City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2020 Continuity as Crisis: Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds Adam See The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3527 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] CONTINUITY AS CRISIS Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds by ADAM SEE A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The City University of New York 2020 ii © 2019 Adam See All Rights Reserved iii Continuity as Crisis: Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds by Adam See This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. __________________________ _____________________________ Date Catherine Wilson Chair of Examining Committee __________________________ _____________________________ Date John Greenwood Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: John Greenwood Philip Kitcher Peter Godfrey-Smith Catherine Wilson THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iv ABSTRACT Continuity as Crisis: Two Traditions of Theorizing about Animal Minds by Adam See Advisor: John Greenwood Contemporary philosophers and scientists remain largely resistant to attributing humanlike capacities to non-human animals, particularly great apes, for reasons that are not based on compelling empirical or theoretical grounds. Mental faculties such as reason, agency, and theory of mind are widely seen as differing in kind from functionally analogous abilities in other extant species. This dissertation appraises the current state of the animal minds literature by means of a critical genealogy charting the development of skepticism about animal cognition throughout the history of philosophy. In doing so, this project addresses the sedimentation of epistemic, linguistic, ontological, and methodological impasses that continue to shape debates over human uniqueness and limit comparative discussions of human and animal cognition. Since antiquity, discourse about animal minds has broadly followed two traditions, both of which are representative of positions in the recent philosophical and scientific literature. The dominant path has been to defend fundamental discontinuities between the human mind and the rest of the animal kingdom. I show how this tradition is bound up with common patterns of argumentation and evasive rhetoric that prejudge debates in comparative cognition in favor of discontinuity. Representative figures range from Aristotle, Descartes, and Wallace to modern primatologists such as Daniel Povinelli and Michael Tomasello. This tradition, I argue, is largely defined by the tenacity and v adaptability of “exceptionalism claims,” i.e., claims evoking a cognitive hierarchy in the animal kingdom. It has also been historically preoccupied with so-called “logical problems” suggesting, for example, that decades of experimental research on mindreading in chimpanzees cannot provide evidence for this ability even in principle. Revealing this problem’s underlying ontological, epistemic, and procedural assumptions explains why this tradition repeatedly fails to solve the problems it poses for itself, e.g., does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? In addition to this unhealthy skepticism, I show how the dominant tradition relies on a problematic form of rhetoric whereby animals are said to act “as if” possessing X (a presumably uniquely human faculty) but lack “genuine,” “true,” or “real” X, where X is defined at the highest level of human ability. This has long been, and remains, a common strategy used by discontinuity theorists in reaction to evidence of boundary-threatening abilities in animals. This rhetoric has tacitly encouraged antiquated “all or nothing” accounts of human mental faculties that have no place in the contemporary literature. The critical genealogy this dissertation develops is dialectical — the claims of the dominant tradition are continuously challenged by voices from within a marginalized tradition that take seriously the possibility of cognitive explanations of animal behavior. In illuminating this alternative tradition, my project brings together thinkers as diverse as Plutarch, Lucretius, Montaigne, La Mettrie, Hume, Darwin, Margaret Washburn and Kristin Andrews, who articulate and defend naturalistic approaches to cognition that do not presuppose a cognitive hierarchy with human abilities situated at the top. This tradition has been particularly sensitive to anthropocentric double standards in denying mental capacities to animals, and is home to the original defenders of “minimal” accounts vi of rationality. This project selectively draws from this marginalized tradition to promote a healthy skepticism toward animal cognition, culminating in a chapter undercutting the force of modern discontinuity arguments regarding the socio-cognitive capacities of humans and chimpanzees. vii Acknowledgements My deepest appreciation is owed to the efforts of John Greenwood. John encouraged this project from the beginning and was very helpful in narrowing its content. His immense knowledge of the history of psychology was an invaluable resource at every step. John’s presence at the helm was a constant sense of comfort to me. I looked forward to our meetings in the way that one looks forward to seeing a good friend. He was always affable, heartening, and constructive, and I feel privileged to have him as my advisor. Thank you, John. I am immensely grateful to Philip Kitcher, Peter Godfrey-Smith, and Catherine Wilson for acting on my committee. This project turned out to be much longer than anticipated, and the early stages were quite rocky for me. Philip, Peter, and Catherine: Thank you. Philip in particular has been a formative figure in my intellectual, moral, and professional development. Philip advised me during my Masters degree at Columbia, and I am very thankful that he signed onto this project. Philip was instrumental in helping me through some of my lowest points this past decade, which he always did with grace and compassion. It was Philip who turned me onto John Dewey, my favorite philosopher, and who changed the way I thought about philosophy. The structure of this dissertation owes much to Dewey, and in that way owes much to conversations with Philip that stretch back to 2009. More importantly, Philip encouraged my efforts to put Dewey’s ideas into extra- curricular action. I would not have joined the then-new Philosophy Outreach Program at Teacher’s College, and thus became enamored by the idea of teaching, were it not for Philip. Years later, I have fond memories of returning to Democracy and Education while planning and teaching my first courses at Brooklyn College. Philip was the first to impart viii upon me that teaching can be more significant and rewarding than research. Philip also inspires me a public intellectual. The last time I saw him he was giving a speech on climate change at the Brooklyn Public Library. That’s my kind of philosopher. Outside of academia my greatest supporter has been my girlfriend Caroline Macfarlane. She’s heard me struggle to explain this project hundreds of times, in various states of sobriety, over many years. Most importantly, Caroline was strong enough to provide encouragement and emotional support to me during the darkest year of her life, and I am forever grateful. Thank you Chilla. Mom and Dad, you should be at the top but if you knew John you’d understand. My parents, Myra and George See, have worked as hard or harder than anyone I’ve personally known. The stress they selflessly endure has been difficult for my family. My parents worked themselves up from nothing in rural Ontario, and they put me through three college degrees debt free, studying philosophy of all damn things, in New York City. And they never, ever made me feel a burden. It’s incredible, the faith they have in me, and the respect they’ve always shown to my projects and causes. I don’t know how to love anything more than I love my mom and dad. Nothing I’ve accomplished here is commensurate with what you accomplished to make it possible. A few words for Caitlin Hurst, my most meaningful friend and closest confidante on grad school drama since the beginning. She’s never read this thing, but she was there at every step, having a beer with me, talking about David Berman (RIP) lyrics, helping me to carry on. Thanks Pine. Cody Ross and Taylor Christoffel, my brothers in Otro Lado who’ve seen me in the ugly depths of it. Our band started around the time I began this dissertation. Making ix and performing music with you guys has opened up innumerable non-academic spaces in my life, helping me to complete this project in more ways than I can say. I can’t tell you how important it is for this philosopher to create and argue about music. I also want to acknowledge, in no particular order, the following lovely people. My close friend Jon Lawhead for introducing me to D&D (among other things), for being an inspiring teacher, and for being one of the best philosophers that I know; Jon always had my back and encouraged this project. Jeremy Forster for our deeply personal relationship, and for always being down to play NES till 4am and listen to The Clash. Chris Whalen for making NYC feel like home (those nights on Riverside looking out at the GWB listening to ATCQ were therapy), and for emotional support throughout writing this dissertation and in life generally. I owe thanks to Mateo Duque for helping me understand Aristotle (who I was more anxious to write about than anyone in the history of philosophy) and for being my best friend in my CUNY cohort.