Self and Identity in the Films of Ingmar Bergman James Bradley Mitchell
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University of South Carolina Scholar Commons Senior Theses Honors College Spring 5-5-2016 "For Me, Film is Face": Self and Identity in the Films of Ingmar Bergman James Bradley Mitchell Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses Part of the Mathematics Commons Recommended Citation Mitchell, James Bradley, ""For Me, Film is Face": Self and Identity in the Films of Ingmar Bergman" (2016). Senior Theses. 95. https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/senior_theses/95 This Thesis is brought to you by the Honors College at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 “For Me, Film is Face”: Self and Identity in the Films of Ingmar Bergman Brad Mitchell Spring 2016 2 I. Introduction The filmography of Ingmar Bergman is often described in terms whose aptness is hard to deny, but whose connotations can be a bit hazier – “dark,” “serious,” and “melodramatic” are often used to describe his films, doubtless due to particular themes reoccurring throughout his works. Repeatedly expounded are ideas of life and death, God and Satan, light and darkness. These ideas sometimes manifest themselves literally, such as the character of Death in The Seventh Seal, and sometimes exist as struggles his characters face, such as a priest’s crisis of faith in Winter Light or Isak Borg’s struggle with living in Wild Strawberries. At other times these ideas are shown directly to the viewer on the screen: cinematographer Sven Nykvist, who worked with Bergman on many of his films, reportedly sat in the church where Winter Light was filmed for an entire winter day in order to observe how the light moved throughout the space. Bergman, who made films “entirely for his own sake” [Shargel 49] was well aware of these themes in his films, and stated that his films have definitive and intentional meanings. Tied to all of these themes, but less immediately apparent in most of Bergman’s work, is the idea of the self. Whether Bergman directed any of his films with the intention of some philosophical exploration of the self explicitly is unclear, but his films undeniably harbor very interesting ruminations on the topic. Bergman repeatedly expressed a strong interest in the human face, emphasizing how strongly the face can represent the känsloliv of a character. [Shargel xii] This is a word defined as the “inner life”, “emotional life”, or “life of the mind”, and the interest in this aspect of characters indicates an interest in identity. The motif of personal identity is clearly present in some of his films, but works in much more subtle ways in other films, and the human face is often utilized in these films to make a statement about identity (such as the 3 similarity in appearance of Alma and Elisabeth in Persona). The face of characters has always been an extremely important part of films, and usage of the face turned out to be an important tool for Bergman in achieving his vision throughout his filmography. The question of personal identity and how to define it has long been an important topic in metaphysics. It has been written about from the time of The Enlightenment and is still written about often in contemporary philosophy. The questions of how to define a person and how to reconcile any of these definitions with the way we, as humans, change over time physically as well as mentally1 is an extremely difficult one, and the philosophical canon is replete with attempts to answer these questions. I intend to analyze several of Bergman’s films through the lens of two conflicting arguments on the topic – Descartes’ idea of identity as being the product of a mind-body dualism and Hegel’s master-slave dialectic – as well as with considerations of the ways in which Derek Parfit’s treatise on personal identity can influence this discussion. The essential point of disagreement between Descartes and Hegel on this subject is that in Descartes’ system, a singular person can have a well-defined identity, while Hegel’s master-slave dialectic asserts that another consciousness is necessary for one consciousness to have an identity. I will attempt to determine the degree to which, as well as the manner by which, Bergman’s films may support either of these views, and whether specific films can be said to agree with either view. I will also attempt to view these films with regards to Parfit’s conclusions on personal identity, and try to determine if perhaps Bergman would agree with Parfit’s assertion that “the question of identity has no importance.” [Parfit 4] 1 I will forego the discussion of whether mental capacity can be reduced to something physical, as the answer would have no effect on the assertions made here. 4 The master-slave2 dialectic outlined in The Phenomenology of Spirit by Hegel describes the way by which a consciousness can arise. Hegel argues that for a consciousness to fully realize itself as a distinct entity (i.e. make the distinction between “I” and “not I”), it must come in contact with another consciousness. In his own words – “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.” [Hegel 116] When these two consciousnesses come face to face with each other, however, a tension arises. At first, the two are recognizing each other, but each is also recognizing that the other is recognizing him. In this state, the two consciousnesses cannot distinguish themselves, as they are only each defined by the other. This builds tension in the dialectic, since each consciousness wishes to be on its own, and each wants to dominate the other. Here the one dominating would be living for itself, while the other consciousness would be living for another (and thus would seemingly have no life of its own). This becomes a state of deadlock that can only be broken by one consciousness becoming recognized as master by the other consciousness (the slave). It seems at first that the only way to settle this is a fight to the death between the two, but both consciousnesses realize that by killing the other, he would be destroying the only recognition that can establish him as a consciousness. At some point, the consciousness that has the greatest fear of its own annihilation must give in. Now the victorious consciousness can kill the other, but knows that he must not do this, or else he will cease to be 2 The translation of “master and slave” is sometimes translated as “Lordship and Bondage”, which some scholars take to be a much more appropriate translation. The term “slave” is a term that carries a lot of weight and history with it, and it can therefore cause misinterpretations of the meaning of a “slave” in this dialectic. I will describe Hegel’s work in terms of “master-slave” here, as it does not affect the way that the dialectic plays out, but it is important to note that the “slave” in this dialectic is not a slave in the sense that we have come to understand it (i.e. the “slave” in the dialectic is not legally owned in any way by the master). This is especially important to keep in mind in regards to the discussion of analogous relations between characters in the film that is to follow. 5 a consciousness. The victorious consciousness instead enslaves the other consciousness, creating the relation of master-slave. Here the slave works for the master and satisfies his desires. This, however, is still an asymmetric and unstable relation between the two. This is rectified by the fact that the master slowly begins to rely on the slave. The master wants recognition from an equal, but he has made the slave into a lesser consciousness. Now the master gets to the point where he is incapable of caring for himself, and is therefore dependent on the slave, while the slave has cultivated strength and skill. Through this development and through the fact that the slave was the only one to confront death during the death struggle, the slave begins to regain some of the power in the dialectic. The master may control the slave, but the slave is independent through his labor – he is a craftsperson, and is no longer alienated from his labor, while the master has become dependent on the slave, and thus becomes enslaved in a way himself. The dialectic is an evolving situation filled with tension, and tension exists throughout its entirety. The master feels very independent and powerful at first, but eventually becomes dependent by asserting his will on the slave, and resents this dependency. The slave becomes subservient out of fear, but eventually gains independence through fulfilling the will of the master. The power relations between the two change, but tension holds the master and slave together throughout the dialectic. Hegel’s description of this dialectic ends in a still unresolved state, with the two consciousnesses still progressing towards a higher unity in consciousness. The Cartesian view on identity is much simpler than Hegel’s once the foundations of Descartes’ mind-body dualism are understood. Descartes argued that the mind and the body are two completely separate entities where the mind is something that thinks but has no 6 physical manifestation while the body is a thing with a physical manifestation that does not think. It is important to note here that a Cartesian mind is more like what would normally be referred to as a soul – something that exists and that defines a person but that does not have any physical properties.