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Policy Notes for the Trump Notes Administration the Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ 2018 ■ Pn55
TRANSITION 2017 POLICYPOLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP NOTES ADMINISTRATION THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2018 ■ PN55 TUNISIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA AARON Y. ZELIN Tunisia should really open its embassy in Raqqa, not Damascus. That’s where its people are. —ABU KHALED, AN ISLAMIC STATE SPY1 THE PAST FEW YEARS have seen rising interest in foreign fighting as a general phenomenon and in fighters joining jihadist groups in particular. Tunisians figure disproportionately among the foreign jihadist cohort, yet their ubiquity is somewhat confounding. Why Tunisians? This study aims to bring clarity to this question by examining Tunisia’s foreign fighter networks mobilized to Syria and Iraq since 2011, when insurgencies shook those two countries amid the broader Arab Spring uprisings. ©2018 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ NO. 30 ■ JANUARY 2017 AARON Y. ZELIN Along with seeking to determine what motivated Evolution of Tunisian Participation these individuals, it endeavors to reconcile estimated in the Iraq Jihad numbers of Tunisians who actually traveled, who were killed in theater, and who returned home. The find- Although the involvement of Tunisians in foreign jihad ings are based on a wide range of sources in multiple campaigns predates the 2003 Iraq war, that conflict languages as well as data sets created by the author inspired a new generation of recruits whose effects since 2011. Another way of framing the discussion will lasted into the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. center on Tunisians who participated in the jihad fol- These individuals fought in groups such as Abu Musab lowing the 2003 U.S. -
Consejo De Seguridad Distr
Naciones Unidas S/2012/622 Consejo de Seguridad Distr. general 10 de diciembre de 2012 Español Original: inglés Cartas idénticas de fecha 10 de agosto de 2012 dirigidas al Secretario General y al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Representante Permanente de la República Árabe Siria ante las Naciones Unidas Siguiendo instrucciones de mi Gobierno, y en relación con mis cartas de fechas 16 a 20 y 23 a 25 de abril; 7, 11, 14 a 16, 18, 21, 24, 29 y 31 de mayo; 1, 4, 6, 7, 11, 19, 20, 25, 27 y 28 de junio; 2, 3, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17 y 24 de julio; y 1, 2, 8 y 10 de agosto de 2012, tengo el honor de trasmitirle adjunta una lista pormenorizada de las violaciones del cese de la violencia cometidas por grupos armados en la República Árabe Siria desde la noche del domingo 29 de julio de 2012 hasta la noche del lunes 30 de julio de 2012 (véase el anexo). Le agradecería que tuviera a bien hacer distribuir la presente carta y su anexo como documento del Consejo de Seguridad. (Firmado) Bashar Ja’afari Embajador Representante Permanente 12-63989 (S) 181212 181212 *1263989* S/2012/622 Anexo de las cartas idénticas de fecha 10 de agosto de 2012 dirigidas al Secretario General y al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Representante Permanente de la República Árabe Siria ante las Naciones Unidas [Original: árabe] List of attacks and violations carried out by the armed terrorist groups in the evening of 29 July and on Monday, 30 July 2012 No. -
Deir Ez Zor Governorate
“THIS IS MORE THAN VIOLENCE”: AN OVERVIEW OF CHILDREN’S PROTECTION NEEDS IN SYRIA Deir Ez Zor PROTECTION SEVERITY RANKING BY SUB-DISTRICT Severity ranking by sub-districts considered 3 indicators: i) % of IDPs in the population; Kisreh ii) conflict incidents weighted according to Tabni the extent of impact; and Sur iii) population in hard-to-reach communities. Deir-ez-Zor Khasham Basira Deir-ez-Zor Muhasan Thiban Sve anks Al Mayadin Hajin N oblem Ashara oblem Jalaa Moderat oblem Susat Abu Kamal oblem Svere oblem Cri�cal problem Catrastrophic problem POPULATION DATA Number of 0-4 Years 5-14 Years 15-17 Years Locations Total Children % of Children Total Population Communities 136 Overall Population 12% 27% 6% 400K 45% 895K PIN 12% 25% 8% 329K 45% 740K IDP 12% 27% 6% 68K 45% 152K Hard to Reach Locations 135 12% 27% 6% 285K 45% 638K Besieged Locations 0 Military Encircled Locations 1 12% 27% 6% 37K 45% 84K * es�mates to support humanitarian planning processes only SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 131 communities (96%) were assessed in Deir-ez-Zor issue of concern. Adolescent boys (70%) followed by adolescent governorate. girls (8%) were considered most affected child population groups. • In 7 per cent of assessed communities, respondents • In 100 percent of assessed communities respondents reported reported child labour preventing school attendance was that family violence was an issue of concern. Adolescent girls an issue of concern. Both adolescent boys in different age (100%) followed by both girls <12 years and boys <12 years (99%) groups 15-17 and 12-14 years were considered equally were considered the most affected child population groups. -
Syria SITREP Map 07
Syria Situation Report: February 7 - 21, 2018 1a-b February 10: Israel and Iran Initiate Largest Confrontation Over Syria Since 6 February 9 - 15: Turkey Creates Two Additional Observation Points in Idlib Start of the Syrian Civil War: Israel intercepted and destroyed an Iranian drone that violated Province: The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) established two new observation points near its airspace over the Golan Heights. Israel later conducted airstrikes targeting the drone’s control the towns of Tal Tuqan and Surman in Eastern Idlib Province on February 9 and February vehicle at the T4 Airbase in Eastern Homs Province. Syrian Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (SAMS) 15, respectively. The TSK also reportedly scouted the Taftanaz Airbase north of Idlib City as engaged the returning aircraft and successfully shot down an Israeli F-16 over Northern Israel. The well as the Wadi Deif Military Base near Khan Sheikhoun in Southern Idlib Province. Turkey incident marked the first such combat loss for the Israeli Air Force since the 1982 Lebanon War. established a similar observation post at Al-Eis in Southern Aleppo Province on February 5. Israel in response conducted airstrikes targeting at least a dozen targets near Damascus including The Russian Armed Forces later deployed a contingent of military police to the regime-held at least four military positions operated by Iran in Syria. town of Hadher opposite Al-Eis in Southern Aleppo Province on February 14. 2 February 17 - 20: Pro-Regime Forces Set Qamishli 7 February 18: Ahrar Conditions for Major Offensive in Eastern a-Sham Merges with Key Ghouta: Pro-regime forces intensified a campaign 9 Islamist Group in Northern of airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting the 8 Syria: Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar opposition-held Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Al-Hasakah a-Sham merged with Islamist group Damascus, killing at least 250 civilians. -
Syrian Army Shows Growing Signs of Strain | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1835 Syrian Army Shows Growing Signs of Strain by Jeffrey White Aug 1, 2011 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Jeffrey White Jeffrey White is an adjunct defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of the Levant and Iran. Brief Analysis Although the Syrian army has shown signs of fraying for some time, the potential for more serious fissures is beginning to emerge. s Ramadan commences, the Syrian government is stepping up efforts to suppress unrest, with special A emphasis on the cities of Hama and Dayr al-Zawr. The regime has faced serious challenges in these areas and reportedly killed tens of people there during operations over the weekend and into today. These and other ongoing internal security efforts are placing serious strain on its forces, particularly the army. Regime Response T he government's response to the demonstrations since March has involved isolating areas of disturbance; arresting protestors, movement leaders, and uninvolved civilians; terrorizing the population with "disappearances" and shootings; conducting raids against centers of resistance; and, when these measures have proven insufficient, carrying out assaults with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and helicopters. At the core of these tactics has been a willingness to use major violence against largely peaceful and unarmed demonstrators. This weekend's operations in Hama and Dayr al-Zawr are typical of this pattern. Yet the demonstrations are widespread, persistent, and growing in size, forcing the regime to conduct a "360 degree defense." No area of the country seems secure except perhaps the Alawi heartland in the northwest. -
132484385.Pdf
MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOIMIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA Diplomityö Kapteeni Valtteri Riehunkangas Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 58 Maasotalinja Heinäkuu 2017 MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Kurssi Linja Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 58 Maasotalinja Tekijä Kapteeni Valtteri Riehunkangas Tutkielman nimi VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOI- MIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA Oppiaine johon työ liittyy Säilytyspaikka Operaatiotaito ja taktiikka MPKK:n kurssikirjasto Aika Heinäkuu 2017 Tekstisivuja 137 Liitesivuja 132 TIIVISTELMÄ Venäjä suoritti lokakuussa 2015 sotilaallisen intervention Syyriaan. Venäjä tukee Presi- dentti Bašar al-Assadin hallintoa taistelussa kapinallisia ja Isisiä vastaan. Vuoden 2008 Georgian sodan jälkeen Venäjän asevoimissa aloitettiin reformi sen suorituskyvyn paran- tamiseksi. Syyrian intervention aikaan useat näistä uusista suorituskyvyistä ovat käytössä. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää Venäjän ilmavoimien kyky tukea maaoperaatiota. Tutkimus toteutettiin tapaustutkimuksena. Tapauksina työssä olivat kolme Syyrian halli- tuksen toteuttamaa operaatiota, joita Venäjä suorituskyvyillään tuki. Venäjän interventiosta ei ollut saatavilla opinnäytetöitä tai kirjallisuutta. Tästä johtuen tutkimuksessa käytettiin lähdemateriaalina sosiaaliseen mediaan tuotettua aineistoa sekä uutisartikkeleita. Koska sosiaalisen median käyttäjien luotettavuutta oli vaikea arvioida, tutkimuksessa käytettiin videoiden ja kuvien geopaikannusta (geolocation, geolokaatio), joka -
Monthly Every 2 Months Yearly
Syrian Arab Republic: Coverage of Main Multisectoral Assessments and Timeline (April 2015) Al-Malikeyyeh Al-Malikeyyeh Turkey Turkey Quamishli Quamishli Jarablus Jarablus Ras Al Ain Ras Al Ain Afrin Ain Al Arab Afrin Ain Al Arab Azaz Tell Abiad Azaz Tell Abiad Al-Hasakeh Al Bab Al-Hasakeh Al Bab Al-Hasakeh Al-Hasakeh Harim Harim Jebel Saman Ar-Raqqa Jebel Saman Ar-Raqqa Menbij Menbij Aleppo Aleppo Ar-Raqqa Idleb Ar-Raqqa Idleb Jisr-Ash-Shugur Jisr-Ash-Shugur As-Safira Ariha As-Safira Lattakia Ariha Ath-Thawrah Lattakia Ath-Thawrah Al-Haffa Idleb Al-Haffa Idleb Deir-ez-Zor Al Mara Deir-ez-Zor Al-Qardaha Al Mara Al-Qardaha As-Suqaylabiyah Deir-ez-Zor Lattakia As-Suqaylabiyah Deir-ez-Zor Lattakia Jablah Jablah Muhradah Muhradah As-Salamiyeh As-Salamiyeh Hama Hama Banyas Banyas Hama Sheikh Badr Masyaf Hama Sheikh Badr Masyaf Tartous Tartous Dreikish Al Mayadin Dreikish Ar-Rastan Al Mayadin Ar-Rastan Tartous TartousSafita Al Makhrim Safita Al Makhrim Tall Kalakh Tall Kalakh Homs Syrian Arab Republic Homs Syrian Arab Republic Al-Qusayr Al-Qusayr Abu Kamal Abu Kamal Tadmor Tadmor Homs Homs Lebanon Lebanon An Nabk An Nabk Yabroud Yabroud Al Qutayfah Al Qutayfah Az-Zabdani Az-Zabdani At Tall At Tall Rural Damascus Rural Damascus Rural Damascus Rural Damascus Damascus Damascus Darayya Darayya Duma Duma Qatana Qatana Rural Damascus Rural Damascus IraqIraq IraqIraq Quneitra As-Sanamayn Quneitra As-Sanamayn Dar'a Quneitra Dar'a Quneitra Shahba Shahba Al Fiq Izra Al Fiq Izra As-Sweida As-Sweida As-Sweida As-Sweida Dara Jordan AREA OF ORIGIN Dara Jordan -
COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Government of Syria Controlled Areas
Humanitarian Needs GOS 31 March, 2020 Assessment Programme COVID-19 Rapid Assessment Government of Syria Controlled Areas This report provides an overview of the response to the COVID-19 virus in GoS controlled areas. Data collection was undertaken at the sub-district level on Saturday 28 and Sunday 29 March 2020, via face-to-face key informant interviews. Mitigation Measures TURKEY No Yes Additional hand washing facilities in the camps / collective shelters 194 Menbij Nabul Al Bab Closure of public spaces Haritan 19 175 Rasm Haram El-Imam Jebel Saman Eastern Kwaires Dayr Hafir As-Safira ZarbahHadher Maskana Banan Communication on COVID-19 risk 6 188 Kasab Hajeb Saraqab Al-Khafsa Qastal MaafRabee'a Abul ThohurTall Ed-daman Maadan Kansaba Ziyara Ein El-Bayda Ma'arrat An Nu'man Khanaser Sabka Al-HaffaSalanfa Mansura Lattakia Kafr Nobol Sanjar Mzair'a Heish Tabni Disinfection campaign 68 126 Hanadi Shat-ha Madiq Castle FakhuraAl-Qardaha Tamanaah Khan Shaykun Hamra As-Suqaylabiyah IRAQ Jablah Kafr Zeita As-Saan Suran Qteilbiyyeh Tell Salhib Deir-ez-Zor Khasham Dalyeh Muhradah Anaza Jeb Ramleh Banyas Saboura Distribution of soap/disinfectant 189 5 Qadmous Hama Oqeirbat Rawda Masyaf As-Salamiyeh Muhasan Sheikh Badr Soda Khawabi Ein Halaqim Harbanifse Eastern Bari Sibbeh Oj Ar-Rastan Tartous Dreikish Talbiseh Al Mayadin Arwad HawashQabu Taldu Safita Ein Elniser Jeb Ej-Jarrah Kherbet Elma'aza Nasra Shin Al Makhrim Ashara Health screening for new IDPs 191 3 HameidiyyehSafsafa Homs SisniyyehTall KalakhHadideh Sokhneh Kherbet Tin Noor Jalaa Kareemeh -
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Syria Situation Report: March 22 - April 19, 2021 1 Mar. 27-Apr. 12: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) escalate operations to secure prisons and 6 Apr. 11: Russian-backed Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 5th Corps establishes camps in northeastern Syria and preempt an ISIS break-out attempt during Ramadan, April new military base and helipad in Ma’adan. The SAA 5th Corps previously construct- 12-May 12. The SDF conducted the “Humanitarian and Security Operation” in the al Hawl displaced persons camp ed a helipad near Ma’adan, Deir ez-Zour Province, in August 2020. Russian officers, from March 27-April 12, arresting at least 150 ISIS affiliates and raiding several ISIS cells responsible for the string members of the SAA 5th Corps, and local officials met on April 10 to discuss the potential of assassinations in the camp in early 2021. The SDF also transferred tens of detainees out of the overcrowded of establishing another military base in Tibni, about 15 miles southeast of Ma’adan, to Ghuwayran detention center in Hasakah City to smaller detention centers in Shaddadi and at the al Omar gas field, expand Russian-backed National Defense Force control in northwest Deir Ez-Zour. Deir ez-Zour Province, throughout March and early April. ISIS reportedly broke 11 detainees out of the SDF-affiliat- Russian-backed units will likely use their base at Ma’adan to expand the range of their ed prison in al Suwar, Deir ez-Zour Province, on March 22. ISIS also tried and failed to break detainees out of the rotary-wing aircraft during counter-ISIS operations in the Central Syrian Desert, where Kabiba detention center in Deir ez-Zour Province on April 6 and April 12. -
68%Educationfood As a Top 3 Priority
SYRIASYRIA 615 of524 1630 of 776assessed assessed ♍ ♍ communitiescommunities reported reported ☇☄ PriorityPriority Need:Need: FoodEducation Shelter - January - March 20192018 38%68%educationfood as a top 3 priority Kms ² 0 20 40 60 TURKEY AL-HASAKEH ALEPPO AR-RAQQA IDLEB HAMA DEIR-EZ-ZOR IRAQ HOMS Percent of assessed communities in sub-district reporting education as top 3 priority need RURAL 0% 0-25%DAMASCUS 26-50% 51-75% 76%-100% DAMASCUS Not assessed Assessed communities by sub-district reporting education in top 3 priority needs GovernorateSub-District Education GovernorateSub-District Education GovernorateSub-District Education GovernorateSub-District Education Al-HasakehAl-Hasakeh 6/9 Aleppo Hadher 0/1 Deir-ez-Zor Basira 2/14 Idleb Armanaz 6/14 Al-HasakehAl-Malikeyyeh 19/34 Aleppo Haritan 8/8 Deir-ez-Zor Deir-ez-Zor 5/17 Idleb Badama 2/10 Al-HasakehAmuda 10/18 Aleppo Jandairis 18/44 Deir-ez-Zor Hajin 1/4 Idleb Bennsh 0/4 Al-HasakehAreesheh 3/12 Aleppo Jarablus 11/35 Deir-ez-Zor Khasham 2/8 Idleb Dana 0/20 Al-HasakehBe'r Al-Hulo Al-Wardeyyeh7/9 Aleppo Ma'btali 25/25 Deir-ez-Zor Kisreh 14/19 Idleb Darkosh 13/26 Al-HasakehDarbasiyah 5/11 Aleppo Mare' 1/6 Deir-ez-Zor Muhasan 0/6 Idleb Ehsem 0/19 Al-HasakehHole 0/1 Aleppo Menbij 15/35 Deir-ez-Zor Sur 1/15 Idleb Harim 1/5 Al-HasakehJawadiyah 10/15 Aleppo Nabul 1/1 Deir-ez-Zor Tabni 0/10 Idleb Heish 2/18 Al-HasakehMarkada 5/11 Aleppo Raju 11/50 Deir-ez-Zor Thiban 0/11 Idleb Idleb 6/15 Al-HasakehQahtaniyyeh 15/19 Aleppo Sarin 2/4 Hama As-Salamiyeh 0/1 Idleb Janudiyeh 3/14 Al-HasakehQuamishli -
Syria Situation Report: September 27 - October 10, 2017
Syria Situation Report: September 27 - October 10, 2017 1 October 2: IS Conducts Spectacular Attack in Damascus Amidst IS Counter-Offensive 6 October 7 - 8: Turkey Stages for Intervention into Idlib Province: Turkish in Eastern Homs Province: IS conducted a spectacular attack targeting a regime police station in President Recep Erdogan announced the start of cross-border operations by opposition the Midan District of Central Damascus, killing at least fifteen individuals and wounding twenty others. groups backed by the Turkish Armed Forces in Idlib Province on October 7. Erdogan IS detonated two SVESTs inside the station as well as either an SVEST or VBIED outside the station described the intervention as a step towards a formal ‘de-escalation zone’ in Idlib Province targeting security forces responding to the blasts. IS-affiliated Amaq News Agency claimed the attack. brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran at the Astana Talks on September 15. Turkey later sent a military delegation to hold negotiations with HTS in Western Aleppo Province. Activists Syria Situation Report: May 1alleged - 10, that Turkey 2017 aims to deploy its forces to occupy opposition frontlines with the 2 October 4 - 6: Pro-Regime Forces Claim to Clear IS majority-Kurdish Afrin Canton as well as select towns along the Syrian-Turkish Border. Pocket in Eastern Hama Province: Pro-regime forces claimed to end clearing operations against the pocket of terrain held by IS near Salamiyah in Eastern Hama Qamishli 7 October 8 - 10: SDF Province. IS allegedly withdrew from Hama Province Prepares for Final Effort to rural areas in Eastern Homs Province. -
Syria Intelligence Report – 07-09 October 2017 On
Syria Intelligence Report – 07-09 October 2017 On Friday evening, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), supporting numerous Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions that participated in the Operation Euphrates Shield, launched the first steps of its operations in Idlib. Dubbed Idlib Shield, the operation was described by the TSK as a means to observe and enforce the de-escalation regime that was agreed in December 2016. The TSK stated that these operations, which are being conducted with support from the Russian Airforce, are looking to facilitate the suitable conditions to ensure the return of Syrian refugees to their homes and deliver humanitarian aid to the region. The TSK statement further mentioned that the immediate objectives of the forces are to set up observation posts in key areas. So far, the TSK has ruled out any intent of operations against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG). However, subsequent statements, as well as statements from the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan over the weekend suggest that in the long-term, the TSK and its FSA allies are seeking to contain the HTS and the YPG in Idlib and Afrin respectively, removing the potential of either force threatening Turkish interests. Indeed, since the launch of the operation, the Idlib Shield forces have positioned themselves in the countryside south of Afrin, entering Atmeh (and its adjacent refugee camp), Qah, Salwa, Zarzitah, Qaturah, Mount Simeon and Mount Barakat. A Turkish delegation has also reportedly entered the town of Dar’at Izza for negotiations. In the immediate aftermath of the Turkish forces entering into Idlib, localised clashes were reported between the Idlib Shield forces and the HTS.