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A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth Edition A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth edition John Losee OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science This page intentionally left blank A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Fourth edition John Losee 1 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © John Losee , The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN ––– Typeset in Adobe Minion by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King’s Lynn Preface This book is a historical sketch of the development of views about scientific method. Its emphasis is on developments prior to . No attempt has been made to reproduce the contemporary spectrum of positions on the phil- osophy of science. My purpose has been exposition rather than criticism, and I have endeavoured to abstain from passing judgement on the achievements of the great philosophers of science. It is my hope that this book may be of interest both to students of the philosophy of science and to students of the history of science. If, on reading this book, a few such students are encouraged to consult some of the works listed in the Bibliography at the end of the book, I shall consider my effort to have been well spent. I have received numerous helpful suggestions from Gerd Buchdahl, George Clark, and Rom Harré in the preparation of this volume. I am most grateful, both for their encouragement, and for their criticism. Of course, responsibility for what has emerged is mine alone. Lafayette College July Preface to the Second Edition The discussion of post-Second-World-War developments has been reorgan- ized and expanded in the second edition. There are new chapters on the Logical Reconstructionism of Carnap, Hempel, and Nagel; the critical reac- tion to this orientation; and the alternative approaches of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan. August Preface to the Third Edition The third edition includes new material on theories of scientific progress, causal explanation, Bayesian confirmation theory, scientific realism, and alternatives to prescriptive philosophy of science. September vi prefaces Preface to the Fourth Edition Contributions to the discipline have continued at an accelerated pace since publication of the Third Edition. The Fourth Edition incorporates, in Chapters –, recent work on theory-appraisal, experimental practice, theories of explanation, normative naturalism, the debate over scientific realism, and the philosophy of biology. Contents Introduction 1 1 Aristotle’s Philosophy of Science 4 2 The Pythagorean Orientation 14 3 The Ideal of Deductive Systematization 20 4 Atomism and the Concept of Underlying Mechanism 24 5 Affirmation and Development of Aristotle’s Method in the Medieval Period 26 6 The Debate over Saving the Appearances 39 7 The Seventeenth-Century Attack on Aristotelian Philosophy 46 I. Galileo 46 II. Francis Bacon 54 III. Descartes 63 8 Newton’s Axiomatic Method 72 9 Analyses of the Implications of the New Science for a Theory of Scientific Method 86 I. The Cognitive Status of Scientific Laws 86 II. Theories of Scientific Procedure 103 III. Structure of Scientific Theories 117 10 Inductivism v. the Hypothetico-Deductive View of Science 132 11 Mathematical Positivism and Conventionalism 143 12 Logical Reconstructionist Philosophy of Science 158 13 Orthodoxy under Attack 177 14 Theories of Scientific Progress 197 15 Explanation, Causation, and Unification 210 16 Confirmation, Evidential Support, and Theory Appraisal 220 17 The Justification of Evaluative Standards 236 18 The Debate over Scientific Realism 252 19 Descriptive Philosophies of Science 264 viii contents Select Bibliography 279 Index of Proper Names 305 Index of Subjects 309 Introduction A decision on the scope of the philosophy of science is a precondition for writing about its history. Unfortunately, philosophers and scientists are not in agreement on the nature of the philosophy of science. Even practising philo- sophers of science often disagree about the proper subject-matter of their discipline. An example of this lack of agreement is the exchange between Stephen Toulmin and Ernest Nagel on whether philosophy of science should be a study of scientific achievement in vivo, or a study of problems of explan- ation and confirmation as reformulated in the terms of deductive logic.1 To establish a basis for the subsequent historical survey, it will be helpful to sketch four viewpoints on the philosophy of science. One view is that the philosophy of science is the formulation of world- views that are consistent with, and in some sense based on, important scien- tific theories. On this view, it is the task of the philosopher of science to elaborate the broader implications of science. This may take the form of speculation about ontological categories to be used in speaking about “being- as-such”. Thus Alfred North Whitehead urged that recent developments in physics require that the categories ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’ be replaced by the categories ‘process’ and ‘influence’.2 Or it may take the form of pro- nouncements about the implications of scientific theories for the evaluation of human behaviour, as in Social Darwinism and the theory of ethical relativ- ity. The present study is not concerned with “philosophy of science” in this sense. A second view is that the philosophy of science is an exposition of the presuppositions and predispositions of scientists. The philosopher of science may point out that scientists presuppose that nature is not capricious, and that there exist in nature regularities of sufficiently low complexity to be accessible to the investigator. In addition, he may uncover the preferences of scientists for deterministic rather than statistical laws, or for mechanistic rather than teleological explanations. This view tends to assimilate philosophy of science to sociology. A third view is that the philosophy of science is a discipline in which the concepts and theories of the sciences are analysed and clarified. This is not a matter of giving a semi-popular exposition of the latest theories. It is, rather, a introduction matter of becoming clear about the meaning of such terms as ‘particle’, ‘wave’, ‘potential’, and ‘complex’ in their scientific usage. But as Gilbert Ryle has pointed out, there is something pretentious about this view of the philosophy of science—as if the scientist needed the phil- osopher of science to explain to him the meanings of scientific concepts.3 There would seem to be two possibilities. Either the scientist does understand a concept that he uses, in which case no clarification is required. Or he does not, in which case he must inquire into the relations of that concept to other concepts and to operations of measurement. Such an inquiry is a typical scientific activity. No one would claim that each time a scientist conducts such an inquiry he is practising philosophy of science. At the very least, we must conclude that not every analysis of scientific concepts qualifies as philosophy of science. And yet it may be that certain types of conceptual analysis should be classified as part of the philosophy of science. This question will be left open, pending consideration of a fourth view of the philosophy of science. A fourth view, which is the view adopted in this work, is that philosophy of science is a second-order criteriology. The philosopher of science seeks answers to such questions as: . What characteristics distinguish scientific inquiry from other types of investigation? . What procedures should scientists follow in investigating nature? . What conditions must be satisfied for a scientific explanation to be correct? . What is the cognitive status of scientific laws and principles? To ask these questions is to assume a vantage-point one step removed from the practice of science itself. There is a distinction to be made between doing science and thinking about how science ought to be done. The analysis of scientific method is a second-order discipline, the subject-matter of which is the procedures and structures of the various sciences, viz.: level discipline subject-matter Philosophy of Science Analysis of the Procedures and Logic of Scientific Explanation Science Explanation of Facts Facts The fourth view of the philosophy of science incorporates certain aspects of the second and third views. For instance, inquiry into the predispositions of scientists may be relevant to the problem of evaluating scientific theories. This is particularly true for judgements about the completeness of explanations. Einstein, for example, insisted that statistical accounts of radioactive decay were incomplete.
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