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Quantum Conditional Probability: Implications for Conceptual Change of Science

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Quantum Conditional Probability: Implications for Conceptual Change of Science UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID FACULTAD DE FILOSOFÍA Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia QUANTUM CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONCEPTUAL CHANGE OF SCIENCE. MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR PRESENTADA POR Isabel Guerra Bobo Bajo la dirección del doctor Mauricio Suárez Madrid, 2010 • ISBN: 978-84-693-3483-6 QUANTUM CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY Implications for Conceptual Change in Science ISABEL GUERRA BOBO Director de tesis: Dr. Mauricio Suarez Phd Thesis, June 2009 Quantum Conditional Probability Implications for Conceptual Change in Science A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid . Isabel Guerra Bobo Supervisor: Mauricio Suárez, Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Isabel Guerra Bobo, 2009. ‘Quantum Conditional Probability: Implications for Con- ceptual Change in Science.’ I hereby declare that this submission is my own original work and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text. Research toward this thesis has been carried out thanks to an FPI Scholarship of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education (MEC) associated to the Research Project Causation, Propensities and Causal Inference in Quantum Physics within the DGICYT Research Network HUM2005-01787: 2005- 2008 Classical and Causal Concepts in Science, and to the Complutense Research Group MECISR. Munich, June 2009 To Arthur Fine, for making quantum mechanics & philosophy become alive for me. Y a Jose. Acknowledgments Giving birth and life to this dissertation has mostly occurred during the past five years. The story begins on the morning of Thursday July 1st 2004, in which I met Mauricio Suárez at a cafe in Madrid. I had decided at that time that this was the last meeting I would have in the search for a PhD, for I was not finding anything I really wanted to pursue. At that meeting, I heard the name ‘Philosophy of Physics’ and ‘London School of Economics’ for the first time. Interestingly enough, these two words, were soon part of my everyday vocabulary. With the incredible help of Mauricio, whom, at that time, I hardly knew, on Friday July 2nd I decided I would apply for a one-year Masters program at LSE. I am really thankful to Mauricio for having opened the door for me into this world. The year in London was a very special year. Eneritz, Stefania, Giacomo y Clara: life is a miracle! At the intellectual level, it was an incredible, but, at the same time, a very demanding and difficult experience. I remember reading Hume’s essay ‘An enquiry con- cerning human understanding’ – my first philosophical reading ever! – and having no clue whatsoever as to what ‘this guy’ was trying to say. Stephan Hartmann was my anchor point during the first term at LSE. To him I am very grateful for his understanding and listening; I still remember sitting at his office in November and shedding some tears. In the Lent term, I interacted a lot with Roman Frigg, who later became my (master’s) dissertation supervisor. Since then, we have kept in touch and I have received very helpful feedback from him at many stages. Thank you very much, Roman. Finally, I thank Jon Williamson for encouraging me with my difficulty in writing essays and for introducing me to philosophy of probability, albeit with some reluctance on my part – after feeling frustrated in many classes, I finally allowed myself ask: ‘but why are we considering seriously that probability is the degree of belief of a person? It just doesn’t make any sense!’. After the year at LSE I decided to start a PhD in philosophy of physics, although, already at that time, many doubts had started dancing around me: is this really what I want to do? Now, looking back, I am happy I decided to start, and I am happy to have continued till the end. Much has occurred during this process. I decided to go back to Madrid – I did not want to (permanently) live far away from my family – and again Mauricio was crucial for making this possible. He agreed to be my supervisor, which I was very happy about for he had continued to be a very important reference point and source of encouragement throughout the year in London. And so I entered the PhD program ‘Entre Ciencia y Filosofía’ at UCM. From this first year at UCM, I wish to thank Julian Reiss, Antonio Blanco and Javier Vilanova. Ana Rioja’s course on the Heisenberg’s relations of uncertainty was particularly interesting. Muchas gracias Ana. In September 2006 I received the FPI scholarship associated with Mauricio’s research project, which since then has allowed me to be economically independent. If this had not been so, I probably wouldn’t have continued my PhD. Again, I wish to thank Mauricio for this. The FPI scholarship has the incredible feature of allowing one to spend six months each year at a foreign university. I here want to thank the former Ministry of Science and Technology for developing such a wonderful program. This possibility, alongside with Mauricio’s help, has allowed me to take advantage of many otherwise inaccessible oppor- tunities which have enormously enriched my education. I have been able to interact with many different people and follow courses at other universities. Arthur Fine, Seattle and the University of Washington have played such a major role in my life and work during the last three years, that it’s difficult to convey it in words. Arthur, having received so much from you, and of such fine quality, both at a human and at an intellectual level, makes me feel incredibly fortunate, happy and grateful. I would not have reached the point of writing the acknowledgments of my dissertation without you. The Philosophy department at the University of Washington has been an embracing home for me during my (long!) two research stays from January-June 2007 and March- September 2008. Thank you very much Barb, Bev and Sara for treating me with great care, Ann and Larry for being my first teachers of ‘real’ philosophy, and the staff and graduate students at the department. It was a pleasure to be in such a wonderful graduate community. I loved being with Monica and Ben, Rachel and Jeremy. And Karen. Joe, Lars, Ali (my 8 o’clock good morning!), David Alexander, Jason, Mitch, Tye, Brandon, Jon, Andrea, ... (and Negin!). And hurray for the pro-seminar and the work-sharing it got going! And Micky, always, my guardian angel. Susan, at home, together. Nancy, biking all over Seattle and always giving me her love. Peter, the first person who gave light to my new home, and who afterward always continued doing so. Amy, whom I wish I had also lived with the second year (but I loved to be with in Lasqueti!). And Patrick, whose love and admiration for the kind of work I was doing was of great value to me. And Mount Rainier, Golden Gardens, the Puget Sound, the Olympic Mountains, Port Townsend and the Washington State Ferries. Hampstead Heath. The Englisher Garten. And, of course, Oriol y la Sierra de Guadarrama. My own private refuges, without which I cannot live. Finally, Mount Aspiring National Park and Fiordland, which managed to get me out of the dark hole I was in. Now, I am in Munich, at the Carl von Linde Academy (TUM). And again luck seems to follow me. For working with Wolfgang and Fred has turned out to be a really wonderful and unexpected treat. I am very grateful I have two great new friends! Wolfgang, thank you also for making this research stay possible and for giving me extremely helpful comments on my dissertation; and thank you Fred for our wonderful morning routine. I am also grateful to the Carl von Linde Academy for allowing me to be part of it – Jörg Wernecke, Klaus Mainzer and Rainhard Bengez. Finally, I want to thank the audiences at different congresses – especially, at LSE, Cambridge University, UCM, University of Washington, UA Barcelona, and APA Pasadena – for the very helpful opportunity of preparing a talk, giving it, and getting feedback. And in my mind, I now go back to Madrid. For there is Albert, with whom I’ve been with during the four years at UCM. Me ha encantado encontrar un lugar para estar juntos estos últimos meses de escritura. Mil gracias. Thanks also to the people in our research group: Iñaki, Fernanda, Carlos, Pedro, Carl, Henrik, Mari Cruz Boscá. Y a Mari Cruz, que me encanta tener de referencia del departamento en la UCM. Y gracias al departamento por haberme dado la oportunidad de impartir docencia y haber proporcionado el marco en el que se desarrolla este programa de doctorado; en particular, muchísimas gracias a Luis Fernández por todo su apoyo y ayuda. Y mi madre, mi padre, Alicia y Martirio. Jose. Marta. Eneritz. Y Domingo. No encuentro palabras. Hebe y Marian, mis dos hadas madrinas españolas. Mi grupo de Gestalt: Bea, Angelina, Borja, Nazaret, Aurora, Míguel, Edu, Marta, Silvia, Mónica, Sara, Jorge, Margarita y Alejandro. Estefanía, Paloma, Isabel y Miguel. Y Marta Rosillo, a la que espero seguir conociendo (y acercar a la Gestalt!) Ignacio, a quien sigo llevando muy cerca de mi. María y Natalia (ya son 25 años!). Reyes, gran reencuentro en la recta final, y Marina, qué gusto los pequeños encuentros contigo! Alisa. Álvaro, que finalmente ha conseguido ganar la apuesta. Celine y Bea. Nurieta y Carol. Et Sophie! Y por todas las ‘bobadas’, en Pirineos, en Burgos, o donde quiera.
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