Vehículos De Lanzamiento (URSS/Rusia)

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Vehiculos de lanzamiento 1 Vehículos de Lanzamiento (URSS/Rusia) Copyright © 2009 by Eladio Miranda Batlle. All rights reserved. Los textos, imágenes y tablas que se encuentran en esta cronología cuentan con la autorización de sus propietarios para ser publicadas o se hace referencia a la fuente de donde se obtuvieron los mismos. Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] Vehiculos de lanzamiento 2 Vehículos de lanzamiento. URSS/Rusia. URSS / Rusia 53T6 (ABM-3 A-4 (Russian R-1 SRBM (SS-1 R-1 (Scientific) Gazelle) Modifications) Scunner) R-2 SRBM R-2 (scientific) A-350 (ABM-1 Galosh) 51T6 (ABM-4 Gorgon) (SS-2 Sibling) Bulava (R-30,3M30) Angara-1 Angara-3 -5 Energiya (K-1 / SL-17) SLBM Energiya-M Kuryer ICBM M-100 MR-1 Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] Vehiculos de lanzamiento 3 MR-UR-100 Sotka ICBM N1-L3 (Gerkules) (G- MR-12 MR-20 (SS-17 Spanker) 1e / SLX-15) R-5 MRBM (SS-3 R-7 ICBM (SS-6 R-5 (Scientific) Sputnik (A / SL-1, -2) Shyster) Sapwood) Molniya & Soyuz R-7 with integrated Voskhod & Soyuz (A-2 / with upper stages(A- Vostok (A-1 / SL-3) upperstages (A-m, A- SL-4) 2e / SL-6) 1m / SL-5, SL-10) Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] Vehiculos de lanzamiento 4 R-9 Desna ICBM (SS- R-11 MRBM / R-300 Aurora GR-1 ICBM 8 Sasin) Elbruz MRBM R-12 Dvina MRBM R-11FM SLBM R-11A Kosmos-2 (B-1 / SL-7) (SS-4 Sandal) R-13 SLBM (SS-N-4 R-14 Usovaya MRBM Kosmos-3 (C-1 / SL-8) V-3A Sark) (SS-5 Skean) Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] Vehiculos de lanzamiento 5 R-16 ICBM (SS-7 R-36 ICBM (SS-9 R-21 SLBM (SS-N-5 Tsiklon Saddler) Scarp) Serb) R-27 SLBM (SS-N-6 R-27K SLBM (SS-NX- R-26 ICBM Zyb Sawfly) 13) R-29 SLBM (SS-N-8, R-31 3M71 SLBM (SS- R-36M Voivode ICBM Vysota / Volna / Shtil -18, -23) N-17 Snipe) (SS-18 Satan) R-39 SLBM (SS-N-20 R-39M Grom SLBM (SS- Rif-MA Dnepr Sturgeon) NX-28) Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] Vehiculos de lanzamiento 6 R-400 Oka SRBM (SS- Iskander SRBM (SS-X- Priboy Riksha 23 Spider) 26 Stone) RT-2 ICBM (SS-13 RT-2PM Topol ICBM RT-2UTTKh Topol-M RT-1 ICBM Savage) (SS-25 Sickle) ICBM (SS-27) Start RT-15 MRBM (SS-14 RT-20P ICBM (SS-X-15 RT-21 ICBM (SS-16 Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] Vehiculos de lanzamiento 7 Scamp) Scrooge) Sinner) RT-21M Pioner RT-23 Molodets ICBM Tochka SRBM (SS-21 TR-1 Temp SRBM MRBM (SS-20 Saber) (SS-24 Scalpel) Scarab) (SS-12 Scaleboard) UR-100 ICBM (SS-11 UR-100N ICBM (SS- Rokot Strela Sego) 19 Stiletto) Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] Vehiculos de lanzamiento 8 UR-200 ICBM (SS-10 UR-200B Proton (D / SL-9) Proton-K (D-1 / SL13) Scrag) Proton-K Blok-D (D- Proton-K & -M Briz-M Proton-M KVRB V-1000 1e / SL-12) Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] Vehiculos de lanzamiento 9 Zenit-2 (J-1 / SL16) Zenit-3 (SeaLaunch) Eladio Miranda Batlle [email protected] .

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