Engaging China and Russia CNS on Nuclear Disarmament OCCASIONAL PAPER #15 MARCH 2009 Cristina Hansell, William C. Potter, eds. JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES Th e James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) strives to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis. A research center at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (an affi liate of Middlebury College), CNS is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. For more information about CNS, visit cns.miis.edu. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies 460 Pierce St., Monterey, CA 93940, U.S.A. Tel. +1 (831) 647-4154; fax +1 (831) 647-3519; e-mail: [email protected] Editors Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter Policy recommendations, statements of fact, and opinions expressed in this Occasional Paper are the responsibility of the authors and do not imply the endorsement of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies or the Monterey Institute of International Studies. ISBN 978-0-9798703-5-4 (PDF) © Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 2009 Cover: Composite using images from iStockphoto.com: Hands © Chen Chih-Wen; Chinese fl ag © Bjorn Kindler; Russian fl ag © Matt Trommer; U.S. fl ag © Lugo Graphics. Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, Editors James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper No. 15 April 2009 CONTENTS Foreword iii Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter SUMMARY REPORT Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Achieving Nuclear Zero 1 Nikolai N. Sokov, Jing-dong Yuan, William C. Potter, and Cristina Hansell Figure 1. Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament: 20 Principal Players and Policy-Making Processes. Figure 2. Structure of Russian Decision Making on Disarmament 22 and International Security. COMMISSIONED ESSAYS China and the Nuclear-Free World 25 Jing-dong Yuan Chinese Nuclear Posture and Force Modernization 37 Jeff rey Lewis How Chinese Analysts View Arms Control, Disarmament, 47 and Nuclear Deterrence aft er the Cold War Lora Saalman Th e Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Security Policy 73 Nikolai N. Sokov Reducing Russia’s Reliance on Nuclear Weapons in Security Policies 89 Vladimir Dvorkin Th e Prospect of Universal Complete Nuclear Disarmament 103 Pavel S. Zolotarev Formulation of Nuclear Policy in Moscow: Actors and Interests 113 Mikhail Tsypkin and Anya Loukianova Strategic Relations between the United States, Russia, and China 123 and the Possibility of Cooperation on Disarmament Cristina Hansell and Nikita Perfi lyev CONTRIBUTORS 149 i FOREWORD he past several years have witnessed a major revival of interest in nuclear disarmament in the United States. TTh e primary contributor to this phenomenon was a January 2007 essay on the topic in the Wall Street Journal by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. Th e essay sent a shockwave through the U.S. national security establishment by daring to discuss the need for totally eliminating nuclear weapons: so-called nuclear zero. While the “road to zero” steps that the essay recommended were not new, they lent credibility to the call for a serious debate on a topic that was until recently considered taboo in the United States. Th is call was taken up at a meeting entitled “Reykjavik Revisited” 1 at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution in October 2007 and at a follow-up con- ference on “Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” held in Oslo in February 2008.2 While the Shultz et al. initiative has clearly expanded the political space for debate about nuclear disarmament in the United States and appears to be playing a role in shaping some elements of the new U.S. approach to nuclear arms control and risk reduction, it is more diffi cult to discern the impact of the initiative on other nuclear weapon states, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom.3 Chinese and Russian policy makers, in particular, have tended to be very circumspect in their public commentary on the initiative, and it remains to be seen how receptive they will be to new thinking on the subject of nuclear disarmament. And yet unless key decision makers in Beijing and Moscow are engaged in a serious discussion of these issues, it will prove impossible to make progress toward disarmament. In order to try to remedy this situation, and with an eye to engaging Beijing and Moscow in a serious dialogue about practical steps along “the road to zero,” the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), with the support of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, embarked on a project to analyze the prevailing perspectives, bureaucratic players, and politics related to nuclear disarmament in China and Russia. In addition, the project sought to develop recommendations on how to build support for desired policy changes in Beijing and Moscow and to devise a strategy for bringing the study’s fi ndings to the attention of relevant policy makers and experts. Th e essays in this Occasional Paper represent the fi ndings from the fi rst stage of the project: the examination of thinking on strategic policy, nuclear postures, and prospects for disarmament in Beijing and Moscow. Th e fi rst essay summarizes the main fi ndings and recommendations of the project. It also provides detailed charts on nuclear policy making in Russia and China. Th e other essays constitute the background papers that were commissioned for the project. Th ree of the commissioned papers examine Chinese nuclear perspectives. In the fi rst of these essays, Jing-dong 1. This followed an earlier conference George Shultz initiated at Stanford in October 2006, on the twentieth anniversary of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik, to review the goals of the original Reykjavik Summit. The 2006 conference instigated the composition of the Wall Street Journal piece the following January. 2. In addition, a number of other high-profi le efforts to promote nuclear disarmament have been launched recently, including a campaign for Global Zero and the creation of the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, an initiative supported by the Australian and Japanese governments. 3. Several high-level statements in support of disarmament have been made by U.K. offi cials, beginning with Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Margaret Beckett’s address to the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?” on June 25, 2007. Most recently, in February 2009, the Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce issued a document entitled “Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” <www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/counter-terrorism/weapons/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-paper>. iii FOREWORD Yuan looks at the Chinese reaction to the recent calls for nuclear zero as well as a variety of nuclear nonproliferation measures promoted over the past decade. He interprets Chinese positions on these issues with reference to Beijing’s understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in the current international strategic environment and notes the par- ticular importance China attaches to U.S. missile defense and space activities, as well as qualitative improvements in U.S. conventional forces. Yuan examines Chinese perspectives on relevant international agreements and a number of specifi c proposals made by advocates of nuclear zero; he also looks at Beijing’s assessment of the potential impact of these proposed steps on China’s security interests. Th e next essay, by Jeff rey Lewis, assesses China’s nuclear posture and the modernization of its nuclear weap- ons systems and provides a review of the technical, historical, and bureaucratic impetus driving Chinese nuclear policies. Lewis notes new challenges posed by the failure of Chinese and U.S. political leaders to think through the consequences of the interaction of the new strategic capabilities they are developing, which may include in- creased possibility of accidents, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Nevertheless, Lewis remains optimistic; he believes that it should be possible to reinforce strategic stability through dialogue, as neither the United States nor China have any intention of attacking each other. Th e fi nal essay devoted to China is a review by Lora Saalman of Chinese analyses of arms control, disarmament, and deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Based on an extensive review of Chinese-language materials, Saalman provides a broad survey of contemporary viewpoints and demonstrates that opinion on nuclear issues in China is less uniform than oft en portrayed in the West. Her fi nding suggests that there may be a variety of ways to engage China on a path toward nuclear zero. Another set of commissioned papers focuses on Russian players and perspectives. Nikolai N. Sokov examines Russian strategic policy and the evolving role of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. He fi nds that while Russia’s status is increasingly determined by economic and political factors—and less by the possession of nuclear weapons—Moscow continues to view nuclear arms as essential in dealing with a variety of security threats. A shift to reliance on conventional arms, Sokov believes, will take at least a decade. As a consequence, he suggests that tackling the causes of Russia’s insecurity should involve a wide range of arms control and confi dence-building mea- sures directed at negotiating a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), resolving diff erences over missile defense, addressing the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, and repairing relations between Russia and NATO. Further progress toward disarmament, however, will require the restructuring of the entire fabric of Russia’s relations with the West.