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A foundationalist defense of the given Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Poulsen, Rachel J. Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 23/09/2021 19:45:57 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/280644 A FOUNDATIONALIST DEFENSE OF THE GIVEN by Rachael J. Poulsen Copyright © Rachael J. Poulsen 2004 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2004 UMI Number: 3145120 Copyright 2004 by Poulsen, Rachael J. All rights reserved. INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI UMI Microform 3145120 Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 2 The University of Arizona ® Graduate College As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Rachael Jean Poulsen entitled A Foundational 1st Defense of the Given and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy John L. Pollock jo <4 date Keith E. Lehrer I 2."^ date vid J. Chalmers ^ 1 lo Ite Terence E. Horgan ijO-Sjof date date Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. 4f2?/54 iXisse^ationDirector: john L. Pollock date 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under the rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder. SIGNED: 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank all those at the University of Arizona and elsewhere who have discussed with me the topics that have made their way into this dissertation. In particular, I wish to thank Brad Thompson and Adam Boch for many pleasurable discussions that have proved quite useful to me in the development of my ideas. Thanks to my friends in the department of philosophy who have been a source of support and who have made my time at the University of Arizona so enjoyable. In particular, thanks to Scott Hendricks, Joel Martinez, and William Oberdick. Thanks to my advisor, John Pollock, for his comments, encouragement and advice. He has been all that I could hope for in an advisor and I am indebted to him. Also thanks to David Chalmers, Keith Lehrer, Joseph Tolliver, and Terence Horgan for helpful discussions as well as comments and suggestions on drafts of my dissertation. Much thanks goes to Adam Boch who has helped in many ways to make this dissertation possible. Thanks for the philosophical discussions, the comments, and the help on editing various drafts of the dissertation. Thanks too, for friendship and emotional support. 1 wish to thank my father, Mark Poulsen, for instilling in me a love for philosophy. I wish to thank my mother, Katherine, for teaching me how to set and accomplish my goals. 1 wish to thank them both for their support and for their faith in me. Finally, I wish to thank my daughter, Madeleine, for her patience with me through this process. Her love and well-being has always been a motivating factor in my work. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 7 INTRODUCTION 9 CHAPTER ONE: THE LEGEND OF THE GIVEN 18 INTRODUCTION 18 MOTIVATING THE LEGEND 22 THE GIVEN: SOME DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS 27 DIRECT ACQUAINTANCE 28 INFALLIBILITY 32 TRANSPARENCY 34 NON-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER 36 UNMEDIATED ACCESS 37 AWARENESS OF SORTS 38 CONCLUSION 39 CHAPTER TWO: THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN 41 INTRODUCTION 41 AGAINST DIRECT ACQUAINTANCE 42 AGAINST INFALLIBILITY 48 AGAINST TRANSPARENCY 53 AGAINST NON-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER 56 AGAINST UNMEDIATED ACCESS 59 AGAINST AWARENESS OF SORTS 61 CONCLUSION 63 CHAPTER THREE: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF THE GIVEN 64 INTRODUCTION 64 WHAT MAKES A STATE CONCEPTUAL? 70 OVERIEW OF MY RESPONSE 77 CHAPTER FOUR: A DEFENSE OF THE GIVEN 80 APPREHENDING THE GIVEN 80 COGNITIVE AND NON-COGNITIVE APPREHENSION 80 AWARENESS OF SORTS 85 DISCRIMINITIVE AND CONCEPTUAL APPREHENSION 88 APPREHENSION AND JUSTIFICATION 96 EPISTEMIC PRIORITY 97 AGAINST FOUNDATIONALISM 98 NON-ANALYZABILITY 102 SELLARS ON 'LOOKINGS' 104 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) THE MYTH OF JONES 109 THE SPACE OF REASONS 117 EXCULPATIONS VS. JUSTIFICATION 118 GIVING AND ASKING FOR REASONS 122 JUSTIFICATION AS INFERENCE 129 LOGICAL SPACE 131 CONCLUSION 136 CHAPTER FIVE: A CHALLENGE TO THE CONCEPTUALIST 137 INTRODUCTION 137 SELLARS' VIEW 138 MCDOWELL'S VIEW 150 CONCLUSION 161 CHAPTER SIX: NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE 163 REPRESENTATIONS AND CONCEPTS 163 THE PHENOMENAL AS REPRESENTATIONAL 166 NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT 168 THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL CONTENT 174 DETERMINING PHENOMENAL CONTENT 176 WHAT DOES OUR EXPERIENCE REPRESENT? 183 CONSTRCTING CONCEPTS 189 DE RE REPRESENTATIONS 195 PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS 196 PERCEPTUAL CONCEPTS 201 OBSERVATIONAL CONCEPTS 205 CONCLUSION 208 CHAPTER SEVEN: NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND JUSTIFICATION 211 EXPERIENCE AND REASON 211 THE RATIONAL ROLE OF EXPERIENCE 217 PHENOMENAL BELIEF... 238 PERCEPTUAL BELIEF 244 OBSERVATIONAL BELIEF 250 REASON AND TRUTH 252 CONCLUSION 254 REFERENCES 257 7 ABSTRACT What is 'given in experience' is the phenomenal character that is immediately available to the conscious subject when she senses. The doctrine of the given is the view that what is given in our experience may play a foundational role in our knowledge. This doctrine of the given has been rejected by some as a 'myth.' The aim of my dissertation is to develop a notion of the given that is theoretically useful in an account of knowledge and that withstands the various attacks that have traditionally been logged against it. In chapter one I offer a brief historical overview of the given, considering motivations for accepting such a notion and identifying six central features that have been traditionally attributed to the given. In chapter two I consider and respond to arguments against the given as they are logged against each of these six central features. In chapter three I consider the major argument against the given that will occupy my attention throughout the rest of the work. This argument contends that the given cannot play a foundational role in knowledge and rests primarily on a crucial assumption, the conceptualist thesis. The conceptualist thesis states that nothing can epistemically contribute to the acquisition or justification of knowledge that is not essentially conceptual or belief-like. Chapters four through seven are aimed at arguing against the conceptualist thesis. In chapter four 1 consider the major arguments in favor of the conceptualist thesis. I demonstrate that these arguments are faulty or misguided. In chapter five I consider alternative views that suppose experience to be essentially and necessarily conceptual. I offer objections to such views and show that the flaws in these views are the result of the mistaken assumption of the conceptualist thesis. In chapter six I discuss what is represented non-conceptually in experience. Given the representational nature of experience I show how a non-conceptual given can play an epistemic role in our acquisition of both introspective and perceptual knowledge. In chapter seven I show how a non-conceptual given can provide reasons or justification for both introspective and perceptual beliefs. 9 INTRODUCTION The doctrine of the given has fallen on hard times. Indeed, one hardly hears mention of the given without the disparaging preface, the myth of the given. Philosophers like Wittgenstein, Austin and Seliars have criticized the notion of direct and private 'knowings' of sense experience. McDowell, Bonjour, Sellars and Brewer have challenged the idea that what is non-conceptual can play an epistemic role in our knowledge. Foundationalist views that depend on a notion of the given arc criticized for ascribing an epistemic role to something that is taken to be 'merely causa!.' In what follows we will reconsider this unpopular doctrine. We will recall some of the major motivations for a commitment to such a doctrine (after all, the given has had some rather respectable advocates and should not be dismissed lightly). We will address some of the major arguments against the given. Finally, we will lay out a foundationalist view that highlights the crucial role that the given plays in our acquisition and justification of knowledge. The 'doctrine of the given' must be distinguished from various notions of the given. Chisholm formulated the doctrine well and so I will borrow his formulation here.
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