DOCSLIB.ORG

Amerykański System Obrony Antybalistycznej Oraz Faktyczne Źródła Rosyjskiego Sprzeciwu

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Amerykański System Obrony Antybalistycznej Oraz Faktyczne Źródła Rosyjskiego Sprzeciwu Amerykański system obrony antybalistycznej oraz faktyczne źródła rosyjskiego sprzeciwu Leszek Pawlikowicz1 Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, Wydział Prawa Zakład Historii Prawa i Doktryn Polityczno-Prawnych Abstrakt: Amerykański program BMD jest formalnie postrzegany jako największe – obok rozszerzania NATO na Wschód – wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyj- skiej od chwili powstania państwa w końcu 1991 r. Jednak ze względu na mające miejsce w ciągu ostatniego ćwierćwiecza w Rosji zaniechania modernizacyjne (w odróż- nieniu od imponującego skoku technologicznego dokonanego w Chinach) – zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do sfery gospodarczej – faktycznie może on stanowić znacznie większe potencjalne wyzwanie dla rosyjskiej ekonomii, geopolityki i prestiżu niż dla jej zdolności obronnych. Stąd próba ambitnej odpowiedzi, polegającej na forsowaniu kosztownych programów zbrojeniowych, może być – paradoksalnie – taką samą pułapką, jak próba utrzymania parytetu w odpowiedzi na mityczny program SDI ze strony ZSRR. Wystar- czającą pod względem efektywności militarnej (efektu odstraszania), a przy tym rela- tywnie najtańszą ekonomicznie odpowiedzią jest utrzymywanie przez Rosję strategicz- nych sił jądrowych na obecnym pułapie ilościowym. W długofalowej perspektywie de- cydujące dla przyszłej pozycji oraz siły tego państwa, a także jego „atrakcyjności” i „siły 129 przyciągania” w przestrzeni międzynarodowej będzie znaczące podniesienie potencjału gospodarczego, zwłaszcza w sferze wysokich technologii oraz w branżach odpowie- dzialnych za zaspokojenie szeroko rozumianej konsumpcji. Tego typu strategia dopro- wadziła do bezprecedensowego rozwoju Chin. Słowa kluczowe: BMD, równowaga wojskowa, Stany Zjednoczone, Federacja Rosyjska 1 Leszek Pawlikowicz – adiunkt w Zakładzie Historii Prawa i Doktryn Polityczno-Prawnych Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego. Jest autorem czterech monografii: Tajny front zimnej wojny. Uciekinierzy z polskich służb specjalnych 1956–1964, Warszawa 2004; Status prawny ucie- kinierów z polskich służb specjalnych 1956–1964. Normy prawa karnego, międzynarodowego publicznego oraz wewnętrzne przepisy azylowe krajów przyjmujących, Rzeszów 2008; Aparat centralny 1. Zarządu Głównego KGB jako instrument realizacji globalnej strategii Kremla 1954– –1991, Warszawa 2013; Aparaty centralne służb wywiadu cywilnego Układu Warszawskiego jako wyspecjalizowane struktury państwa 1944-1991, Rzeszów 2015. Twórca kilkudziesięciu artykułów naukowych o charakterze interdyscyplinarnym (z zakresu historii, prawa i politologii) dotyczących w szczególności różnorodnych aspektów funkcjonowania służb specjalnych okresu zimnej wojny. Szczególne obszary zainteresowań naukowych: aspekty strukturalno-kadrowe oraz efektywność funkcjonowania wywiadu i kontrwywiadu w latach 1945–1991, aspekty strukturalno-kadrowe oraz efektywność funkcjonowania sił zbrojnych i pozostałych „resortów siłowych” w sytuacjach zagrożenia (tzw. stanach nadzwyczajnych) 1939–1991. E-mail: [email protected]. Amerykański system obrony antybalistycznej… red. naukowa Malina Kaszuba, Mirosław Minkina American system anti-missile defense and real sources of russian opposition Abstract: The American program BMD has been formally regarded as the greatest – alongside NATO enlargement to the East – challenge to the security of the Russian Federation since the establishment of the state at the end of 1991. However, due to the modernization omissions taken place in the last quarter of a century in Russia (in contrast to the impressive technological leap made in China) – particularly with regard to the economic sphere – in fact it can be a much greater potential challenge for the Russian economy, geopolitics and prestige than for its defense capabilities. Hence, an ambitious attempt of response consisting in pushing through the costly weapons programs can be – paradoxically – the same trap as an attempt to main- tain parity in response to the mythical program SDI from the Soviet Union. Suffi- cient, in terms of the military effectiveness (deterrence effect), and at the same rela- tively cheapest cost, the answer is to keep Russia’s strategic nuclear forces to pre- sent a quantitative ceiling. In the long term, decisive for the future position and strength of the country as well as its “attractiveness” and “attraction” in the interna- tional sphere will be a significant increase ofthe economic potential, especially in the sphere of high technologies and industries responsible for meeting the wider consumption. This type of strategy has led to the unprecedented development of China. 130 Keywords: BMD, military balance, United States, Russian Federation Wprowadzenie Zapowiedź i przystąpienie do realizacji przez Stany Zjednoczo- ne Ameryki (USA) tzw. systemu obrony antybalistycznej (Ballistic Missile Defense – BMD) oraz brak akceptacji Rosji wobec tego faktu należą od prawie półtorej dekady do najistotniejszych nierozwiąza- nych problemów bezpieczeństwa współczesnego świata. Wbrew ro- syjskim deklaracjom przyczyny wspomnianego sprzeciwu wcale nie ograniczają się do źródeł stricte militarnych. Wydaje się, że co naj- mniej równie istotną rolę odgrywają w tym kontekście także inne elementy: prestiż związany ze statusem Rosji jako mocarstwa, a tak- że czynniki ekonomiczne i geopolityczne. Rozwój systemów obrony antyrakietowej supermocarstw w okresie zimnej wojny Pierwsze studyjne prace nad powstaniem tej kategorii broni rozpoczęto już w drugiej połowie lat 40. ubiegłego wieku: na począt- ku – 4 marca 1946 r. – w USA (w ramach tzw. projektu MX-794 Wi- zard na Uniwersytecie w Michigan), a dwa lata później w Związku Leszek Pawlikowicz Polska – Rosja. Polityka bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej… Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich (ZSRR) (w biurze konstruk- cyjnym НИИ-4)2. Minęła jednak prawie dekada zanim w obu państwach podjęto decyzje o przeprowadzeniu testów nad pierwszymi eksperymental- nymi systemami obrony przeciwrakietowej: w ZSRR nastąpiło to 17 sierpnia 1956 r. (tzw. program A), a w USA 11 miesięcy później – 22 stycznia 1958 r. (tzw. program Nike Zeus). Z kolei pierwsze testy startowe rakiet antybalistycznych (zwanych również antyrakietami) miały miejsce: 13 października 1957 r. w ZSRR (była to – według ro- syjskiego zapisu literowego – antyrakieta B-1000, oznaczana jedno- cześnie według zachodnich systemów identyfikacji wywiadowczej ja- ko Gaffer) oraz 14 października 1959 r. w USA (antyrakieta XLIM-49A Nike Zeus A), a pierwsze skuteczne przechwycenia przez nie rakiet ba- listycznych – celów miało miejsce odpowiednio: 4 marca 1961 r. (zniszczenie przez B-1000 radzieckiej rakiety R-12) i 19 lipca 1962 r. (strącenie przez Nike Zeus B amerykańskiej rakiety Atlas D)3. Do końca lat 60. w wyścigu zbrojeń tej kategorii broni prym wiódł Związek Radziecki. Jednak ze względu na bardzo wysokie koszty systemów antyrakietowych oba kraje zmuszone były do ograniczenia ambitnych programów ich rozwoju. Choć do 1990 r. spośród czterech radzieckich typów antyrakiet do uzbrojenia wpro- 131 wadzono aż trzy [kolejno: 5W61/A-350Ż, 5W61R/A-350R i 53T6/PRS-1 Azow oznaczane na Zachodzie odpowiednio jako: ABM-1A Galosh (SH-01), ABM-1B Galosh (SH-04) oraz ABM-3A Ga- zelle (SH-08M)], to jednak wszystkie z nich rozmieszczono jedynie wokół Moskwy, a zamiast 256 planowanych wyrzutni antyrakiet pierwszego typu (ten typ wszedł do użytku w czerwcu 1971 r.), było ich zaledwie 48, co stanowiło jedynie 19% pierwotnego planu4. Po zgłoszonej w czerwcu 1967 r. przez prezydenta Lyndona Johnsona propozycji podpisania układu o ograniczeniu programów 2 D.R. Baucom, Origins of SDI: 1944–1983, Lawrence 1992, s. 6; A. B. Карпенко, Противоракетная и противокосмическая оборона, Caнкт-Петербург 1998, s. 3. 3 D.R. Baucom, op. cit., s. 203; Карпенко, op. cit., s. 3, 19; History of Strategic Air Ballistic Missile Defense. Volume 1: 1945–1955, [b.m.w.] 2009, s. 111; Система А – GAFFER, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-340.html [dostęp: 4.05.2015]; Nike Zeus, Nuclear ABMs of the USA, http://www.nuclearabms. info/NikeZeus.html [dostęp: 4.05.2015]; J. Walker, L. Bernstein, S. Lang, Seize the High Ground. The Army in Space and Missile Defense, Washington 2003, s. B–6. 4 А-35 Алдан – ABM-1 GALOSH, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-344.html [do- stęp: 4.05.2015]; Система А-35М – ABM-1B GALOSH, http:// militaryrussia.ru/ blog/topic-353.html [dostęp: 4.05.2015]; Система С-225 Азов – ABM-X-3, http:// mi- litaryrussia.ru/ blog/topic-346.html [dostęp: 4.05.2015]. Koncepcja walki informacyjnej jako element strategii… red. naukowa Malina Kaszuba, Mirosław Minkina tej kategorii broni oraz stosunkowo krótkich rokowaniach oba pań- stwa podpisały 26 maja 1972 r. w Moskwie Traktat o ograniczeniu rozwoju, testowania i rozmieszczania systemów antybalistycznych (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty – ABM). Zezwalał on na utrzymywanie przez każdą ze stron jednego lądowego systemu obrony strefowej, ulokowanego bądź wokół stolicy, bądź bazy międzykontynentalnych rakiet balistycznych. Układ ograniczał liczbę antyrakiet oraz ich wy- rzutni w każdym systemie do 100. Zarówno USA, jak i ZSRR w bar- dzo szybkim tempie dokonały jego ratyfikacji5. Mimo wprowadzenia do służby w październiku 1975 r. amery- kańskiego systemu opartego na dwóch typach antyrakiet (LIM-49A Spartan i Sprint) Kongres wstrzymał środki na jego utrzymanie ze względu na ogromne koszty funkcjonowania. Na początku 1976 r. – zaledwie po trzech miesiącach od osiągnięcia zdolności operacyjnej – system wycofano z uzbrojenia6. Od tamtej pory aż do września 2004 r. USA nie posiadały żadnej kategorii tej broni w gotowości
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016
    The Russian Armed Forces are developing from a force primarily designed for handling internal – 2016 Perspective Ten-Year in a Capability Military Russian disorder and conflicts in the area of the former Soviet Union towards a structure configured for large-scale operations also beyond that area. The Armed Forces can defend Russia from foreign aggression in 2016 better than they could in 2013. They are also a stronger instrument of coercion than before. This report analyses Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective. It is the eighth edition. A change in this report compared with the previous edition is that a basic assumption has been altered. In 2013, we assessed fighting power under the assumption that Russia was responding to an emerging threat with little or no time to prepare operations. In view of recent events, we now estimate available assets for military operations in situations when Russia initiates the use of armed force. The fighting power of the Russian Armed Forces is studied. Fighting power means the available military assets for three overall missions: operational-strategic joint inter-service combat operations (JISCOs), stand-off warfare and strategic deterrence. The potential order of battle is estimated for these three missions, i.e. what military forces Russia is able to generate and deploy in 2016. The fighting power of Russia’s Armed Forces has continued to increase – primarily west of the Urals. Russian military strategic theorists are devoting much thought not only to military force, but also to all kinds of other – non-military – means. The trend in security policy continues to be based on anti- Americanism, patriotism and authoritarianism at home.
    [Show full text]
  • Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament
    Engaging China and Russia CNS on Nuclear Disarmament OCCASIONAL PAPER #15 MARCH 2009 Cristina Hansell, William C. Potter, eds. JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES Th e James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) strives to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis. A research center at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (an affi liate of Middlebury College), CNS is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. For more information about CNS, visit cns.miis.edu. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies 460 Pierce St., Monterey, CA 93940, U.S.A. Tel. +1 (831) 647-4154; fax +1 (831) 647-3519; e-mail: [email protected] Editors Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter Policy recommendations, statements of fact, and opinions expressed in this Occasional Paper are the responsibility of the authors and do not imply the endorsement of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies or the Monterey Institute of International Studies. ISBN 978-0-9798703-5-4 (PDF) © Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2009 Cover: Composite using images from iStockphoto.com: Hands © Chen Chih-Wen; Chinese fl ag © Bjorn Kindler; Russian fl ag © Matt Trommer; U.S. fl ag © Lugo Graphics. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, Editors James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15 April 2009 CONTENTS Foreword iii Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter SUMMARY REPORT Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Achieving Nuclear Zero 1 Nikolai N.
    [Show full text]
  • Contents Purpose
    Contents Purpose ................................................................................................................................................... 3 Method ................................................................................................................................................... 3 Description of sources ............................................................................................................................. 4 Topics for discussion................................................................................................................................ 4 Disposition............................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 6 Ballistic Missile Defense........................................................................................................................... 9 US Ballistic Missile Defense: Organization and technology ................................................................... 9 Block 2004-2005 ............................................................................................................................ 12 Block 2006-2007 ............................................................................................................................ 13 US Ballistic Missile Defense System components...........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction
    GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION April 2015 De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION April 2015 De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures Copyright © 2015 by Global Zero All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without written permission of the copyright holder. Global Zero assumes full responsibility for the analysis and recommendations contained in this report. www.globalzero.org GLOBAL ZERO COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION April 2015 Chair Gen. (Ret.) James E. CARTWRIGHT, Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Fmr. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf, United States Members Amb. K. Shankar BAJPAI, Fmr. Chairman, National Security Advisory Board; Fmr. Secretary of the Ministry of External Afairs, India Amb. Richard BURT, Fmr. United States Chief Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Evgeny P. BUZHINSKY, Senior Vice President, PIR Center; Fmr. Head, International Treaty Directorate, Main Department of International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Amb. Ivo H. DAALDER, President, Te Chicago Council on Global Afairs; Fmr. Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vincent DESPORTES, Senior Military Advisor, Panhard General Defense; Fmr. Director of the Joint War College (College interarmée de defense, CID), France Adm. (Ret.) Giampaolo DI PAOLA, Fmr. Minister of Defence, Italy; Fmr. Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Maj. Gen.
    [Show full text]
  • SIPRI Yearbook 2021, Chapter 10, World Nuclear Forces
    SUBJECT TO FINAL FORMATTING. 10. World nuclear forces Overview At the start of 2021, nine states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea)—possessed approximately 13 080 nuclear weapons, of which 3825 were deployed with operational forces (see table 10.1). Approximately 2000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert. Overall, the number of nuclear warheads in the world continues to decline. However, this is primarily due to the USA and Russia dismantling retired war­ heads. Global reductions of operational warheads appear to have stalled, and their numbers may be rising again. At the same time, both the USA and Russia have extensive and expensive programmes under way to replace and modern­ ize their nuclear warheads, missile and aircraft delivery systems, and nuclear weapon production facilities (see sections I and II). The nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear­armed states are considerably smaller (see sections III–IX), but all are either developing or deploying new weapon systems or have announced their intention to do so. China is in the middle of a significant modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and India and Pakistan also appear to be increasing the size of their nuclear weapon inven tories. North Korea’s military nuclear programme remains central to its national security strategy, although in 2020 it did not conduct any tests of nuclear weapons or long­range ballistic missile delivery systems. The availability of reliable information on the status of the nuclear arsenals and capabilities of the nuclear­armed states varies considerably.
    [Show full text]
  • SIPRI Yearbook 2016
    world nuclear forces 619 II. Russian nuclear forces hans m. kristensen As of January 2016 Russia maintained an arsenal of approximately 4490 nuclear warheads assigned to nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. About 2540 of these are strategic warheads, of which around 1790 are deployed on ballistic missiles and at bomber bases. Russia also possessed nearly 1950 non-strategic (tactical) nuclear warheads, all of which are in central storage. A further 2800 warheads are in reserve or retired and awaiting dis- mantlement, for a total inventory of roughly 7290 warheads (see table 16.3). Russia met the ceiling of 1550 deployed warheads mandated by the 2010 Russian–US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Lim- itation of Strategic Off ensive Arms (New START) in 2012, six years earlier than envisaged by the treaty.1 Since 2013, however, the number of deployed warheads has been increasing. It stood at 1648 accountable warheads as of 1 September 2015.2 This increase is an anomaly created by the transition from older to newer weapon systems, and Russia is expected to reach com- pliance with the New START Treaty by 2018 as required. Russia is in the middle of a long transition from Soviet-era forces to newer weapons, albeit on a less than one-for-one basis. As this transition continues over the next decade (all Soviet-era strategic ICBMs are scheduled to be retired by 2022), the overall size of Russia’s nuclear arsenal will probably fall further, even without a follow-on arms reduction treaty. Russia’s nuclear modernization is motivated by the need to replace old sys- tems, maintain rough overall parity with the United States, and to enhance weapon survivability and effi ciency, and national prestige.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing the Arsenals Past, Present, and Future Capabilities
    ASSESSING THE ARSENALS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE CAPABILITIES JACOB COHN ADAM LEMON EVAN BRADEN MONTGOMERY ASSESSING THE ARSENALS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE CAPABILITIES JACOB COHN ADAM LEMON EVAN BRADEN MONTGOMERY 2019 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2019 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Jacob Cohn is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, where he conducts research on future warfare and long-term military competitions. He also manages CSBA’s Strategic Choices Tool, which focuses on future challenges facing the United States and its allies as well as the linkages between the strategy and resources necessary to confront those chal- lenges. Mr. Cohn has authored several publications on trends in the defense budget and defense acquisitions as well as ones exploring nuclear deterrence and the return of great power competi- tion. He is also an adjunct lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Adam Lemon is a Research Assistant at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. At CSBA, his research focuses on nuclear weapons, missiles and missile defense, naval warfare, and long-term geopolitical competitions. He has coauthored reports on the Second Nuclear Age, post-INF Treaty missile forces, the carrier air wing, and long-term competition with China.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Nuclear Weapons Capability 【Overview】 Compared with the U.S
    Russian nuclear weapons capability 【Overview】 Compared with the U.S. French, and UK nuclear capabilities, Russian capabilities are quite vague. As for the data pertaining to the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty, Russia, unlike the U.S., has not disclosed any breakdown of the number of (deployed/non-deployed) launchers. On March 1, 2019, Russia announced that it possessed a total 524 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,461 deployed strategic nuclear warheads (U.S.Department of State 2019). This chart and the New START Treaty data can be reconciled by replacing the 200 warheads counted under “Strategic bomber payloads” with the estimated number of operational strategic bombers (50) to reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads to 512 and 1,432, respectively. Given Russiaʼs limited transparency and day-to-day fluctuations in deployments in reality, this is probably a reasonable estimate. Also, Russia has approximately 160 ballistic missiles on high alert (capable of launch in 15 minutes), and most of them are estimated to be ICBMs (Kristensen, Hans M. 2017). After 2008, 96% of deployed ICBMs are said to be on high alert (Podvig, Pavel 2014). Russia is in the process of systematically replacing Soviet-era SS-18, -19, and -25 systems with the latest SS-27M2 systems with complete replacement by 2020. SS-18s are likewise being replaced by SS-X-30 Sarmats under development. Strategic nuclear submarines and SLBMs will also be replaced by the latest Borei-class submarines and new SLBM Bulava. Elsewhere, Russiaʼs bombers, cruise missiles and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their launchers are all being modernized.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Nuclear Weapons
    Arms Control on the Eve of Destruction? The Prospects for an Arctic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in an Age of Counterforce Dominance by Nancy Jane Teeple Master of Arts (War Studies), Royal Military College of Canada, 2008 Master of Library and Information Science, University of Western Ontario, 2004 Master of Arts (Ancient Studies), University of Toronto, 2003 Bachelor of Arts (Honours), Classical Studies, University of Ottawa, 2000 Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences © Nancy Teeple SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Fall 2017 Copyright in this work rests with the author. Please ensure that any reproduction or re-use is done in accordance with the relevant national copyright legislation. Approval Name: Nancy Teeple Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Title: Arms Control on the Eve of Destruction? The Prospects for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in an Age of Counterforce Dominance Examining Committee: Chair: Genevieve Fuji Johnson Professor Douglas Ross Senior Supervisor Professor Alex Moens Supervisor Professor Tsuyoshi Kawasaki Supervisor Associate Professor Nicole Jackson Internal Examiner Associate Professor Department of International Studies James Fergusson External Examiner Professor Department of Political Science University of Manitoba Date Defended/Approved: December 19, 2017 ii Abstract Within the context of the U.S.-Russian nuclear competition, this dissertation investigates the feasibility of cooperation on an Arctic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. The strategic dimension has been largely neglected in assessing the potential for establishing an arms control regime in a region of such geo-strategic importance. In the tradition of offence- defence theory, this work stems from the assumption that conditions defined by a reduction in threatening strategic behaviour must be established between the two Arctic nuclear powers before such an initiative can move forward in the form of cooperation.
    [Show full text]
  • Informatie of Inlichtingen?
    INFORMATIE OF INLICHTINGEN? Institutioneel onderzoek naar de relevantie van de rapportages van de Afdeling Inlichtingen en Veiligheid (AIV) van de Koninklijke Luchtmacht in 1986-1987 Bachelor-scriptie Naam: R.A. van Bavel Rang: Cadet-vaandrig Klas: 403 KW (Krijgswetenschappen) Faculteit: Faculteit Militaire Wetenschappen Registratienummer: 90.07.14.032 Scriptiebegeleider: Prof. dr. B.G.J. de Graaff Tweede lezer: Drs. P. Donker Adviseur MIVD: Drs. D.G. Pronk Aantal woorden: 14.173 Aantal pagina’s: 85 Inleverdatum: 31-03-2017 Voorwoord Voor u ligt de bachelor-scriptie ‘Informatie of inlichtingen’. In deze scriptie is voor het eerst onderzoek gedaan naar inlichtingensamenvattingen van de Afdeling Inlichtingen en Veiligheid van de Luchtmacht Inlichtingendienst in de jaren 1986-1987. Deze scriptie is geschreven door Robert van Bavel, vierdejaars cadet Krijgswetenschappen aan de Faculteit Militaire Wetenschappen te Breda. Deze bachelor-studie is onderdeel van mijn opleiding tot officier Inlichtingen & Veiligheid aan de Koninklijke Militaire Academie in Breda. Tijdens het onderzoek en het schrijven van deze scriptie heb ik veel samengewerkt met prof. dr. B.G.J. de Graaff, mijn scriptiebegeleider. In samenspraak met hem en dr. F.H. Baudet zijn we samen tot de structuur van dit onderzoek gekomen. Het onderwerp van deze scriptie is afkomstig van drs. D.G. Pronk, werkzaam bij de Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst. Bij dezen wil ik graag mijn dank betuigen aan mijn begeleiders, prof. dr. de Graaff en dr. Baudet. Daarnaast wil ik ook drs. Pronk bedanken voor het aandragen van het onderwerp en het beschikbaar stellen van de benodigde rapporten. Tot slot wil ik mijn klas- en jaargenoten bedanken voor hun feedback en mijn vriendin Laura de Groot voor de steun tijdens de afgelopen periode.
    [Show full text]
  • SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
    244 military spending and armaments, 2017 II. Russian nuclear forces hans m. kristensen As of January 2018, Russia maintained an arsenal of approximately 4350 nuclear warheads. About 2520 of these are strategic warheads, of which nearly 1600 are deployed on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and at bomber bases. Russia also possessed approximately 1830 non- strategic (tac tical) nuclear warheads, all of which are in central storage sites.1 An estimated additional 2500 warheads were retired or awaiting dismantle- ment, giving a total inventory of approximately 6850 warheads (see table 6.3). The reduction in Russia’s deployed strategic warheads from the estimated total of 1950 in early 2017 was due to its continuing implementation of the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra- tegic Offensive Arms (New START) during 2017.2 Strategic bombers Russia’s Long-range Aviation Command operates a fleet of approximately 13 Tu-160 (Blackjack), 30 Tu-95MS16 (Bear-H16) and 25 Tu-95MS6 (Bear-H6) bombers. Some of these may not be fully operational and others are undergoing various upgrades. The maximum loading on the oper- ational bombers is more than 600 nuclear weapons, of which approximately 200 might be stored at the two strategic bomber bases. Modernization of the bombers is well under way. Nearly all of the Tu-160s and some of the Tu-95s will be upgraded to maintain a bomber force of 50–60 aircraft. The upgraded bombers are capable of carrying the new Kh-102 (AS-23B) nuclear air-launched cruise missile.3 The Russian Government has also announced plans to resume production of the Tu-160 to produce up to 50 modified aircraft known as Tu-160M2, with serial production starting in 2023.4 The additional bombers would probably replace many of the old Tu-95 (MS16 and MS6) aircraft and provide a bridge to the future next-generation bomber, known as PAK-DA, which is scheduled to begin fielding in the late 2020s.5 1 For a recent overview of Russia’s nuclear weapon storage facilities see Podvig, P.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Agestrategic Stability Cover Photo: Pakistan’S Long-Range Surface-To- Surface Missile, Shaheen II
    Strategic Stability Age Nuclear in the Second Cover Photo: Pakistan’s long-range surface-to- surface missile, Shaheen II. (Courtesy Reuters) Council Special Report No. 71 November 2014 Council on Foreign Relations Gregory D. Koblentz 58 East 68th Street New York, NY 10065 tel 212.434.9400 Council No. 71 Special Report fax 212.434.9800 Strategic Stability 1777 F Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 tel 202.509.8400 in the Second fax 202.509.8490 www.cfr.org Nuclear Age Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age Council Special Report No. 71 November 2014 Gregory D. Koblentz Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business execu- tives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR carries out its mission by maintaining a diverse membership, with special programs to promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign policy leaders; con- vening meetings at its headquarters in New York and in Washington, DC, and other cities where senior government officials, members of Congress, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come together with Council members to discuss and debate major international issues; supporting a Studies Program that fos- ters independent research, enabling CFR scholars to produce articles, reports, and books and hold round- tables that analyze foreign policy issues and make concrete policy recommendations; publishing Foreign Affairs, the preeminent journal on international affairs and U.S.
    [Show full text]