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Conflicting Strategies on the Way to Raqqa

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Conflicting Strategies on the Way to Raqqa 8 June 4, 2017 News & Analysis Syria Conflicting strategies on the way to Raqqa Sami Moubayed Abu Kamal first are the US backed rebels, currently known as the Maghawir al-Thawra (Commandos Beirut of the Revolution). This group, formerly known as the New Syrian he Iranian media recently Army, attempted to take Abu Kamal raised a red flag, saying in 2016 from their bases in Jordan, that the United States parachuting fighters into the ISIS was preparing to over- held city but who were quickly run what remains of the rounded up and defeated. T599km Syrian-Iraqi border, with the help of troops from Great Brit- Racing against time ain and Jordan. to reach Abu Kamal This was largely in response to first are the US an early May military drill by the backed rebels, US and Jordanian militaries called currently known as “Eager Lion.” Although annually the Maghawir practised since 2010, the troop al-Thawra. build-up raised eyebrows in Iran, where generals saw it as a prelude to a massive operation by the It was one of the worst US- Jordanian Army, aimed at carving a backed operations in the conflict, safe zone out of southern Syria and prompting fighters with the New taking the remainder of the Syrian- Syrian Army to lie low, before Iraqi border. regrouping and re launching More than half of it is in the hands themselves as Maghawir al-Thawra of US-backed Kurdish forces while for a second round in Abu Kamal the strategic frontier city of Abu earmarked for this summer. Kamal is occupied by the Islamic Maghaweer al-Thawra fighters State (ISIS). Iranians worried that, hold the desert hills from the border if the Americans manage to take city of al-Tanf to the countryside of what was left through their proxies, Deir ez-Zor. They transformed al- this would sever the Damascus- Tanf into a hub for US-backed Syrian Baghdad Highway, which is the fighters, using it as a springboard only route for Hezbollah arms and for the battle of Deir ez-Zor. If they Regrouping. A file picture shows soldiers from the Syrian Army carrying a rocket as they prepare to money transported by land from manage to take the oil-rich city fire at ISIS positions in the province of Raqqa. (AP) Iran to Lebanon, first through Iraq and Abu Kamal, these troops hope and then via Syria. to create a shadow buffer between Deir ez-Zor and the city of Homs, eastern Kalamoon district. They are furious with the Trump White Relieved from fighting in those In Damascus, the preventing its penetration by either have also reclaimed the Palmyra- House for refusing to end its support four territories, the Syrian Army feeling is that the ISIS or Hezbollah. Damascus Highway and are heading for Kurdish militias, especially the has regrouped and marched with This strategy is based on how for al-Tanf, hoping to secure the SDF. During his trip to Washington, full weight towards the Iraqi border, Americans will not far the Americans are willing to triangle of the Syrian-Jordanian- Turkish President Recep Tayyip seemingly assured by the Turks, via lift a finger to help support them — and to pick a Iraqi borders. The Trump White Erdogan tried — with little luck — Russia, that they won’t get attacked their proxies. fight on Syrian territory with both House has done nothing to stop to talk US President Donald Trump on other fronts while doing so. Russia and Iran. Apart from lip them. into abandoning the Kurds. Trump It was Erdogan’s way of telling the service and a ceremonial strike In Damascus, the feeling is that sees them as vital partners in the Americans: “If the Kurdish project In response the Syrian Army on Syrian weaponry west of al- the Americans will not lift a finger war on terror and, not only did he does not end, I can and will create announced Operation Grand Dawn, Tanf, the Americans have shown to help their proxies, being satisfied turn down Erdogan’s request, he havoc for the Americans elsewhere officially aimed at liberating the no signal that they are willing to with securing their share of the seems determined to empower the in the Syrian battlefield, even if it eastern desert from ISIS. It is a walk the extra mile to wrestle the Syrian patchwork, which covers militias further. means letting the regime secure a multifaceted operation involving border from Moscow, Tehran and everything east of the Euphrates To obstruct the project, Erdogan victory on the border.” Syrian government troops, the Iraqi Damascus. River and includes pockets of put his full weight behind the He wouldn’t mind it, only if it Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) They have also shown no reaction Kurdish self-rule areas, now held four “de-conflict zones” that were would help limit Kurdish ambitions and Hezbollah — with Russian air to the launch of Operation Grand by the Syrian Democratic Forces agreed upon at ceasefire talks in to the Syrian north-east. What cover, of course. Dawn, which is being billed as the (SDF), the only militia on the Syrian Astana. That agreement, co-signed matters to him is that the Kurds It aims to retake three strategic largest in the 7-year conflict, against battlefield still receiving heavy US by Iran and Russia, agreed to end are kept away from his borders and cities in the clutches of ISIS: Abu ISIS. Government troops have arms and military assistance. hostilities east of Damascus, north denied the honours of expelling ISIS Kamal, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, all retaken more than 1,300 sq.km of Seemingly, the Turks are not of Homs, south of Daraa and in Idlib from Deir ez-Zor, Abu Kamal and, on the shores of the Euphrates. area in the Syrian Desert, between as unhappy as they seem with in north-western Syria, basically the certainly, their de facto capital of Racing against time to reach the ancient city of Palmyra and the Operation Grand Dawn since they four remaining battlefields in Syria. Raqqa. The Kurds’ greatest challenge may still lie ahead Simon Speakman Cordall ni Arab-dominated city. ent to the YPG command structure The SDF was founded in October and entirely reliant upon the far-left 2015, with the title initially serving Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s trained Tunis to provide diplomatic breathing fighters who administer its every space between Washington and the action. ith fighting be- Kurdish People’s Protection Units, YPG domination of the SDF was all tween the Islamic (YPG), which is designated a ter- but accepted by the United States, State (ISIS) and the rorist organisation by the United when the White House agreed to Kurdish-dominated States’ NATO allies in Ankara. ship arms directly to Kurdish fight- Syrian Democratic ers, despite their internal politics WForces (SDF) said to be within 4km The SDF remains and Turkish objections. A statement of ISIS’s self-proclaimed capital of determinably from the White House described Raqqa, what looks to be the most secular, something the group as “the only force on the significant battle in the long war that within Arab- ground that can successfully seize against the jihadist group appears dominated areas, Raqqa in the near future.” imminent. runs counter to local However, like their opponents That the US-backed SDF will ul- within Raqqa, much of the YPG’s timately prove successful against norms. military success has been fuelled the 4,000 or so militants within the by an ideology that has both served city seems inevitable. Ahead of the However, the brand has proven a to propel the group across northern group’s expected summer assault powerful recruiting tool. US officials Syria and provided the model for on Raqqa, the SDF called on ISIS said 23,000-25,000 of the SDF’s the consolidation of its territorial members in Raqqa to surrender. 45,000 or so multi-ethnic fighters gains. Issues ahead. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters ride on a Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently, are described as Syrian Arabs, as- A Crisis Group paper said that vehicle in the north of Raqqa city. (Reuters) a group of independent journal- sembled along with Turkmen and SDF officials, trained by the PKK, ists tracking human rights abuses Caucasians under the broad banner are typically appointed to key posi- by ISIS and other forces, instructed of a Kurdish leadership and frame- tions within the “Democratic Self- However, outside of the Kurd- pointment of the SDF’s Raqqa civil- civilians in the city on how best to work. Administration.” Though ostensibly ish-majority territory, the model ian council, co-led by Kurdish femi- withstand a protracted siege. Speculating on Raqqa’s future un- designed to foster broad political in- appears less secure. Despite the nist Layla Mohammed. der SDF control during a telephone clusion within captured territory, it influx of Arabs, the SDF remains “The civilian council of Raqqa SDF officials, trained briefing in late March, the com- is “best understood as mechanisms determinably secular, something will be charged with administering by the PKK, are manding officer of the US-led coali- that co-opt locals through access to that within Arab-dominated areas, Raqqa and the surrounding prov- typically appointed to tion, US Army Lieutenant-General services.” runs counter to local norms. Arabs ince after liberation,” the Syrian key positions within Stephen Townsend, said: “I don’t Despite much local chaos and participating within the Democratic Democratic Forces’ General Com- see a Kurdish state. I see a multi- complaints, within Kurdish terri- Self-Administration are left to enjoy mand said in a statement.
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