- nation of emergencies (RSE) was established in partmental Emergency Commission begins work. 1994 to unite efforts, forces and means of the au- The RF Emergency Ministry (EMERCOM of Rus- thorities of different levels and facilities that are sia) manages the RSE. 32 charged to protect the public and territories. The The center to manage crisis situations is set up in RSE structure comprises two subsystems: territo- EMERCOM of Russia for everyday control of rial and functional. emergency forces and means. The center is acti- vated 24 hours a day, and can organize immediate The territorial subsystem maintains five levels: response to any emergency. An operative shift on federal, regional, territorial, local and objective. duty can simultaneously collect information on The appropriate Emergency Commission is respon- two or three emergencies at the federal or re- sible for organization of emergency activities at gional level. each level. Emergencies at nuclear complex facilities (or dur- The profile ministries and departments have the ing transportation of radioactive substances) RSE functional subsystems. Their task is to super- force the Branch System of Emergency Response vise and control the status of environment and sit- of Russia’s MinAtom (the present RosAtom) to uation at potentially-hazard facilities, as well as act to eliminate emergencies and protect person- to protect the personnel and the public. In case nel. All actions outside the control zone of the fa- of a catastrophe that affects a few regions or cility are the RSE prerogative.

Whom should one contact in Moscow in case of emergency?

(095) 926-3901 Inquiry Office [email protected] The Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense and Emergencies (095) 926-3500; www.mchs.gov.ru Public Relations/ (095) 926-3509; Information Department (095) 926-3940; (095) 923-5745 (fax) Territorial Subsystem

The North-West Regional Civil Defense/Emer- Murmansk region. In 2003, the list of regional gency (CD/E) Center is located in Saint Peters- hazardous productions subject to safety regula- burg. In case of emergency, the Regional EC tions was approved. The list covers three joint- coordinates activities of the territorial subsystems stock companies («Apatyt», «Belomor Oil-Tank», at a regional level, and the Regional Central and «Kola Hydrometallurgical Complex»), which 33 CD/E Department gets involved in the everyday are located in the cities of Kirovsk, Apatyty and activities. Monchegorsk, as well as in the Pechengsky dis- Options for emergency response by all services are trict. established and understood. They are developed Administrators of the regional cities/districts are by specialists of Central CD/E Department and expected to systematically consider at the EC meet- are at the disposal of the EC. Depending on spe- ings the process of safety declarations for the cific circumstances, various options are involved. listed sites and to take required actions to en- The plans to prevent emergencies and to protect hance the activity and strictly observe the term the public are agreed with the territorial bodies of for developing safety declarations. The authorized Gosatomnadzor, Gosgortechnadzor and Sanepid- bodies are expected to issue licenses to operate nadzor, and other divisions or services of the func- hazardous sites per the appropriate declaration tional subsystem. made in compliance with standard regulations. Re- The Arkhangelsk Central Department comprises spective regional departments (Central CD/E De- the CD/E structural subdivisions (affiliates) in partment, Gosgortechnadzor, Gosenergonadzor the cities of Arkhangelsk, Kotlas, Novodvinsk, and Environmental Resources/Environmental Pro- Severodvinsk, and Koriazhma. tection Department), are assigned to control the The following example demonstrates the current declaration development with regard to adherence activity of the RSE regional subsystem in the to the dates.

Whom should one contact in case of emergency?

Reception Room (8182) 651-494 (fax) Central Department for Civil Defense and Emergencies Operative person on duty (8182) 646-001 27, Svobody str., (CD/E) in the Arkhangelsk Arkhangelsk region Head of the Arkhangelsk 163000 CD/E Department (8182) 205-467 Kola NPP

The Kola NPP emergency plan envisages a pre- premises. Protective plans provide for exits and the cise procedure for declaring such states as «Emer- motor transport delivery, taking into account a si- gency Preparedness» and «Emergency Situation», multaneous resettlement of the entire population. as well as for enacting the «Plan of Actions to pro- The Rosenergoatom administration managing all tect the Kola NPP personnel». Immediate notifica- Russian NPPs declares an immediate meeting in tion is the most vital action in an elevated state. 34 the Rosenergoatom’s crisis center in Moscow, for In compliance with regulations, the shiftman of the group that renders operative assistance to the plant who receives a message about a possible NPPs (OANPP). The OANPP group obtains radiation-hazard situation or an accident shall re- on-line, basic technological and radiation parame- port to: ters of all NPP sensors, by which decision makers î Dispatcher on duty from Rosenergoatom; can estimate the safety status of any power unit. î Civil Defense/Emergency Department of the Po- The Moscow experts in the Rosenergoatom’s cri- liarnye Zori city; sis center at any moment can run a teleconference î Central Civil Defense/Emergency Department with the plant’s emergency centre to specify the of the Murmansk region; situation and develop countermeasures. î Situation-Crisis Centre of MinAtom of Russia. If the OANPP Group decides to involve one of the The Poliarnye Zori administration has developed MinAtom’s regional special emergency and tech- a plan of protection for the population from nical centers, all special equipment available Poliarnye Zori and other localities within a 30-km (robots, satellite and mobile communication fa- zone of the NPP. Action plans to protect the per- cilities, protective facilities, etc.) immediately de- sonnel and the public are correlated to timely no- ploys to the emergency site. Upon arrival, personnel tify of an accident threat (event); as to volume/ are ready to work «from the wheels». In case of an frequency of current information transmission; alert, the Defense Ministry engineering troops, or and coordination of actions and mutual aid in im- radiation and chemical protection departments lo- plementation of measures envisaged. cated in the region may be used. If necessary, the Ten loudspeaker devices and three electric sirens OANPP group visits the emergency site and re- are activated to alert residents from Poliarnye sumes an operative management of all forces and Zori. The local broadcasting system and cable departments, in case of incompetent actions on television transmit the information of the emer- the part of emergency manager. gency. Residents of the settlements are notified by Consistency among all departments and services the broadcasting communication lines. The infor- develops through regular exercises and training. mation of the accident is also transmitted over the For instance, Rosenergoatom ran the latest emer- telephone to the heads of facilities. gency training at the Kola NPP in October 2003. In case of an accident, the public finds sheltering in The next course is planned for the summer of available protective buildings, basements adjusted 2004, and in September Rosenergoatom plans a for sheltering, as well as in residential and service complex review of the Kola NPP. Land-Based Sites of the Nuclear Fleet

Similar emergency exercises run at the other op- Players notified the public using electric sirens, erating nuclear complex sites, including nuclear street loudspeakers and megaphones installed on shipbuilding facilities. the militia cars. The Severomorsk radio, the North fleet television and cable television of the The first North fleet’s large-scale exercises to elim- Rosliakovo settlement broadcasted the operative inate potential nuclear/radiation accident impacts information. took place in February 2000. Representatives of 35 The probability for an accident on the «Kursk» ves- the Murmansk Regional CD/E Department and sel was negligibly low, as there were no activities heads of administration from closed administra- planned for the reactor in the dock. Nevertheless, tive and territorial formations (CATF) were a plan for temporary resettlement of people from involved in the exercises combined with the mili- Posliakovo was developed. Nearly 11,000 inhabit- tary. According to the exercise scenario, the fleet ants of the settlement were to leave the place by force was to mitigate accident impacts on the «Pe- buses for safe areas, if necessary. ter the Great» heavy nuclear missile cruiser. Fleet The most recent exercises in Severodvinsk took specialists in emergency-rescue, medical and chem- place in May 2003. According to the background ical services, as well as radiation safety services, information of the exercises, a radioactive sub- were almost fully deployed. Points of decontamina- stance release occurred at one of the nuclear sub- tion and points for rendering assistance to evacu- marines moored by the berth of Zviezdochka ees and injured people were set up at several sites engineering facility, and a radioactive contamina- around Severomorsk. tion threat resulted. The exercises started by switching on electric sirens at the facilities and in In September 2001, complex exercises ran to im- the streets of the city, and with transmission of a prove interaction between the fleet and civil de- warning over the municipal radio communication fense forces in case of emergency, while the lines. The commission comprising representatives «Kursk» nuclear vessel was docked. The exercises of the municipality and the CD/E municipal de- were conducted on the CATF Severomorsk terri- partment observed the subsequent player actions, tory, which includes the Rosliakovo settlement, a and reported that everything had been done com- location of the floating dock. petently, by schedule and according to plan.

Whom should one contact in case of emergency? (8152) 454-828 Central Department for Civil Reception Room (8152) 453-659 (fax) 4, K. Burkova str., Defense and Emergencies Murmansk (CD/E) in the Murmansk region Operative person (8152) 473-906 183025 on duty (8152) 455-090 RosAtom Branch System Role of Local Authorities

Creation of the efficient system to prevent and In compliance with federal laws on radiation eliminate emergencies at all nuclear-hazard facili- safety of the population and on protection of the ties is one of the main lessons of Chernobyl. public and territories from natural and human- induced emergencies, the local authorities act as In case of emergency at the nuclear complex fa- follows: cilities as well as when transporting nuclear ma- 36 terials and radioactive substances, the Nuclear/ Before the emergency: î Radiation Safety Division of Russia’s Federal Set up permanent managing bodies specially au- thorized to tackle issues in the field of public Agency for Atomic Energy (RosAtom) is immedi- protection; ately involved in organizing the emergency ac- î Train the public in preventive measures/ac- tions. Its task is to mobilize RosAtom’s forces tions in these situations; and means. î Prepare and keep ready all forces and means re- RosAtom branch subsystem of RSE comprises five quired; regional emergency technical centers equipped î Create financial/material resource reserves to with state-of-the-art equipment and professional eliminate emergencies; and staff. One such center is located in the Urals, in î Economically promote the activity of natural/le- the city of Snezhinsk. RosAtom can involve more gal persons dealing with radiation safety provi- than 300 qualified professional rescuers trained sion. for radiation emergency conditions and up to During the emergency: 80,000 professional nuclear specialists in the ac- î Make decisions and organize evacuation mea- tivities at the emergency facility. sures; î Organize and run the emergency-rescue work The Situation-Crisis Center (SCC) was estab- and other pressing activities, as well as support lished in RosAtom to efficiently address issues public order during their running; arising in crisis situations. The Center gathers all î Notify and inform the public of potential haz- information on branch systems of the Automated ards or emergencies; and Radiation Situation Control System (ARSCS). î Assist in stable functioning of facilities in emer- Apart from that, the Center maintains satellite gencies. communication with all branch facilities, and ob- After the emergency: tains the information about normal operation, î Control radiation at the appropriate sites and contingencies and emergencies, 24 hours a day. take into account exposure doses to the public; In case of emergency, the SCC efficient-dispatch î Introduce particular treatments for the public service reports to RosAtom management and ap- living in the radioactive contamination zones; propriate services, providing them with informa- î Enact measures to mitigate emergency conse- tion to make decisions. quences in appropriate areas; î Control assistance rendered to the irradiated established to terminate the period of temporary public; and resettlement. î Establish procedures for citizens’ health indem- Sheltering is applied for the term of no more than nification and for paying damages for lost prop- 1–2 days in immediate proximity to the emer- erty. gency location, if the dose predictable for the first 10 days is in the range of 5 to 50 mSv. Use of pro- The objectives for local authorities are, possibly, 37 the most difficult, as these individuals approve tective properties of buildings and constructions or reject experts’ proposed decisions regarding within the period of greatest exposure intensity safety. (during the first hours after the emergency when the radioactive cloud appears over the locality) de- The experts forecast radiation situation develop- creases the probability of residents becoming ra- ment, estimate dose loads for the public, and pre- diogenic cancer carriers. pare recommendations for public safety measures. The local authorities make decisions, taking into account not only expert recommendations but also Time of stable iodine Protection pill consumption factor a variety of circumstances, including the interests of different people. For local authorities, the pub- During the inhalation By 90 times lic risk perception is more important than the risk 2 hours after the inhalation By 10 times itself. Therefore, the local decisions do not always correspond to scientific expert recommendations. 6 hours after the inhalation By 2 times Decisions on protective actions for the public are based on comparisons between predictable dose Iodine preventive measures. The NPP emer- and emergency intervention levels. The interven- gency release contains, as a rule, a great amount tion levels are defined so as to prevent clinical ex- of radioactive iodine-131. Getting into the human posure effects. Thus, no cases of acute radiation body, via the unprotected respiratory system or sickness among the population in any nuclear facil- with food, it accumulates in a thyroid gland and ity emergencies, including Chernobyl, have oc- negatively impacts the function. The most effec- curred. tive safety method is the intake of medical prod- Evacuation is applied when the predictable doses ucts of stable iodine: potassium iodine in tablets are close to the level of clinical effects (50-500 or powders (iodine preventive measures). The mSv for the first 10 days). If doses are above 500 maximum protective effect is achieved at prelimi- mSv, evacuation is obligatory; if doses are less, nary reception of stable iodine or simultaneously the experts make a forecast for a more remote pe- with radioactive iodine. Iodine preventive mea- riod: a month or a year. If during the first month sures decrease the doses of thyroid gland exposure the doses exceed 30 mSv, a temporary resettle- by several times, thus mitigating the risk of devel- ment is involved; the level of 10 mSv per month is oping thyroid gland pathology. Role of Local Authorities

In the first days following the emergency, radioac- Under what conditions is the harm from interfer- tivity levels in the environment decrease very ence greater than the benefit of protective ac- quickly due to decay of short-life radioisotopes. Ac- tions? Such conditions are clearly defined by the cordingly, basic exposure of the population falls radiation safety standards (RSS-99). Two types on the first days. Therefore, decisions to take pro- of the intervention levels (level A and level B) are tective actions should be made quickly and imple- defined for a large-scale radiation accident. At 38 mented effectively. Any delay with respect to dose loads above level B the protective actions are shelter, evacuation or iodine preventive measures justified; at doses below level A, they will bring in the early period gives rise to future problems, more harm than benefit. including social issues. In those cases when estimated doses are between levels A and B, the decision in respect of protec- tive measures should be made with consideration Radioiodine is hazardous in emergencies occur- of specific situation and local conditions, so that red at operating nuclear reactor. «Iodine hazard» pure benefit of decreasing the dose would exceed significantly decreases, when the reactor is deac- to the maximum the damage from the interfer- tivated. ence. Let us consider the following example. Esti- mated doses are slightly higher than level A for evacuation, and the weather conditions are ex- tremely adverse (hard frost). A responsible per- It is obvious that radiation preventive measures re- son should compare predicted radiation risks with sult in the disruption of normal lifestyles, chang- anticipated damage from evacuation, including ing the habitual course, economic and social func- the number of those people who have caught cold tions. The interference entails not only economic or got pneumonia, etc. The right decision in this damage but also adverse influence on public case might be strict adherence to the procedure of health, including psychological stress. The main sheltering, rather than evacuation. principle of radiation protection is that damage de- As emergency exercises show, in the above-men- crease as a result of dose reduction should be suffi- tioned case local administrators are inclined to cient to justify harm and cost of the treatment make unjustified decisions, such as, for instance, interference, including social cost. resettlement of people from minimally contami- nated lands long after the accident. In such cases, branch exercises at the RosAtom facilities, local great resources are spent to prevent small collec- authorities co-manage the events and are enabled tive doses. Measures taken soon after the accident to use to maximum state-secured resources for de- make the maximum impact concerning radiologi- veloping their territorial radiation-safety systems. cal issues. Timely shelter of the population and Therefore, one of the most vital conditions for en- running iodine preventive measures allow preven- acting citizens’ rights for protection of life, health 39 tion of high collective doses, at lower cost. and personal property in case of severe accident at Local authorities’ competencies in making effec- the nuclear complex facilities is the interested atti- tive decisions increase considerably through emer- tude of local authorities to the emergency activi- gency exercises and trainings. When organizing ties run at the RosAtom facilities.

Safety methods in case of radiation accident þ Shelter in protective constructions or buildings with immediate sealing of windows/doors/air holes, etc.; þ Use individual means of protection (respirators, gas masks, and protective clothes and shoes, etc.); þ Use anti-radiation drugs; þ Exclude contaminated products and water from use; þ Evacuate people from contaminated areas; þ Restrict the access to the territory contaminated; þ Sanitize people, and decontaminate clothes, equipment, etc.