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Curriculum Vitae Paul Horwich Department of Philosophy 212 998 8320 (tel) New York University 212 995 4178 (fax) 5 Washington Place [email protected] New York, NY 10003 EDUCATION Cornell University (Philosophy) Ph.D. 1975 Cornell University (Philosophy) M.A. 1973 Yale University (Physics and Philosophy) M.A. 1969 Oxford University (Physics) B.A. 1968 TITLE OF DOCTORAL THESIS: The Metric and Topology of Time. EMPLOYMENT Spring 2007 Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tokyo Fall 2006 Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris 2005–present Professor, Department of Philosophy, New York University 2000–2005 Kornblith Distinguished Professor, Philosophy Program, Graduate Center of the City University of New York Spring 1998 Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney 1994–2000 Professor, Department of Philosophy, University College London Fall 1994 Associate Research Director, Institute d'Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences et Technique, CNRS, Paris 1987–1994 Professor, Department of Linguistics And Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1980–1987 Associate Professor of Philosophy, MIT Fall 1978 Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Los Angeles 1973–1980 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, MIT CV, Paul Horwich, March 2017 GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS 2008–9 Guggenheim Fellowship Spring 2007 Fellowship from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science 2007 U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship Fall 1988 U.S. National Science Foundation Research Grant Fall 1984 U.S. National Science Foundation Research Grant 1983–84 U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship Fall 1976 Old Dominion Research Fellow at MIT 1969–73 Humanities and Social Sciences Fellow at Cornell 1968–69 Josiah Willard Gibbs Fellow at Yale 1965–68 Hulme Scholar at Brasenose College, Oxford PROFESSIONAL SERVICE Refereeing for Nous, Mind, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophers’ Imprint, Mind and Language, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Studies, The Philosophical Review, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophia, Theoria, Synthese, Erkenntnis, Dialectica, European Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (editorial board), Episteme (editorial board), Philosophical Papers, MIT Press, Princeton University Press, Oxford University Press Governing Board of U.S. Philosophy of Science Association, 1991–1995 Editorial Board for Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 1993–1994 Organizer of Conference on the Philosophical Impact of Thomas Kuhn, Cambridge, Mass, Spring 1991 PUBLICATIONS Books 2012 Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy, Oxford University Press (225 pages) 2010 Truth–Meaning–Reality, Oxford University Press (341 pages) 2005 Reflections on Meaning, Oxford University Press (236 pages) 2004 From a Deflationary Point of View, Oxford University Press (178 pages) 1998 Meaning, Oxford University Press (241 pages) CV, Paul Horwich, March 2017 1990 Truth, Basil Blackwell (136 pages) (Italian translation, Rome, Laterza, 1994). 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1998 (157 pages). (Japanese translation published in 2016 by Keiso Shobo, Tokyo). Asymmetries in Time, MIT Press (218 pages). (Japanese translation, Tokyo: Maruzen, 1987 1992). 1982 Probability and Evidence, Cambridge University Press (146 pages). Reprinted in 2011. Edited Volumes 1994 Theories of Truth (with editor’s Introduction), International Research Library of Philosophy, Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing Company. 1993 World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science (with editor’s Introduction), MIT Press. Reprinted in 2010 by Pittsburg University Press. Articles In preparation: “Four Forms of Moral Relativism” “Qualia Skepticism” “Languages and Idiolects” solicited for a Festschrifft for Michael Devitt, to be edited by Andrea Bianchi. A solicited contribution to a special issue of the Australasian Philosophical Review, curated by Alex Miller, to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the publication of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. “Is Meaning Normative?”, to appear in B. Dunaway & D. Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes from the Work of Allan Gibbard, Cambridge University Press. “Forms of Philosophy and Forms of Progress”, to appear in B. Ramberg, H. Cappelen, & P. Greenough (eds.) Progress in Philosophy. “The Nature of Necessity”, to appear in an OUP volume in honor of Bob Hale, edited by Ivette Fred and Jessica Leech. Forthcoming: “Ernest Sosa’s Theory of Knowledge”, to appear in a special issue of Synthese, curated by Christoph Kelp. “A Fresh Look at Compositionality”, to appear in C. Mayr and E. Williams (eds.) Festschrifft for Martin Prinzhorn. “Davidson’s Wittgensteinian View Of Meaning”, to appear in C. Vegheggen (ed.) Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action, Cambridge University Press. CV, Paul Horwich, March 2017 “Is TRUTH a normative concept?”, to appear in Synthese a special issue to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the publication of my book, Truth). 2016 “Wittgenstein on Truth”, Argumenta, Issue 3 (December). “The Nature of Paradox”, Meanings and Other Things; Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer, edited by Gary Ostertag, MIT Press (preprinted in Truth–Meaning– Reality). “Wittgenstein’s Global Deflationism”, in H. Cappelen, T. Szabó Gendler, and J. Hawthorne (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, Oxford University Press, pp.130–6. 2015 “Was Wittgenstein Right?”, in P. Catapano and S. Critchley (eds.) The Stone Reader, Norton/Liveright [A selection from the pieces that have appeared over the last five in the New York Times online philosophy section) “Kripke’s Wittgenstein”, in S. Gross, N. Tebben, and M.J. Williams (eds.) Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism, Oxford University Press. [Revision of Ch.5 of Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy (2012)] 2014 “An Undermining Diagnosis of Relativism about Truth”, Mind 123 (491): 733–752. “Critical Notice of Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts by R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye”, Mind Volume 123, Issue 49O, 1123–4. “Naturalism and the ‘Linguistic Turn’”, in B. Bashour and H. Muller (eds.) Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications, Routledge. “Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning”, in J. Berg (ed.) Naming, Necessity and More: Explorations in the Philosophical Work of Saul Kripke, Palgrave Macmillan, 191–201 [Revision of 2009 article]. 2013 “Was Wittgenstein Right?”, in The Stone (New York Times), published online on 3rd March. “Belief–Truth Norms”, in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, Oxford University Press, pp.17–31. “Reply to Timothy Williamson’s Review of Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy, European Journal of Philosophy 21(S3), e18–e26. “Naturalism, Deflationism, and the Relative Priority of Language and Metaphysics”, in H. Price (ed.) Three Themes in Contemporary Pragmatism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 112–127. 2012 “Against Meaning–Skepticism”, in Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz, de Gruyter. 2010 “Rorty’s Wittgenstein”, in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide, A. H. Ahmed (ed.), Cambridge University Press. CV, Paul Horwich, March 2017 “Williamson’s Philosophy of Philosophy”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1). “Regularities, Rules, Meanings, Truth Conditions, and Epistemic Norms”, in Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy, Alberto Voltolini, Diego Marconi, and Pasquale Frascolla (eds.), Palgrave, UK. A shorter version, preprinted in Truth– Meaning–Reality, will appear in A. Coliva (ed.) Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press. 2009 “Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning”, Polish Journal of Philosophy III/1, 23–32. [Revised for my Truth–Meaning– Reality (2010; further revision for (2012] version.] “A New Framework for Semantics”, Philosophical Perspectives, 22(1), 233–240. “Wittgenstein’s Definition of ‘Meaning’ as ‘Use’”, in The Later Wittgenstein on Language, edited by Daniel Whiting, Palgrave Macmillan. An earlier version appeared in Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science, 16: 1&2, March 2008, pp. 133–141. 2008 “Ungrounded Reason”, Journal of Philosophy CV–9, September, Special Issue: Epistemic Norms. Revised version in Truth–Meaning–Reality. “What’s Truth Got to Do With It?”, Linguistics and Philosophy, 31, 308–322. “Varieties of Deflationism”, Philosophical Topics 36:2 (special issue on Robert Brandom’s lectures, ‘On Between Saying and Doing’), edited by Ed Minar, Blackwell (reprinted in Truth–Meaning–Reality). “Being and Truth”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXXII (special issue: “Truth and its Deformities”), edited by P. French and H. Wettstein, pp. 258–273. Reprinted in Truth–Meaning–Reality, and in Truth and Truthmaking, edited by A. Rami and E.J. Lowe, Acumen Press, 2010. “Explaining Intentionality”, Manuscrito, Campinas, v.31, n.1 (special issue: “Logic, Language, and Knowledge – Essays on Chateaubriand's Logical Forms), W.A. Carmielli & J.J. da Silva (eds.) pp. 467–482. 2007 “The Quest for REALITY”, Dialectica Vol. 61 Fasc, 1(special issue: “Fine Philosophy”) pp. 5–16. Substantial revision published in Truth–Meaning–Reality. “What is Truth?”, Journal of the Tokyo University Society of Philosophy, October. 2006 “A World without Isms”, Realism and Truth: New Debates, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Lynch, Oxford University Press. Reprinted
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