DOCSLIB.ORG

Nuñez Angles

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

5th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean Multi-Dimensional Security Reports (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. (+34) 93 302 6495 - [email protected] (+34) 93 302 6495 - Fax. [email protected] Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: An omnidirectional threat. Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde, Balder Hageraats and Ximena Valente - Calle Elisabets, 12 08001 Barcelona, España Tel. Fundación CIDOB WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN OMNIDIRECTIONAL THREAT Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde Co-director of the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action, IECAH Balder Hageraats Researcher at IECAH Ximena Valente Researcher at IECAH Introduction 1. Similar to the first report, the concept of WMD is used in its general understanding of having the Similarly to the first report on Weapons of mass destruction in the three basic components of nuclear, Mediterranean: current status and prospects, released in 2005, this chemical and biological weapons. In practical terms, however, the main second report (Weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean: an focus of this report is on nuclear omnidimensional threat) is the result of an initiative – responding to a weapons given that these are the sustained interest in matters of security and defence in the Mediterranean only ones that true fit the profile of WMD at the moment. - by the CIDOB Foundation. It is therefore fitting to mention the annual seminars on security and defence that are held in Barcelona since 2002. In line with the decision taken at the third of these meetings, the aim of this report is to facilitate – both for those attending the sessions directly as well as the wider security community interested in the region - the analysis of one of the most pressing problems on the international agenda. At the same time, the report is an attempt to stimulate debate and reflection on the related threats. This includes both the existing nuclear, biological and chemical programmes and arsenals as well as the worrisome attempts to obtain such weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by various state and non-state actors. It is with this in mind that the following pages are intended to serve as a continued effort to offer tools for policymaking as well as to deepen the understanding of the issues at hand. These issues strongly influence the image of a Mediterranean that is characterised by high levels of insecurity. On the one hand there are highly poisoned and openly violent situations such as in Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict, while on the other hand there are sources of tension. These make it difficult to imagine in the medium- term a fulfilment of the objective of the Barcelona Process to create a Euro-Mediterranean space of shared peace and prosperity. On the contrary, the main signals emanating from the region point toward a generalised deterioration which pushes the notion of a Mediterranean free of WMD even further away. This worsening of the situation seems especially true in the more complex South-South relationships, rather than those between the South and the North. Since the presentation of the last report, there has only been an increase in concern over WMD1 in the Mediterranean – understood from a security perspective as the space made up by the European Union (EU), Balkans and Russia in the north, and - in the south and east - the • 153 Maghreb, Near East and Middle East. Most attention during the past months has centred on the evolution of Iran’s nuclear programme –together with the crisis surrounding North Korea– and the efforts by the international community –led by the EU, or, more specifically, the UK, France and Germany, with explicit support by the United States (US)– to avoid Iran possessing military capabilities in this area. From a regional security perspective, it is hard to find a relevant fact that points towards a lessening of tensions. The conflicts in Iraq and the one between Israel and its Arab neighbours have only worsened, while there is still no solution for the situation in Western Sahara or for the shadows that surround the relations between neighbouring nations in the Maghreb. The structure for dialogue and the confidence measures that were started years ago have so far failed to sufficiently reduce the enormous gaps of inequality and high levels of instability that affect the region as a whole. Among these measures are both those initiated by NATO and by the EU –with the Process of Barcelona– and some countries of the southern coast, and which are already more than a decade old, as well as those of sub-regional order, such as the 5+5 Group. In general terms, however, not all dynamics that were identified in the first report have undergone significant changes. Consequently, rather than repeating the same analysis again for countries whose profile with regard to WMD has not substantially changed, the reader is referred to last year’s report and to the update of the main issues per country in Section IV of this present report. The first report already announced the aim of successively filling the gaps which were not covered then. Therefore it was decided that the structure of this second report would be as follows: 1) Provide analysis (Section I) of northern countries that either because of their WMD capacities (France and the United Kingdom) or global interests with obvious links to the region (United States) should form part of this research on WMD in the Mediterranean. 2) Dedicate special attention –even if it was already analysed in last year’s report– to the case of Iran (Section II) which remains the most obvious priority after the events of the last twelve months. 3) Study in greater detail (Section III) the threat of so-called nuclear international terrorism which is nowadays considered –albeit not always backed-up by sufficient facts– to be one of the principal threats to international security. The report is completed by an Appendix (Section V) which contains a list of acronyms used in this text, a detailed chronology of Iran’s nuclear programme, and a list of internet sites related to the subject and which serves as an addition to the bibliographical references in Section VII of the first report. It is to be hoped that, in a future report, regional initiatives of non- proliferation will merit a whole section dedicated to them. This would be an indication that there exists a common political will to free the region from some arsenals and programmes that, rather than guaranteeing the security of separate countries, only contribute in increasing the insecurity of the whole. At the moment there is nothing worth adding to the report from 2005. At the global level, the conference on revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has demonstrated the enormous difficulties that exist in overcoming related obstacles in order to advance the agenda. At a regional level, it has 154 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN OMNIDIRECTIONAL THREAT • been for a long time already that the differences in perception between Israelis, Arabs and Persians make it impossible to integrate the issue into the agenda for Mediterranean security. The analysis in this report is framed within an environment of international security that remains dominated by the badly-named “war on terror”, spearheaded by the US. It is within this framework that WMD proliferation, together with international terrorism, is identified as the two main threats that hang above our heads. It is also in this model that multilateral approaches to deal with global threats, identified after the Cold War, have been neglected. These threats themselves have also been largely ignored in order to give way to unilateral and militaristic methods. The problems worsen even further after detecting a clear preference of counter-proliferation methods –which are basically centred on the use of force and coercion– rather than strengthening non-proliferation –turned towards instruments of international law and political agreements. Concern also grows after finding that important state actors such as the US are repositioning their own nuclear strategies in order to make them into weapons for combat situations. Finally, there is an insistence on using double standards for evaluating different actors (India, Pakistan, Israel, and even North Korea). By considering that the problem is not so much possessing nuclear weapons in the first place but rather the profile of the owner, this only serves to feed the negative comparisons that cause others (Iran being the most obvious example) to accelerate the process of obtaining them themselves. In spite of the short time that has passed since the beginning of the implementation of this strategy –initiated by the US– it seems already sufficient in order to conclude that it is an inadequate tool. This is not only because it fails to effectively respond to problems such as poverty, exclusion, pandemics or environmental degradation –all real international security threats– but also to deal with the two main threats identified above which have turned into obsessions that are badly understood and managed even worse. Together with the persistent negative contamination that the “war on terror” provokes in the area of WMD in the Mediterranean region, the other starting points and influences that were identified in the first report remain valid. There is therefore no need to repeat them again, but they should be taken as principal factors that explain the pages that follow. It is with this in mind and with the final goal of ultimately achieving a Mediterranean that is free of WMD that this present report aims to contribute to promoting a climate of greater transparency, mutual confidence, and to raise awareness about a subject matter that is usually shrouded in secrecy and has the potential to worsen even more the regional relations that are clearly in need of improvement.
Recommended publications
  • CRUISE MISSILE THREAT Volume 2: Emerging Cruise Missile Threat

    CRUISE MISSILE THREAT Volume 2: Emerging Cruise Missile Threat

    By Systems Assessment Group NDIA Strike, Land Attack and Air Defense Committee August 1999 FEASIBILITY OF THIRD WORLD ADVANCED BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE THREAT Volume 2: Emerging Cruise Missile Threat The Systems Assessment Group of the National Defense Industrial Association ( NDIA) Strike, Land Attack and Air Defense Committee performed this study as a continuing examination of feasible Third World missile threats. Volume 1 provided an assessment of the feasibility of the long range ballistic missile threats (released by NDIA in October 1998). Volume 2 uses aerospace industry judgments and experience to assess Third World cruise missile acquisition and development that is “emerging” as a real capability now. The analyses performed by industry under the broad title of “Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat” incorporate information only from unclassified sources. Commercial GPS navigation instruments, compact avionics, flight programming software, and powerful, light-weight jet propulsion systems provide the tools needed for a Third World country to upgrade short-range anti-ship cruise missiles or to produce new land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) today. This study focuses on the question of feasibility of likely production methods rather than relying on traditional intelligence based primarily upon observed data. Published evidence of technology and weapons exports bears witness to the failure of international agreements to curtail cruise missile proliferation. The study recognizes the role LACMs developed by Third World countries will play in conjunction with other new weapons, for regional force projection. LACMs are an “emerging” threat with immediate and dire implications for U.S. freedom of action in many regions .
  • Nuclear Weapon Producers

    Nuclear Weapon Producers

    Chapter 2 Nuclear Weapon Producers Nuclear weapon producers in this report Aecom (United States) Alliant Techsystems (United States) Babcock & Wilcox (United States) Babcock International (United Kingdom) BAE Systems (United Kingdom) Bechtel (United States) Bharat Electronics (India) Boeing (United States) CH2M Hill (United States) EADS (Netherlands) Fluor (United States) Gencorp (United States) General Dynamics (United States) Honeywell International (United States) Huntington Ingalls (United States) Jacobs Engineering (United States) Larsen & Toubro (India) Lockheed Martin (United States) Northrop Grumman (United States) Rockwell Collins (United States) Rolls-Royce (United Kingdom) Safran (France) In some of the nuclear-armed states – especially the SAIC (United States) United States, the United Kingdom and France – Serco (United Kingdom) governments award contracts to private companies to Thales (France) ThyssenKrupp (Germany) carry out work on their nuclear arsenals. This report URS (United States) looks at 27 of those companies providing the necessary infrastructure to develop, test, maintain and modernise nuclear arsenals. They are involved in producing or maintaining nuclear weapons or significant, specific components thereof. The 27 companies described in this chapter are substantially involved in the nuclear weapons programmes of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, India or Israel and themselves based in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany and India. In other nuclear-armed countries – such as Russia, China, Pakistan and North Korea – the modernization of nuclear forces is carried out primarily or exclusively by government agencies. In those countries, the opportunities to achieve divestment through public campaigning are limited. A potentially more effective way to challenge investments in these nuclear industries would be through influencing budgetary decision-making processes in national legislatures.
  • Bombs, Guns and Missiles (And CPP Investments)

    Bombs, Guns and Missiles (And CPP Investments)

    Bombs, Guns and Missiles (and CPP Investments) Delivery Systems: B-1, B-2, B-52 ll 115 of the weapons listed be- AGM = Air to Ground Missile low are aboard the major deliv- Contractor: Boeing (formerly AIM = Air Intercept Missile Aery systems with components McDonnell Douglas) and/or services provided by Canadian BGM = Ballistic Guided Missile AGM-88A HARM BLU = Bomb Live Unit companies that are highlighted on pages CPP Investmentü 11 to 30 of this issue of Press for Con- CBU = Cluster Bomb Unit This high-speed antiradiation missile version! Not all of the prime contrac- GBU = Guided Bomb Unit tors of these weapons could be deter- (HARM) is a more advanced version GPS = Global Positioning System mined. Nine were found to be produced of the AGM-45 “Shrike.” It finds and directly by the U.S. government. Of the MW = Multipurpose Weapon destroys enemy radar-equipped, air 73 weapons listed here – whose defense systems and uses a 143.5 lb nongovernment, prime contractors could be determined, 59 Direct Fragmentation warhead. were built by prime contractors in which the Canada Pen- Delivery Systems: EA-6, F-14, F-15, F-16, F-117, Tornado sion Plan has investments, i.e., 81%. Contractor: Raytheon [Texas Instruments] AGM-89 SRAM CPP Investmentü AGM-45 Shrike CPP Investmentü This 2240-lb. Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) has a The “Shrike” guided missile finds and destroys radar trans- 170 kiloton W69 warhead and uses an inertial guidance mitters that are directing missiles at warplanes. It uses a system. Its maximum range is about 115 miles.
  • Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018 Part 1 Introduction

    Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018 Part 1 Introduction

    Marine Nuclear Power: 1939 – 2018 Part 1: Introduction Peter Lobner July 2018 1 Foreword In 2015, I compiled the first edition of this resource document to support a presentation I made in August 2015 to The Lyncean Group of San Diego (www.lynceans.org) commemorating the 60th anniversary of the world’s first “underway on nuclear power” by USS Nautilus on 17 January 1955. That presentation to the Lyncean Group, “60 years of Marine Nuclear Power: 1955 – 2015,” was my attempt to tell a complex story, starting from the early origins of the US Navy’s interest in marine nuclear propulsion in 1939, resetting the clock on 17 January 1955 with USS Nautilus’ historic first voyage, and then tracing the development and exploitation of marine nuclear power over the next 60 years in a remarkable variety of military and civilian vessels created by eight nations. In July 2018, I finished a complete update of the resource document and changed the title to, “Marine Nuclear Power: 1939 – 2018.” What you have here is Part 1: Introduction. The other parts are: Part 2A: United States - Submarines Part 2B: United States - Surface Ships Part 3A: Russia - Submarines Part 3B: Russia - Surface Ships & Non-propulsion Marine Nuclear Applications Part 4: Europe & Canada Part 5: China, India, Japan and Other Nations Part 6: Arctic Operations 2 Foreword This resource document was compiled from unclassified, open sources in the public domain. I acknowledge the great amount of work done by others who have published material in print or posted information on the internet pertaining to international marine nuclear propulsion programs, naval and civilian nuclear powered vessels, naval weapons systems, and other marine nuclear applications.
  • Mp-Avt-108-01

    Mp-Avt-108-01

    UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED Interoperability & Aircraft Stores Certification – An Australian Perspective on Where To From Here Malcolm G. Tutty Director Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering Agency Aerospace Operational Support Group RAAF Base EDINBURGH South Australia 5111 [email protected] ABSTRACT The level of interoperability of aircraft and stores is vital to Australia being able to fly and fight with our allies. Interoperability (ie the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services from other systems, units or forces and to use the service so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together) is usually given a very high priority early in aerospace weapons programs in setting the standards required and then seems to be left behind when fiscal realities start hitting home. Standardisation can occur within the areas of doctrine, procedures and equipment at three possible levels of standardisation to achieve the required level of interoperability: Compatibility, Interchangeability and Commonality. This paper will discuss Australia’s perspective on the extant development and agreement of better, internationally recognised, technical standards addressing structures, electrical interfaces, EMC/EMI/HERO, safe escape, flight termination systems, safety templates, risk management and, most importantly, a method to verify the level of interoperability. The level of interoperability for nationally “certified” aircraft stores configurations needs to, however, mature beyond such a technical emphasis to one of a people
  • Air-To-Surface Missiles Links

    Air-To-Surface Missiles Links

    Air-To-Surface Missiles Links AIR-TO-SURFACE-MISSILES Argentine ASMs British ASMs Chinese ASMs French ASMs International ASMs Japanese ASMs Russian ASMs Swedish ASMs US ASMs Yugoslavian ASMs file:///E/My%20Webs/asms/air-to-surface_missiles_links_2.html[5/24/2021 5:50:18 PM] Argentine ASMs Martin Pescador Notes: The Martin Pescador (Kingfisher in Spanish) is an ASM that is primarily meant to take down ships, but is also useful against land targets. It can be fired from helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft. It borrows heavily from the US Bullpup, including the simple radio command with joystick control in the cockpit. Though the missile was shown as early as 1979, none were used in the 1982 Falklands War, and the missile has not been seen much. Acquisition may have been slowed or stopped by budgetary problems. Weapon Difficulty Guidance Weight Price Martin Pescador Average Radio Command 140 kg $4568 Weapon Speed Round Min Range Max Range Damage Pen Martin Pescador 3910 KEP/HE 2500 9000 C70 B82 119C file:///E/My%20Webs/asms/argentine_asms.htm[5/24/2021 5:50:37 PM] British ASMs ALARM Notes: This is the antiradiation missile most normally carried by European aircraft. It was first used in combat in the 1991 Gulf War and proved very effective in the Gulf War and the Twilight War. The missile has a loiter capability; if it loses its target, the missile will climb to 12,000 meters, deploy a parachute, and slowly descend over the last known location of the target, waiting for more radar emissions. It can also home in on the last known location of its target, achieving a hit that way.
  • IHS™ Jane's® Weapons

    IHS™ Jane's® Weapons

    IHS™ Jane’s® Weapons Air-Launched 2014-2015 RobertHewson ISBN 978 07106 3104 6-Weapons Air-Launched ISBN 978 07106 3108 4-Weapons Ammunition ISBN 978 07106 3105 3-Weapons Infantry ISBN 978 07106 3106 0-Weapons Naval ISBN 978 07106 3107 7-Weapons Strategic ISBN 978 07106 3120 6-Weapons Full Set ©2014 IHS. All rights reserved. Thirdparty details and websites No partofthis publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any Any thirdparty details and websites aregiven for information and reference purposes means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, or be stored in only and IHS Global Limited does not control, approve or endorse these thirdparties any retrieval system of any nature, without prior written permission of IHS Global or thirdparty websites. Further,IHS Global Limited does not control or guarantee the Limited. Applications for written permission should be directed to Christopher Bridge. accuracy, relevance, availability, timeliness or completeness of the information contained on any thirdparty website. Inclusion of any thirdparty details or websites is Any views or opinions expressed by contributors and thirdparties arepersonal to not intended to reflect their importance, nor is it intended to endorse any views them and do not represent the views or opinions of IHS Global Limited, its affiliates or expressed, products or services offered, nor the companies or organisations in staff. question. Youaccess any thirdparty websites solely at your own risk. Disclaimer of liability Use of data Whilst
  • Consequences of an Accident Involving Nuclear Weapons

    Consequences of an Accident Involving Nuclear Weapons

    ThisreportisdedicatedtothememoryofJohn Ainslie, whose persistent and meticulous research exposedmanyoftheaccidentsdescribedhere CONTENTS REPORT HEADLINES 2 FOREWORD 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 INTRODUCTION 8 THE PRODUCTION AND MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 14 CASE STUDY 1: ‘An accident waiting to happen: fire at Windscale .......... 25 ON THE ROAD: ACCIDENTS DURING THE TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 30 CASE STUDY 2: Slipping off the road ............................. 39 STORAGE AND HANDLING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 42 CASE STUDY 3: Rough handling at RAF Bruggen ...................... 46 IN THE FIELD: INCIDENTS INVOLVING AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS 48 CASE STUDY 4: Nuclear weapons and the Falklands War ................ 55 UNDER THE WAVES: ACCIDENTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR-ARMED SUBMARINES 58 CASE STUDY 5: Collision in the ocean depths.........................73 SECRETS AND SPIES: NUCLEAR SECURITY 76 CASE STUDY 6: “We’re hijacking this submarine. Take us to Cuba.” ..........87 OVER HERE: ACCIDENTS INVOLVING US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE UK 90 CASE STUDY 7: Broken Arrow at Lakenheath......................... 98 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 100 AFTERWORD 103 APPENDIX 104 GLOSSARY 106 REPORT AUTHOR: PETER BURT 1 REPORT HEADLINES Whywedidthisstudy: • The following factors have all contributed to accidents involving British nuclear weapons: This report presents the accident record of the ` Failures caused as equipment reaches UK’s nuclear weapons programme over its 65 the end of its operating life. year history. Our aim in doing this is simple: to remind the public of the risks posed by nuclear ` Equipment in short supply or overused. weapons, and to alert politicians and decision ` Operations hurried or conducted makers to the need to eliminate these risks. under pressure. ` Workers failing to follow even the What we found: strictest instructions and procedures.
  • Nuclear Weapons in Europe: British and French Deterrence Forces in a European Context Has Come to the Fore in Recent Years

    Nuclear Weapons in Europe: British and French Deterrence Forces in a European Context Has Come to the Fore in Recent Years

    Questions about the meaning, role and utility of nuclear deterrence forces deterrence and French British in Europe: weapons Nuclear in a European context has come to the fore in recent years. Russia has reemphasized the role of a full-spectrum nuclear arsenal. This includes increased reliance on substrategic nuclear weapons for battlefield use, to compensate for its perceived inferiority in conventional armaments. In Europe, the main multilateral and intergovernmental institutions and cooperation have been put under strain as a result of several negative developments. As a consequence the UK and France, Europe’s two nuclear powers, are debating the role and composition of their respective deterrent forces. Multiple, complex security dilemmas, and the possibility that established alliances and partnerships might not be sufficiently reliable, inform the choices that have to be made. The study concludes that while the current arsenals will remain fundamental to national security, their long term futures are far from certain. Budgetary constraints, domestic politics, and strategic perceptions informed by national nuclear mentalities are the main factors determining the outcome and composition of French and British arsenals beyond 2030. Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces Niklas Granholm, John Rydqvist FOI-R--4587--SE ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se April 2018 Niklas Granholm John Rydqvist Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces Bild/Cover: HMS Victorious returning to Clyde. Photo UK MoD. FOI-R--4587--SE Titel Kärnvapen I Europa: Storbritanniens och Frankrikes kärnvapenarsenaler Title Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--4587--SE Månad/Month April Utgivningsår/Year 2018 Antal sidor/Pages 79 ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet Forskningsområde 8.
  • Nuclear Weapons FAQ (NWFAQ) Organization Back to Main Index

    Nuclear Weapons FAQ (NWFAQ) Organization Back to Main Index

    Nuclear Weapons FAQ (NWFAQ) Organization Back to Main Index This is a complete listing of the decimally numbered headings of the Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions, which provides a comprehensive view of the organization and contents of the document. Index 1.0 Types of Nuclear Weapons 1.1 Terminology 1.2 U.S. Nuclear Test Names 1.3 Units of Measurement 1.4 Pure Fission Weapons 1.5 Combined Fission/Fusion Weapons 1.5.1 Boosted Fission Weapons 1.5.2 Staged Radiation Implosion Weapons 1.5.3 The Alarm Clock/Sloika (Layer Cake) Design 1.5.4 Neutron Bombs 1.6 Cobalt Bombs 2.0 Introduction to Nuclear Weapon Physics and Design 2.1 Fission Weapon Physics 2.1.1 The Nature Of The Fission Process 2.1.2 Criticality 2.1.3 Time Scale of the Fission Reaction 2.1.4 Basic Principles of Fission Weapon Design 2.1.4.1 Assembly Techniques - Achieving Supercriticality 2.1.4.1.1 Implosion Assembly 2.1.4.1.2 Gun Assembly 2.1.4.2 Initiating Fission 2.1.4.3 Preventing Disassembly and Increasing Efficiency 2.2 Fusion Weapon Physics 2.2.1 Candidate Fusion Reactions 2.2.2 Basic Principles of Fusion Weapon Design 2.2.2.1 Designs Using the Deuterium+Tritium Reaction 2.2.2.2 Designs Using Other Fuels 3.0 Matter, Energy, and Radiation Hydrodynamics 3.1 Thermodynamics and the Properties of Gases 3.1.1 Kinetic Theory of Gases 3.1.2 Heat, Entropy, and Adiabatic Compression 3.1.3 Thermodynamic Equilibrium and Equipartition 3.1.4 Relaxation 3.1.5 The Maxwell-Boltzmann Distribution Law 3.1.6 Specific Heats and the Thermodynamic Exponent 3.1.7 Properties of Blackbody
  • Innovation Studies and the History of Technology

    Innovation Studies and the History of Technology

    Trying to secure the past: innovation studies and the history of technology A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the Faculty of Humanities Jonathan Aylen 2018 1 Contents page Listing of Publications 3 Abstract 4 Declaration 5 Copyright Statement 5 Jonathan Aylen, Statement of Eligibility 6 Introduction 1. Selection of a coherent set of papers 8 2. Historical methods in the study of technology 23 3. The nature of the innovation process 30 4. Lessons from innovation research 41 5. Bibliography 46 6. Corrections and updates 57 7. Impact of this research 59 Papers Blue Danube - Britain’s post-war atomic bomb 61 Stretch - how innovation continues once investment is made 62 Bloodhound - building the Ferranti Argus process control computer 63 Open versus closed innovation - development of the wide strip mill for steel 64 Construction of the Shotton wide strip mill 65 Development of computer applications in the iron and steel industry 66 2 “Trying to secure the past: innovation studies and the history of technology” "People work much in order to secure the future; I gave my mind much work and trouble, trying to secure the past" Isak Dinesen/also known as Karen von Blixen-Finecke (1885-1962), Shadows on the Grass, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990, essay “Echoes from the Hills”, p.116 papers: 1. Jonathan Aylen, “First waltz: development and deployment of Blue Danube, Britain’s post-war atomic bomb”, The International Journal for the History of Engineering & Technology, vol. 85, no.1, January 2015, pp.31-59 2.
  • (Dis)Continuous Deterrence

    (Dis)Continuous Deterrence

    SEPTEMBER 2018 (Dis)Continuous Deterrence Challenges to Britain’s Nuclear Doctrine Toby Fenwick © The British American Security Information Council (BASIC), 2018 All images are available for reuse under the MOD (Consent License) and the OGL (Open Government License) unless The British American Security otherwise stated. Information Council (BASIC) 17 Oval Way The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility London of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of BASIC. SE11 5RR Charity Registration No. 1001081 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, T: +44 (0) 20 3752 5662 electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or www.basicint.org any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. The Author BASIC Toby Fenwick is a Research Associate of BASIC, The British American Security Information Council bringing more than 15 years’ public policy (BASIC) is an independent think tank and registered experience in HM Treasury, UK Cabinet Office, DFID, charity based in Whitehall, London, promoting the UK NAO, and think tanks to his work. He served innovative ideas and international dialogue on for 14 years in the RAF intelligence reserves, nuclear disarmament, arms control, and supporting operations at home and abroad. A nonproliferation. Since 1987, we’ve been at the Liberal Democrat, he served on the party’s most forefront of global efforts to build trust and recent nuclear weapons working group, has written cooperation on some of the world’s most extensively on UK nuclear weapons policy, and progressive global peace and security initiatives, lectured on it at the James Martin Center for advising governments in the United States, United Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey, California.