Nuclear Weapons in Europe: British and French Deterrence Forces in a European Context Has Come to the Fore in Recent Years
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Questions about the meaning, role and utility of nuclear deterrence forces deterrence and French British in Europe: weapons Nuclear in a European context has come to the fore in recent years. Russia has reemphasized the role of a full-spectrum nuclear arsenal. This includes increased reliance on substrategic nuclear weapons for battlefield use, to compensate for its perceived inferiority in conventional armaments. In Europe, the main multilateral and intergovernmental institutions and cooperation have been put under strain as a result of several negative developments. As a consequence the UK and France, Europe’s two nuclear powers, are debating the role and composition of their respective deterrent forces. Multiple, complex security dilemmas, and the possibility that established alliances and partnerships might not be sufficiently reliable, inform the choices that have to be made. The study concludes that while the current arsenals will remain fundamental to national security, their long term futures are far from certain. Budgetary constraints, domestic politics, and strategic perceptions informed by national nuclear mentalities are the main factors determining the outcome and composition of French and British arsenals beyond 2030. Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces Niklas Granholm, John Rydqvist FOI-R--4587--SE ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se April 2018 Niklas Granholm John Rydqvist Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces Bild/Cover: HMS Victorious returning to Clyde. Photo UK MoD. FOI-R--4587--SE Titel Kärnvapen I Europa: Storbritanniens och Frankrikes kärnvapenarsenaler Title Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--4587--SE Månad/Month April Utgivningsår/Year 2018 Antal sidor/Pages 79 ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet Forskningsområde 8. Säkerhetspolitik FoT-område Ej FoT Projektnr/Project no A18102 Godkänd av/Approved by Lars Höstbeck Ansvarig avdelning Defence Analysis/Försvarsanalys Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, vilket bl.a. innebär att citering är tillåten i enlighet med vad som anges i 22 § i nämnd lag. För att använda verket på ett sätt som inte medges direkt av svensk lag krävs särskild överenskommelse. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. 2 FOI-R--4587--SE Summary Questions about the meaning, role and utility of nuclear deterrence in a European context has come to the fore in recent years. Russia has reemphasized the role of a full-spectrum nuclear arsenal. This includes increased reliance on substrategic nuclear weapons for battlefield use, to compensate for its perceived inferiority in conventional armaments. In Europe, the main multilateral and intergovernmental institutions and cooperation have been put under strain as a result of several negative develop- ments. As a consequence the UK and France, Europe’s two nuclear powers, are debating the role and composition of their respective deterrent forces. Multiple, complex security dilemmas, and the possibility that established alliances and partnerships might not be sufficiently reliable, inform the choices that have to be made. The study concludes that while the current arsenals will remain fundamental to national security, their long term futures are far from certain. Budgetary con- straints, domestic politics, and strategic perceptions informed by national nuclear mentalities are the main factors determining the outcome and composition of French and British arsenals beyond 2030. Keywords: France, Great Britain, nuclear weapons, SSBN, deterrence, European security, United States, nuclear cooperation 3 FOI-R--4587--SE Sammanfattning Kärnvapen har under de senaste åren återkommit som en faktor i europeisk säkerhet. Ryssland betonar åter kärnvapen som en strategisk och operativ komponent i sitt försvar. I detta ingår inte bara vapen för strategisk avskräckning utan även slagfältskärnvapen. Detta motiveras bland annat med behovet av att kompensera för en upplevd konventionell militär underlägsenhet. I Västeuropa är den politiska sammanhållningen av flera orsaker ifrågasatt. EU påvisar splittringstendenser och det finns frågetecken kring den transatlantiska länken. Som följd av omvärldsläget diskuterar Europas två kärnvapenmakter, Storbritannien och Frankrike, arsenalernas roll och sammansättning. Hur de multipla och komplexa säkerhetsdilemman de står inför utvecklas, kommer att vara avgörande för framtida vägval. Studien drar slutsatsen att kärnvapenarsenalerna i båda länderna fortfar att vara av fundamental betydelse för nationell säkerhet i ett kort och medellångt perspektiv. Ekonomiska faktorer, inrikespolitisk utveckling samt fortsatt strategisk utveckling kopplat till nationella föreställningar kommer att avgöra vilken roll och samman- sättning arsenalerna får bortom 2030. Nyckelord: Frankrike, Storbritannien, kärnvapen, SSBN, kärnvapenavskräckning, europeisk säkerhet, USA, kärnvapensamarbete 4 FOI-R--4587--SE Contents Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces 1 Summary 3 Sammanfattning 4 Foreword 6 Abbreviations 7 1 Introduction 11 1.1 The focus of this study .................................................................... 13 2 The British Nuclear Deterrent 15 2.1 Background ..................................................................................... 15 2.2 Current British Nuclear Doctrine ..................................................... 18 2.3 Current British Nuclear Forces ........................................................ 21 2.3.1 Nuclear Components .................................................................. 21 2.3.2 Non-nuclear Components ........................................................... 27 2.4 Issues for the Future ....................................................................... 28 2.5 Conclusion: Neither Credible, nor Independent or Affordable? ...... 33 3 The French Nuclear Deterrent 37 3.1 Background ..................................................................................... 37 3.2 Current French Nuclear Doctrine .................................................... 45 3.3 Current French Nuclear Forces ....................................................... 50 3.3.1 Nuclear Components .................................................................. 50 3.3.2 Non-nuclear Components ........................................................... 57 3.4 Issues for the Future ....................................................................... 61 3.5 Conclusion: Grandeur, Defence and the Nuclear Deterrent ........... 67 4 Conclusion and Discussion 69 5 Sources and literature 72 5 FOI-R--4587--SE Foreword This study has been undertaken on behalf of the Swedish Ministry of Defence under the auspices of the Nordic and Trans-Atlantic Security Studies project (NOTS). It is part of a broader effort analysing nuclear issues in Europe. The security environment in Europe and surrounding regions are under transformation. Nuclear deterrence and issues of escalation control and warfighting have again come to the fore as a fundamental political and military question. Issues of strategic deterrence and conventional defence can no longer be seen as separate. The European nuclear powers are a central factor in this environment. Several experts, within and outside of the FOI, have contributed with helpful advice and comments, for which we are deeply grateful. Jan Frelin commented on the final manuscript, Eve Johansson gave invaluable comments on the proper use of the English language, Lars Wedin provided excellent comments from the French perspective. Bruno Tertrais and Tom Plant provided us with insightful, expert comments on the respective national programmes. Any remaining faults and weaknesses are the sole responsibility of the authors. Stockholm in April 2018 Niklas Granholm and John Rydqvist 6 FOI-R--4587--SE Abbreviations ASMP Air-Sol Moyenne Portée ASW anti-submarine warfare ATL2 Dassault Atlantique 2, French long-range maritime patrol aircraft AWE Atomic Weapons Establishment, UK bn billion CASD Continuous At Sea Deterrence CEA Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives, the French atomic and alternative energy agency CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty DAM Direction des applications militaires, the division for military applications of the CEA EII European Intervention Initiative, a French initiative launched in the 2017 Strategic Review EMP electromagnetic pulse EPURE Expérimentations de Physique Utilisant la Radiographie Éclair, joint UK-French X-ray radiograph facility in Valduc, France EU European Union FMCT Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty FOST Force océanique stratégique, France’s SSBN force FREMM Frégate européenne multi-mission, new French frigate class FTI Frégate de Taille Intermédiaire, forthcoming French frigate class GBP British pound GDP gross domestic product HMNB Clyde Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde IMF International Monetary Fund km kilometre kt kiloton LMJ Le Laser Mégajoule, key facility for French nuclear simulation MIRV multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle MDA Mutual Defence Agreement MPA maritime patrol aircraft NGO non-governmental organization NOTC Nuclear Operations Targeting Centre 7 FOI-R--4587--SE NPG