Richard Neal Manning Department of Philosophy University of South
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Realism for Realistic People
Realism for Realistic People Author(s): Hasok Chang Source: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2018) 31-34. Published by: The University of Toronto DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v9i1.27002 EDITORIALOFFICES Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Room 316 Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1K7 [email protected] Published online at jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations ISSN 1913 0465 Founded in 2006, Spontaneous Generations is an online academic journal published by graduate students at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto. There is no subscription or membership fee. Spontaneous Generations provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge. Focused Discussion Invited Paper Realism for Realistic People* Hasok Chang† Why should anyone care about the seemingly interminable philosophical debate concerning scientific realism? Shouldn’t we simply let go of it,in the spirit of Arthur Fine’s “natural ontological attitude” (NOA) (Fine 1986, chs. 7-8)? To a large extent I follow Fine, especially in relation to the endless arguments surrounding realist attempts to show that the impossible is somehow possible, that empirical science can really attain assured knowledge about what goes beyond experience. It is time to face the fact that we cannot know whether we have got the objective Truth about the World (even if such a formulation is meaningful). Realists go astray by persisting in trying to find a way around this fact, as do anti-realists in engaging with that obsession. -
CV, Paul Horwich, March 2017
Curriculum Vitae Paul Horwich Department of Philosophy 212 998 8320 (tel) New York University 212 995 4178 (fax) 5 Washington Place [email protected] New York, NY 10003 EDUCATION Cornell University (Philosophy) Ph.D. 1975 Cornell University (Philosophy) M.A. 1973 Yale University (Physics and Philosophy) M.A. 1969 Oxford University (Physics) B.A. 1968 TITLE OF DOCTORAL THESIS: The Metric and Topology of Time. EMPLOYMENT Spring 2007 Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tokyo Fall 2006 Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris 2005–present Professor, Department of Philosophy, New York University 2000–2005 Kornblith Distinguished Professor, Philosophy Program, Graduate Center of the City University of New York Spring 1998 Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Sydney 1994–2000 Professor, Department of Philosophy, University College London Fall 1994 Associate Research Director, Institute d'Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences et Technique, CNRS, Paris 1987–1994 Professor, Department of Linguistics And Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1980–1987 Associate Professor of Philosophy, MIT Fall 1978 Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Los Angeles 1973–1980 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, MIT CV, Paul Horwich, March 2017 GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS 2008–9 Guggenheim Fellowship Spring 2007 Fellowship from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science 2007 U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship Fall 1988 U.S. National Science Foundation -
The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy
Introduction n recent years the classical authors of Anglo-Saxon pragmatism have gar- Inered a renewed importance in international philosophical circles. In the aftermath of the linguistic turn, philosophers such as Charles S. Peirce, William James, George H. Mead, Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, and John Dewey are being reread alongside, for example, recent postmodern and deconstructivist thought as alternatives to a traditional orientation toward the concerns of a represen- tationalist epistemology. In the context of contemporary continental thought, the work of Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Gilles Deleuze comprises just a few examples of a culturewide assault on a metaphysical worldview premised on what Michel Foucault called the empirico-transcendental doublet, and presents a wealth of potential exchange with the pragmatist critique of representationalism. In both cases, aspects of pragmatist thought are being used to add flexibility to the conceptual tools of modern philoso- phy, in order to promote a style of philosophizing more apt to dealing with the problems of everyday life. The hope for a pragmatic “renewing of phi- losophy” (Putnam) evidenced in these trends has led to an analytic reexami- nation of some of the fundamental positions in modern continental thought as well, and to a recognition of previously unacknowledged or underappreciated pragmatic elements in thinkers like Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. Within the current analytic discussions, a wide spectrum of differing and at times completely heterogeneous forms of neopragmatism can be distinguished, which for heuristic purposes can be grouped into two general categories according to the type of discursive strategy employed. The first of these consists in a conscious inflation of the concept of pragmatism in order to establish it as widely as possible within the disciplinary discourse of philosophy. -
Subjunctive Reasoning
Subjunctive Reasoning John L. Pollock SUBJUNCTIVE REASONING PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES IN PHILOSOPHY Editors: WILFRIDSELLARS, University of Pittsburgh KEITHLEHRER, University of Arizona Board of Consulting Editors: JONATHANBENNETT, University of British Columbia ALANGIBBARD, University of Pittsburgh ROBERTSTALNAKER, Cornell University ROBERTG. TURNBULL,Ohio State University VOLUME 8 JOHN L. POLLOCK University of Rochester SUBJUNCTIVE REASONING D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY DORDRECHT-HOLLAND/BOSTON-U .S.A. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Pollock, John L Subjunctive reasoning. (Philosophical studies series in philosophy ; v. 8) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Conditionals (Logic) 2. Reasoning. 3. Counter- factuals (Logic) 4. Probabilities. I. Title. BC199.C56P64 160 76-19095 ISBN 90-277-0701 -4 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O.Box 17, Dordrecht, Holland Sold and distributed in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Inc. Lincoln Building, 160 Old Derby Street, Hingham, Mass. 02043, U.S.A. All Rights Reserved Copyright @ 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any informational storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner Printed in The Netherlands TO CAROL who puts up with me TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE I. INTRODUCTION 1. Subjunctive Reasoning 2. The Linguistic Approach 3. The 'Possible Worlds' Approach 4. Conclusions Notes 11. FOUR KINDS OF CONDITIONALS 1. Introduction 2. The Four Kinds 3. 'Even if Subjunctives 4. 'Might Be' Conditionals 5. Necessitation Conditionals 6. Simple Subjunctives 7. -
Curriculum Vitae
PETER D. KLEIN Home Address 72 Pine Grove Ave. Somerset, NJ 08873 Email: [email protected] Education Earlham College, B.A. 1962 Yale University, M.A., 1964, Ph.D. 1966 Employment Colgate University: Assistant Professor 1966-70 Rutgers University: Assistant Professor 1970-1973 Associate Professor 1973-1981 Professor, 1981-2016 Professor Emeritus, 2016-present Publications Books Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, University of Minnesota Press, 1981, xiv + 242. (second printing, 1984) Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism, co-edited with John Turri, Oxford University Press, 2014. Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, co-edited with Claudio de Almeida and Rodrigo Borges, Oxford University Press, 2018. Xv + 414. Articles, Chapters in Books, Reviews and Other Items “The Private Language Argument and The Sense-Datum Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 47.3, 1969, 325-343. “Are Strawson's Persons Immortal? - A Reply,” Philosophical Studies, 20.5, 1969, 65-69. 1 “A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy, 67.16, 1971, 471-482. Reprinted in: Knowing, M. Roth & L. Galis (eds.), University Press of America, l984; Knowledge and Justification, Ernest Sosa (ed), Ashgate Publishing Co., 1994; On Knowing and the Known, Ken Lucey (ed), Prometheus Books, 1996; Epistemology: An Anthology, J. Kim & E. Sosa & M. McGrath (eds.), Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies, 1999; Epistemology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, R. Neta (ed.), 2012. “Knowledge, Causality and Defeasibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 73.20, 1976, 792-812. Review of David Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, in Philosophical Review, 85.2, 1976, 225-227. “Misleading ‘Misleading Defeaters’,” Journal of Philosophy, 76.7, 1979, 382-386. -
The Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy: Program History
The Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy: Program History 1960 FIRST COLLOQUIUM Wilfrid Sellars, "On Looking at Something and Seeing it" Ronald Hepburn, "God and Ambiguity" Comments: Dennis O'Brien Kurt Baier, "Itching and Scratching" Comments: David Falk/Bruce Aune Annette Baier, "Motives" Comments: Jerome Schneewind 1961 SECOND COLLOQUIUM W.D. Falk, "Hegel, Hare and the Existential Malady" Richard Cartwright, "Propositions" Comments: Ruth Barcan Marcus D.A.T. Casking, "Avowals" Comments: Martin Lean Zeno Vendler, "Consequences, Effects and Results" Comments: William Dray/Sylvan Bromberger PUBLISHED: Analytical Philosophy, First Series, R.J. Butler (ed.), Oxford, Blackwell's, 1962. 1962 THIRD COLLOQUIUM C.J. Warnock, "Truth" Arthur Prior, "Some Exercises in Epistemic Logic" Newton Garver, "Criteria" Comments: Carl Ginet/Paul Ziff Hector-Neri Castenada, "The Private Language Argument" Comments: Vere Chappell/James Thomson John Searle, "Meaning and Speech Acts" Comments: Paul Benacerraf/Zeno Vendler PUBLISHED: Knowledge and Experience, C.D. Rollins (ed.), University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. 1963 FOURTH COLLOQUIUM Michael Scriven, "Insanity" Frederick Will, "The Preferability of Probable Beliefs" Norman Malcolm, "Criteria" Comments: Peter Geach/George Pitcher Terrence Penelhum, "Pleasure and Falsity" Comments: William Kennick/Arnold Isenberg 1964 FIFTH COLLOQUIUM Stephen Korner, "Some Remarks on Deductivism" J.J.C. Smart, "Nonsense" Joel Feinberg, "Causing Voluntary Actions" Comments: Keith Donnellan/Keith Lehrer Nicholas Rescher, "Evaluative Metaphysics" Comments: Lewis W. Beck/Thomas E. Patton Herbert Hochberg, "Qualities" Comments: Richard Severens/J.M. Shorter PUBLISHED: Metaphysics and Explanation, W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966. 1965 SIXTH COLLOQUIUM Patrick Nowell-Smith, "Acts and Locutions" George Nakhnikian, "St. Anselm's Four Ontological Arguments" Hilary Putnam, "Psychological Predicates" Comments: Bruce Aune/U.T. -
Realism and Theories of Truth
Realism and Theories of Truth Jamin Asay University of Hong Kong [email protected] Forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, ed. Juha Saatsi 1. Introduction The notion of truth has never been far from the ongoing conversation about scientific realism. Scientific realism (and its opposition) is often defined explicitly in terms of truth, and sometimes it is argued that scientific realism (and its opposition) requires a commitment to particular conceptions about the nature of truth. It’s not difficult to appreciate why. The realist perspective maintains that science succeeds (or aims at succeeding) in correctly capturing the nature of reality, and to correctly describe reality just is to give a true theory about it. While it is fairly indisputable that there is some connection between truth and realism, it remains to be seen just how deep the relationship goes. In this essay, I explore some of the prominent ways that scientific realism and the theory of truth have intersected, and evaluate the arguments that have been offered concerning their relationship. Two basic positions can be articulated when it comes to the relationship between the theory of truth and scientific realism. Those who favor neutrality believe that one’s position on the theory of truth is neutral with respect to one’s position on scientific realism, and vice versa. Even though realism might be defined in terms of truth, it’s a further (and false) claim that realism (or its opposition) must be defined in terms of particular theories of truth. Those who favor a partisan view believe that varieties of scientific realism and anti-realism are tied up in the nature of truth, such that the former are committed to particular perspectives on truth. -
Curriculum Vitae
CURRICULUM VITAE James O. Young, FRSC Department of Philosophy University of Victoria P.O. Box 1700, STN CSC Victoria, B.C. Canada, V8W 2Y2 Telephone: (1) 250 721 7509; Fax: (1) 250 721 7511 e-mail: [email protected] Degrees: B.A. (First Class Hons.), Simon Fraser University, May 1979 M.A., University of Waterloo, June 1981 Ph.D., Boston University, January 1985 Academic Positions: Professor, University of Victoria (1999-present) Senior Visiting Fellow, Durham University (2018) Visiting Scholar, Universidad de Murcia (2018) Associate Professor, University of Victoria (1991-99) Assistant Professor, University of Victoria (1985-91) Research Fellow, University of Melbourne (1987-88) Lecturer, University of Calgary (1984-85) Monographs: History of Western Philosophy of Music. Under contract with Cambridge University Press. Radically Rethinking Copyright in the Arts. New York and London: Routledge, 2020. Filosofía de la Música. Respuestas a Peter Kivy. Logroño: Calanda, 2017. Critique of Pure Music. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Cultural Appropriation and the Arts. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. James O. Young Curriculum Vitae 2 Paperback edition, 2009. Chinese translation forthcoming. Art and Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge, 2001. Chronicle of Higher Education featured New Scholarly Book. Korean translation, Seoul National University Press, 2013. Arabic translation, National Center for Translation (Egypt), forthcoming Global Anti-realism. Aldershot: Avebury, 1995. Translations: Jean-Baptiste Du Bos: Critical Reflections on Poetry and Painting. Translated with an Introduction and Notes. Forthcoming from Brill. (Co-translator and co-author: Margaret Cameron) Charles Batteux: The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle. Translated with an Introduction and Notes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. -
Hilary Putnam Edited by Yemima Ben-Menahem Frontmatter More Information
Cambridge University Press 0521012546 - Hilary Putnam Edited by Yemima Ben-Menahem Frontmatter More information Hilary Putnam The richness of Hilary Putnam’s philosophical oeuvre consists not only in the broad spectrum of problems addressed but also in the transformations and re- structuring his positions have undergone over the years. The essays collected in this volume are sensitive to both these dimensions. They discuss Putnam’s major philosophical contributions to the theory of meaning, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science and mathematics, and moral theory. But, in addition, tracing threads of change and continuity, they analyze the dynamics underlying the unfolding of Putnam’s thought. The volume also constitutes a critical introduction to a number of central issues in contemporary philoso- phy, including quantum logic, realism, functionalism, the ‘mind as computer’ metaphor, and the fact/value dichotomy. Yemima Ben-Menahem is a memberof the Departmentof Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 0521012546 - Hilary Putnam Edited by Yemima Ben-Menahem Frontmatter More information Contemporary Philosophy in Focus Contemporary Philosophy in Focus offers a series of introductory volumes to many of the dominant philosophical thinkers of the current age. Each vol- ume consists of newly commissioned essays that covermajorcontributionsof a preeminent philosopher in a systematic and accessible manner. Comparable in scope and rationale to the highly successful series Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, the volumes do not presuppose that readers are already inti- mately familiar with the details of each philosopher’s work. They thus combine exposition and critical analysis in a manner that will appeal to students of phi- losophy and to professionals as well as to students across the humanities and social sciences. -
Quantum Conditional Probability: Implications for Conceptual Change of Science
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID FACULTAD DE FILOSOFÍA Departamento de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia QUANTUM CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONCEPTUAL CHANGE OF SCIENCE. MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR PRESENTADA POR Isabel Guerra Bobo Bajo la dirección del doctor Mauricio Suárez Madrid, 2010 • ISBN: 978-84-693-3483-6 QUANTUM CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY Implications for Conceptual Change in Science ISABEL GUERRA BOBO Director de tesis: Dr. Mauricio Suarez Phd Thesis, June 2009 Quantum Conditional Probability Implications for Conceptual Change in Science A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid . Isabel Guerra Bobo Supervisor: Mauricio Suárez, Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Isabel Guerra Bobo, 2009. ‘Quantum Conditional Probability: Implications for Con- ceptual Change in Science.’ I hereby declare that this submission is my own original work and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text. Research toward this thesis has been carried out thanks to an FPI Scholarship of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education (MEC) associated to the Research Project Causation, Propensities and Causal Inference in Quantum Physics within the DGICYT Research Network HUM2005-01787: 2005- 2008 Classical and Causal Concepts in Science, and to the Complutense Research Group MECISR. Munich, June 2009 To Arthur Fine, for making quantum mechanics & philosophy become alive for me. Y a Jose. Acknowledgments Giving birth and life to this dissertation has mostly occurred during the past five years. The story begins on the morning of Thursday July 1st 2004, in which I met Mauricio Suárez at a cafe in Madrid. -
DIA Volume 15 Issue 3 Back Matter
Canadian Journal of Philosophy announces the reprinting in response to demand of New Essays IN THE Philosophy of Mind Edited by John King-Farlow and Roger A. Shiner Contents Observation and Subjectivity in Quine—Harold Morick Actions—L. H. Davis Can Desires be Causes of Actions?—D. A. Browne Strawson's Transcendental Deduction of Other Minds—/. L. Martin Physicalism and the Evolution of Consciousness—Roland Puccetti Scientific Reduction and the Mind-Body Problem—L F. Mucciolo Wittgenstein on Verification and Private Language—]. S. C/egg Can One Recognize Kinds of Private Object?—Charles E. Marks Price $7.00 Order from: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4-108 Humanities Centre, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E5 An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry Founded 1888 by Edward C. Hegeler Editor, Eugene FREEMAN Editorial Board: William P. Alston, Monroe C. Beardsley, Lewis White Beck, William A. Earle, Dagfinn Fi^llesdal, William Frankena, Maurice Mandelbaum, R. Barcan Marcus, Richard Martin, Mary Mothersill. Joseph Owens, Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, Wilfrid Sellars, John E. Smith, Richard Wasserstrom. Managing Editor. Ann FREEMAN EACH ISSUE IS LIMITED TO ARTICLES ON A SINGLE GENERAL TOPIC. Communicate with the Editor in advance for Special Instructions. Papers should be 4000-8000 words in length and must be submitted in duplicate nine months prior to the scheduled publication of the issue, accompanied by return postage. SCHEDULED PUBLICATION DATES: ~ Vol.60, No. 1 Jan., 1977 Bioethics and Social Responsibility Vol.60, No. 2 Apr., 1977 Philosophy and Religion in the Nineteenth Century Vol. 60, No. 3 July, 1977 New Directions in Semantics Vol.60, No. -
A Bibliography of the Philosophical Writings of Richard Taylor
A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF RICHARD TAYLOR 1950 'Comments on a Mechanistic Conception of Purposefulness', Philosophy of Science 17. Reprinted in Purpose in Nature, ed. by J. V. Canfield (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966) and in Modem Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist, ed. by Walter Buckley (Chicago, 1968) and in Philosophy, the Cutting Edge, ed. by David Berlinski (Sherman Oaks, Calif., 1976). 'Behavior and Purpose: A Rejoinder', Philosophy of Science 17. Reprinted in Buckley, ibid. 1951 Review of A History ofAncient and Medieval Philosophy by Frederick Mayet. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 11. 1952 'Mr Black on Temporal Paradoxes', Analysis 13. 'Negative Things', The Journal ofPhilosophy 49. 'Mr Wisdom on Temporal Paradoxes', Analysis 13. 'The Writings of C. J. -Ducasse' [a bibliography], Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13. Review of Theory of Knowledge by A. D. Woozley. The Philosophical Review 61. Review of St. Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle's Love and Friendship by Pierre Conway. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12. Review of Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature by R. A. Kocourek. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12. Review of The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics by Joseph Owens. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13. 1953 'Ayer's Analysis of Negation', Philosophical Studies 4. 'A Note on Knowledge and Belief, Analysis 13. 'A Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics', Review of Metaphysics 7. Review of A Study in Memory by E. J. Furlong, The Journal of Philosophy 50. 1954 'Rejoinder to Mr Malcolm',Analysis 14. 301 302 PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF RICHARD TAYLOR 'Knowledge and Certainty', Review of Metaphysics 7. 'Disputes about Synonymy', The Philosophical Review 63.