The Case for Praxics Robert Epstein Northeastern University and Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies

The Behavior Analyst 1984, 7, 101-1 19 No. 2 (Fall) The Case for Praxics Robert Epstein Northeastern University and Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies

Since the early 1 900s a variety of names has been proposed for the scientific study ofbehavior, but none has come into general use. "Praxics," a recent entry, is defensible on several grounds. "Behaviorism," on the other hand, is the name of a school of philosophy. Though praxics has roots in behaviorism, the term "behaviorism" should not be applied to praxics. Confusion between the science and the philosophy has retarded the growth ofthe science immeasurably. Its growth has also been impeded by its association with psychology, which is still primarily the study of mind. Efforts are underway to establish praxics as an independent field.

It was not a wholly TERMS satisfactory namefor afield. There have been several attempts to -B. F. Skinner (1979, p. 331), name the study of behavior in general on "the experimental analysis and the experimental analysis of behav- of behavior" ior in particular (Epstein, 1984a). Most ofthese efforts have failed. Two-"ethol- "Praxics"-a blend of "physics" and ogy" and "praxiology"-have been par- "praxis" (irpa&ts), the Greek for "action" tially successful in certain domains. or "behavior"-is a term I and others now use for the experimental analysis of behavior and related disciplines. We de- Ethology fine it as the study of behavior. We call The term "ethology" has two different, one who studies behavior a "praxist," though closely related, modem usages. It after "chemist." In this essay I present was defined by Lorenz and Tinbergen as (a) the case for the use of the terms, (b) the study of instinct (e.g., Tinbergen, the case for drawing a clear distinction 1951). It was a specialty within biology, between praxics and behaviorism, and (c) concerned primarily with innate behav- the case for the separation ofpraxics and ior patterns in non-human animals in the psychology. Most ofthe arguments I will natural habitats. By the 1960s it had make have, it turns out, already been evolved into a more comprehensive field, made, and hence much of this essay is defined as "the biology ofbehavior" (Eibl- historical. Eibesfeldt, 1970) or "the biological study of behavior" (Tinbergen, 1963). For many years there was little communication between ethologists and experimental psychologists and none to speak I thank P. T. Andronis, C. D. Cheney, R. E. Crow, J. Donahoe, P. Harzem, J. M. Johnston, F. S. Kel- of between ethologists and those who ler, T. V. Layng, B. F. Skinner, and T. Zane for worked in the operant tradition. Though comments on an early draft of this paper, as well exchanges are now common (e.g., Fan- as I. Iversen, H. Pennypacker, and G. E. Zuriff for tino & Logan, 1979; Nevin, 1973), ethol- stimulating discussions. I am also grateful to I. Iver- still remains somewhat narrow in its sen for calling my attention to the Kuo article and ogy to J. Goldstein, D. Kolker, K. Marcus, and M. Mar- focus: Ethologists still study non-human sted for assistance in library research. For reprints animals for the most part; they rely al- of this article write to Robert Epstein, Cambridge most exclusively on field studies and are Center for Behavioral Studies, 11 Ware Street, skeptical of laboratory research on be- Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. Correspondence to: Cambridge Center for Be- havior; they are interested mainly in feral havioral Studies, 11 Ware Street, Cambridge, MA animals and are critical ofthe use oflab- 02138. oratory-bred or domesticated animals; 101 102 ROBERT EPSTEIN

and so on.' "Ethology" is not an appro- of behavior. According to Keller (per- pnate label for the experimental analysis sonal communication, October 1983), of behavior or the many other scientific he first heard it in a course he had as a fields that are concerned with the deter- graduate student at Harvard in 1928. His minants of behavior. instructor, Dwight Chapman, used the A prior use ofthe term was somewhat term jokingly, and Keller, too, has used more comprehensive and closer to at least it somewhat hesitatingly ever since. It has some characterizations of modern psy- not been adopted by operant condition- chology. In Book Six ofhis classic A Sys- ers, nor by biologists. But it has been used tem of Logic, published in 1843, John fairly widely in other domains-philos- Stuart Mill proposed "ethology" as a la- ophy, education, and economics, in par- ble for what he hoped would be a new ticular- so widely that it is listed in sev- science, "the science of the formation of eral unabridged dictionaries and character." He derived the term from dictionaries ofphilosophy and behavior- "ethos" (iiOos), the Greek for "character," al science. by which he meant behavior in all of its The original OED contains no such aspects. He hoped to see the emergence listing, but the 1982 Supplement con- of a comprehensive science to supple- tains a listing 49 lines long. "Praxeolo- ment the philosophical psychology ofhis gy," "praxiology," or "praxology" (in that day, but none emerged, and the term fell order) is defined as "The study of such into disuse. The original Oxford English actions as are necessary in order to give Dictionary (henceforward, OED), which practical effect to a theory or technique; was published in installments between the science of human conduct; the sci- 1884 and 1928, gives Mill's definition, ence of efficient action." "Praxiologist" as well as two obsolete definitions from is defined only as "one who studies prac- the 17th and 18th centuries: the study of tical activity." The American standard, ethics, and the practice of mimicry. The Webster's Third New International Dic- 1933 supplement to the OED adds the tionary, published in 1966, defines first biological definition, the obvious "praxeology" or "praxiology" (again, in precursor to the modern usage: "The that order) simply as "the study of hu- branch of Natural History which deals man action and conduct." with an animal's actions and habits, its Many specialty dictionaries give sim- reaction to its environment." The first ilar definitions. Horace B. English's relevant usage is attributed to two zool- (1928) classic A Student's Dictionary of ogists, Parker and Haswell (1897), who Psychological Terms defines "praxiolo- defined it as the study of "the relation of gy" as "Study of the activities or move- the organism to its environment," which, ments or 'deeds' of an organism as a they said, had also been called "bio- whole; synonymous with behaviorism nomics." except in not denying the importance of mental processes." The Psychiatric Dic- Praxiology tionary (Hinsie & Campbell, 1970) dis- agrees on the last point: "Praxiology" is The history ofthe term "praxiology"- "Dunlap's term for the science ofbehav- also spelled "praxeology" -is consider- ior, which excludes the study of con- ably more complicated.2 F. S. Keller has sciousness and similar non-objective, proposed it from time to time (e.g., 1984) metaphysical concepts." Wolman's as a name for the experimental analysis (1973) Dictionary ofBehavioral Science defines it thus: "1. Psychology viewed as ' In Four Saints in Three Acts Gertrude Stein the study ofactions, and overt behavior. provided a suitable rejoinder: "Pigeons in the grass, 2.... Any normative science ... e.g., alas." education, social philosophy, ethics, etc., 2 The English term "praxis" is also common, but it will not be discussed in this essay, since most of that sets norms and goals for human ac- its applications have little or no relevance to the tions." The Dictionary ofPhilosophy and issues at hand. Religion (Reese, 1980) refers the reader CASE FOR PRAXICS 103

to an entry on Kotarbiinski, about whom Kotarbin'ski. Praxiology was taken up more will be said below. by-or perhaps reinvented by-indi- Many similar works contain no such viduals in four separate fields. The Polish entry, including the 1977 International philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbin'ski (e.g., Encyclopedia of Psychiatry, Psychology, 1965) defines it as "the general theory of Psychoanalysis, and Neurology (this is efficient action"-for "action" read "la- significant, since Wolman was the edi- bor" or "work"-which, he says, derives tor), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy from or is at least harmonious with such (1967), The Encyclopedia of Psycho- diverse works as Marx's Capital, Mill's analysis (1968), The Dictionary of Psy- Utilitarianism, Machiavelli's II Principe, chology and Related Fields (1971), The and Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. Though Dictionary ofthe History ofIdeas (1973), they didn't use the term, he says, George A Concise Encyclopedia of Psychiatry Herbert Mead, Talcott Parsons, and (1977), A Dictionary of Philosophy Georges Hostelet were all concerned with (1979), The Encyclopedia of Psychiatry praxiology, which he describes as fol- (1981), and the Dictionary ofPhilosophy lows: These notwithstand- (1983). omissions The praxiologist concerns himself with finding the ing, the term clearly has some legitimacy. broadest possible generalizations ofa technical na- How did it get it? ture. His objective is the technique ofgood, efficient A number of scholars assert that the work as such, indications and warnings important term originated with the London author for all work which is intended to achieve maximum and physician, Charles A. Mercier, who effectiveness. (p. 1) lived from 1852 to 1919. In his 1911 This use of "praxiology" does not rule book, Conduct and Its Disorders, he out mentalism or teleology, and the field wrote: "Apart from the general advan- Kotarbiinski describes is neither experi- tage ... of having a systematic knowl- mental nor data based. Chapter 14 ofhis edge ofconduct as a whole; there are cer- 1965 book is entitled "Mental Activity" tain special advantages to be derived from and reads in part: a study of Praxiology, if I may so term ... every act includes elements which are mental it" (p. viii). Of course, there is nothing in nature. This is so because in every act there is new under the sun: Seven years earlier, contained a free impulse directed towards a certain W. R. Boyce Gibson, a lecturer in phi- goal, which means that the agent not only moves losophy at the University ofLondon, used but also is conscious of the purpose of his movement-and that consciousness undoubtedly is a the term "praxology" for what seems to mental factor.... [Purely] mental actions do ex- have been the first and last time (also see ist-mental solution of arithmetic problems; re- Ford [1952], who apparently reinvented calling past events; composition of musical works the term yet again). On page 190 of Gib- without writing down notes.... Hence, one may son's book A Philosophical Introduction not only discuss the role of mental events in any action, but also ... analyze purely mental actions to Ethics appear the following rather ob- as a case ofaction in scure statements: "The proper propae- special general. (pp. 175-176) deutic for a course in moral philosophy Kotarbinski's version ofpraxiology has would, in my opinion, consist ofa theory been applied in education, in essays, for ofexperience (or philosophical logic), fol- example, by James Perry (e.g., 1971) and lowed up by a teleological (or philosoph- E. S. Maccia (e.g., 1966), who argue, un- ical) psychology. I say 'theory of expe- derstandably, that we need to know more rience' instead of theory of 'knowledge' about how to be effective in education. or 'epistemology,' in order to include the They do not mention advances in any theory of action or 'praxology"' (italics empirical science of behavior. original). And von Mises (1944)-who Von Mises. The Austrian-American cites neither Gibson nor Mercier-cred- economist, Ludwig von Mises (e.g., 1944, its the first uses ofthe term "praxeology" 1962), who held a faculty appointment to the French philosopher Espinas in the at New York University from 1945 until 1890s (e.g., 1890, 1897) and the Russian his death in 1973, defined praxeology as economist Slutsky in 1926. the general science of human conduct. 104 ROBERT EPSTEIN

Economics, he said, was a special from 1898 to 1970. Kuo was trained by branch-"the only developed branch" Tolman at the University of California (Gutierrez, 197 1)- ofthis science. Again, at Berkeley, where he became, for a time, the field he described is not a laboratory a devotee of Watson. He soon became science: an even more radical behaviorist than Watson himself, and, indeed, he, like Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental and incidental circumstances of Skinner, called his brand ofbehaviorism the concrete acts. It aims at knowledge valid for all "radical behaviorism" (e.g., Kuo, 1967). instances in which the conditions exactly corre- In 1923, after five years at Berkeley, spond to those implied by its assumptions and in- he returned to China. By 1930 he had ferences. Whether people exchange commodities and established four laboratories devoted to services directly by barter or indirectly by using a medium ofexchange is a question ofthe particular the study of animal behavior, one fi- institutional setting which can be answered by his- nanced solely by income from his books tory only. But whenever and wherever a medium in Chinese. He is best known for his strong ofexchange is in use, all the laws ofmonetary theory stand against the concept ofinstinct (e.g., are valid with regard to the exchanges thus trans- Kuo, 1921, 1930), as well as for a long acted. (von Mises, 1944, p. 529) series of innovative studies on the be- It is not, he said, "based on psychology havior of the chick embryo (e.g., 1932, and is not a part of psychology" (von 1933). Unfortunately, political events in Mises, 1944, p. 531), which he took to China terminated his research career in be the study of mind. "Praxeology deals the 1930s. Between 1936 and 1940 he with choice and action and with their had neither a job nor a country, and he outcome. Psychology deals with the in- was not able to publish scientific works ternal processes determing the various again until the 1960s (see the preface of choices in their concreteness" (p. 531). Kuo, 1967). Except for a brief period in If praxeology is not empirical, where 1963, he was denied the opportunity to do its laws come from? Von Mises and conduct laboratory research for the last his students advanced a series of postu- 30 years of his life (Gottlieb, 1972). lates and theorems of action which were In a brilliant essay called "Prolegome- "developed by reason and logic from a na to Praxiology," published in The priori truths" (Bien, 1969, p. 4). "The Journal ofPsychology in 1937, Kuo made starting point of praxeology," wrote von the case for praxiology, and, in effect, for Mises (1962), "is a self-evident truth, the praxics.3 He attributed the term to Mer- cognition ofaction, that is, the cognition cier and Dunlap, whom, he said, sug- of the fact that there is such a thing as gested it as a better name for Watson's consciously aiming at ends" (pp. 5-6). behaviorism.4 But, disturbed by what he The laws were still dependent on data, called "the half-heartedness of the be- however, even though they supposedly havioristic revolt, and its inability to weren't derived from them, which led make a decisive break with the tradi- Gutierrez (1971) to dismiss the entire enterprise as vacuous. Further examination ofthese issues would be out ofplace here. 3A footnote in the Kuo (1937) paper promises a Suffice it to say that von Mises, like Perry book on the subject, to be called "Principles of and Maccia, seemed unaware that there Praxiology," but I am aware of no such book. Ro- existed a science of behavior any more back (1937) attributes to Kuo a book published in Chinese in 1935, whose title is translated "The Scope sophisticated than the one he was es- of Praxiology." pousing. That should be a matter ofsome 4Though several sources attribute the term concern to those who are immersed in "praxiology" to Knight Dunlap, none that I have such a science, a matter to be discussed read has provided relevant references, and I have below. been unable to find the term in his writings. And Mercier, ofcourse, proposed the term "praxiology" Kuo. "Praxiology" was also adopted- as a name for the study of behavior several years with a passion-by Zing Yang Kuo, an before Watson presented his seminal paper on be- ardent behavioral psychologist who lived haviorism. CASE FOR PRAXICS 105

tional psychology" (p. 5), he assigned and with "spiritualists, psychic research- "praxiology" yet another meaning: ers, and Freudians, who object to the pet- [Praxiology is] a branch ofbiology which deals with ty laboratory problems in terms ofwhich the behavior ofanimals (including man) with spe- the psychologist outlines his field and who cial emphasis on its ontogenic andphysiological as- resent deeply and religiously the tenden- pects as the chief channels through which causal cy in modem psychology to eliminate the factors ofbehavior may be discovered [italics orig- purposeful activity of mind" inal]. The ultimate purpose of praxiology is, of (Hunter, course, prediction and control ofbehavior. But un- 1926, p. 83). The solution, he thought, less its physiology and developmental history are was a new name for that part of psy- sufficiently known, it will be futile to hope to be chology which was truly objective. His able to predict and control behavior. Watson, the seminal paper on the subject appeared in founder of behaviorism, has made a great mistake 1925, he by declaring that the behaviorist can make a thor- while was a faculty member at oughly comprehensive and accurate study of be- the University of Kansas: havior without reference to physiology.... [The Anthroponomy is the science of the laws which praxiologist] is firmly convinced that by acquiring govern human action-the science ofhuman nature adequate data on the nature of stimulus and re- [cf. J. S. Mill's "ethology," described above]. It seeks sponse and their intricate relations and on the phys- by experiment and systematic observation to arrive iology and ontogeny ofbehavior he can give a thor- at an understanding ofthe factors which determine oughly scientific description of behavior in purely certain ofthe observable phenomena ofthe human mathematical and physical terms. (pp. 5-6) individual .... The essential difference between psychology and anthroponomy lies in the attitude "Praxiology" in perspective. Though towards the observations which are made. The for- Kuo's program-an independent, biolog- mer science is derived directly from the Greek phi- ically-based field, the subject matter of losophers and is concerned only with the study of which is the behavior of organisms-is mind, consciousness, or the psyche .... Such a point of view results, as might be expected, in the not without merit, the term "praxiolo- neglect ofall data concerning the human individual gy," I submit, is no longer a viable name which cannot be interpreted as evidence for the for it. It has been used too widely since existence of some type ofpsychic process. In other the 1930s and in too many ways. The words, scientific observations are not to be valued dominant usage seems to be Ko- for their own sake, but solely because of the infer- today ences concerming consciousness which they make tarbifiski's, which is clearly an inappro- possible.... [In contrast, the anthroponomist] never priate label for an empirically-based sci- raises the question whether or not the observable ence like the experimental analysis of phenomena express or embody a psychic world be- behavior. The term itself, it could be ar- yond them. He studies the large field ofobservable gued, is unattractive-antique, perhaps, human nature in order to describe and explain the in its sound and spelling. "Praxology," phenomena there found. (p. 286). the form which is cognate with "psy- Hunter discussed and dismissed a chology," seems attractive until a listener variety of other terms: "objective psy- confuses it with "proctology." chology," "behaviorism," "science of behavior," "tropology," and "anthro- Anthroponomy pology": Another early behavioral psychologist, ... non-psychic studies have become so numerous ... that new names for the science are coming into Walter S. Hunter, proposed yet another use. Of these Objective Psychology and Behavior- term for the scientific study of human ism are the most prominent. The former, however, behavior (e.g., Hunter, 1925, 1926, 1930). is defective in that it suggests a sub-division ofpsy- Hunter, like Watson, was trained at the chology and in that it contains the obvious contra- of under and diction of a non-psychic psychology.... Among University Chicago Angell Americans, Behaviorism has proved a wonderfully Carr just after the turn of the century. apt term. It contains no suggestion of the psychic And, like Watson, he wanted psychology .... It does, however, refer to an "ism" and is not, to become a natural science. He devoted therefore, well suited to designate an entire science. himself to this end throughout his life The term Science of Behavior is too cumbersome, and the Greek equivalent Tropology is too remi- (Schlosberg, 1954). niscent ofa special problem in the behavior oflower He argued that psychology was tainted animals [the "tropism"], to make these acceptable with "charlatans" (Hunter, 1925, p. 286) names for the science .... The term Anthropology, 106 ROBERT EPSTEIN

science of man, escapes these difficulties, but is nothing of behavior analysis, though it preempted by a closely related discipline .... At present only one thing is certain, and that is the has heard of every other scientific disci- inappropriateness of the term "psychology." (pp. pline from anthropology to zoology. And, 290-291) with few exceptions, the same ignorance may be attributed to funding agencies. Hunter died in 1954, his dream for an- One does not identify oneself as a "be- throponomy unrealized. In a eulogy havior analyst" on a grant application; which appeared in The PsychologicalRe- doing so would likely be suicidal. view, J. McV. Hunt (1956) wrote: ... Finally, because the term is so closely he suggested that the term anthroponomy linked with the operant tradition, it is replace psychology .... The amusement more a label for a fraternity than a sci- aroused by this suggestion he took in ence. I oversimplify perhaps only slightly good-spirited stride" (p. 214). by saying that behavior analysts are those people who are active in the Association Behavior Analysis for Behavior Analysis; they are con- The term "behavior analysis" has come cerned primarily with operant condition- to be used by many individuals as a label ing in some domain or other. In contrast, for both basic research, primarily in op- behavior therapists are those people who erant conditioning, and the technology are active in the Association for Ad- that has evolved from this research. The vancement ofBehavior Therapy; they are term is far from ideal as a label for the perhaps slightly more concerned with study of behavior in general or the ex- classical conditioning and, these days, perimental analysis of behavior in par- with cognition. There is some overlap be- ticular. tween the groups, of course. The term, first of all, is nomic but not nominal; that is, it is the customary label The Experimental Analysis ofBehavior for what certain people do, but it is not truly a name. It is, rather, a description: In the second volume of Skinner's au- Both behavioral engineers and labora- tobiography, he discusses the origin of a tory researchers sometimes analyze be- term whose sesquipedalian segments have havior. Even as a descriptor, the term is plagued the palates of even its most de- not wholly satisfactory, for behavior an- voted disciples evern since. With Fred S. alysts do far more than analyze, which Keller and William N. Schoenfeld, Skin- means to separate a whole into its con- ner organized the first conference on the stituent parts. They manipulate vari- domain of research he had originated ables, make predictions, construct theo- nearly two decades earlier. It was held at ries and models, treat problem behavior, Indiana University in June, 19465: shape and maintain behavior, engineer We called it a conference on the "experimental physical environments, and so on. analysis of behavior," taking the "experimental The term seems to be used more con- analysis" from the subtitle of The Behavior ofOr- sistently as a label for applied behavior ganisms. It was not a wholly satisfactory name for analysts than for basic researchers, who a field. What should we call ourselves? "Students of behavior"? "Behavior analysts"? And what ad- are sometimes called "operant condi- jectives could we use to identify our research, our tioners" or "operant psychologists" but theories, or our organization? "Behaviorism," "be- who are usually not labeled anything at haviorists," and "behavioristic" were not quite right. all, since no suitable label exists. Basic They were too closely tied to John B. Watson. (Skin- researchers are, understandably, never ner, 1979, p. 331). called "experimental analysts of behav- Ironically, Hunter had rejected the la- ior." bel "science of behavior" as "cumber- The term "behavior analysis" is used almost exclusively by behavior analysts themselves and even then only cautious- ' A photograph ofthose who attended this meet- ly. It is a kind of family term, used by ing appears on page 456 of Volume 5 (1962) ofthe family members only. The public knows Journal ofthe Experimental Analysis ofBehavior. CASE FOR PRAXICS 107

some" more than 20 years earlier. Were 1975). Kantor, like Watson and Skinner, standards of locution different in 1946? was ardently anti-mentalistic, but, unlike Against all odds, "the experimental other behavioral psychologists, he was not analysis of behavior" has persisted as a content to say that the subject matter of label for the activities of those who con- psychology was behavior, for this meant, tinue to do research in the tradition of he believed, that one might study mere Skinner's The Behavior ofOrganisms. It movement or activity apart from an or- is far from satisfactory as a label for this ganism's interactions with its environ- domain: It is awkward, and, like "be- ment. "[Only] the treatment of psycho- havior analysis," it is more a description logical events as fields in which responses than a name. And, again, researchers in or acts of the organism operate in inter- this field do more than analyze. Finally, action with stimulus objects under spec- the term is wholly unsatisfactory as a ified conditions can supply complete and name for the study of behavior in the satisfactory scientific descriptions and broader sense, since it is so closely iden- interpretations in psychology as in every tified with a single research tradition. other science" (Kantor & Smith, 1975, p. 31). Both research on behavior and empirically-derived theories of behavior Other Terms have typically involved an analysis of Some related terms deserve at least such interactions, even though Kantor's brief mention. Hunter had rejected the point has seldom, ifever, been stated ex- term "objective psychology," which had plicitly. been proposed by the Russian V. M. Bekhterev and was used from time to Praxics time as an umbrella term for non-mentalistic forms of psychology (see Diser- Ifindeed all ofthese terms are in com- ens, 1925). Bekhterev eventually switched petition with each other, "praxics" should to "reflexology"; the study of reflexes surely win at this point by process of would, he asserted, following Sechenov elimination. It hasn't failed yet, which is (1863/1935), eventually encompass all more than can be said for most of the psychological phenomena (Boring, 1950). other terms. It is too new to have been Knight Dunlap (e.g., 1922, 1926) pro- abused. It can be difficult to pronounce posed the term "scientific psychology" in at first, but it proves, with practice, to be much the same spirit that Hunter offered much easier than "tachistoscope," "sta- "anthroponomy," although Dunlap did tistical significance," or "the experimen- not reject consciousness as a subject mat- tal analysis of behavior," and "praxist" ter. He wanted merely to dissociate him- is easier still. "Praxics" is simple in form self from various "new psychologies" (cf. "cybernetics") and is recognizable on which seemed to be of questionable val- sight as the name of a science, probably ue, like those based on Freud, phrenol- because it is only three letters away from ogy, or psychic research. Dunlap is also "physics." It has a respectable and ap- credited with inventing the term "psy- propriate Greek root. chobiology," which Moore (1923) sug- Unadorned, the term describes neither gested as the inclusive label for both psy- an "attitude" (cf. "anthroponomy," "be- chology (which, said Moore, "means and haviorism," "interbehaviorism," "ob- can only mean the science of mind" [p. jective psychology," "scientific psychol- 235]) and praxiology, the science of be- ogy," and so on) nor a methodology (cf. havior. "the experimental analysis of behavior" Finally, J. R. Kantor offered the terms or Kotarbihiski's "praxiology"). It simply "interbehaviorism,," "interbehavioral circumscribes a subject matter, as do the psychology," and "organismic psychol- terms "physics," "biology," "epidemiol- ogy" as labels for his own extensive phil- ogy," "psychology," "'otolaryngology," osophical and theoretical contributions "ornithology," "astronomy," and so on. (e.g., Kantor, 1924; Kantor & Smith, The labels ofscientific domains are labels 108 ROBERT EPSTEIN for subject matters.6 How odd that a sub- "Behaviorism," as J. B. Watson (1913) ject matter as pervasive as the behavior first used the term, was the name of a oforganisms has been so difficult to name. movement in psychology-"a breath of The study of behavior needs some le- fresh air, clearing away the musty accu- gitimacy, and I suspect that, like the neo- mulation ofthe centuries" (R. I. Watson, nate, it lacks legitimacy for the very sim- 1963, p. 401). It was not the name of a ple reason that it lacks a name. A name, subject matter; nor was it the name of a after all, can create legitimacy even where school of philosophy. The term "behav- none is warranted. There is credibility in iorist" was more like "suffragette" than a name (IBM, immunology, microbiol- "physicist." Watson did not offer "be- ogy) and, sometimes, prestige (Lloyds of haviorism" as a label for the science of London, mathematics, neurology). "Ifwe behavior; rather, he hoped to convince lost our stock of labels," said William psychologists that psychology should be- James, "we should be intellectually lost come the science of behavior. One need in the midst of the world." Certainly the hardly look beyond the titles of his two lack ofa name for the science ofbehavior seminal works on behaviorism to see the has made it hard to communicate with point: "Psychology as the Behaviorist other people. Over the years I have re- Views It" (J. B. Watson, 1913) and Psy- sponded to the question, "But what kind chologyfrom the Standpoint ofa Behav- of psychologist are you?" in at least six iorist (J. B. Watson, 1919). Behaviorism different ways, and I have occasionally was not intended as an alternative to psy- had to try two or three on the same lis- chology but rather as a corrective action. tener to evoke the slightest sign of com- Consider the opening sentences of Wat- prehension. Unfortunately, that sign has son (1913): usually been the rather singsong "Ohhh Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely . . ." that you emit when you're trying not objective experimental branch of natural science. to show how much you disapprove of Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of someone. Which brings me to behavior- behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of ism. its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms ofconscious- PRAXICS AND BEHAVIORISM ness. (p. 158) Ifpraxics is the study ofbehavior, what we terms? Dunlap, Hunter, Weiss, Skinner, and is behaviorism? Do need both others continued Watson's program of reform. In December of 1928, shortly after he began graduate school, Skinner 6 Peters (1962), in the revision of Brett's History wrote in a letter: ".... my fundamental ofPsychology, argues that sciences-and psychology in particular-are not definable by their subject interests lie in Psychology, and I shall matters. "No doubt," he adds, "there is a quite probably continue therein, even, if nec- usual and harmless sense ofthe term 'subject-mat- essary, by making over the entire field to ter' in which, in any account of scientific method, suit myself' (Skinner, 1979, p. 38). petrologists, ornithologists, and astronomers can be The movement was not entirely suc- said to have different subject matters.... [But what] we call psychology is just an amalgam of different cessful, but this is a matter which we can questions about human beings [what about other sidestep for the moment. It is safe to say animals?] which have grown out of a variety of that behaviorism as a movement in psy- traditions ofenquiry" (p. 27). Though it is true that chology died long ago. There are few be- chaotic and diverse events may have preceded the havioristic reformers around these days, formalization of a scientific domain, once formal- ized it virtually always has a clearly delimited sub- and psychology is not especially vulner- ject matter, specified by its name. For the purposes able to them. That was not the case in ofthis essay, I am content to use the term "subject- Watson's day. He was viewed by many matter" in that "quite usual and harmless sense" in the field as a savior. He was elected that allows us to say that the subject matter of pe- trology is rocks, the subject matter of ornithology President ofthe American Psychological is rooks, and the subject matter of psychology is Association only two years after he pub- either mind or behavior. lished his 1913 paper, when he was only CASE FOR PRAXICS 109

37 years old-an unprecedented rise to Skinner seems to have been the first to prominence in the field. The Association tease apart the science and the philoso- would hardly reward a behavioristic flag- phy, perhaps because he added so much waver with the same kind of recognition substance to the science. He has used the today. term "behaviorism" fairly consistently But the movement left two distinct as the label for a philosophical school: products, each of which has grown and, "Behaviorism is not the science of hu- to some extent, flourished: First, it helped man behavior," he wrote, "it is the phi- to convince many researchers that the losopy of that science" (Skinner, 1974, behavior of organisms was a legitimate p. 3). It is, of course, more than that; it subject matter in its own right. And sec- is a school ofphilosophy in its own right, ond, it led to the development ofa school which has concerned itself with issues ofphilosophy-consisting mainly ofpsy- such as the nature of mind and con- chologists, not philosophers -called "be- sciousness (e.g., Quine, 1976; Wessells, haviorism." 1982), the nature and importance offeel- ings (e.g., Russell, 1978), free will and Behaviorism as Philosophy determinism (e.g., Burton, 1980), values A system of philosophy was implicit (e.g., Graham, 1977; Rottschaefer, 1980), in Watson's early statements. In deline- the nature of knowledge (e.g., Russell, ating a subject matter, he also made many 1980), the nature of perception and lan- assertions about the nature ofconscious- guage (e.g., Faraone, 1983; Natsoulas, ness, thought, conscious content, intro- 1982), and so on (cf. Zuriff, in press). A spection, feelings, perception, free will, philosophy journal called Behaviorism the role of heredity in human behavior, was established by Willard F. Day, Jr. in and other matters. Like James, Freud, 1973 to encourage discourse on these and and Skinner, he was a strict determinist. other topics. He asserted early in his career, without Behaviorists have made assertions such supporting data, that thought was simply as: (1) Behavior is orderly and predict- laryngeal movement.7 On the nature- able; free will is an illusion. (2) Mind is nurture question, Watson at first stood a superfluous concept. Thoughts are not the middle ground, but he eventually the causes ofbehavior. Our concern with shifted toward thorough-going environ- mind keeps us from finding out more mentalism. Note that he could conceiv- about the real determinants ofbehavior. ably have delineated the subject matter (3) Feelings do not cause behavior. They without taking such stands. are unimportant, and our preoccupation Watson never made a clear distinction with them keeps us from finding practical between the philosophy and the science solutions to our problems. (4) Language he If is also behavior and can only be under- espoused. anything, the distinction stood as such. The formal analysis oflan- got murkier over the years. In his 1930 guage tells us nothing. (5) Perceptual phe- revision ofBehaviorism-his last contri- nomena such as imaging can also be bution to academe-he used the term treated as behavioral phenomena, and the "behaviorism" as a label for the move- laws that govern observable motor be- ment he had begun, as a synonym for havior may be adequate to explain per- "objective psychology," and as a label for ceptual behavior. the science ofbehavior- by this time, he As Skinner recognized, the laboratory had shifted the emphasis to human be- study of behavior proceeds almost en- havior (see Watson, 1930, p. 2). He con- tirely independently of such assertions. tinued to take strong stands on a wide Whether or not behavior is "deter- range of philosophical issues. mined" in the philosophical sense, one can still search for-and, of course, one 7He adopted a more sophisticated view ofthought will find-order in behavior in the lab- in his later works. See Watson (1930) and Watson oratory. One can study and will undoubt- and McDougall (1928). edly discover interesting things about be- 110 ROBERT EPSTEIN havior whether mind exists or not. The ical sciences. The clear separation of presence or absence of consciousness in praxics and behaviorism is critical for a a given species will not affect one's ex- number of reasons: perimental attack on behavior in that a) No laboratory science, no matter species "by one jot or one tittle" (Wat- what its origins, should be constrained by son, 1913, p. 161?). Where data and for- a philosophy. "To set limits to specula- mal theory are relatively sparse-as in tion," said Whitehead, "is treason to the the analysis of language or perception- future." As I noted above, data generate philosophical arguments will naturally be limits to speculation, but it is one thing taken more seriously (after all, they're all to have one's subject matter constrain we've got), but once the scientific attack one's theories and quite another to be on some phenomenon is successful, phil- constrained by philosophical dogma. The osophical arguments fall by the wayside. role that genes play in language acquisi- This is not to say that data necessarily tion, for example, is an empirical ques- settle philosophical debates; rather, the tion. The old environmentalist assertion data tend to create a substantive under- that genes play a trivial role goes beyond standing ofthe subject matter which takes the facts currently available. on its own life. A century from now, if This is not to say that scientists do not the behavioral approach to language has make assumptions. On the contrary, sci- been successful, praxists will be debating ence has always rested on a foundation about the significance of data and about of assumptions, and the assumptions, the merits and demerits of various for- once tested, have often proved to be mal, predictive theories oflanguage. The wrong (Burtt, 1954). Early in the century, views of the philosopher will be at best for example, many physicists abandoned ofonly marginal interest, just as they are the assumption of determinism in favor at best of only marginal interest to the of the assumption that the universe is laboratory chemist. Facts constrain spec- probabilistic; the latter, more conserva- ulation. tive assumption was, many said, an ad- Though Skinner seems to have recog- equate basis for scientific progress (e.g., nized the distinction between behavior- Eddington, 1928). ism and praxics, the fact that he is both Perhaps all ofthe natural sciences were the most accomplished living behaviorist constrained by close ties to formal phi- in the world and the most accomplished losophy in their early stages, but the phil- living praxist has surely caused trouble. osophical origins of a particular science And though he has made the distinction, are eventually forgotten by all but the others have not. Rachlin (1970), for ex- historians. Modem chemistry, for example, defines "behaviorist" as "[one ample, has clear origins in ancient Greek who is] engaged in the experimental study philosophy (Hopkins, 1934); it is no ac- ofbehavior" (p. 2). Like Watson, Rachlin cident that one of the alchemist's tools presents the philosophy of behaviorism was called the "philosopher's stone." But side by side with laboratory findings in philosophical assertions that helped give the study of behavior. rise to chemistry-for example, the no- tion that all things strive toward perfec- tion-would seem bizarre or at least ir- Behaviorism vs. Praxics relevant to modern chemists. The The term "behaviorism" is by no distillation of science from philosophy means obsolete. It is, quite the contrary, has occurred even in psychology. For ex- essential. But its appropriate use today is ample, modem psychophysics is the off- as the name for a school of philosophy. spring of Fechner's obsession with the Praxics, on the other hand, is a laboratory mind-body problem; his early research science, inspired in large part by behav- was meant, once and for all, to solve that iorism, as well as by the theory of evo- ancient problem (Fechner, 1860/1966). lution and other advances in the biolog- Though research ofthe sort Fechner con- CASE FOR PRAXICS 111 ducted is still underway (e.g., Mansfield, also, like Skinner, be both praxist and 1976), the mind-body problem has played behaviorist. no part in it for nearly a century. (c) Behaviorism is unattractive to the The future is clear: The science of be- American public, and because it has been havior will go free of behaviorism. so closely identified with the laboratory (b) Behaviorism is truly an "ism," a science, the science has suffered materi- system of interrelated assertions and be- ally. Praxics has produced profoundly liefs, primarily about mind, free will, and important technologies that have aided feelings. Praxists can (and do) study be- millions of people-in pharmacology, havior no matter what their opinions are medicine, child rearing, education, insti- on these matters, just as physicists study tutional management, therapy, the treat- the material world no matter what their ment of the mentally retarded, business, opinions are of metaphysics (the physi- industry, and so on -but it has not re- cists I know are dualists of the most ex- ceived commensurate support and ap- treme sort). And so it should be. It's hard preciation from the public. If it is pre- to see how an individual's ability to dis- sented to the public as a laboratory science cover orderly relationships between vari- that is independent of any "ism"-the ables in the behavioral laboratory could support may finally come. be much affected by his or her views on The study of mind -in the hands of the mind-body problem. Yet -because of "cognitive science," an amalgam of psy- the confusion between behaviorism and chologists, linguists, and computer sci- praxics-people who have had doubts entists-has presented itself this way in about behaviorism have kept away from recent years with profound effect. Skin- behavioral laboratories or have stayed ner recently showed me a copy of the there uneasily. The behavioral researcher "Report of the Research Briefing Panel is perceived as a "disciple, " a "believer, " on Cognitive Science and Artificial In- a "card-carrying member." The behav- telligence," one of several chapters in a ioral laboratories have surely lost talent- new book published by the National ed researchers as a resuh, and the range Academy Press (Estes et al., 1983). The and quality of its investigations have book was commissioned by the White surely been restricted. An individual with House and the National Science Foun- no particular philosophical bent, or with dation to serve as a guide to funding views that change radically from time to agencies for funding in science. Accord- time, or even with views that are anti- ing to the preface, cognitive science was thetical to behaviorism, is capable of identified as one of a small number of making a positive contribution to the sci- scientific areas that "were likely to return ence. The laboratory doors should be the highest scientific dividends as a result open to all talented researchers, and the of incremental federal investment...." dualists currently therein should not feel It was placed on an equal footing with guilty. mathematics, the atmospheric sciences, The fact is that you can be a praxist astronomy and astrophysics, agricultural without being a behaviorist, and vice ver- research, neuroscience, human health ef- sa. In addition to the many mentalists in fects of hazardous chemical exposure, the behavioral laboratory, there are many materials science, chemistry, immunol- individuals who are deeply religious. ogy, solid earth science, and computer Some of the most prominent behavioral science. researchers in the country are regular The report could easily signal more churchgoers, and I know of one accom- money annually for cognitive scientists plished researcher who has more than a than the grand total ofall awards to op- passing interest in Eastern mysticism. erant conditioners since the first confer- One can also be a behaviorist, ofcourse, ence in 1946. I known personally ofmore without ever entering the laboratory- than forty million dollars in foundation Kantor was an example -and one might funds that have gone to cognitive psy- 112 ROBERT EPSTEIN chologists over the past few years. And proper subject matter of zoology is ac- with money goes prestige, laboratories, tually genetics. She is on her guard. You jobs, professorships, institutes, discov- tell her that you insist on assuming the eries, applications (however ill-con- chairmanship of the Zoology Depart- ceived), and so on. Support of this mag- ment immediately. She throws you out nitude will leave its mark on psychology of her office. for many years. This tale seems bizarre until you ex- Praxics is hardly worth promoting, of amine the history of American psychol- course, unless it is advancing as a science. ogy during the first two decades of the It has advanced, and it is still advancing, 20th century. For hundreds of years the though the number and range of topics subject matter of psychology had been that have been explored is disappointing, mind. The term comes from the Greek in large part, I am sure, because of the "psyche" (4I'vixri), which means "breath." lack of resources. Drawing a clear dis- It came to mean "spirit" or "soul," the tinction between praxics and behavior- animating principle of life, since the ab- ism is likely to help. sence ofbreath was a sign ofthe absence oflife. In English we distinguish between "soul" and "mind," but the terms have PRAXICS AND PSYCHOLOGY often been used interchangeably, and in some languages, no clear distinction is If praxics is to grow and flourish, it made. In German, for example, the word must strike out on its own. But rather Seele is used for both. than make a case at this point for its sep- Early users ofthe term "psychology"- aration from psychology, I will attempt for example, Christian Wolff and David to recast the problem. To argue that the Hartley in the early 1 700s-defined it as time for secession has come might im- the study of mind, following a tradition ply to some that praxics belonged in psy- ofinquiry that had begun 2000 years ear- chology departments at some point in the lier with Aristotle's Peri Psyches (better past. But it never belonged in psychology known by the Latin title DeAnima). Psy- departments. Psychologists and praxists chology had long been in the hands of have been locked in mortal combat for philosophers only, but, over a period of more than half a century, competing for several decades in the 19th century, the scarce resources and debating about what first psychology laboratories were estab- the appropriate subject matter of psy- lished, and psychology emerged as a sci- chology should be. But the appropriate ence (cf. Epstein, 1981)-a science of subject matter ofpsychology is mind, not mind. Fechner's vision of 1850, Wundt's behavior. laboratory in Leipzig, Ebbinghaus' classic experiments with nonsense syllables, A Historical Blunder Mueller's experiments on attention-all were concerned with mind. The new You are a geneticist. You make your "functional psychology" that Angell made way through the august halls of the Zo- popular in America during the first de- ology Building, stop at the office of the cade of the new century was a new ap- Chairman of the Department, and insist proach to the study of mind. Morgan's on speaking to her. You tell her that your Canon-which the behaviorists later discipline has a lot to contribute to zo- modified for their own uses-was a pre- ology and that you want an office and scription for simplicity in theories ofmind laboratory space in her department. She (Epstein, 1 984b). The original OED gives is surprised, but intrigued by the force of only one definition of"psychology": "The your arguments. You tell her that prob- science ofthe nature, functions, andphe- lems ofclassification could be handled in nomena of the human soul or mind" a more sophisticated and objective way (italics added). by genetic analysis and that, indeed, the Then, in 1905, in walks William CASE FOR PRAXICS 113

McDougall and, a few years later, John No doubt more than one department B. Watson. Like our psychotic geneticist, chairman was outraged by such claims, they demand nothing less than that the or, as Watson himself said, with atypical subject matter ofpsychology be changed. understatement, "It was only natural that Consider McDougall's cogent remarks ... criticisms should appear" (Watson, on the subject in The Battle ofBehavior- 1930, p. x). But, as Boring (1950) noted, ism (Watson & McDougall, 1928): Watson's "vigorous propaganda" (p. 641) I, ratherthan Dr. Watson, am the Arch-Behaviorist. was consistent with the prevailing Up to the end of the last century and beyond it, Zeitgeist in two important respects: First, psychologists did in the main concentrate their at- even in the 1913 paper, Watson prom- tention upon the introspectively observable facts, ised practical applications for "the edu- unduly neglecting the facts of human action or be- cator, the physician, the jurist and the haviour, and ignoring the need for some adequate theory ofbehaviour and ofcharacter .... This ne- businessman," and second, many psy- glect is implied in the definition ofpsychology com- chologists were disillusioned with the monly accepted at that time, namely, the "science progress psychology had made in the of consciousness" .... (p. 54) study of mind. "Psychology claimed to McDougall proceeds with a discussion of be science but it sounded like philosophy the unsuccessful attempts of J. S. Mill and a somewhat quarrelsome philosophy and Charles Mercier to create "ethology" at that" (Boring, 1950, p. 642).8 and "praxiology," respectively, and then In other words, if our geneticist had writes: only been a little more persuasive and his timing a little better, he might have suc- It was at this time that I was beginning to struggle ceeded-for a time-in taking over the with the fundamentals ofpsychology. And it seemed to me that both Mill and Mercier were in error; Zoology Department. that what was needed was not a new science of behaviour under a new Greek name, but rather a reform ofpsychology, consisting ofgreater attention The Legitimacy ofPsychology to thefacts ofbehaviour orconduct [italics added].... I gave expression to this view in my first book The study ofmind held its own during [Primer ofPhysiological Psychology, 1905], by pro- the three decades when behaviorism was posing to define psychology as the positive science a force to reckon with in psychology. With of conduct. I further defended this definition and expounded the need of this reform in my Intro- the advent ofthe computer and the adop- duction to Social Psychology (1908). And in 1912 tion of the information processing met- I published my little book entitled Psychology, the aphor by cognitive psychologists, the Study ofBehavior. (pp. 57-58) study of mind gained considerable pres- Watson (1913) continued this bizarre tige in the 1950s and 1960s. The mar- program even more aggressively than riage of cognitive psychology with lin- McDougall had. Not only should psy- guistics and computer science has created a new he further legitimacy-not only within the chology adopt subject matter, field, but among the public at large. The said, it should also completely abandon Freudians and their descendants are still its traditional one: active in the field, and even behavior The time seems to have come when psychology therapists have become taken with the must discard all reference to consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself into thinking that it is making mental states the object of observation. We have become so enmeshed in speculative ques- 8 Boring never gave an inch, however, to behav- tions concerning the elements of mind [and] the iorism. In his preface to the 1929 edition ofA His- nature ofconscious content ... that I, as an exper- tory of Experimental Psychology, which was re- imental student, feel that something is wrong with printed in the 1950 edition, he wrote, "Naturally our premises.... I believe we can write a psy- the words 'experimental psychology' must mean, chology, define it as [the science of behavior], and in my title, what they meant to Wundt and what never go back upon our definition: never use the they meant to nearly all psychologists for fifty or terms consciousness, mental states, mind, con- sixty years-that is to say, the psychology of the tent, introspectively verifiable, imagery, and the generalized, human, normal, adult mind, as re- like .... (pp. 163-166) vealed in the psychological laboratory" (p. x). 114 ROBERT EPSTEIN cognitive model. Moreover, if current reformed, and, as I have argued above, trends in funding are any indication, the it is probably unreformable. immediate future ofthe study ofmind is There is an alternative to the reform assured. movement, which, after all, was only one I don't happen to find the assertion that of the methods proposed for the estab- mind is a legitimate subject matter com- lishment of a science of behavior. The pelling, but the vast majority of psy- other is the program suggested by Mill chologists do-even, Isuspect, a majority and Mercier so long ago-the establish- ofthe members ofthe existing behavior- ment of an independent, biologically- istic organizations. No matter what the based science: "a new science of behav- referent of the term, most people seem iour under a new Greek name," as to think it's worth studying. So be it. Let McDougall said. The first method hasn't them study it! Give psychology to the worked. Let's try Plan B. psychologists! Establishing a science ofbehavior out- side ofthe confines ofpsychology makes The Legitimacy ofPraxics sense for a number of reasons: I ask the reader's indulgence while I (a) Psychology, like behaviorism, has overdramatize a simple point: No one- a terrible public image, largely deserved. no university administrator, no govern- The "charlatans and spirit-seekers" about ment official, no foundation director, no whom Hunter warned are still with us, biologist, no psychologist, not even the and the press is still wary. hard-core cognitivist-would deny that (b) "Psychology" is an inappropriate the behavior oforganisms is a legitimate name for the study of behavior. subject matter. Cognitivists have been (c) As I noted above, the concept of hostile to behaviorists not because ofany mind seems as compelling as ever to most doubts about the legitimacy ofthe subject people, and it may simply never go away. matter but because of the behavioristic If someone believes that the earth is flat, polemic: "Mind is verboten, let us take you can point to evidence that it is not. over your field." But there is nothing you can point to to How tragic were the consequences of convince someone that he or she doesn't that historical blunder. The study of be- have a mind. In any case, it seems un- havior was denied its place in the sun likely that psychology will be the disci- because Watson and others thought they pline that debunks mind. A successful could elbow their way into a field that debunking can begin only with an effec- was not theirs. tive formulation of the behavior of organisms, and that will be more likely to Argumentsfor Separation emerge from a thriving, well-funded, in- Many have shared the dream of a sci- dependent science ofbehavior than from ence of behavior-Mill, Mercier, Mc- psychology. Dougall, Watson, Meyer, Weiss, Kuo, (d) Seventy years ofdebate and struggle Hunter, Skinner, Schneirla, Hull, Tol- has resolved nothing. Further debate will man, Guthrie, Lashley, and so on. But only keep us from moving forward.'0 only Skinner managed to found a school (e) They'll be glad to see us go. that has survived, and that school con- (f) A split will likely mean new re- stitutes less than three percent of the sources. (A scene toward the end of Wal- membership ofthe American Psycholog- den Two comes to mind.) As long as there ical Association. The percentage, fur- are only so many offices and positions to thermore, has been declining in recent go around in a psychology department, years.9 Psychology, in short, has not been we will have trouble growing-indeed, we will have trouble surviving. When, some- day, an administrator risks the creation 9 These statements are based on ratios of recent membership figures ofDivision 25 ofthe American Psychological Association, which is devoted to the '0 Pennypacker (1984) made the point more dra- experimental analysis of behavior, to membership matically: "Never try to teach a pig to sing. It wastes figures of the Association as a whole. your time, and it only annoys the pig." CASE FOR PRAXICS 115 of a department of praxics, the depart- sonian behaviorism was so successful that ment will have only itself to blame if it it literally "conquered itself to death. It does not flourish. ... has become a truism. Virtually every (g) The establishment of an indepen- American psychologist, whether he knows dent science of behavior will allow a re- it or not, is nowadays a methodological alignment with the hard sciences, espe- behaviorist" (Bergmann, 1956, p. 270). cially with the various branches ofbiology Watson was fighting many battles at that are concerned with the controlling once, and some were won. But the subject variables of behavior: evolutionary bi- matter itselfhas never been secured. The ology, ecology, ethology, physiology and concern with objectivity is now applied anatomy, behavioral genetics, and so on. to the traditional-and appropriate- Biologists have largely ignored behav- subject matter of psychology. ioral psychologists simply because behavioral psychologists are psychologists. METHODS We should attend to data and theories from any field-including economics, so- Previous proposals for a science ofbe- ciology, anthropology, psychology, and havior have neglected to include a Meth- so on-that will help us advance our un- ods section, which may account for their derstanding ofthe subject matter, but our fates. I offer a glimpse of activities that primary concern should probably be with are underway toward the establishment biology. ofan independent science ofbehavior, as (h) There have been occasional at- well as some pertinent historical data. tempts in biology to synthesize information from various disciplines-pri- The Praxics Society marily psychology, anthropology, and various branches of biology-that have In 1983 Paul T. Andronis, T. V. Layng, concerned themselves with the behavior and I founded an organization called The of organisms; the effort is sometimes Praxics Society. Andronis, who earned called "behavioral biology" (e.g., Kon- his Ph.D. under Israel Goldiamond and ner, 1982)."l "Sociobiology" (Wilson, who is currently doing post-doctoral work 1975) is a well-known, though contro- at the University of Chicago, serves as versial, variant. The creation of depart- Director.'2 (In the Chicago area, I'm told, ments of praxics could help bring about the term "praxics" has shown up on ex- this synthesis. The possible benefits to ams, which makes it official.) After nearly society would be enormous. a year of correspondence and discussion among interested students and faculty What about The Battle? members, twenty of the Society's members met in Nashville in May 1984, dur- "I am pigeon-livered," said Hamlet, ing the meetings of the Association for "and lack gall/ To make oppression bit- Behavior Analysis. The membership ter." But proposing a split from psy- consists-by design-mainly of young chology is not defeatism. The "battle of people, but a number of senior people in behaviorism" was to some extent won by the field have been supportive ofthe con- the behaviorists long ago: Introspection cept. lost its popularity early in the century and The Society is setting up a Science-like has remained suspect. A concern for ob- journal called, naturally, Praxics, which jectivity in method and terminology has will publish original reports of advances become part ofthe fabric ofmodern psy- in the several biologically-oriented fields chology, largely due to early behaviorism that contribute to our understanding of (Schultz, 1969). According to some, Wat- the behavior of organisms. The Society

" A good source ofwork in this area is thejournal 12 For further information about The Praxics So- Behavioral and Neural Biology, which was founded ciety, write to Paul T. Andronis, Director, The in 1968 as Communications in Behavioral Biology Praxics Society, 10226 South Artesian, Chicago, IL and subsequently called simply Behavioral Biology. 60642. 116 ROBERT EPSTEIN is also planning a series of conferences Hall's research was done in the labora- and books that will also involve repre- tory of a physiologist. Hall founded the sentatives from a number ofdifferent dis- first psychology journal in America, the ciplines. These activities are meant to set American Journal ofPsychology, in 1887, the stage for the achievement ofSociety's and the first professional organization, primary goal: to bring about the first De- the American Psychological Association, partment of Praxics by 1990. Is this hu- in 1892. The world's first chair in psy- bris? How does one create-at least in chology was occupied by James McKeen name-a new field? Early psychologists Cattell in 1887 at the University ofPenn- no doubt asked precisely the same ques- sylvania, where Cattell established what tions. was perhaps the first university-sanc- tioned psychology laboratory in the country the same year (less official lab- On the Creation ofDepartments oratories had been established previously Modem academic psychology began as at Harvard and Johns Hopkins). an area of specialization in philosophy Still, these things take time. For de- departments. The first clear suggestions cades many psychology programs in the that psychology might have something in United States were still part of philoso- common with the natural sciences were phy departments. At Harvard, the first made by Herbart early in the 19th cen- semblance of a psychology department tury (e.g., Herbart, 1816, 1824-1825). did not appear until 1913, as the De- Kant had insisted that psychology could partment of Philosophy and Psychology, never be a natural science, but Herbart still under a bureaucratic entity called the asserted that psychology could be ad- "Division of Philosophy"; before that vanced by using two ofthe techniques of only a Social Ethics Department existed the natural sciences-observation and under that Division. It was not until 1934 mathematics. Experimentation, he that separate departments of psychology thought, was not possible (after all, the and philosophy were created -still under subject matter was immaterial). His suc- a larger entity called the "Division of cessor at Gottingen, Hermann Lotze, Philosophy and Psychology." (Note that agreed that experimentation on mind was the Divisions, not the Departments, had impossible, but he took the extraordinary the authority to grant Ph.D.s.) Psychol- step of applying physiological and med- ogy did not truly become a separate entity ical data to psychological issues (e.g., with the authority to grant its own Ph.D.s Lotze, 1852), which helped make psy- until 1939, when the Division system was chological experimentation inevitable. changed.'3 Skinner himself received his His students, along with Wundt, Fech- Ph.D. in 1931 from the Department of ner, and others, performed the first such Philosophy and Psychology, under the experiments in the 1850s. A new field, authority of the Division of Philoso- substantively different from philosophy, phy. 14 had been created, but formal programs and departments to accommodate the new field did not immediately spring to 13 This information comes from volumes of the life. Harvard University Catalogue dated from 1912 to The first formal program in psychology 1940. was probably Wundt's Institute at Leip- 14 Skinner's dissertation, which is dated Decem- ber 19, 1930, reads "A Thesis Presented in Partial zig, which was founded in 1879-more Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of than twenty years after he conducted his Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Psy- first psychology experiments. Some land- chology of Harvard University," but the Depart- marks in the United States are also no- ment of Psychology was not formed until 1934. E. in B. Newman (personal communication, June 1984) table: The first graduate degree psy- has suggested that Boring, Skinner's advisor, may chology was awarded to G. Stanley Hall have been acting as if a Department ofPsychology at Harvard in 1878, but it was awarded existed years before the fact. It is notable that Bor- by the Department of Philosophy, and ing became the Department's first chairman. CASE FOR PRAXICS 117

In England some psychology depart- there is any merit in the idea-is for the ments were still part of philosophy de- young, for their futures. The Israelites had partments in the 1950s. Harzem (1984) to wait in the desert for forty years before reported that he was part ofthe two-man they could enter the Promised Land- team that planned the last such split in though it was just over the next hill- the United Kingdom -the creation ofthe until those among them who had been Department of Psychology at the Uni- slaves had lived out their natural lives. versity of Wales, Bangor-in 1963. And Praxics can and probably should be es- in Greece, Spain, and other enlightened tablished without the support and par- countries in Europe, psychology depart- ticipation ofpeople who have strong ties ments are still uncommon. As of this to psychology. writing, the University ofChicago has no I can't think of a more fitting ending psychology department; specialists in ex- to this essay than Kuo's (1937) closing perimental psychology are awarded de- words, of which I have taken the liberty grees in biology. of altering only two: The point, I hope, is clear: We all come When I discussed with my colleagues my pro- to preexisting departments, structures, gram for [praxics], I was often told: "Your pro- edifices, programs, and so on, which, in spectus looks fine, but it will be beyond the possi- some cases, are literally cast in concrete. bility ofactual accomplishment, and as long as your But we must never take these divisions ideal cannot be fully realized, we will have to rely on those old psychological concepts for the expla- and labelsfor granted; they were created nation of behavior." I wish to ask my readers for bypeople, they are not necessarily the best more indulgence ifI relate an ancient Chinese fable means for promoting either a science or about an old farmer. The farmer was known among a technology ofbehavior, and they can be his neighbors by his nickname, "Mr. Fool." He changed. lived in a house which was right behind a hill. Dis- pleased by the obstruction in front ofhis house, he started to remove the hill. All his neighbors laughed SOME FINAL COMMENTS at him most heartily and called him "Mr. Fool." But despite the laughter and ridicule, Mr. Fool car- In the short time since The Praxics So- ried on. Once he told his neighbors, "I believe we ciety was founded, faculty members at shall be able to remove this hill. If I cannot finish it in my lifetime, I will make my children, grand- three universities have expressed interest children, and great-grand-children do it." When he in establishing programs in praxics at their died he stated in his will that he had buried all his universities. That should not be surpris- fortune under the hill and the only way to get it out ing, since many senior faculty members was to remove the entire hill. So generation after generation all his children worked feverishly on the in behavioral psychology have dreamed hill. And in less than four generations, the old house of such a field for decades, since many had gained a clear view ofthe field. Perhaps this is junior members are shell-shocked from a true story about some modem fools in science. the attacks oftheir cognitivist colleagues, Be it fact or fable, and fool or no fool, the [praxist] and since many graduate students in be- has planned to remove something much larger than havioral psychology are looking forward a hill. to rewarding careers as computer pro- grammers. No one doubts that the study REFERENCES ofbehavior is a legitimate enterprise. The question is simply how to bring such an Bergmann, G. (1956). The contribution of John enterprise fully to life. B. Watson. Psychological Review, 63, 265-276. Should established behavioral psy- Bien, B. (1969). The works ofLudwig von Mises. Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: The Foundation for chologists resign from the American Psy- Economic Education. chological Association and join the So- Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental ciety? By no means. The attempt to psychology(2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren- establish an independent science of be- tice-Hall. havior does not require an exodus from Burton, M. (1980.) Determinism, relativism and the behavior of scientists. Behaviorism, 8, 113- psychology. Many students of behavior 122. are already invested in psychology, and, Burtt, E. A. (1954). The metaphysicalfoundations as usual, some will flourish. Praxics-if ofmodern science. New York, Doubleday. 118 ROBERT EPSTEIN

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