DOCSLIB.ORG

A Discussion on Berkeley's Account of Time a Thesis Presented to The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Discussion on Berkeley's Account of Time a Thesis Presented to The A Discussion on Berkeley’s Account of Time A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Nicholas L. Shooner August 2020 © 2020 Nicholas L. Shooner. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled A Discussion on Berkeley’s Account of Time by NICHOLAS L. SHOONER has been approved for the Department of Philosophy and the College of Arts and Sciences by James M. Petrik Associate Professor of Philosophy Florenz Plassmann Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 Abstract SHOONER, NICHOLAS L., M.A., August 2020, Philosophy A Discussion on Berkeley’s Account of Time Director of Thesis: James M. Petrik We examine what George Berkeley says about the nature of time and weigh two competing interpretations of his theory to determine which is closer to his intended meaning. Berkeley presents a theory of time that is idealist (time consists in ideas and their motions), subjectivist (time is contained within subjects), and relationalist (time is not an absolute entity, but is a description of the relations between events). While these features of Berkeley’s theory are not in dispute, there is a debate concerning whether he accepts an inter-subjective, universal ordering of events which grounds the temporal experiences of all human subjects. H. Scott Hestevold argues that, for Berkeley, such an order is to be found in the all-encompassing subject, God, whereas Darren Hynes argues that no such ordering is needed in Berkeley’s system. We evaluate these interpretations in light of Berkeley’s other metaphysical commitments and conclude that Hestevold’s interpretation is superior since it is better able to accommodate Berkeley’s commitment to the meaningfulness of temporal language in ordinary discourse and his commitment to the possibility and success of the natural sciences. 4 Dedication I want to dedicate this modest thesis to all of my fellow students and classmates through the years, my teachers, my family, as well as all of my friends in Athens, Ohio, with whom I was so lucky to enjoy conversation and life. The learning that made this project possible was not something that happened strictly confined to a book, but in the day to day that I was so lucky to share with you all. 5 Acknowledgments I wish to thank, firstly, my fellow students in philosophy through the years, particularly those I have gone through the M.A. program with. In particular I would like to thank Dylan Rostoker, Kyle Burback, Christopher Meyer, Jamie Perzanowski, Luke and Ben Elmore, Zachariah Renfro, Brad Osuna, Nicholas Bocheneck, Matt Meyers, Samantha Stewart, and Jacob Koval, among others. Additionally, I want to thank everyone I’ve ever had the pleasure of living and staying with through the years, in particular the sailors: Andrew, Fish, Kyle, Spencer, John, Briana, Maggie, Mackenzie, Austin, Ben, and Robbie. Also, Dylan Vanover and Ryan Powers. All these people I am honored to consider my friends, and they know so well how much we exchanged thoughts and grew through each other, as well as the nature of the frustrations and resistance we all had to face (and likely still do) from time to time in the pursuit of our own projects, or our own ideas, or even in search of our own notion of what the best life is like and in any effort we may make to actualize it for ourselves. I also want to thank all of my teachers here through the years, and though I am nervous of the length involved in a full enumeration, I must at least attempt some account. How far back does one go, in looking at who is responsible for what they are at some later point? How do we thank all of those whose generosity, from our youth, even, was responsible for our growth; deeds sometimes let to fall away from our minds, but without which we would not be who we are. I want to acknowledge my teachers and friends in grade-school at St. Elizabeth Ann Seton and St. Andrew’s, and in my high school at Roger Bacon. I am here hesitant to name particulars because it would be 6 something of an absurdity, and I feel as though if I listed one I would have to name them all. I want to thank my teachers in subjects other than philosophy, here at Ohio University who have helped me develop my perspective; particularly those in linguistics – Gabriella Castaneda, and Sofia Fernandez – and in Classics and World Religions – Brian Collins and Steve Hays. I also want to thank the philosophers (or, those who I was lucky enough to know and learn from, at least); Scott Carson, Alfred Lent, Alyssa Bernstein, Jeremy Morris, Phil Ehrlich, Yoichi Ishida, James Petrik, Christoph Hanisch, and the late John Bender. As is common to all human relations, we certainly had moments of abrasion and contention, but nevertheless it all appears to have turned out, if not for the best, at least not for the worst. Also, all my friends in Athens, Ohio, who were so often willing to engage in friendly conversation and share a beer or two. I am so grateful for all of you, and, though it would be a fantasy to think that every deed or every exchange has been perfect, or even good, you have made my life full in many ways. 7 Table of Contents Page Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 3 Dedication ........................................................................................................................... 4 Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... 5 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 8 2. Excerpts from Berkeley on the General Notion of Time .............................................. 10 2.1 Background Aspects of Berkeley’s Metaphysical System ................................... 12 3. Interpreting Berkeley’s View ........................................................................................ 14 3.1 Interpretation 1 (The Traditional Interpretation) .................................................. 14 3.1.1 A Preliminary Consideration Against the Traditional Interpretation .......... 16 3.1.2 Potential Solutions to This Consideration.................................................... 18 3.2 Interpretation 2 (Hestevold’s Alternative) ............................................................ 18 4. Is One Interpretation Preferable Over the Other? ......................................................... 21 4.1 How Proximate are the Two Interpretations? ....................................................... 21 4.2 A Defense of the Traditional Interpretation .......................................................... 23 4.3 Argument for Implicit Subscription to the Second Interpretation from a Commitment to Historical Consistency and Generalizability of Scientific Laws ...... 27 4.3.1 Why Berkeley Should Be Regarded as Subscribing to the Hestevold’s Interpretation ......................................................................................................... 27 4.3.2 Why Hynes Should be Regarded as Subscribing to the Second Interpretation ............................................................................................................................... 30 4.3.3 Unspecified Features of Events in the Overall Order of Events .................. 33 5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 35 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 36 8 1. Introduction In this paper we will discuss a number of aspects of Berkeley’s theory of time as forwarded primarily in the Principles of Human Knowledge.1 At the time Berkeley was writing, the predominant vein of physical theory was guided by Newtonian ideas, including his notions of absolute space and absolute time.2 Berkeley rejected the idea that space and time should be regarded as absolute, objectively subsisting metaphysical entities, and articulated an opinion by which space and time should be regarded as relative rather than absolute, and as dependent on events existing only within minds. Time (our particular focus here), rather than being an absolute entity that subsists independently of events, is by his account nothing more than a succession of ideas in minds.3 Here we will discuss two interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of time in order to determine if one interpretation is superior. Additionally, we will discuss whether these two interpretations are as distinct as they seem, and, if so, where exactly they diverge. The interpretations presented here are systematic and formalized re-statements of the ideas that Berkeley presented in a handful of remarks scattered throughout his writings. These can thus be regarded as attempts to specify through logical exposition ideas that were at first presented under a form which makes more of an appeal to intuitive understandings of the significances of terms.4 In particular, we will focus our evaluations 1 George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, in Readings in Modern Philosophy, ed. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins, vol.2, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Associated Texts (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2000). 2 G. J. Whitrow, “Berkeley’s Philosophy of Motion,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4, no.13 (1953): 37. 3 Berkeley, Principles, ¶98. 4 This brief
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Bishop Berkeley Exorcises the Infinite
    TWELVE Bishop Berkeley Exorcises the Infinite It all began simply enough when Molyneux asked the wonderful question whether a person born blind, now able to see, would recognize by sight what he or she knew by touch (Davis 1960). After George Berkeley elaborated an answer, that we learn to perceive by means of heuristics, the foundations of contemporary mathematics were in ruins. Contemporary mathematicians waved their hands and changed the subject.1 Berkeley’s answer received a much more positive response from economists. Adam Smith, in particular, seized upon Berkeley’s doctrine that we learn to perceive distance to build an elabo- rate system in which one learns to perceive one’s self-interest.2 Perhaps because older histories of mathematics are a positive hindrance in helping us under- stand the importance of Berkeley’s argument against in‹nitesimals,3 its conse- quences for economics have passed unnoticed. If in‹nitesimal numbers are ruled 1. The mathematically decisive event that changed the situation and let historians appreciate the past was Abraham Robinson’s development of nonstandard analysis. “The vigorous attack directed by Berkeley against the foundations of the Calculus in the forms then proposed is, in the ‹rst place, a brilliant exposure of their logical inconsistencies. But in criticizing in‹nitesimals of all kinds, English or continental, Berkeley also quotes with approval a passage in which Locke rejects the actual in‹nite. It is in fact not surprising that a philosopher in whose system perception plays the central role, should have been unwilling to accept in‹nitary entities” (Robinson 1974, 280–81).
    [Show full text]
  • Modern Wisdom
    Modern Wisdom Jimmy Rising Philosophy is generally concerned with the nature of things: truths about reality, human nature, and why things are and do what they are and do. In this sense, philosophy fits its archaic name, “natural science.” Philosophy can also be described as the “pursuit or love of wisdom” (this is the origin of the word) and it is imagined that the philosophical life, a life characterized by contemplation and inquiry, is necessary to attain true wisdom. Modern philosophy, with its emphasis on breaking down old beliefs even more than con- structing new ones, is decidedly on the “science” side of philosophy. Nonetheless, I believe that all philosophers study the subject in part in hopes of understanding and gaining wis- dom. Every “advance” in philosophy as the natural science is associated with a refinement or change in the view of wisdom. For example, George Berkeley proclaims that philosophy is “nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth” in the introduction to his Principles, and then speaks hardly another word of the nature of wisdom. What is the wisdom of modern philosophy? More to the point, what is wisdom, according to various branches of modern philosophy, and to modern philosophy as a whole? 1 1 Definition of Wisdom To answer this question, even without trying to define wisdom before it’s definition is sought, we need to specify what we are looking for– that is, the indications of wisdom. Wisdom is: Knowledge – Wisdom, firstly, is a characteristic of the mind or the soul, not of the body. It is a kind of knowledge, skill, sense, or intuition the affects who one thinks.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to Berkeley
    INTRODUCTION TO BERKELEY http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/ George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was one of the great philosophers of the early modern period. He was a brilliant critic of his predecessors, particularly Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke. He was a talented metaphysician famous for defending idealism, that is, the view that reality consists exclusively of minds and their ideas. Berkeley's system, while it strikes many as counter-intuitive, is strong and flexible enough to counter most objections. His most- studied works, the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Principles, for short) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (Dialogues), are beautifully written and dense with the sort of arguments that delight contemporary philosophers. He was also a wide-ranging thinker with interests in religion (which were fundamental to his philosophical motivations), the psychology of vision, mathematics, physics, morals, economics, and medicine. Although many of Berkeley's first readers greeted him with incomprehension, he influenced both Hume and Kant, and is much read (if little followed) in our own day. 2. Berkeley's critique of materialism in the Principles and Dialogues In his two great works of metaphysics, Berkeley defends idealism by attacking the materialist alternative. What exactly is the doctrine that he's attacking? Readers should first note that “materialism” is here used to mean “the doctrine that material things exist”. This is in contrast with another use, more standard in contemporary discussions, according to which materialism is the doctrine that only material things exist. Berkeley contends that no material things exist, not just that some immaterial things exist.
    [Show full text]
  • Durham E-Theses
    Durham E-Theses On some ancient and medieval roots of George Berkeley's thought Bradatan, Costica How to cite: Bradatan, Costica (2003) On some ancient and medieval roots of George Berkeley's thought, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4077/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk ON SOME ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL ROOTS OF GEORGE BERKELEY'S THOUGHT A thesis submitted by Costica Bradatan in accordance with the requirements of the University of Durham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy April 2003 The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. Declaration I declare that no part of this work has been submitted by me for any degree in this or any other university.
    [Show full text]
  • Re-Construction and Definition of New Branches & Hierarchy of Sciences
    Philosophy Study, July 2016, Vol. 6, No. 7, 377-416 doi: 10.17265/2159-5313/2016.07.001 D DAVID PUBLISHING New Perspective for the Philosophy of Science: Re-Construction and Definition of New Branches & Hierarchy of Sciences Refet Ramiz Near East University In this work, author evaluated past theories and perspectives behind the definitions of science and/or branches of science. Also some of the philosophers of science and their specific philosophical interests were expressed. Author considered some type of interactions between some disciplines to determine, to solve the philosophical/scientific problems and to define the possible solutions. The purposes of this article are: (i) to define new synthesis method, (ii) to define new perspective for the philosophy of science, (iii) to define relation between new philosophy perspective and philosophy of science, (iv) to define and organize name, number, relations, and correct structure between special science branches and philosophy of science, (v) to define necessary and sufficient number of branches for philosophy of science, (vi) to define and express the importance and place of new philosophy of science perspective in the new system, (vii) to extend the definition/limits of philosophy of science, (viii) to re-define meanings of some philosophical/scientific theories, (ix) to define systematic solution for the conflicts, problems, confusions about philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science, (x) to define new branches of science, (xi) to re-construct branches and hierarchy of science, (xii) to define new theories about science and branches of science. Author considered R-Synthesis as a method for the evaluation of the philosophy, philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science.
    [Show full text]
  • A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth Edition
    A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Fourth edition John Losee OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science This page intentionally left blank A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Fourth edition John Losee 1 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © John Losee , The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN ––– Typeset in Adobe Minion by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King’s Lynn Preface This book is a historical sketch of the development of views about scientific method.
    [Show full text]
  • Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum
    LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ AND THE CONTINUUM LOST IN THE LABYRINTH: SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ AND THE CONTINUUM By PATRICK RIESTERER, B.A. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfillment ofthe Requirements For the Degree Master ofArts McMaster University © Copyright by Patrick Riesterer, August 2006 MASTER OF ARTS (2006) McMaster University (Philosophy) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: Lost in the Labyrinth: Spinoza, Leibniz and the Continuum AUTHOR: Patrick Riesterer, B.A. (Trinity Western University) SUPERVISOR: Professor Richard Arthur NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 110 ii Abstract In this thesis, I address the extent ofSpinoza's influence on the development of Leibniz's response to the continuum problem, with particular emphasis on his relational philosophy oftime and space. I expend the first chapter carefully reconstructing Spinoza's position on infinity and time. We see that Spinoza developed a threefold definition ofinfinity to explain the difference between active substance and its passive modes. Spinoza advances a syncategorematic interpretation ofinfinity, and founds a causal theory oftime directly on this conception ofinfinity. In the second chapter, I examine the changes Leibniz's understanding ofthe continuum problem underwent during 1676 and immediately thereafter. During this period, Leibniz's interacted extensively with Spinoza's ideas. We see that several fundamental features ofLeibniz's philosophy oftime take shape at this time. Leibniz adopts a Spinozistic definition ofdivine eternity and immensity, he reevaluates several analogies in an attempt to understand how the attributes ofa substance interrelate, and he develops the notion ofthe law of the series that will become an essential feature ofmonadic appetition. Leibniz synthesizes several ofthese discoveries into a first philosophy ofmotion.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyright © 2008 by Lydia R
    ABSTRACT Analogy, Causation, and Beauty in the Works of Lucy Hutchinson Evan Jay Getz, Ph.D. Dissertation Chairperson: Phillip J. Donnelly, Ph.D. Lucy Hutchinson's translation of the ancient epic De Rerum Natura is remarkable in light of her firm commitments to Calvinist theology and the doctrine of Providence. David Norbrook and Jonathan Goldberg offer strikingly different explanations for the translation exercise. For instance, Norbrook argues that Hutchinson translates Lucretius in order that she might learn from the false images in Lucretius and make better ones in such works as Order and Disorder (Norbrook, “Margaret” 191). In contrast, Goldberg argues for compatibility between Lucretian atomism and Hutchinson‟s Christianity, seeing no contradiction or tension (Goldberg 286). I argue that neither critic accounts for the aesthetics of beauty in Hutchinson's poetry; both critics instead attribute an aesthetics of the sublime to Hutchinson. In making this argument, I show that Hutchinson's theory of causation has much in common with Reformed Scholasticism, whereby she is able to restore a metaphysics of formal and final cause. Hutchinson also revives the doctrine of the analogy of being, or analogia entis, in order to show that the formal cause of creation is visible as God's glory. After a discussion of her metaphysics and ontology, I then show that Hutchinson's poetry reflects a theological aesthetics of beauty and not the aesthetics of the sublime. In the fourth chapter, I compare the typological accounts of Abraham found in Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan and Hutchinson's Order and Disorder with a view to virtue as the proper basis of authority.
    [Show full text]
  • Reason and Revelation in 19Th Century Philosophy
    Roots of analytic philosophy PHIL 3104 Winter 2010 David Matheson Tue & Thu 2:35-3:55 p.m. 3A45 Paterson Hall 129 Paterson Hall 613-520-2600 ext. 1928 [email protected] Office hours: Tue & Thu 1:00-2:00 p.m. Description In this course we will explore the roots of analytic philosophy by examining some central metaphysical, epistemological, and metaphilosophical themes from three of its founding figures: G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Background and context readings will be drawn from George Berkeley, F.H. Bradley, and Gottlob Frege. The main objectives are to engage the topics considered as live philosophical issues to be addressed in their own right, and to advance our own philosophical perspectives as a result. You should be prepared to do some philosophy for yourself in this course, not merely to memorize and regurgitate historical facts about what the philosophers we will consider said about the topics addressed. Readings and texts A number of readings for the course will be drawn from the following texts, which can be purchased at the university bookstore: Bertrand Russell, The philosophy of logical atomism (Chicago: Open Court, 1985) Ludwig Wittgenstein, The blue and brown books (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) The remaining readings, listed below, will for the most part be drawn from free online sources: George Berkeley, Introduction and §§1-33 of A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Berkeley%20-Treatise.txt F.H. Bradley, Introduction and Chapter IV of Appearance and reality http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Appearance_and_Reality G.E.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy.Pdf
    Philosophy 1 PHIL:1401 Matters of Life and Death 3 s.h. Contemporary ethical controversies with life and death Philosophy implications; topics may include famine, brain death, animal ethics, abortion, torture, terrorism, capital punishment. GE: Chair Values and Culture. • David Cunning PHIL:1636 Principles of Reasoning: Argument and Undergraduate major: philosophy (B.A.) Debate 3 s.h. Undergraduate minor: philosophy Critical thinking and its application to arguments and debates. Graduate degrees: M.A. in philosophy; Ph.D. in philosophy GE: Quantitative or Formal Reasoning. Faculty: https://clas.uiowa.edu/philosophy/people/faculty PHIL:1861 Introduction to Philosophy 3 s.h. Website: https://clas.uiowa.edu/philosophy/ Varied topics; may include personal identity, existence of The Department of Philosophy offers programs of study for God, philosophical skepticism, nature of mind and reality, undergraduate and graduate students. A major in philosophy time travel, and the good life; readings, films. GE: Values and develops abilities useful for careers in many fields and for any Culture. situation requiring clear, systematic thinking. PHIL:1902 Philosophy Lab: The Meaning of Life 1 s.h. Further exploration of PHIL:1033 course material with the The department also administers the interdisciplinary professor in a smaller group. undergraduate major in ethics and public policy, which it offers jointly with the Department of Economics and the PHIL:1904 Philosophy Lab: Liberty and the Pursuit of Department of Sociology and Criminology; see Ethics and Happiness 1 s.h. Public Policy in the Catalog. Further exploration of PHIL:1034 course material with the professor in a smaller group. Programs PHIL:1950 Philosophy Club 1-3 s.h.
    [Show full text]
  • Mind, Body, Motion, Matter Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives Edited by Mary Helen Mcmurran and Alison Conway MIND, BODY, MOTION, MATTER
    Mind, Body, Motion, Matter Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives edited by Mary Helen McMurran and Alison Conway MIND, BODY, MOTION, MATTER Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives Mind, Body, Motion, Matter Eighteenth-Century British and French Literary Perspectives EDITED BY MARY HELEN MCMURRAN AND ALISON CONWAY UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London © University of Toronto Press 2016 Toronto Buffalo London www.utppublishing.com Printed in the U.S.A. ISBN 978-1-4426-5011-4 (cloth) Printed on acid-free, 100% post-consumer recycled paper with vegetable-based inks. ___________________________________________________________________ Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Mind, body, motion, matter : eighteenth-century British and French literary perspectives / edited by Mary Helen McMurran and Alison Conway. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4426-5011-4 (cloth) 1. English literature – 18th century – History and criticism. 2. French literature – 18th century – History and criticism. 3. Philosophy in literature. 4. Materialism in literature. 5. Vitalism in literature. 6. Aesthetics in literature. I. Conway, Alison Margaret, editor II. McMurran, Mary Helen, 1962–, author, editor PR448.P5M55 2016 820.9'384 C2015-908168-8 ___________________________________________________________________ CC-BY-NC-ND This work is published subject to a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivative License. For permission to publish commercial versions please
    [Show full text]
  • Materialism and “The Soft Substance of the Brain”: the Case of Diderot Charles T. Wolfe Department of Philosophy and Moral S
    Materialism and “the soft substance of the brain”: the case of Diderot Charles T. Wolfe Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences Sarton Centre for History of Science Ghent University Longer draft (2015) of paper forthcoming in British Journal of History of Philosophy (a number of additional citations appear in published version) Abstract Materialism is the view that everything that is real, is material or is the product of material processes. It tends to take either a ‘cosmological’ form, as a claim about the ultimate nature of the world, or a more specific ‘psychological’ form, detailing how mental processes are brain processes. I focus on the second, psychological or cerebral form of materialism. In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, the French materialist philosopher Denis Diderot (1713-1784) was one of the first to notice that any self-respecting materialist had to address the question of the status and functional role of the brain, and its relation to our mental, affective, intellectual life. After this the topic grew stale, with knee-jerk reiterations of ‘psychophysical identity’ in the nineteenth-century, and equally rigid assertions of anti-materialism. In 1960s philosophy of mind, brain-mind materialism reemerged as ‘identity theory’, focusing on the identity between mental processes and cerebral processes. In contrast, Diderot’s cerebral materialism allows for a more culturally sedimented sense of the brain, which he describes in his late Elements of Physiology as a “book – except it is a book which reads itself”. Diderot thus provides a lesson for materialism as it reflects on the status of the brain, science and culture.
    [Show full text]