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Arms Control on the Eve of Destruction? The Prospects for an Arctic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in an Age of Counterforce Dominance by Nancy Jane Teeple Master of Arts (War Studies), Royal Military College of Canada, 2008 Master of Library and Information Science, University of Western Ontario, 2004 Master of Arts (Ancient Studies), University of Toronto, 2003 Bachelor of Arts (Honours), Classical Studies, University of Ottawa, 2000 Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences © Nancy Teeple SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Fall 2017 Copyright in this work rests with the author. Please ensure that any reproduction or re-use is done in accordance with the relevant national copyright legislation. Approval Name: Nancy Teeple Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Title: Arms Control on the Eve of Destruction? The Prospects for an Arctic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in an Age of Counterforce Dominance Examining Committee: Chair: Genevieve Fuji Johnson Professor Douglas Ross Senior Supervisor Professor Alex Moens Supervisor Professor Tsuyoshi Kawasaki Supervisor Associate Professor Nicole Jackson Internal Examiner Associate Professor Department of International Studies James Fergusson External Examiner Professor Department of Political Science University of Manitoba Date Defended/Approved: December 19, 2017 ii Abstract Within the context of the U.S.-Russian nuclear competition, this dissertation investigates the feasibility of cooperation on an Arctic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. The strategic dimension has been largely neglected in assessing the potential for establishing an arms control regime in a region of such geo-strategic importance. In the tradition of offence- defence theory, this work stems from the assumption that conditions defined by a reduction in threatening strategic behaviour must be established between the two Arctic nuclear powers before such an initiative can move forward in the form of cooperation. This work proposes a refined Offence-Defence Balance model to assess the intensity of the strategic competition between two nuclear states under conditions dominated by Deterrence by Denial versus Deterrence by Punishment nuclear strategies. Qualitative indicators of sea, air, and land-based delivery platforms for nuclear forces oriented towards the offense or defence, including plans for nuclear modernization, ballistic missile defence, and conventional counterforce alternatives, assessed in conjunction with offensive or defensive nuclear postures determine whether nuclear states are likely to engage in cooperative initiatives towards arms control or competition and arms races. The assessment demonstrates that efforts by the U.S. to achieve nuclear superiority through counterforce dominance have resulted in actions by its principal nuclear competitor to pursue nuclear postures and delivery technologies that offset the U.S. nuclear advantage. Such conditions intensify the strategic competition, creating a nuclear security dilemma, which generates new arms races, and challenge the future of arms control treaties such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and militate against cooperation on new arms control initiatives such as an Arctic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. Keywords: Nuclear deterrence; arms control; United States defence policy; Russian defence policy; Arctic security iii Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my grandfathers and great-grandfathers who served in the First and Second World Wars, and to my grandmothers and great- grandmothers who maintained the home front in their absence. iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank my academic committee for their support, guidance, and enduring patience throughout the progress of my program, and especially the dissertation. I am grateful for the many professional and research funding opportunities I received while pursuing doctoral studies under such mentorship. The great many thought-provoking and inspirational discussions in the office, in West Point Grey, on Salt Spring Island, and in many coffee shops around Vancouver, with my supervisor Dr. Douglas Ross. The advice, opportunities, and experience throughout the years working with Dr. Alex Moens, on multiple projects on Canadian defence and security, and the very successful NATO Field School. The phenomenal brain storming sessions with Dr. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, whose guidance and logic helped my dissertation through the multiple stages of development. Thank you to the internal and external examiners, Dr. Nicole Jackson and Dr. James Fergusson for providing valuable feedback and recommendations for the future of my work. Special thanks also to the supportive faculty of the Department of Political Science: Dr. Genevieve Fuji-Johnson, Dr. Anil Hira, Dr. David Laycock, Dr. Clare McGovern, Dr. Jeremie Cornut, and many others who made themselves available to provide advice and encouragement along the way. Dr. Stuart Farson also belongs on this list, as he was a mentor during our work together on intelligence studies. The very helpful administrative staff at Political Science also deserve mention: Lynn Kool, Katherine Ensslen, Sherry Lloyd, Eliza So, and Anisha Sahota. I would also like to acknowledge my current and former doctoral program colleagues Rina Kashyap, Michael Oram, and Vincent Hopkins for their encouragement and camaraderie. Also thanks to Peter Gizewski, Colonel John Crosman, Major John Sheehan, and many other former colleagues at CFB Kingston for starting me on the path to my PhD and providing such valuable insight and advice. On a personal note, I would like to thank my family and friends for believing in me. Finally, I would like to thank my fiancé Andrew McBride, who encouraged me through this entire journey and never doubted that I would be successful. I would like to acknowledge the funding sources that made my PhD work possible. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC). In addition, my program and research were also funded by fellowships from Simon Fraser University’s Graduate Studies, the Department of Political Science, Community Trust Endowment Funds (CTEF), Stevenson Graduate Scholarship, Pacific Century Graduate Scholarship, and President’s PhD Scholarship. Nancy Teeple Simon Fraser University December 2017 v Table of Contents Approval ............................................................................................................................ ii Abstract .............................................................................................................................iii Dedication ........................................................................................................................ iv Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... v Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. vi List of Tables .................................................................................................................... ix List of Figures.................................................................................................................... x List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................... xi Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 Background: Necessary Conditions for an Arctic NWFZ .................................................. 8 Research Questions ...................................................................................................... 8 Contribution to the Field of Arms Control ........................................................................ 13 Central Argument ............................................................................................................ 16 The Value of an Arctic NWFZ ......................................................................................... 18 Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................... 19 Research Logic ............................................................................................................... 28 Plan of Work.................................................................................................................... 28 Chapter 2. Literature Review: Strategic, Political and Conceptual Impediments to an Arctic NWFZ ............................................................................................... 30 Proposals for an Arctic NWFZ ......................................................................................... 30 Nuclear Policy of the U.S., NATO, and Russia ............................................................... 35 Considerations of a Shift in Nuclear Strategy towards Minimum Deterrence ................. 42 Defining Deterrence ..................................................................................................... 42 The Security Dilemma and Offence-Defence Balance (ODB) Theory ............................ 49 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 52 Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework: Offence-Defence
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