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FACT SHEET SYRIA IFK Institute for Peace Support 16.09.2017 – 13.10.2017 NO

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FACT SHEET SYRIA IFK Institute for Peace Support 16.09.2017 – 13.10.2017 NO. 65 and Conflict Management LANDESVERTEIDIGUNGSAKADEMIE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ● As retaliation against a recent Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) attack, Russia the Aleppo province. The deployment presumably aims to guarantee that and Syria have conducted air raids in Idlib and Hama despite the ag- the area is protected from Russian and regime bombing but also to reed upon de-escalation zone. The al-Qaida linked HTS is excluded from the control the kurdish province of Afrin. Syria's foreign minister supported the ceasefire agreement. de-escalation zone, yet criticized the Turkish presence there. ● Russia and Syria attacked all rebel groups present in Idlib, even those who ● Mutual recrimination between the US and Russia regarding the at- are participating in the Astana process. Syrian opposition accused Russia tacks from militias supported by the respective sides in the fight against of utilizing maps presented in the Astana negotiations to bomb posts of the IS in Deir ez-Zour have increased. Russia accused the US-backed Syrian Free Syrian Army (FSA). At the UN General Assembly, foreign Minister al- Democratic Forces (SDF) of opening the dams to prevent the crossing of the Moallem designated the zones as a "temporary agreement" only. Euphrates by pro-regime forces. ● For the first time, Turkish soldiers and FSA units entered Idlib on Oc- ● US is expected to actively contribute to an increasing forced movement tober 7th, in order to establish the agreed upon de-escalation zone. The of IS fighters to Deir ez-Zour by reducing air raids in Western Iraq. In a HTS has reportedly joined reconnaissance mission in Sheikh Barakat, an meeting between US and russian generals, incidents’ avoidance measures area overlooking the Kurdish province of Afrin and the rebel-held parts of were discussed. DOMESTIC POLITICS ● “Rebuild Syria” Exhibition addressing the country’s reconstruction ● The SDF announced the formation of a civil council in the Deir process was held in mid-September under the patronage of the Syrian ez-Zour province, which was rejected by the head of the previous local Government. The rebuilding of Syria has been estimated by the govern- council of Deir ez-Zour and by member of the opposition led Syrian Inte- ment to cost up to $500 Billion. rim Government. ● A deal between the Syrian government and IS allowed the evacuation ● A military zone in the Jabel al-Sheikh area of Quneitra was an- of hundreds of civilians from an IS-held territory in eastern Hama to nounced, allowing civilians limited time to leave the area. This occurs a rebel held areas in Hama and Idlib. day after the Quneitra Command Council terminated the southern de-es- ● In mid September, Syrian Kurds voted in Kurdish-led regions in nort- calation zone following increasing violations by pro-government forces. hern Syria to set up new governing institutions and boost regional auto- ● The HTS announced Abu Mohammad al-Jolani as its new leader. nomy. Recent changes in personnel are likely the result of severe blows that ● The Kurds’ goal of securing autonomy (as part of a decentralized the organization suffered due to Russian airstrikes. Lately, Russia clai- Syria) is opposed by the Syrian government, Turkey and the US. med that Jolani was critically injured in an air raid. The Syrian regime accepted the possibility of autonomy for the Kurds ● Opposition group Kataib Ibn Taymiyyeh broke from HTS and clas- and stated that it is negotiable as soon as the IS is defeated. hed over control of Daret Izza in rural Aleppo. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS ● Russian airstrikes targeted HTS headquarters in Idlib. The airstrikes Essen” frigate, demonstrated the Syrian Army’s limited capacities and were executed in retaliation following an attack on Russian military police- the intense Russian involvement on the ground, evident by the death of the men who were monitoring the implementation of the de-escalation agree- russian commander of Syria’s 5th Corps of volunteers caused by an IS mor- ment. tar fire near Deiz ez-Zour. ● Turkish forces and HTF fighters exchanged fire near the village of ● In Deir ez-Zour, regime forces advanced southward along the Euphrates Kafr Lusin on the Syrian-Turkish border. valley and captured, according to regime sources, the city of al-Mayadin. ● In the area between Palmyra and Deir ez-Zour, IS’ comprehensive counter- ● The SDF emphasised that the capture of Raqqa from IS was in its attack aimed at taking control of the rural area east of Palmyra also resulted final stages as 80% of the city was already seized. US-backed SDF in the seizure of several gas fields. Yet, Syrian forces were able to contain IS’ forces negotiated an evacuation deal for the remaining IS fighters. attempt to capture the vital logistics route between Deir ez-Zour and Palmy- ● IS claimed responsibility for bombing a Damascus police station ra. The offensive, during which Russia fired cruise missiles from its “Admiral killing at least 17 people and injuring as many as 20 officers and civilians. AdanaTERRITORIALOsmaniyeGaziantep CONTROL TURKEY MAP ANALYSIS CeyhanCeyhanAs of: 9.10.2017 Tarsus Ain al-Arab (Kobane) Cheekha Dar Al-Qamishli Intensive3611 fighting in Deir-ez-Zour along the Euphrates river remains, Manbij with the Syrian Army continuing advancements from the northwestern Al-Bab Al-Hasaka r Sinjar direction, while the SDF is advancing from the north. Attacking the IS e Antakya Aleppo Mossul from multiple fronts will put the terrorist group under pressure. In Homs, e Idlib M Ar-Raqqa pro-regime forces continue to target IS militants from all directions as s e the latter’s military influence largely diminishes. While the kurdish SDF h Deir Ash-Sharqatforces continue to engage in battle in Raqqa with IS encircled, various c Latakia s ez-Zour Tigris i reports indicate that Turkish troops entered Idlib to implement the de- d Hama n IRAQ escalation zone and to occupy the frontlines with the kurdish controlled ä l Al-Mayadin canton of Afrin. l Tartus e Homs SYRIA Diyala t Euphrates t Tripoli i Palmyra (Tadmur) Abu Kamal River FORECAST M LEBANON Qaryatayn Baalbek BEIRUT WadiIS is constantly losing territory in the ThartharEuphrates valley. The Syrian army is Baghdadi Douma Rebels Occupied territories by Turkish-backedHit rebels preparing to launch an attack against Al-Walid DAMASKUS Occupied territories by different IslamistRamadi groups one of the last remaining IS controlled Jihadist Rebels Kuneitra IS controlled al-Habbania-See pocket in Qaryatayn. The territorial los- Golan Assad regime and allies Razzaza- ISR Heights As-Suwayda Occupied territories by the Government Seeses of IS in eastern Syria may lead the Dar‘a Kurds group to conduct terrorist attacks in Irbid Occupied territories by the JORDAN Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) western Syria. The latest developments Israel-occupied territories in Idlib and Damascus proved that IS 0 50Az Zarqa100 150 200 km AMMAN Agreed de-escalation zones in Astana sleeper cells are still very effective. Jerusalem SOURCES MEDIA ANALYSIS COMPILED BY IFK MENA-Team (Jasmina RUPP, Nasser EL-HAJ, Maya HADAR, David FUSSI); LAYOUT: REF III/Medien, IMG FACT SHEET IRAQ IFK Institute for Peace Support 19.09.2017 – 13.10.2017 NO. 65 and Conflict Management LANDESVERTEIDIGUNGSAKADEMIE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT ● Outspoken opposition to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referen- Erdogan threatened Kurdistan with military maneuvers similar to those ta- dum of september 25: Whereas the EU warned that the referendum will ken against the Kurds in northern Syria. be counterproductive and that independence should be explored through ● Though repeatedly expressed, Turkey hasn’t carried out its threat to a peaceful and constructive dialogue with Bagdad, the UN alerted that the boycott kurdish oil. Hundreds of thousands of barrels a day reach the vote could hamper the fight against the Islamic State (IS), in which Kurdish world market via Turkey. The Turkish Minister of Economic Affairs oppo- forces have played a critical role. sed economic actions against the KRG, stating that it is a major hurdle for ● Turkey and Iran described the vote as illegal and unacceptable Turkey as a regional hub for financial and commercial transactions. Putin and launched numerous retaliatory measures against the Kurdish Regi- stated that no one would benefit from such an embargo as oil pri- onal Government (KRG): Iran closed its borders and stopped importing/ ces would be pushed up. The gas pipeline planned by Rosneft, which will exporting oil products from/to Iraqi Kurdistan, Bagdad demanded all coun- supply gas from Kurdistan via Turkey to Europe in 2020 certainly plays a tries to suspend their air traffic with Kurdistan, whereas Iran, Turkey, Leba- relevant role as well. non, Egypt and Jordan followed this call. ● A new Audio message from IS-Kalif Baghdadi was published, hereby dis- ● Turkey carried out joint military maneuvers with the Iraqi army near its proving rumors surrounding his death, called for the endurance of IS figh- border. The Iranian Revolution Guards and army also conducted military ters in Syria and Iraq and ultimately motivated IS sympathizers worldwide to exercises near the Kurdish border, thereby threatening Kurdistan. President carry out terror attacks in the West. DOMESTIC POLITICS ● Polling took place in the three provinces in the province of Kirkuk which transfers and flights to the region and turned off mobile phones’ commu- is disputed yet claimed by the Kurds. Kurdish leaders said that although nication networks. the referendum isn’t binding it is meant to legitimate a mandate to negoti- ● Kurdish parliamentarians is close to ending boycott of Iraqi parliament ate secession. Final referendum results showed nearly 93% in favor and will resume attendance of sessions after nearly two weeks of boycott of independence and 7.3% against.
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    Syria Situation Report: March 22 - April 19, 2021 1 Mar. 27-Apr. 12: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) escalate operations to secure prisons and 6 Apr. 11: Russian-backed Syrian Arab Army (SAA) 5th Corps establishes camps in northeastern Syria and preempt an ISIS break-out attempt during Ramadan, April new military base and helipad in Ma’adan. The SAA 5th Corps previously construct- 12-May 12. The SDF conducted the “Humanitarian and Security Operation” in the al Hawl displaced persons camp ed a helipad near Ma’adan, Deir ez-Zour Province, in August 2020. Russian officers, from March 27-April 12, arresting at least 150 ISIS affiliates and raiding several ISIS cells responsible for the string members of the SAA 5th Corps, and local officials met on April 10 to discuss the potential of assassinations in the camp in early 2021. The SDF also transferred tens of detainees out of the overcrowded of establishing another military base in Tibni, about 15 miles southeast of Ma’adan, to Ghuwayran detention center in Hasakah City to smaller detention centers in Shaddadi and at the al Omar gas field, expand Russian-backed National Defense Force control in northwest Deir Ez-Zour. Deir ez-Zour Province, throughout March and early April. ISIS reportedly broke 11 detainees out of the SDF-affiliat- Russian-backed units will likely use their base at Ma’adan to expand the range of their ed prison in al Suwar, Deir ez-Zour Province, on March 22. ISIS also tried and failed to break detainees out of the rotary-wing aircraft during counter-ISIS operations in the Central Syrian Desert, where Kabiba detention center in Deir ez-Zour Province on April 6 and April 12.