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SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FAILS to CONTAIN ISIS in BADIA SITUATION REPORT 14 April 2021

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SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FAILS to CONTAIN ISIS in BADIA SITUATION REPORT 14 April 2021 SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FAILS TO CONTAIN ISIS IN BADIA SITUATION REPORT 14 April 2021 Contents Key points 2 Current situation 3 Analysis and forecasting 4 ISIS activity in the Syrian Badia 5 ISIS has crossed ‘red-lines,’ becoming a serious threat 6 Syrian government’s previous attempts to contain ISIS 7 Unprecedented Iranian participation in current anti-ISIS campaign 8 Current anti-ISIS campaign takes defensive posture 8 Humanitarian impact 9 MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FAILS TO CONTAIN ISIS IN BADIA 1 KEY POINTS On 4 February, the government’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA), pro-government militias and the supporting Russian Air Force launched a large military campaign in the Syrian desert (Badia) west of the Euphrates aimed at eliminating ISIS cells positioned in the area. This military campaign comes after an increase in ISIS attacks against Syrian government forces and their allies, targeting military positions, vital infrastructure, economic trade routes and commercial convoys. ISIS activity in the Badia is characterized by direct military engagement through guerilla tactics. This is due to the Badia’s geography, where vast, unpopulated areas of the desert allows the group to maintain a small, mobile fighting force which can launch direct attacks on government forces. Government forces and their allies established military positions in different areas of the Badia, and military checkpoints on main roads, including the Deir-ez-Zor– Damascus road, the Ar-Raqqa–Salamiyeh road and the Asrieh–Khanaser road. According to local sources, Russian and Iranian-backed militias have established an estimated 37 checkpoints and military positions on the Deir-ez-Zor–Tadmor road, and about 20 checkpoints and military positions on the Ar-Raqqa–As-Salamiyeh road. The impact on humanitarian organisations is largely assessed to be increased risk of extortion or aid diversion at checkpoints on primary and secondary roads. This can have a significant impact on programming, potentially affecting the cost and amount of aid to beneficiaries, as well as the misappropriation of aid to armed actors. There is a low-level risk of humanitarian convoys being caught in the crossfire during attacks between both sides, or being targeted themselves. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FAILS TO CONTAIN ISIS IN BADIA 1 three locations extending between areas of Deir- CURRENT SITUATION ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa, Homs, and Hama governorates as follows (and shown in Figure 1): The government's Syrian Arab Army (SAA), with Russian and Iranian-backed militias, is engaged in Al Mayadin desert: The SAA, with the pro- an ongoing large-scale military campaign against government National Defense Forces (NDF), the remnants of ISIS in the Syrian desert (Badia), Liwaa al-Quds, Liwaa al-Fatimiyoun, Liwaa al- west of the Euphrates. The campaign, which Zeinabiyoun and Abu Fadel al-Abbas involved combing through large areas of the concentrated on areas close to the Al-Taim oil desert in which ISIS fighters were thought to be station, through Faydat Ibn Muwaina and the Al- hiding, began on 4 February and concentrated on Miyah valley in the depths of Deir-ez-Zor’s southern desert. Syrian government’s anti-ISIS campaign Figure 1: Areas in the Syrian Badia included in the government’s anti-ISIS campaign (Source: HAT Syria) MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FAILS TO CONTAIN ISIS IN BADIA 3 Deir-ez-Zor–Damascus highway: The Syrian following strategic locations and vital economic government and its allied forces divided infrastructure in the area: themselves into two sections; the first group of SAA, NDF and Liwaa al-Quds fighters, began in Strategic locations: Kaba Jeb and Al-Shola Deir-ez-Zor city while the second group, made up townships (Deir-ez-Zor subdistrict) located on of SAA, 5th Corps, NDF, Hezbollah, and Iranian the Deir-ez-Zor—Damascus road; Abu Kamal city Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) fighters (Abu Kamal subdistrict), Sokhneh city (Sokhneh began in Tadmor city (Palmyra). The two sections subdistrict), Tadmor city (Tadmor subdistrict), T4 1 travelled along the Deir-ez-Zor–Damascus airbase in Qaryatein subdistrict. highway, meeting in As-Sokhneh city. Economic infrastructure: Al-Taim power station, Tweinan gas station, al-Ward oil field, al-Kharata Ar-Raqqa–Hama–Homs triangle: The SAA and its elite 25th Special Mission Forces Division oil field, and al-Thawra oil field. (formerly known as the Tiger Forces), with the Iranian-backed militias also followed suit, setting NDF, Liwaa al-Quds, Liwaa al-Baqr, Liwaa al- up their own security perimeters in Saffa Fatimiyoun, and the IRGC focused on the Eltayyas village (Qaryatein subdistrict) and southern Ar-Raqqa countryside, Rasafa desert, Sokhneh city. al-Bishri mountains, the eastern Hama countryside, Rahjan desert (east of Hama), and the eastern Homs countryside. ANALYSIS AND The campaign included defensive measures to FORECASTING prevent further ISIS incursions and attacks. The Russian Air Force provided close air support and ISIS maintains its presence in the Badia in three conducted numerous airstrikes on ISIS positions strategic locations from where it is able to project in the Rasafa and Rahjan deserts, and the Tadmor force: and al-Bishri mountains, allegedly using banned high-explosive cluster munitions. Russian- Tadmor mountains: Located north of the city of backed militias and Russian Military Police Tadmor, the mountains of Abu Rujmain, Al- established military checkpoints along main Marah and Al-Shaer are used by ISIS as staging roads passing through the Badia, including the grounds for attacks against targets in the eastern Deir-ez-Zor–Damascus road, the Ar-Raqqa–As- Hama countryside and eastern Homs Salamiyeh road, and the Asrieh–Khanaser road, countryside, including the Asrieh–Khanasser and imposed security perimeters around the road, Damascus–Tadmor road, T3 and T4 1 The locations held by Russian-backed militias are considered strategic either due to their proximity to primary roads or their nature as military bases. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FAILS TO CONTAIN ISIS IN BADIA 4 stations, and government positions around medium weapons, and on occasion rocket and Tadmor and Sokhneh cities. artillery fire. In addition to hit-and-run attacks on specific targets, ISIS ambushes government Al-Bishri mountains: Extending from the Badia military convoys on roads and highways. These to western Deir-ez-Zor and the eastern Ar- attacks have a number of strategic advantages in Raqqa countryside. ISIS uses this area as a that they are difficult to defend against, require launching point for attacks on the southwestern minimal resources and manpower and enable desert of Deir-ez-Zor, the Deir-ez-Zor–Tadmor ISIS to salvage ammunition and weapons. As a road, the Rusafa desert south of Ar-Raqqa, and small force, militants are able to establish the Tabqa–Salamiyeh road. hideouts in the desert and relocate quickly, Southernmost areas of Deir-ez-Zor: representing a constantly moving target which Mountainous regions extending from Wadi Al- again, are difficult to attack. Rutba near the Syria–Iraq border, and towards In addition to targeting government forces and the areas deep in the desert including Faydat Ibn their allies, ISIS has also attacked commercial Muwaina (85 km southwest of Deir-ez-Zor city, vehicles on primary and secondary roads since between Kabajib and Al-Mayadin), Khoder Al- April 2020 as an extortion method, forcing Ma’, and Wadi Al-Miah: This is a key area for ISIS companies to pay a tax for ‘safe passage’.2 ISIS attacks towards the Abu Kamal and Al Mayadin also reportedly receives payment for allowing subdistricts, and the areas of southern Deir-ez- fuel trucks to pass through from Self- Zor including the Deir-ez-Zor–Damascus road. Administration to Syrian government-held areas The area provides ISIS with direct access to Iraq, undisrupted. potentially allowing the group to move and transport weaponry and military equipment Attacks have been recorded on the following between the two countries. roads: ISIS activity in the Syrian Badia Deir-ez-Zor–Damascus Road: Connects Deir- ez-Zor governorate with Damascus and Homs. It From these staging grounds, ISIS executes small- also passes near the T4 military airbase. scale guerilla attacks on Syrian government forces and its allies, avoiding prolonged military Al-Tabaqa–As-Salamiyeh Road: Connects Ar- confrontations which require superior military Raqqa governorate with the governorates of power. As with most guerilla warfare, ISIS Hama, Homs, and Damascus, and passes through depends on the element of surprise to disrupt the Rasafa desert in southern Ar-Raqqa. It also and wear down its opponents, using light to passes through the towns of Asrieh, As-Saan (As- 2 For example, On 14 November, ISIS carried out an attack against an oil convoy consisting of several Qaterji group tanks in the southwestern countryside of Ar-Raqqa. The convoy had reportedly been travelling along the Ar-Raqqa–Salamiyah road, which the company uses for transporting oil, fuel, grains and foodstuffs between Self-Administration and Syrian government-held areas. MERCY CORPS HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FAILS TO CONTAIN ISIS IN BADIA 5 Saan subdistrict), Saboura (Saboura subdistrict), first quarter of 2021, with 29 recorded in and As-Salamiyeh (As-Salamiyeh subdistrict). February 2021 alone (see Figure 2). The road is used for civilian transportation and trade. In addition to their greater frequency, ISIS attacks have become more emboldened, Ar-Raqqa–Aleppo Road: Links the governorates targeting high-value targets. For example, on 18 of Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa, and Aleppo. It is used August 2020, ISIS ambushed a Russian patrol for civilian transportation and for trade. It is also near an al-Taim oil field, killing one Russian considered the main road through which most officer, a Russian de-mining expert, and seven traded goods pass between Self-Administration NDF fighters, including Mohamad Taysir al- and Syrian government-held areas.
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