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Bombs, Guns and Missiles (And CPP Investments)

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Bombs, Guns and Missiles (and CPP Investments) Delivery Systems: B-1, B-2, B-52 ll 115 of the weapons listed be- AGM = Air to Ground Missile low are aboard the major deliv- Contractor: Boeing (formerly AIM = Air Intercept Missile Aery systems with components McDonnell Douglas) and/or services provided by Canadian BGM = Ballistic Guided Missile AGM-88A HARM BLU = Bomb Live Unit companies that are highlighted on pages CPP Investmentü 11 to 30 of this issue of Press for Con- CBU = Cluster Bomb Unit This high-speed antiradiation missile version! Not all of the prime contrac- GBU = Guided Bomb Unit tors of these weapons could be deter- (HARM) is a more advanced version GPS = Global Positioning System mined. Nine were found to be produced of the AGM-45 “Shrike.” It finds and directly by the U.S. government. Of the MW = Multipurpose Weapon destroys enemy radar-equipped, air 73 weapons listed here – whose defense systems and uses a 143.5 lb nongovernment, prime contractors could be determined, 59 Direct Fragmentation warhead. were built by prime contractors in which the Canada Pen- Delivery Systems: EA-6, F-14, F-15, F-16, F-117, Tornado sion Plan has investments, i.e., 81%. Contractor: Raytheon [Texas Instruments] AGM-89 SRAM CPP Investmentü AGM-45 Shrike CPP Investmentü This 2240-lb. Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) has a The “Shrike” guided missile finds and destroys radar trans- 170 kiloton W69 warhead and uses an inertial guidance mitters that are directing missiles at warplanes. It uses a system. Its maximum range is about 115 miles. 145-lb conventional high-explosive/fragmentation warhead. Delivery System: B-1 Delivery System: F/A-18 Contractor: Lockheed Contractor: Texas Instruments and Sperry Rand/Univac AGM-114 Hellfire CPP Investmentü AGM-62 Walleye The “Hellfire” Missile System, with its 8 km range can The “Walleye” is an air-to-surface TV-guided glide bomb provide “heavy anti-armor capability.” used against fuel tanks, tunnels, bridges, radar sites, port Delivery Systems: AH-64, OH-58, RQ-1, UH-60 facilities and ammunition depots. Contractor: Rockwell International Corp. Delivery System: F/A-18 Contractor: Naval Weapons Center, China Lake (U.S. gov’t) AGM-122 Sidearm CPP Investmentü AGM-65 Maverick CPP Investmentü The “Sidearm” is a small Anti-Radiation Missile for self defense against anti aircraft gun and SAM radars. The “Maverick” guided missile destroys armour, air de- Delivery System: AH-64 fences, ships, transport equipment and fuel storage facili- Contractor: Motorola ties. The AGM-65E version (F/A-18) is used against forti- fied ground installations, armoured vehicles and soldiers. AGM-129 CPP Investmentü AGM-65 Delivery Systems: A-10, F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A- Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) 18, Tornado The 2760-lb ACM has a maximum range of 1800 nautical Contractor: Hughes Aircraft (now General Motors) and miles and a dramatically reduced radar signature. It car- Raytheon Co. ries a 5 to 150 kiloton W80 nuclear warhead. (Prime Min- AGM-69 SRAM CPP Investmentü ister Trudeau allowed its testing in Canada, 1983-1994.) Delivery Systems: B-1, B-2 This 14-foot, 2,230-lb., rocket-propelled Short Range At- Contractor: General Dynamics tack Missile (SRAM) carries a 170 kiloton W69 nuclear warhead and has a range of 20 to 50 nautical miles. AGM-131 SRAM CPP Investmentü Delivery System: B-1, B-2 This Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) carries a W-91 Contractor: Boeing thermonuclear warhead (10 kiloton or 100 kiloton). AGM-84 SLAM CPP Investmentü Delivery System: B-2 Contractor: Boeing This Stand-Off Land Attack Missile (SLAM), nick-named “Harpoon” with a 150 mile range is used to attack ships AGM-130 CPP Investmentü and carries a 488-lb., high-explosive warhead. This air-to-ground, guided missile carrying a 2,000-lb gen- Delivery Systems: B-52, F-14, F/A-18, P-3 eral purpose warhead is a powered version of the GBU-15. Contractor: Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglas) Delivery System: F-15 AGM-86 CPP Investmentü Contractor: Rockwell International Corp. Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) AGM-137 CPP Investmentü Two versions of the 20’ 9” ALCM: (1) with a W80-1 nu- Conventional Cruise Missile clear warhead (200 kilotons), and (2) with a 3000-lb high This long-range, self-guided, conventional cruise uses a explosive warhead. The maximum range is 1500 nautical GPS-aided, inertial navigation system. One version carries miles. Most AGM-86s now have conventional warheads. Combined Effects Bomblet submunitions (i.e., cluster (PM Trudeau allowed its testing in Canada, 1983-1994.) bombs) to attack land targets. 32 Press for Conversion! Issue # 52 October 2003 Delivery System: B-2 AIM-132 CPP Investmentsü Contractor: Northrop Grumman This advanced, short-range air-to-air missile carries a 10- AGM-142 Have Nap CPP Investmentü kg. blast/fragmentation warhead and is most effective This 3000-lb missile, with a range of 50 nautical miles, is against targets within a 5 to 50 kilometre range. an Israeli-built “Popeye” missile acquired by the US. Delivery System: Tornado Delivery System: B-52 Contractor: Matra British Aerospace, Raytheon-Hughes Contractors: Lockheed Martin and Rafael ALARM CPP Investmentsü AGM-154 JSOW CPP Investmentü The Air-Launched Anti-Radar Missile (ALARM) protects This GPS-guided “Joint Standoff Weapon” can glide 40 bombers and attack warplanes by destroying ground-based miles and carry: (a) a single warhead, (b) 145 BLU-97/B air defence radars and surface-to-air missile radars. anti-armor cluster bomblets, a fragmenting case and zirco- Delivery System: Tornado nium for spreading fire, or (c) 6 BLU-108/B submunitions Contractors: British Aerospace (BAe) and Marconi that each release 4 anti-armor projectiles. Apache CPP Investmentsü Delivery Systems: B-1, B-2, B-52, F/A-18 This 1,230-kg stealth missile is similar to the AGM-86 Contractor: Raytheon Co. Tomahawk cruise missile. AGM-158 JASSM CPP Investmentü Delivery System: Tornado The Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) is a Contractors: Matra BAe Dynamics, a subsidiary of the cruise missile that uses a GPS-aided, inertial navigation Lagardère (France) and British Aerospace (BAe) (UK) system to fly a low-altitude, circuitous route to its target. AS-30L Delivery Systems: B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15, F-16, FA-18, P-3, S-3 This 520-kg laser-guided, high-explosive, semi-armor pierc- Contractor: Raytheon ing missile carries a 240-kg warhead up to 10 km. AIM-7 Sparrow CPP Investmentü Delivery System: Tornado The “Sparrow” is a radar-guided, air-to-air missile with a Contractor: Aerospatiale high-explosive warhead. AS-34 Kormoran Delivery Systems: F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18 The “Kormoran” guided missile has a 23-mile range and Contractor: Raytheon carries a 352-lb. warhead that can penetrate up to 90mm of AIM-9 Sidewinder CPP Investmentsü steel plate before detonating. The “Sidewinder” is a high-explosive, supersonic, heat- Delivery System: Tornado seeking air-to-air missile with a 10 to 18 mile range. Contractor: Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm Delivery Systems: A-10, AH-64, AV-8, F-14, F-15, F-16, B53 F/A-18, F-117, OH-58, P-3, Tornado This gravity bomb is oldest nuclear warhead in the US ar- Contractor: Lockheed Martin and Raytheon senal and, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, AIM-54 Phoenix CPP Investmentsü “does not meet modern safety design criteria.” The “Phoenix” missile is a long-range, radar-guided mis- Delivery System: B-52 sile used to kill multiple air targets with conventional war- B57 heads. Propulsion is provided by a solid propellant rocket This nuclear bomb was used for antisubmarine warfare and motor, and lethality by a high explosive warhead. land warfare until its retirement in 1993. Delivery System: F-14 Delivery System: P-3 Contractor: Hughes Aircraft (now General Motors) and B61 CPP Investmentsü Raytheon This strategic and tactical thermonuclear bomb is a two- AIM-92 Stinger CPP Investmentsü stage radiation implosion weapon with variable yield op- Although the guided “Stinger” missile is often shoulder- tions, or “dial-a-yield” (DAY). fired to shoot down aircraft, it can also be launched from Delivery Systems: B-1, B-2, B-52, Tornado land vehicles and helicopters. It uses a “fire-and-forget” Contractor: General Electric (neutron generators) infrared guidance system and uses high explosive warheads. B83 Delivery Systems: AH-64, OH-58, UH-60 Contractors: Hughes Missile System, General Dynam- This free-fall, earth-penetrating nuclear bomb is for use ics and Raytheon against deeply-buried, hardened targets like bunkers. Delivery Systems: B-1, B-2, B-52 AIM-120 Slammer CPP Investmentsü Beluga This medium-range, guided, air-to-air missile, nick-named “Slammer,” uses active radar target tracking, proportional This weapon scatters cluster bomb units (CBUs). navigation guidance and active Radio Frequency target de- Delivery System: Tornado tection. It employs inertial guidance navigational methods BGM-109 CPP Investmentsü and attacks single or multiple targets. Tomahawk Cruise Missile Delivery Systems: F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18 The “Tomahawk” is a sea-launched, land-attack cruise mis- Contractor: Hughes Aircraft (now GM) and Raytheon sile. It has inertial and terrain contour matching radar guid- October 2003 Issue # 52 Press for Conversion! 33 ance systems that determine the missile’s position by com- Delivery System: Tornado paring stored map references with the actual terrain. Contractor: Alenia Marconi Systems Delivery System: DDG-51 CBU-52 Contractor: Hughes Missile Systems (now General Motors) Each of these 785-lb. antimaterial/antipersonnel cluster BL-755 bombs contains 220 3.5-inch spherical bomblets weighing This 600-lb cluster bomb releases 147 bomblets which each 2.7 lbs.
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