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Brandom Curriculum Vitae Robert Boyce Brandom Addresses Office Home Philosophy Department 1118 King Ave. 1001 Cathedral of Learning Pittsburgh, PA 15206-1437 University of Pittsburgh U.S.A Pittsburgh, PA 15260 U.S.A. ORCID 0000-0001-5478-8567 Telephone Email Office: 412-624-5776 [email protected] Fax: 412-624-5377 Home: 412-661-6190 Web http://www.pitt.edu/~rbrandom Academic Positions Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh (2007-present) Fellow, Center for the Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh (1977–present) Spinoza Chair, University of Amsterdam (2021) Cardinal Mercier Chair, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2020) Leibniz Professor, Universität Leipzig (2008) Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford (2006) Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences Stanford University (2002-2003) Distinguished Service Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh (1998-2006) Professor, Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh (1991–1998) Associate Professor, Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh (1981–1990) Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh (1976–1981) 1 Brandom Honors and Awards Fellow, British Academy (elected 2018) Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2000) Anneliese Maier Forschungspreis, Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung (€ 250,000) (2014) Distinguished Achievement in the Humanities Award, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation ($1,500,000) (2004) Jean-Pierre Barricelli Book Prize, (for A Spirit of Trust), best book on Romanticism International Conference on Romanticism (2019) Education Ph.D. Philosophy: 1977, Princeton University Thesis: Practice and Object Directors: Richard Rorty and David K. Lewis Porter Ogden Jacobus Fellow, Princeton, 1975–76 Whiting Fellow, 1974–76 B.A. 1972, Yale University Summa cum laude Honors with Exceptional Distinction, Philosophy Phi Beta Kappa, 1971 Languages English: Native Speaker German: Reading French: Reading Python Erdős Number: 5 2 Brandom Publications Books: 1. A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology Harvard University Press, 2019 ISBN#9780674976818 German translation in preparation for Suhrkamp Verlag Chinese translation in preparation. French translation in preparation. 2. In the Space of Reason: Inferentialism, Normative Pragmatism, and Metalinguistic Expressivism The 2018 Dewey Lectures at Fudan University, Shanghai, China Ning Sun, Jing Zhou, Yuanfan Huang, Jie Wen, translators Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2019 ISBN：9787208158337 3 Brandom 3. Heroism and Magnanimity: The Post-Modern Form of Self-Conscious Agency The Aquinas Lecture, 2019 Marquette University Press, 2019 ISBN#978-0874621938 4. Wiedererinnerter Idealismus Suhrkamp Verlag, 2015 ISBN#978-3-518-29704-9 5. From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars Harvard University Press, 2015 ISBN#978-0-674-18728-3 4 Brandom 6. Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary Harvard University Press, 2011 ISBN#978-0-674-05808-8 『プラグマティズム どこから来て、どこへ行くのか』 (Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary) (Where Does Pragmatism Come From and Where Does It Go) Translated by 加藤隆文 (KATO Takafumi), 田中凌 (TANAKA Ryo), 朱喜哲 (JU Heechul), 三木那由他 (MIKI, Nayuta) Publisher: 勁草書房 (Keiso Shobo) Publishing Date: November 2nd 2020 上巻 (Volume 1) ISBN-13 : 978-4326199808 下巻 (Volume 2) ISBN-13 : 978-4326199815 5 Brandom 7. Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas Harvard University Press, 2009, 248 pp. ISBN#0-674-03449-X La Raison en Philosophie: Donne vie aux idées French translation of Reason in Philosophy Traduit par le Groupe de travail Brandom: Solal Azoulay, Sofia Batko, Adrien Carpentier, Pierre-Henri Castel, Maxime Diveu, Ulysse Jacquin, Carlos Malache Silva, Vincent Mussat, Pierre-François Mouraud, Manon Poinsignon, Valentin Rio et Adèle Rugini Ithaque, 2020 ISBN 978-2-490350-08-7 6 Brandom 8. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism (The 2006 Oxford John Locke Lectures) Oxford University Press, 2008, 240 pp. ISBN#0-199-54287-2 Między mówieniem a działaniem nowość: W stronę analitycznego pragmatyzmu (Polish translation of Between Saying and Doing) Marcin Gokieli (trans.), Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warsaw 2012 ISBN#978-83-01-17279-4 7 Brandom 9. In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars Edited with an Introduction by Kevin Scharp and Robert Brandom. Harvard University Press, 2007, 528 pp. ISBN#0-674-02498-2 10. Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality Harvard University Press, 2002, 430 pp. ISBN#0-674-00903-7 8 Brandom 11. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism Harvard University Press, 2000 (paperback 2001), 230 pp. ISBN#0-674-00158-3 (cloth), #0-674-00692-5 (paper) Begründung und Begreifen: Eine Einfuhrung in den Inferentialismus (German translation of Articulating Reasons) Eva Gilmer (trans.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 2001 ISBN#3-518-58308-5 La articulación de las rezones: Una introducción al inferencialismo (Spanish translation of Articulating Reasons) Eduardo de Bustos & Eulalia Perez Sedeño (trans.), Siglo XXI (Veintiuno) de España Editores, Madrid 2002 ISBN#84-323-1105-7 9 Brandom Articolare le Ragioni: Un'introduzione all'inferenzialismo (Italian translation of Articulating Reasons) Carlo Nizzo (trans.), Il Saggiatore, Milano 2002 ISBN#88-428-0958-6 L'Articulation des raisons (French Translation of Articulating Reasons) Claudine Tiercelin and Jean-Pierre Cometti (trans.), Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, 2009, 237 pp. ISBN#978-2-204-08355-3 Articulando Razões: Uma Introdução ao Inferencialismo (Portuguese translation of Articulating Reasons) Agemir Bavaresco, Eduardo Garcia Lara, Juliano do Carmo (trans.), ediPUCRS, Porto Alegre, 2013 ISBN#978-85-397-0273-2 10 Brandom Japanese translation of Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism Translated by Hirofumi Saito in series Great Works: Invitation to Contemporary Philosophy, supervised by Nobuharu Tanji Shunjusha, Japan. 2016 Chinese translation in preparation. 12. Rorty and His Critics Edited, with an Introduction (includes "Vocabularies of Pragmatism") by Robert Brandom Blackwell's Publishers, Oxford, July 2000 ISBN#0-631-20981-6 (cloth), #0-631-20982-4 (paper) Chinese translation in preparation. 11 Brandom 13. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind by Wilfrid Sellars Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1997 With an Introduction by Richard Rorty and Study Guide by Robert Brandom ISBN#0-674-25154-7 (cloth) #0-674-25155-5 (paper) O Empeirismos kai H Philosophia tou Nou (Greek translation of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind) Christos Marsellos (trans.), Hestia, 2005, 239 pp. ISBN#960-05-1225-6 12 Brandom Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Japanese translation) Iwanami Shoten Publishers, Tokyo, 2006, 240 pp. ISBN#4-00-022752-1 Empirismo e a Filosofia da Mente (Portugese translation) Editora Vozes, Petrópolis, 2008, 176 pp. ISBN#978-8532637437 Chinese translation in preparation for Shanghai Translation Publishing House 13 Brandom 14. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment Harvard University Press (Cambridge) 1994. 741 pp. ISBN#0-674-54319-X 9 (cloth), #0-674-54330-0 (paper) Chinese translation in preparation. Expressive Vernunft: Begründung, Repräsentation und diskursive Festlegung (German translation of Making It Explicit) Eva Gilmer and Hermann Vetter (trans.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt, 2000, 1001 pp. ISBN#3-518-58283-6 14 Brandom Hacerlo Explícito (Spanish transation of Making It Explicit) ángela Ackermann Pilári and Joana Rosselló (trans.), Herder, Barcelona, 2005, 943 pp. ISBN#84-254-2243-4 15 Brandom Rendre explicite I (French transation of Volume I of Making It Explicit) Anne-Gaëlle Argy, Gilles Bouttier, Élise Domenach, Goufrane Mansour, Sabine Plaud, Bertrand Rouge, Ludovic Soutif and Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel (trans.), Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2010, 505 pp. ISBN#978-2-204-08353-9 Rendre explicite II (French transation of Volume II of Making It Explicit) Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel (trans.), Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2011, 1148 pp. ISBN#978-2-204-08354-6 16 Brandom 15. The Logic of Inconsistency with Nicholas Rescher Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1980, 174 pp. ISBN#0-631-11581-1 17 Brandom Articles: 1. “Interview with Robert Brandom” by Mohammad Hussain, English version at https://mana.net/robert-brandom, Arabic version at https://mana.net/brandom (May, 2020). 2. “Rorty on Vocabularies” in Revisiting Richard Rorty, Pedro Góis Moreira (ed.), Vernon Press 2020, pp. 1-23. 3. “Remembering Richard Rorty: An Interview with Robert Brandom” in Revisiting Richard Rorty, Pedro Góis Moreira (ed.), Vernon Press 2020, pp. 251-262. 4. Some Strands of Wittgenstein's Normative Pragmatism, and Some Strains of his Semantic Nihilism” Disputatio: Philosophical Research Bulletin, special issue: Linguistic and Rational Pragmatism: The Philosophies of Wittgenstein and Brandom, 2019. 5. “The Commitment to Inference: A Conversation with Robert Brandom” Interview by Ivan Ivashchenko Sententiae, Volume XXXVІІІ, Issue 2, 2019. 124-150 ISSN 2075-6461 https://doi.org/10.22240/sent38.02.124 6. “Hegel and Analytic Philosophy” Analysis (Madrid) 23 (2): 1-20, 2019 7. “Vernunft, Ausdruck, Perspektive. Drei Leitideen von Leibniz—damals und heute,” in Theatrum Naturae et Artium—Leibniz und die Schauplätze der Aufklärung [Sächsische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, in Kommission bei S. Hirzel, Stuttgart/Leipzig, 2019], pp. 46-66. 8. “Freiheit und Bestimmtsein durch Normen” pp. 61-90 in Parodoxien der Autonomie,
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  • Philosophical Review

    Philosophical Review

    Philosophical Review Computation and Content Author(s): Frances Egan Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 181-203 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185977 . Accessed: 17/02/2011 14:54 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Review. http://www.jstor.org ThePhilosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (April 1995) Computation and Content Frances Egan 1.