Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics Global and Regional Perspectives T

Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics Global and Regional Perspectives T. Volgy; R. Corbetta; K. Grant; R. Baird ISBN: 9780230119314 DOI: 10.1057/9780230119314 Palgrave Macmillan

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99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd i 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:584:50:58 PMPM Evolutionary Processes in World Politics

Edited by William R. Thompson, Indiana University

Published by Palgrave Macmillan: The Historical Evolution of World-Systems Edited by Christopher Chase-Dunn and E. N. Anderson (2005) Puzzles of the Democratic Peace: Theory, Geopolitics and the Transformation of World Politics By Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson (2005) The Making of a Digital World: The Evolution of Technological Change and How It Shaped Our World By Joachim K. Rennstich (2008) Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future Edited by William R. Thompson (2009) Theory and Methodology of World Development: The Writings of Andre Gunder Frank Edited by Sing C. Chew and Pat Lauderdale (2010) Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics: Global and Regional Perspectives Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird (2011) Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd iiii 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:584:50:58 PMPM Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics

Global and Regional Perspectives

Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd iiiiii 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:584:50:58 PMPM MAJOR POWERS AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS Copyright © Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird, 2011. All rights reserved. First published in 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–10464–8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Major powers and the quest for status in international politics / edited by Thomas J. Volgy . . . [et al.]. p. cm.—(Evolutionary processes in world politics) ISBN 978–0–230–10464–8 (hardback) 1. Great powers. 2. International relations. 3. World politics—21st century. I. Volgy, Thomas J. JZ1310.M35 2011 327.1—dc22 2010049112 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: June 2011 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd iviv 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:584:50:58 PMPM CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures vii List of Contributors ix Preface xi Jack S. Levy

One Major Power Status in International Politics 1 Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird Two The United States as Global Leader, Global Power, and Status-Consistent Power? 27 William R. Thompson Three USSR/Russian Federation’s Major Power Status Inconsistencies 55 Maria Raquel Freire Four The Power and Politics of Recognition: Status in China’s Foreign Relations 77 Yong Deng Five French Power-Seeking and Overachievement 97 Bertrand Badie

Six Japan as an Underachiever: Major Power Status in - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Climate Change Politics 115 Norichika Kanie Seven Identifying Regional Powers and Their Status 133 Kirssa Cline, Patrick Rhamey, Alexis Henshaw, Alesia Sedziaka, Aakriti Tandon, and Thomas J. Volgy

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd v 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:584:50:58 PMPM vi Contents Eight Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 159 Monica Herz Nine India: A Major Power in the Making 181 Rajesh Basrur Ten Status and the Future of International Politics 203 Renato Corbetta, Thomas J. Volgy, Ryan G. Baird, and Keith A. Grant

References 225 Index 237 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd vivi 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:594:50:59 PMPM TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

1.1 COW Major Powers, 1945 to the Present 5 1.2 Major Power Measures and Status Consistency, Five- Year Intervals, 1951-2005 14 1.3 Major Power Status, COW and MPS Compared, 1951–2005 21 5.1 Factors Affecting France’s Overachievement Strategy 112 6.1 Result of the Principal Component Analysis 123 7.1 Regional Membership, Regional Powers, and Potential Regional Challengers 135 7.2 Criteria for Classifying Regional Powers and Regional Challengers 142 7.3 Military and Economic Opportunity, Regional Powers, and Challenger States, 1990– 2005 143 7.4 Willingness, Regional Powers, and Challenger States, 1990–2005 144 7.5 Regional and Global Status Attribution for Regional Powers and Challengers, 1990–2005 147 7.6 Summary of Findings for Opportunity, Willingness, and Status, 1990-2005 149 7.7 Additional Regions, Regional Powers, Challengers, Isolated States, and Border States 152 7.8 Language Families and Scripts Used to Calculate the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Linguistic Similarity Measure 154 9.1 South Asia’s Nonmilitary Power Indicators, 2000 and 2008 185 9.2 South Asia’s Military Balance, 2008 185 9.3 South Asian Neighbours, Trade with India as Percent of Total Trade, 1997 186 9.4 Military Indicators, India and Major Powers Compared, 2009 193

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd viivii 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:594:50:59 PMPM viii Tables and Figures 9.5 Selected Economic Indicators Comparing India with Major Powers, 2009 194

Figures

1.1 Gini index of the inequality of military expenditures in the international system (1816–2001) 2 1.2 Average Gini coefficients of GDP of the international system for five periods between 1821 and 2006 3 1.3 Conditions influencing community- based status attribution 8 1.4 Threshold Criteria for Inclusion in Major Power Status Club 16 1.5 US capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status measures (1950–2007) 17 1.6 Indian capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status measures (1950–2007) 18 1.7 USSR/Russian capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status measures (1950–2007) 19 2.1 US relative economic and global reach capability 41 2.2 British economic and global reach capability 42 2.3 French economic and global reach capability 43 2.4 German economic and global reach capability 43 2.5 Shares of world GDP 44 2.6 Shares of global reach capabilities 45 2.7 US and USSR/Russian global reach capability shares 46 2.8 The three largest economies 47 2.9 Number one and number two economic and military gaps 48 3.1 Russian GDP (billions of current US$ for 1990–2008) 70 6.1 Six Options for Japan’s midterm target under the Aso cabinet 128 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd viiiviii 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:594:50:59 PMPM CONTRIBUTORS

Bertrand Badie is professor of political science and international relations at Sciences Po, Paris, where he is in charge of the PhD program in international relations. He published about twenty books in International Relations and Comparative Politics, including The Imported State, Stanford University Press, 2000 and Le Diplomate et l’Intrus, Fayard, 2008. He is one of the general editors of The International Encyclopedia in Political Science (Sage). Ryan G. Baird received his PhD in political science from the University of Arizona, and is now at the Warfare Analysis Center. He has written extensively on the primacy of a state’s governance infrastructure, and its relationship with a state’s regime type and economic outcomes. Rajesh Basrur is senior fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His recent publications include South Asia’s Cold War (Routledge, 2008) and Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (Stanford University Press, 2006). Kirssa Cline, Patrick Rhamey, Alexis Henshaw, Alesia Sedziaka, and Aakriti Tandon are PhD candidates in political science at the School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona. Kirssa’s current focus is human rights violations in relation to civil conflict and authoritarian regimes. Patrick’s research interests include domestic-international linkages, regionalism, globalization, conflict, and conflict mediation. Alexis’ research interests include gender, conflict, and Latin American politics. Alesia specializes in international and comparative politics, with - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright an emphasis on Central European states. Aakriti’s primary focus is on international political economy. Renato Corbetta is an assistant professor of political science in the Department of Government at the University of Alabama-Birmingham. His research has been published in Foreign Policy Analysis, Political Research Quarterly, and Conflict Management and Peace Science. His recent work

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd ixix 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:594:50:59 PMPM x Contributors focuses on major power states in international politics, on the expansion of conflict, and on networks in international relations. Yong Deng is professor of political science at US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. He has written extensively on Asian international relations and Chinese foreign policy. His latest book, titled China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations was published by Cambridge University Press in 2008. Maria Raquel Freire holds a PhD from the University of Kent. She is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) and assistant professor of international relations at the School of Economics of the University of Coimbra. Her research interests focus on foreign policy, international security, Russia and the post-Soviet space. Keith A. Grant is an assistant professor of political science at Bucknell University. His research interests focus on issues of systemic complexity in international relations, and configuration of various international networks influencing the behavior of states. His recent work on intergovernmental organizations has appeared in the Journal of Peace Research, as well as in Mapping the New World Order (Volgy et al., 2009). Monica Herz is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. She writes on Latin American security and international organizations. Norichika Kanie is associate professor at the Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology. Currently he is the vice chair of Working Party on Global and Structural Policies (WPGSP) at OECD, and a UNEP International Environmental Governance Advisory Group member. Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors’ professor of political science at Rutgers University, and past president of the International Studies Association (2007–08) and of the Peace Science Society (2005–06). His research focuses on the causes of war and on foreign policy decision-making. William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington and managing editor of International Studies Quarterly. His latest book with Jack Levy is The Causes of War, pub- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright lished by Blackwell/Wiley in 2010. Thomas J. Volgy is professor of political science in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona and is direc- tor of the International Studies Association. He has written extensively on international politics and the strength of major powers. His latest book (co-authored) is entitled Mapping the New World Order, published by Blackwell/Wiley in 2009.

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd x 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:594:50:59 PMPM PREFACE

Many diplomatic histories are essentially histories of the diplomacy of the major powers, and many theories of international politics give primacy to the role of the major powers. These leading states have fought a disproportionate number of wars, and their behavior has largely shaped the structure and evolution of the international system. Lists of major powers are based on the conventional wisdom of historians and encoded into quantitative data bases, but the conceptual and empirical foundations of that conventional wisdom are rarely articulated. This was not too problematic for the study of most of the last five centuries of the modern system, or at least of the dominant European system. For that period, some combination of the size of state armies and of territories provided a fairly reliable indicator of major power rank, leading to broad scholarly agreement about the identity of the major powers and the periods of their ascendancy. The same cannot be said for the period after World War II. With the gradual decline of Europe as the dominant subsystem in international politics, the declining value of territory as a leading component of military power, the development of nuclear weapons introducing new dimensions of power, and the rise to superpower status of the United States and the Soviet Union, the question of who else qualified as a major power became much harder to define conceptually and measure empirically. The lack of a theoretically compelling answer to this question complicates efforts to construct theories of international politics that are transhistorically valid and to compare great power behavior before and after 1945.

Into this analytic vacuum step, Thomas Volgy and his associates who - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright develop a framework for the analysis of major powers, regional powers, and the quest for status in international politics, and then apply their framework to the leading states in the post–World War II international system. In ten well-integrated chapters, contributors engage both substantive questions about multiple status hierarchies in the global system and conceptual and methodological issues in studying such hierarchies. Each of the chapters is informed by a common theoretical framework, but at

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd xixi 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:594:50:59 PMPM xii Preface the same time each reflects the authors’ different theoretical perspectives. Those perspectives, which are informed by realism, constructivism, historical sociology, and other approaches, provide new ways to think about the old question of major power status. Chapter 1 provides the point of departure for the volume by examining conceptual and methodological issues confronting the analysis of major powers. The authors define what is a major power and measure the multiple indicators of economic and military power for the period since 1950. Building on social identity theory, they then introduce the concept of attributed status, which they define in terms of the perceptions of others. They distinguish between status-consistent and status-inconsistent major powers, referring to the extent to which a state’s attributed status is commensurate with its economic and military capabilities. The theoretical framework of chapter 1 provides a useful foundation for subsequent chapters on the major powers in the contemporary system (including the United States, the USSR and the Russian Federation, China, France, and Japan). Collectively, these rigorous and empirical studies break new ground in the analysis of the major powers and constitute a significant contribution to the literature. The second section of the volume moves from major powers to regional powers, which international relations scholars have only recently begun to analyze. Regional powers play an increasingly important role in international politics. They take the lead in constructing rules, norms, and order within regional systems, just as the leading major powers have done in the historical European system and in transregional systems. Regional powers are important for another reason as well. Some regional powers aspire to major power status in the larger international system, and the study of the broader aspirations of regional powers contributes to the study of the origins of major powers. This is a welcome addition to a literature that gives far more attention to the behavior of the major powers than to the processes through which states become major powers in the first place. The conceptual framework for the analysis of regional powers developed in chapter 7 provides the conceptual foundation for the next two chapters in this volume on Brazil and India. These chapters have enormous relevance for policy as well as for theory. The rise of these and possibly other regional powers to major power status, the reactions of the major powers, and the consequences for global politics will be critical policy - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright issues for the coming decades. The chapters in this volume have an even broader theoretical payoff. Although their focus is on the post-1945 system, they indirectly raise the question of whether the frameworks developed here might be useful for studying major and regional power status prior to 1945. This relates to an interesting question raised by William Thompson, who applies the

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd xiixii 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:594:50:59 PMPM Preface xiii volume’s theoretical framework to the United States but then suggests a possible limitation of that framework. He asks whether a single concept of major powers, even one that recognizes gradations of power and status among its members, is adequate to capture the distinct set of interests, responsibilities, and behaviors of global system leaders, or whether such states requires a separate analytic category. With respect to the post-1945 period, for example, did the United States belong in a conceptual league of its own, distinct from other major powers? (And if so, one might ask, how would we classify the Soviet Union during the Cold War period?) With respect to earlier times, did Britain belong in a league of its own, in its role as system leader, or was it just the most powerful of a larger set of major powers? These questions raise some difficult theoretical issues, as do questions about regional powers raised in the second section of this volume. But this kind of self-reflection in a set of chapters that are remarkably coherent in their overall focus only adds to the many contributions of the volume.

Jack S. Levy Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_01_prexiv.indd780230104648_01_prexiv.indd xivxiv 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:594:50:59 PMPM CHAPTER ONE Major Power Status in International Politics

Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird

International politics operates under conditions of anarchy and inequality. Anarchy is a fundamental assumption about the state of international affairs: the absence of centralized governmental structures responsible for world order and global governance.1 As a constant in international affairs, the assumption of anarchy clearly cannot explain variation in international political conditions. Nevertheless, it is a critical assumption: the manner in which international actors construct mechanisms to struggle against anarchy—or, “what states make of it” (Wendt 1992)—varies across space, time, state capabilities, and the innovative thinking of policy makers. Consequently, most approaches to international politics have outlined mechanisms and processes through which states seek to overcome problems associated with anarchy. Assuming anarchy, the inequality condition is critical to understanding the salience of a handful of states in ordering international political relations. Most states are relatively weak and the contestation over world order often falls on a small number of actors with sufficient capabilities to influence international politics.2 The most powerful states can successfully struggle against anarchy by seeking to impose order and global or regional - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright governance in the international system. Meanwhile, other powerful states may seek to contest the imposition of one set of orders and governance rules in favor of others that may benefit them more than the status quo (Drezner 2009b). Inequality among states is as old as the Melian debate: “. . . since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:284:51:28 PMPM 2 Thomas J. Volgy et al.

1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

6 1 1 6

1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 1941 194 1951 1956 1961 196 1971 1976 1901 1906 191 1916 192 1926 1931 1936 1861 1866 1871 1876 1881 1886 1891 1896 1821 1826 1831 1836 1841 1846 1851 1856

Figure 1.1 Gini index of the inequality of military expenditures in the international system (1816–2001).

between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides 1951: 331). Yet, while inequality— like anarchy—is always present, the extent of inequality varies, and perhaps now has reached its highest level in recent international politics. The growth of inequality over the last two centuries is illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, involving both military and economic3 aspects of state capabilities. The extremely high values on the Gini index of inequality underscore the importance of only a very few states that may have the capacity to bring order to international affairs. It is not surprising then that so much scholarship has focused on the salience and roles of a few very strong powers. More recently, identifying the changing capabilities and status of major powers has been central to ongoing discussions regarding polarities in post–Cold War international politics and the extent of potential challengers’ dissatisfaction with US global leadership (Walt 2005). While the concepts of major power4 and major power status are perva- sive in the study of international relations, there are extensive shortcom- ings in the literature: conceptually, major power status remains murky,5 - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright especially regarding the status aspect of the concept, while empirically, the identification of which states belong to the major power club may be mis- specified as a consequence. Meanwhile, much of the literature treats major powers as a homogenized category, failing to distinguish between major powers that are accorded full recognition (status- consistent powers) versus states that demonstrate discrepancy between their attributed status and

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 2 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:284:51:28 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 3

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

1821–31 1836–56 1861–81 1911–31 1936–56 1961–81 1886–1906 1986–2006

Figure 1.2 Average Gini coefficients of GDP of the international system for five periods between 1821 and 2006.

their ability and/or willingness to act as great powers (status- inconsistent powers). Such differences in status should matter especially for how major powers address international politics. In this chapter, we refocus on the status component of major powers, the conditions under which the status of a major power corresponds with its attributes and behavior, and the consequences of variation in types of major power status. Additionally, we offer an alternative approach for defining and measuring major power status and apply the measurement strategy to post–World War II international politics.

Major Powers and Status: A Very Brief Look at the Literature

Decades ago, Morgenthau integrated the notion of status into realism - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright by asserting that major powers shape international politics and that focusing on them allows us to understand the rules by which international relations are played. He warned that a state’s status was defined in equal measure by material capabilities and by less tangible factors (Morgenthau 1985). The issue of major powers and their status also features prominently in Waltz’s seminal work: “The theory, like the story

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 3 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:294:51:29 PMPM 4 Thomas J. Volgy et al. of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era” (Waltz 1979: 72).6 Inconsistency between status, foreign policy activity, and (declining) material capabilities is also central to power transition theory: global or regional conflict (Danilovic and Clare 2007) becomes more likely as the dominant state’s capabilities decline in the presence of a rising, revisionist challenger. The conflict occurs over—among other things—status, since the confluence of capabilities and status necessary to set the rules for a global or regional system and the threats to both status and capabilities for determining those rules underscore the conflict between the dominant state and challenger (Kugler and Lemke 2000). Gilpin’s seminal work also places both great power dominance and the “hierarchy of prestige” at the heart of international politics, and suggests that these two factors are—given anarchy in the international system—the counterparts to government and authority in domestic political systems (Gilpin 1981: 28). Distinguishing between the power of major powers and their status, he notes that “increased ambiguity in interpreting [the hierarchy of prestige] are frequently the prelude to eras of conflict and struggle” (Gilpin 1981: 31). The capabilities of major powers, their behavior, and their status have also been salient for liberal institutionalist agendas. Keohane and Nye (1977), Keohane (1984), and Nye (2004) demonstrate how various forms of power affect the solidification and preservation of the system leader’s status. To the extent that the hegemon successfully manages to shape the international system, a situation of mismatch between the hegemon’s “traditional” material capabilities and its status can be sustained over time, as its “soft power” can compensate for the inconsistency between leadership position and declining resources. Unsurprisingly, major power status has been widely employed in large-N empirical studies of international conflict and cooperation with myriad findings underscoring its salience. Major power status inconsistency is related to the frequency and intensity of conflict at the systemic level (Wallace 1971; Levy 1982). Major power status is associated with initiation and involvement in militarized disputes, wars, and crises (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Siverson and Starr 1990, 1991; Yamamoto and Bremer 1980; Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Siverson and King 1980; Huth 1998), generation of rivalries (Lemke and Reed 2001a), - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright expansion of conflicts (Corbetta 2006a), alliance memberships, and multilateralism (Siverson and King 1980; Sullivan and Siverson 1984; Siverson and Emmons 1991; Corbetta and Dixon 2004). The sheer presence of a major power status state increases the likelihood of war and dispute occur- rence in dyads (Bremer 1992), and the increasing severity of ongoing rivalries (Baird and Dixon 2010). Researchers have even elevated major power

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 4 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:294:51:29 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 5 status to using it as a significant selection criterion in sampling procedures (Maoz and Russett 1993; Huth 1998; Lemke and Reed 2001b). Most empirical analyses of interstate conflict employ the Correlates of War (COW) database to identify great power status.7 COW emphasizes that status is as much a matter of reputation as it is a matter of material resources (Singer and Small 1966: 238). It then offers a unique measurement strategy (Small and Singer 1982); experts were asked to identify great power status in the international system since 1815 (Singer 1988), based on their perceptions of which states were considered to be great powers by other states (Table 1.1). Despite the careful attention given to measuring great power status and the resulting wealth of findings, the COW classification and the literature using it suggest two problems. First, the conceptual and theoretical value of the status aspect of being a major power is virtually ignored. Status functions as a binary variable as all major powers have the same amount or type of status. Concepts such as status consistency and inconsistency, important in the sociological and the earlier international relations literature, are impossible to assess using the COW classification. All states attributed major power status are assumed to act in a similar manner. As we note below, this assertion is problematic since it ignores the likely consequences of status differentiation. Second, the combination of time frames and states produced by COW suggests either an enormous amount of stability in major power status attribution over two centuries of international politics, and/or some mis- specification of status. Only one continuing state (Italy) loses its status permanently. Other major powers lose status only to regain it immediately after world wars, or after the Cold War (Japan and Germany). China appears to be the only “new” major power to join the club over the last hundred years (and “joins” while it is very weak). It may be that such stability is a condition of international politics, but it is difficult to assess so

Table 1.1 COW Major Powers, 1945 to the Present

State COW Status Time Period

China Yes 1950 to present France Yes 1945 to present - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Germany No 1945 to 1990 Germany Yes 1991 to present Japan No 1945 to 1990 Japan Yes 1991 to present Russia/USSR Yes 1945 to present UK Yes 1945 to present United States Yes 1945 to present

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 5 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:294:51:29 PMPM 6 Thomas J. Volgy et al. from the literature; too many scholars have been unclear in defining the concept and have settled for Waltz’s (1979: 131) idea that, in essence, we know a major power when we see one. One exception is Levy (1983) who defines a major power in terms of large capabilities, foreign policy activity and interests, a broad geographical sweep, and substantial recognition by other states. The extant literature on conflict has generally moved away from earlier explanations based on status and its effects on international politics. Reliance on the COW measure has restricted the researcher’s ability to probe more nuanced linkages between different types of major power status and the behavior of states. In order to remedy this deficiency, we seek to answer the following questions: What combinations of capabilities and foreign policy activities are needed for the attribution of great power status to a state? Can we specify major power status attribution from the behavior of other states toward major powers and create a valid measure that treats status as more than just a binary variable? What may be the consequences of some states being status-consistent while others are status-inconsistent major powers?

A Framework for Status Attribution

We begin the construction of our framework by modifying Levy’s (1983) conceptual approach. A state is a major power if it (a) has unusual8 capabilities with which to pursue its interests in interstate relations; (b) uses those capabilities to pursue unusually broad and expansive foreign policies beyond its immediate neighborhood or region9; and (c) seeks to influence the course of international affairs relatively independently10 of other major powers. A state is attributed major power status if it is perceived by policy makers of other states within the international community as being unusually powerful and willing to influence the course of global affairs, and if they act toward it consistent with that perception. Thus, we create an analytical distinction between being a major power and being attributed major power status by other states, accepting the prem- ise in the literature that the relationship between status attribution and various forms of material capabilities and foreign policy behaviors is not straightforward. For example, Italy was recognized as a major power - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright between 1860 and 1943, even though its status “covered some stupendous weaknesses” (Kennedy 1987: 206). Similarly, Austria-Hungary had major power status without being one for a substantial period prior to its disintegration (Sylvan, Graff, and Pugliese 1998). While major powers should receive status consistent with their capabilities and actions, it is also plausible that some states will be attributed major

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 6 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:294:51:29 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 7 power status when no longer warranted (a halo effect); may be denied status while manifesting capacity and willingness to act as one (the lag effect); or may be overattributed status on the potential to become a major power (latency effect). Furthermore, just as policy makers of states may attribute less status to some powers and more to others, they may be inconsistent in their attribution of status to similar powers for a variety of reasons we specify below. Separating the amount and type of status being attributed to major powers from the definition of being a major power can yield a more discriminating, nuanced approach to differences between members of the major power club, and the consequences of such differentiation. Thus, we offer a third definition: status inconsistency occurs either when major power status attribution is not in sync with the capabilities and/or foreign policy pursuits of the state in question; or, if states are inconsistent in awarding it the status of a major power.

The Attribution of Status

Consistent with social identity theory (SIT),11 we propose that status attribution can be created through three different, nonmutually exclusive processes. First, attribution can occur as states in the international system recognize a group of other states as having achieved the status of being a major power. We refer to this process as community attribution, and it is the primary process on which we focus to assess status. The second process through which status may be conferred is when a state is recognized and accepted by other major powers as belonging to their club (in- group status attribution). We assume that in- group attribution will be generally reflected by the larger community of states as well. However, there may be instances when states within the group contest the credentials of a potential member, seeking to exclude it from the club or to weaken its status on ideological grounds or for security reasons. This was likely the case during the first half of the Cold War, with the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Under conditions of in- group conflict over the status of a member, community attribution may or may not reflect in-group attribution. As we note below, some aspects of in- group conflict over club membership constrain community attribution and are reflected in - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright our empirical assessments of both the USSR and Chinese status attribution during the Cold War. Third, status attribution can occur by self- reference. In fact, status is typically not attributed by others if it is not claimed by the actor in question (Sylvan, Graff, and Pugliese 1998: 8). However, status claims by states may not be in sync with the status attributed to them. States’ policy

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 7 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:294:51:29 PMPM 8 Thomas J. Volgy et al. makers (and indeed their domestic constituencies) may judge themselves to be major powers even when others may attribute less status to them, or feel that their status as a major power is slipping even when the status attributed to them remains constant.12 Russia represents a case of its policy makers agonizing over its status (and perhaps misperceiving it) across several centuries (Larson and Shevchenko 2009). Some cases of self- reference attribution are indirectly captured through our measures of status inconsistency, but are more directly addressed in the case studies that follow. Focusing primarily on community- based status attribution, we argue that status should have instrumental value—as it is part of the range of “soft power” capabilities that may be available to major powers—if not toward each other, then at least in their relationships with less powerful states. Previous research (Volgy and Bailin 2003) has indicated that the “structural power” (Strange 1989) of all major states has been in decline since the 1960s, as the international system has grown more complex and interdependent. If this is so, then additional soft power through status attribution to these states by others may be highly salient as these major powers seek to structure global order and governance. Two sets of factors should drive the attribution of major power status by states in the international system (Figure 1.3). One set involves opportunity and willingness to become a major power. States are likely to recognize in a handful of others unusual capabilities that can be utilized to influence the course of international affairs. This is a recognition of major power opportunity, and should be relatively unambiguous. Equally unambiguous should be the recognition that some states are willing to act

Community-Based Status Attribution

Opportunity Willingness • Major Power Capabilities • Major Power Behavior o Military o Conflictual o Economic o Cooperative Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Constraints • Perceived Major Power Independence • System Leaders’ Influence on Prestige Norms

Figure 1.3 Conditions influencing community- based status attribution.

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 8 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:294:51:29 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 9 as major powers, using their capabilities in a consistent and unusual manner to influence the course of international affairs. A second set of factors act as constraints on status attribution. While opportunity and willingness to behave as a major power are crucial to recognition, the evaluation of major power status is moderated by the degree to which a power assumes an independent leadership role in international politics. If a state’s policies basically mirror another major power, it does not constitute an independent force in international affairs and may not be attributed high status. Despite similarities in capabilities between the UK and France after 1945, the close British relationship to the United States provides one such example where we would expect less status attribution to the UK than to France.13 Thus, a state’s foreign policy independence from other major powers should have an impact on its community- based status attribution. How independent a state is, however, may be the subject of substantial uncertainties and can create status inconsistency (Figure 1.3). A second constraint stems from conflicts between major powers that likely reverberate across international politics. We know that major powers are not equal in power or influence, and also have substantial policy differences among them. The strongest of them may successfully influence not only the course of international affairs in general, but as well the status attribution of other states (Volgy and Mayhall 1995). Under conditions of high conflict or polarization in global politics, a very strong major power may work to create institutions and norms that pressure other states to privilege those that concur with its leadership (Ikenberry 2001). Conversely, it may work to dissuade states from privileging others that are in conflict with its leadership. Efforts by the United States to isolate China through the 1960s and diplomatic battles over German recognition (East and West) are classic Cold War examples. Likely, there are limits to its influence. Dissuasion strategies work less against very strong states than against less powerful ones. Persuasive efforts to promote the status of allied states may run afoul when allies fail to perform according to community expectations. Nevertheless, it would be premature to dismiss the potential impact that the strongest of global powers may have on community-based status attribution and on the creation of status inconsistencies.

But Why Care About Status? - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

The large- N literature has demonstrated generically that the status of major powers has an effect independent of their capabilities. But how does the attribution of status to major powers matter in international affairs? There are few clues in the extant literature: earlier work on status (e.g., Galtung 1964; East 1972; Wallace 1971, 1973; Midlarsky 1975) receded as

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 9 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:304:51:30 PMPM 10 Thomas J. Volgy et al. concerns about the material bases of conflict overwhelmed status issues. More recently, social identity theory has emerged as a competing explanation for interstate conflict (Mercer 1998; Hymans 2002; Larson and Shevchenko 2003), including the strong claim that a series of major power conflicts can best be explained by status competition (Wohlforth 2009). We suggest that status attribution matters in three fundamental ways. First, for the community of states, major power status attribution is indicative of expectations that these very strong and determined actors will exercise leadership on a variety of issues and conflicts central to international politics. The community of states attributing major power status will expect these powers to be involved in international affairs, accept such involvement as legitimate, and may even ask for assistance. This status-based receptivity to major power activity is similar to the Weberian notion of status as a soft power that confers privileges to certain states (Sylvan, Graff and Pugliese 1998: 7–8; Nayar and Paul 2003). Second, the legitimacy gained by status attribution should confer additional influence and motivation to major powers for the pursuit of policies and interests outside their immediate neighborhoods. Such additional “soft power” should be consequential, especially if the growing complexity of the international system has led to the decline in the harder, structural strength of all major powers. To the extent that other states may look at great powers for leadership and guidance in the face of crises and/or collective action problems, high status may reduce some of the material costs of efforts to structure global order and/or institutional development necessary for global governance. We suspect that in no small part have status concerns motivated both Russia and China to develop new governance mechanisms for the conduct of relations in Central Asia after the Cold War, while the status attributed to them by other states in the region made their successes far more likely. Third, to the extent that major power status is valued domestically, foreign policy makers in these states may receive added support from domestic constituencies and key political elites for being active, influential, and important major players in global politics. In fact, their status claims may be critical to holding office.14 How much this is the case may vary with domestic political regimes and elite recruitment patterns (Wohlforth and Kang 2009). Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Differentiating between Status Consistency and Status Inconsistency

If status matters, then the quantity and type of status a major power possesses should also matter. Status-consistent major powers—those states whose capabilities and foreign policy activities are matched by full status

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1010 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:304:51:30 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 11 attribution—should have the most legitimacy and influence and should behave differently from status-inconsistent major powers or from non- major powers. Status-consistent major powers have additional capacity to engage in a wide variety of pursuits, ranging from cooperative efforts (construction of regimes, institutions, and organizations) to coercive ones (sanctions, militarized interstate disputes, wars, etc.), that are far more costly for either status-inconsistent major powers or for states outside of the club. As status attribution signals receptivity to their actions, major power policy makers may undertake such tasks with the expectation that they will be successful in their endeavors, and to run lower risks of failure externally and negative consequences domestically. Status- inconsistent major powers should approach international politics in a manner different from status-consistent ones. We identify at least two types of status-inconsistent powers: underachievers and overachievers. Underachievers would be those states that appear to have the capabilities and desire to act as major powers, yet do not receive the full attribution of major power status by other states. Overachievers would be states that are given full major power status yet lack critical attributes associated with being one. If these status distinctions matter, then not only should status-inconsistent powers differ from status-consistent ones in how they approach international politics, but underachievers should differ from overachievers as well. Wolforth proposes that when “actors . . . experience status inconsistency and face incentives to resolve the uncertainty” (2009: 39), such resolve should be manifested in “competition [that] is more likely to plague relations between leading states whose portfolios of capabilities are not only close but also mismatched” (Wolhforth 2009: 40). Underachievers may seek to resolve uncertainty around their status by competing more aggressively than overachievers to create larger roles for themselves in international affairs. At the same time, lacking some of the legitimacy (and the additional capacity) that full status attribution brings, they should be far less likely to be as aggressive as states endowed with full major power status. Overachieving status-inconsistent powers constitute a more heterogeneous category than underachievers and consequently their approaches to international politics may be more diverse. Presumably, both Russia and China today are overachievers, yet Russia’s status results from dwindling - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright capabilities, while China is a rising power with more status attributed to it than it has capacity (or desire) presently to influence global affairs. As overachievers, both states have the commonality of possessing capabilities that are not as strong as their status, but one is on an upward trajectory and the other sliding downward. However, even with such evident differences, we would expect that overachievers would be less likely to risk

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1111 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:304:51:30 PMPM 12 Thomas J. Volgy et al. exposing weakness beneath their status attribution, and to engage international affairs less aggressively than underachievers. These effects of status are consistent with both SIT and prospect theory regarding risk taking. SIT suggests that perceptions of status matter for both international audiences and domestic audiences, and policy makers in major power states will keep such considerations in mind as they make foreign policy decisions. Attributed status, or lack thereof, operates as a reference point around which leaders of major powers may frame their foreign policy decisions. A mismatch between status attribution and capability portfolio will lead decision makers to evaluate the risks and costs of foreign policy actions in a nonlinear manner (Levy 1996). In terms of prospect theory (Levy 1997), underachieving major powers are likely to operate in the “domain of the losses” and will be willing to take greater risks and pay greater costs to achieve status consistency. Overachieving states—and especially those with stable or rising capabilities—are likely to operate in the “domain of the gains” and to bypass high-risk foreign policy opportunities for fear of exposing their weaknesses and losing status. Thus, as Wohlforth (2009) has noted, status- inconsistent powers should vary in how they manifest status competition; underachieving major powers are more likely to intervene in conflicts, while overachievers are more likely to seek to create new cooperative mechanisms in regional or global affairs.

Indicators of Membership in the Club

Our definition of major powers and their status requires unusual material capabilities, the willingness to pursue a wide range of foreign policy interests across a large geographical area, and recognition by other states that they are major powers. Opportunity is identified by military and economic capacity. Military capabilities are first measured by military expenditures; then we create a measure of military reach since military spending alone may not reflect the ability to reach outside of the neighborhood or the region. We operationalize military reach by dividing military expenditures by military personnel (Fordham 2006).15 Economic capability is measured by gross domestic product (GDP) to reflect the size of a state’s economy. However, since economic size registers only bulk, we qualify - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright GDP with an indicator of economic reach, measuring the value of all trade conducted by the state, divided by all global trade.16 Major powers act accordingly, extensively pursuing a broad variety of foreign policy activities outside their region. Powerful states entice and coerce, engaging in both cooperation and conflict; we measure the extent to which states evidence an unusual amount of both cooperative and

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1212 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:304:51:30 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 13 conf lict behaviors. We utilize three events data sets for this task: COPDAB (Azar 1980), WEIS (McClelland and Hoggard 1969; McClelland 1999), and IDEA (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, and Taylor 2003), scaled into cooperation and conflict dimensions, and use both dimensions to assess unusual amounts of foreign policy activity.17 To ensure that the activity is extraregional, we require that global powers demonstrate unusually high activity outside of their regions.18 Status attribution is a perceptual phenomenon, but one that ought to have behavioral consequences. The behavioral correlates of status attribution should reflect choices made by states to seek routinized contacts and formal consultation with those they perceive to be major powers and will likely influence their security and well-being. We use two such measures. One is the establishment of embassies in the capitals of major powers. The creation of diplomatic infrastructure in the home of the major power is one indication of the salience of that state to other states. We search for unusual numbers of such diplomatic contacts being created with certain states.19 Second, state visits—directed at major powers by other states—are indicative of both the desire to consult with major powers and a reflection of the importance of the state to others. We excerpt from our events data (and treat separately) unusual levels of state visits received annually by each state. We do not expect that either measure is sufficient by itself to reflect fully status attribution. However, a combination of the two may yield more satisfactory results and meet the test of face validity, while the degree of congruence among the two measures can provide one indication of inconsistent attribution of a state’s major power status.20 Critical to our measurements is the term “unusual,” which is operationalized as those values that exceed the mean for states by at least one standard deviation (SD).21 SD counts are collected annually for all states on all measures, and reported both cumulatively and in five- year incre- ments22 (see Table 1.2). The annual data illustrate change over time: when the cumulative SD scores flatten, they show diminution of unusual values; when they rise consistently, they indicate stability in a particular indicator. However, it is the consistency of SDs in five-year increments that best reflect unusual major power capabilities, behavior, and attribution of status; consistency minimizes “noise” emanating from a region or neighborhood temporarily in conflict. We assume substantial variation across capabilities, behaviors, and status - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright attribution among major powers. At the lower end, there should be some threshold where status attribution is initially conferred in conjunction with evidence of some major power capabilities and behaviors, but below which a state is no longer considered to be a major power by other states. In order to make these judgments, we need a series of markers capable of validation.

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1313 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:304:51:30 PMPM Table 1.2 Major Power Measures and Status Consistency, Five-Year Intervals, 1951-2005

State/Time Capabilities Foreign Policy1 Status2 Consistency3 Frame GDP EcReach MilSp MilReach Coop Conflict Dipcon Visits

US 1951–55 + + + + + + + + SC 1956–60 + + + + + + + + SC 1961–65 + + + + + + + + SC 1966–70 + + + + + + + + SC 1971–75 + + + + + + + + SC 1976–80 + + + + + + + + SC 1981–85 + + + + + + + + SC 1986–90 + + + + + + + + SC 1991–95 + + + + + + + + SC 1996–2000 + + + + + + + + SC 2001–2005 + + + + + + + + SC USSR/Russia 1951–55 + + + + + SIU 1956–60 + + + + + + + SIU 1961–65 + + + + + + SIU 1966–70 + + + + + + + SIU 1971–75 + + + + + + + SIU 1976–80 + + + + + + + SIU 1981–85 + + + + + + + SIO 1986–90 + + + + + + SIO 1991–95 + + +* + + SIO 1996–2000 + + + + SIO 2001–2005 + + + + SIO UK 1951–55 + + + + ns 1956–60 + + + +* + ns 1961–65 + + + + +* + SIU 1966–70 + + + + + SIU 1971–75 + + + + ns 1976–80 + + + + + SIU 1981–85 + + + + + + SIU 1986–90 + + + + + + SIU 1991–95 + + + + + + SIU 1996–2000 + + + + + + + + SC 2001–2005 + + + + + + + SIU

France - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 1951–55 + + + + SIU 1956–60 + + + + SIU 1961–65 + + + + ns 1966–70 + + + + +* + SIU 1971–75 + + + + SIO 1976–80 + + + + + SIO 1981–85 + + + + + SIO Continued

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1414 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:304:51:30 PMPM Table 1.2 Continued

State/Time Capabilities Foreign Policy1 Status2 Consistency3 Frame GDP EcReach MilSp MilReach Coop Conflict Dipcon Visits

1986–90 + + + + + SIO 1991–95 + + + + + + + + SC 1996–2000 + + + + + + + + SC 2001–2005 + + + + + + + SIU Germany 1951–55 + +* ns 1956–60 + + ns 1961–65 + + + +* ns 1966–70 + + + +* ns 1971–75 + + ns 1976–80 + + + + ns 1981–85 + + + ns 1986–90 + + + ns 1991–95 + + + + +* + ns 1996–2000 + + + + +* + + SIU 2001–2005 + + +* +* + ns China 1951–55 + +* ns 1956–60 + ns 1961–65 + + + ns 1966–70 + + + ns 1971–75 + + ns 1976–80 + + +* ns 1981–85 + ns 1986–90 + + ns 1991–95 + + + +* + + SIO 1996–2000 + + + +* + + SIO 2001–2005 + + + +* + + SIO Japan 1950–55 ns 1956–60 + ns 1961–65 + + ns 1966–70 + + ns 1971–75 + + ns 1976–80 + + ns 1981–85 + + + ns

1986–90 + + + + ns - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 1991–95 + + + + +* + + SIO 1996–2000 + + + + + + + + SC 2001–2005 + + + + + SIU

Notes: 1 Asterisk (*) indicates that the one SD threshold is met or surpassed but not for extraregional interactions. 2 Status attribution measures at two standard deviations from mean of all states. 3 S C , s t a t u s -consistent; SIO, status-inconsistent/overachiever; SIU, status-inconsistent/underachiever; ns= no major power status.

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1515 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:304:51:30 PMPM 16 Thomas J. Volgy et al. Partial Membership (Status Inconsistency) in the Major Power Club Overachievers: States exceeding the threshold on both status indicators but failing to exceed the thresholds for all capabilities and behavior measures.23 Underachievers: States exceeding the threshold on one status measure and demonstrating diverse threshold requirements on capabilities and foreign policy activity, as noted in Figure 1.4. Full membership (status consistency) in the major power club: States exceeding threshold values on all capability, foreign policy, and status measures.

Type of Member Capabilities Activity Status Attribution

Milspend MilReach GDP EconReach Cooperation Conflict Dipcon Visits

Underachievers + and/or + and/or + and/or + + + + or + + and + and + or + + or + + or + Overarchievers + or + and + or + + + + + + and/or + and/or + and/or + + or + + + Fully Status + + + + + + + + Consistent

Figure 1.4 Threshold Criteria for Inclusion in Major Power Status Club. Note: + = meeting standard deviation threshold.

An Argument for Face Validity

Our measurement procedures can be questioned on a number of grounds. We chose an additive rather than a weighted approach to combine different dimensions, and made choices (e.g., qualifying economic size with trading reach) where other options were available. Therefore, it is crucial to demonstrate face validity; we offer four cases in post-1945 international politics that should underscore the utility of these procedures. The US case represents the upper end of status attribution. Clearly the strongest of major powers with “superpower” status, its opportunity, willingness, and status attribution measures should march in tandem across the entire era. This is precisely what our measures illustrate (Figure 1.5): - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright all indicators rise consistently and in tandem over time across capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status attribution.24 India offers a case at the other end of the spectrum, falling below the threshold for major power status designation (Figure 1.6). While India may be a regional power and developing its potential as a global power, it has not yet achieved major power status (Paul 2009). This is precisely what our measures

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1616 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:304:51:30 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 17

(A) 70

0 1952 1960 1962 1964 1974 1976 1992 1994 1998 2004 1950 1954 1956 1958 1966 1968 1970 1972 1978 1980 1982 1986 1988 1990 1996 2000 2002 2006 1984 Cumulative SDs, MIlExp MilReach SDs Cumulative SDs, GDP Coop SDs Conf SDs EconReach Cum SDs

(B) 70

0 1954 1974 2000 1952 1960 1982 2002 1958 1986 1988 1990 1994 1950 1956 1970 1980 1984 1992 1996 2006 1962 1964 1966 1972 1976 1978 1998 1968 2004

Cumulative DIPCON SDs Visits SDs Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Figure 1.5 US capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status measures (1950–2007).

indicate: status attribution is below the specified threshold for both status measures; it registers as a large economy, but fails to demonstrate economic reach, and fails to register on military expenditures. There is a suggestion of major power behavior through its foreign policy measures, but only prior to 1979.25

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1717 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:314:51:31 PMPM 18 Thomas J. Volgy et al.

(A) 60

0 2004 1992 1994 1998 2000 2002 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 2006 1996 1970 Cumulative SDs, MIlExp Cumulative SDs,MilReach Cumulative SDs, GDP Cumulative SDs Cooperation Cumulative SDs Conflict

(B) 60

0 1976 1950 1966 1970 1974 1956 1960 1962 1964 1952 1954 1958 1968 1972 1980 2002 1978 1982 1996 2000 1986 1988 1994 1998 1984 1990 1992 2004 2006

Cumulative Visits SDs Cumulative Dipcon SDs - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Figure 1.6 Indian capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status measures (1950–2007).

The other two cases involve states that should be above the major power status threshold but vary in terms of changes to their major power status. Russia is one such case. Our results appear to be consistent with what we know about the USSR, US containment policies, and weakened

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1818 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:314:51:31 PMPM (A) 70

0 2006 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Cumulative SDs cooperation Conflict SDs Cumulative SDs, MIlExp Cumulative SDs, MilReach Cumulative SDs, GDP Cumulative SDs Econ Reach

(B) 60

0 1950 1960 1966 1952 1954 1958 1970 1972 1976 1980 1986 1996 2000 2004 1956 1962 1964 1968 1974 1978 1982 1984 1988 1990 1992 1994 1998 2002 2006 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Visits SDs Cumulative SDs Dipcon

Figure 1.7 USSR/Russian capabilities, foreign policy activity, and status measures (1950–2007).

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 1919 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:314:51:31 PMPM 20 Thomas J. Volgy et al. capabilities before and after 1991. A major power through most of the Cold War, Russia inherited much of that status in the new era. The data reveal as much, showing dwindling capabilities near the end of the Cold War (1986–1990), and further diminution afterward. Consistent with American efforts at “containment,” the USSR shows status inconsistency: as an underachiever, failing to cross the threshold on formal diplomatic contacts until midway through the Cold War, while attaining high status on state visits as early as 1951. Before it disintegrates into the Russian Federation, the measures already show it as an overachieving, status inconsistent power due to the diminution of its military and economic reach (Figure 1.7). The last case compares the UK and France on status attribution. The two states are highly similar on capabilities and foreign policy activity. We expect, however, that their status attribution would differ: one constraint on attribution is whether or not a state is acting to influence international affairs relatively independently of other major powers. We would expect the UK to be hampered by its close relationship with the United States, while France would be attributed more status consistent with a more independent course from the United States.26 These expectations are supported by our findings: the appendix indicates highly similar profiles on capabilities and foreign policy activity for the UK and France. Yet status attribution for these two states is significantly different. France is attributed substantially more status and consistently so across Cold War and post–Cold War periods, even “overachieving” status while the UK does not.

Major Powers and Their Status in the Post–World War II Era We first compare our Major Power Status (MPS) database to COW status designations,27 and note two major differences (Table 1.3). First, COW shows a club membership of five major powers (China, France, USSR, UK, and the United States) during the Cold War, while MPS ranges from three to four major powers, and entry and exit of major powers in the club for the MPS measure do not exhibit the invariability found in COW. Given how few major powers exist in any single time period, these differences are not insignificant (20 to 40 percent lower than for COW). Second, the MPS markers distinguish between different types of major - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright power status. As major powers are not identical in capabilities or willingness to act, neither are they in the status attributed to them by the community of states (Tables 1.2 and 1.3). Only the United States demonstrates status consistency across the entire time frame. Other major powers typically experience substantial periods of status inconsistency as underachievers or overachievers.

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 2020 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:314:51:31 PMPM Table 1.3 Major Power Status, COW and MPS Compared, 1951–2005

COW MPS # of COW # of MPS Status Consistency/MPS Powers Powers 1951–1955 US US 5 3 33% USSR/Russia USSR/Russia (SIU) China UK France France (SIU) 1956–1960 US US 5 3 33% USSR/Russia USSR/Russia (SIU) China UK France France (SIU) 1961–1965 US US 5 3 33% USSR/Russia USSR/Russia (SIU) China UK UK (SIU) France 1966–1970 US US 5 4 25% USSR/Russia USSR/Russia (SIU) China UK UK (SIU) France France (SIU) 1971–1975 US US 5 3 33% USSR/Russia USSR/Russia (SIU) China UK France France (SIO) 1976–1980 US US 5 4 25% USSR/Russia USSR/Russia (SIU) China UK UK (SIU) France France (SIO) 1981–1985 US US 5 4 25% USSR/Russia USSR/Russia(SIO) CHINA UK UK (SIU) France France (SIO) 1986–1990 US US 5 4 25% Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright USSR/Russia USSR/Russia (SIO) CHINA UK UK (SIU) France France (SIO) 1991–1995 US US 7 6 33% Russia Russia (SIO) China China (SIO) UK UK (SIU)

Continued

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 2121 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:324:51:32 PMPM 22 Thomas J. Volgy et al. Table 1.3 Continued

COW MPS # of COW # of MPS Status Consistency/MPS Powers Powers France France Japan Japan (SIO) Germany 1996–2000 US US 7 7 57% Russia Russia (SIO) China China (SIO) UK UK France France Japan Japan Germany Germany (SIU) 2001-2005 na US 617% Russia (SIO) China (SIO) UK (SIU) France (SIU) Japan (SIU)

Note: Bold, status consistent major power; SIO, status- inconsistent overarchiever; SIU, status-inconsistent underachiever.

The transition from an underachiever to an overachiever is well illustrated by the case of Russia/USSR. Through the first half of the Cold War, the Soviet Union received substantial state visits but unaccompanied by high levels of diplomatic recognition. Through the entire period, it demonstrated high willingness to engage outside its region on both conflict and cooperative behaviors, and its capacity to do so is illustrated on military measures, albeit not on economic reach. Ironically, it began to receive full status attribution after 1980, as its capabilities weakened, while its conflict behavior failed to reach unusual levels after 1990. Starting in 1981, it flipped from an underachiever to an overachiever major power. The Chinese case is one of a gradually emerging, status-overachieving

power. Although COW classifies China as having major power status - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright from 1950 onward, this appears to be contrary to actual Chinese capabilities and intentions.28 Salient threshold values are not crossed sufficiently to attribute major power status (only diplomatic recognition begins to show for 1986–1990) to China until after the end of the Cold War. Once the Cold War ends, both status measures, along with economic size and reach, cross their thresholds. Neither military measure reaches

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 2222 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:324:51:32 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 23 significance, however, and while cooperative and conflictual behaviors are exhibited after 1990, much of the conflict is regional rather than global. The picture emerging for China after 1990 is one of high status attribution and growing capabilities, but not the levels of opportunity or willingness (but perhaps cautiousness29) to match the levels of status attributed to it. Japan demonstrates a consistent pattern through the Cold War, and substantial fluctuation afterward. Prior to 1990, it shows economic size and reach, but neither military capability nor willingness to engage globally, and receives no major power status.30 Immediately before the Cold War’s end, its military reach exceeds the major power threshold (as does military spending between 1996 and 2000), and after 1990 demonstrates the willingness to engage in unusual levels of cooperative behaviors globally, although its conflictual activities fluctuate from one period to the next. It is attributed high status on both measures through the 1990s, but state visits disappear below the threshold after 2000. Thus, it moves from having no major power status during the Cold War to overachieving status (1991–1995), status consistency (1996–2000), and then to underachiever status (2001–2005). Germany demonstrates substantial opportunity for great power status, yet fails to show willingness to engage globally. As a consequence, it does not receive substantial status attribution, and breaks the major power status threshold during only one time frame (1996–2000), when its status is classified as an underachieving major power. Clearly, its economic size and reach are substantial. Its military reach demonstrates substantial strength as well, although falling below the threshold in our final time frame. However, much of its unusual engagement on conflict and cooperative activities is primarily regional rather than global, reflecting its deep integration into the European Union (EU). The British and French cases invite comparison once again. Both states evidence similar economic size and reach; there is rough similarity as well on their willingness measures. They differ substantially with respect to status attribution, paralleling our argument that substantial status attribution requires carving out a relatively independent path in global affairs. Both states achieve diplomatic attribution for all time frames being considered. Yet, the UK manages unusually high scores on state visits for only one time frame (1996–2000), while France does in - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the majority of the cases. With one exception, through the entire time period, the UK receives either underachiever status or insufficient status to rate it as a major power. France, however, ranges from an underachiever to an overachiever, and for the decade of the 1990s achieves full status consistency.

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 2323 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:324:51:32 PMPM 24 Thomas J. Volgy et al. The Chapters that Follow

Our efforts scratch only the surface of what it means to have, to seek, or to try to preserve great power status, or the consequences of variation in status attribution among major powers. These are the tasks explored in the chapters that follow. The chapters focusing on major powers in post–World War II international politics present an eclectic collection of theoretical and methodological orientations to the task. Chapter 2 by William Thompson—based on long cycle theory—uses the case of the global leader (the United States) to challenge the framework of this chapter by offering an alternative meaning for both status inconsistency and the concept of being a global power. In chapter 3, Maria Raquel Freire, using a historically based constructivist perspective, explores the transition by the USSR/Russia from underachiever to overachiever. In chapter 4, Yong Deng uses a blend of social constructivism and realism to assess China’s status aspirations. In chapter 5, Bertrand Badie, using perspectives derived primarily from historical sociology develops a strong portrait of French policy makers’ dedication to holding onto major power status despite limited economic and military capabilities. In chapter 6, Norichika Kanie discusses Japanese major power status seeking by differentiating between foreign policy issue areas as the principal focus of analysis. The third section looks at the club of regional powers. Chapter 7 identifies regional powers, their potential challengers, and the likelihood of their emergence from the regional to the global power club of states. Chapter 8 by Monica Herz (using a “subjectivist perspective within a constructivist framework”) on Brazil and chapter 9 by Rajesh Basrur (using a modified realist framework) on India focus particularly on these critical cases, examining these regional powers’ willingness to order regional relations, and the likely conditions that would allow and motivate them to seek the status attributed with membership in the global power club. Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion of conditions under which the club of global powers is likely to expand, and the extent to which status competition within and between both clubs are likely to face the future of the international politics.

Notes Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

1. Lake (2009) argues for hierarchy instead of anarchy. However, in the context of our narrow definition, Lake’s “hierarchy” is a strategic choice by very strong states in the struggle to overcome anarchy. For an alternative perspective on the anarchy assumption, see chapter 2. 2. Clearly there are not only inequalities between major powers and other states, but inequalities within the major power club as well. Such inequalities are at the heart of the analysis in chapter 2, leading the author to question the arguments in this chapter, as they apply to the strongest of the major powers. 3. For historical series on GDP data, see http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison (June, 2010).

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 2424 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:334:51:33 PMPM Major Power Status in International Politics 25 4. We use the terms “major powers” and “great powers” interchangeably, but separately from the concept of “regional” powers. 5. Nor are we the first to so characterize the literature (e.g., Mansfield 1994; Morton and Starr 2001). 6. Waltz appears to be noncommittal about how policies and reputations help to determine status (Waltz 1986). 7. Two excellent alternatives, albeit seldom utilized, are found in Levy (1983) and Morton and Starr (2001). 8. “Unusual” connotes capabilities, behaviors, and status attribution for major powers that are very different from those of other states in terms of quantitative rather than qualitative differences, although some of the measures (economic and military reach) suggest qualitative differences as well. 9. Chapter 2 challenges whether or not several of these powers are truly global. We distinguish between regional versus global powers, with the latter made up of states that have substantial interregional reach, interest, and willingness to structure part or all of international rules and norms. We recognize that some members of the latter group have limited reach compared to the lead global state. 10. While independence is part of Levy’s definition, we use this policy attribute as a constraint on status attribution, and assume that it is indirectly tapped when measuring inconsistency in status attribution (see our validation scheme below). 11. For examples see Mercer (1998), Hymans (2002), Larson and Shevchenko (2003, 2009), and discussing recent status literature, Wohlforth and Kang (2009). 12. Note a similar claim for France in chapter 5. 13. For examples and strategic choices by French policy makers to create distance from US global leadership, see chapter 5. 14. Labour’s claim to keeping the UK’s major power status may have increased its support at the polls before recent national elections. See “Hero, Villain or Victim of the Global Age?” The Economist, February 27, 2010: 63. For the importance of major power status considerations in the domestic politics of India, see Nayar and Paul (2003). See also chapter 5 on France. 15. The logic here is that as more money is spent on the military per capita, the more likely it is to be spent on sophisticated technology allowing for greater military reach. 16. Military data are from COW, updated using SIPRI and The Military Balance; GDP figures are from Penn World Tables (PWT), updated using World Development Indicators (WDI); trade data are from Barbieri et al. (2008). The initial strategy was to rely on widely used data sources that we would update. COW capabilities are not available after 2001 and we presumed that updating measures such as military expenditures would not be onerous, though COW relies on the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) while updates are available only through SIPRI after 2001. While mixing sources is dangerous, searching for very unusual levels of capability, we felt that using ratios of change to overlap sources would minimize the dangers of misspecifying outliers while updating. Yet, we encountered two major issues. First the differences across ACDA and SIPRI sources are substantial. We chose a conservative strategy of staying with COW and switched over to SIPRI only after the end of the Cold War to estimate changes in Chinese and Russian military spending, using COW as a baseline. This strategy privileges Russia and China toward the major power category. Second, updating GDP data, we compared PWT with WDI. Differences for Russia and China (and for India) are substantial across the two sources. Again, we chose a conservative strategy, using first PWT and adjusting ratios of change from WDI’s estimate of GDP - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright growth rates after PWT ceases to report. Had we used SIPRI and WDI, China would not cross the major power threshold on GDP until 2007 and Russia would fall below it prior to the Gorbachev period; neither would cross the major power threshold on military spending between 1985 and 2007. Japanese and Chinese military expenditure data (COW) do not match the original ACDA data for part of the series, these have been corrected. 17. COPDAB and IDEA use a large variety of sources; WEIS’s sources are substantially limited. We use WEIS to fill gaps between 1978 and 1990 when possible. To do so we estimate the average interactions for a five year period prior to 1979 using WEIS, and estimate whether

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 2525 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:334:51:33 PMPM 26 Thomas J. Volgy et al. or not the mean for the next five year period is significantly different from the previous period. If it is, then we treat that time frame as having missing data. If similar, we attribute continuity in the data, as determined through COPDAB. We repeat this same procedure for the last five- year period that overlaps with the start of the IDEA data base. We are grateful to Professor Rodney G. Tomlinson (2003) for updating and making WEIS available. 18. For European powers the region is Europe; for USSR/Russia, the region is former Soviet Union and East Europe; for the US the region is Latin America, and for China and Japan the region is Asia, as per the COW classification of regions. 19. For factors associated with diplomatic representation, see Neumayer (2008). Diplomatic contacts are drawn from Bayer (2006); annual changes are estimated from Volgy and Mayhall (1995). 20. There are other approaches to status attribution, but seem flawed. Veto power membership in the UN Security Council could ref lect historical in-group status attribution but not current realities. G7(8) membership includes states without major power status (Italy, Canada). Membership in the nuclear weapons club denies Japan and Germany status, overstating status for Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (and previously the Republic of South Africa). 21. In order to minimize noise in the indicators, we use two standard deviations (SDs) for the status attribution measures. 22. In order to measure consistency, we require all indicators to show SD presence for at least 4 out of 5 years in each five-year period. For a similar approach to addressing short- term fluctuations, see Morton and Starr (2001). 23. Foreign policy activity requires as well that states meeting the threshold on conf lict and/or cooperation also exceed by one SD activity outside of their region. Those that fail to do so are noted with an asterisk (*) in the Appendix. 24. For an alternative conceptualization of global leadership status inconsistency, see chapter 2. 25. The early pattern is associated with Indian- Pakistani and Indian- Chinese rivalries, and contained primarily in the region. 26. We constructed foreign policy behavior portfolios for all states for the entire time frame in order to demonstrate foreign policy similarity between major powers. Of the major powers, the UK/US behavioral similarity is by far the most striking, and substantially closer than for the France/US dyad (see Grant, Baird, Corbetta, and Volgy 2010). 27. Comparison with COW provides an additional validity test. If our measures are valid, then they should capture the more subtle variations in status attribution that are well known in historical accounts, but fail to appear in the COW measure. COW estimates can also be evaluated by treating major power status as the dependent variable, and searching for patterns of capabilities and foreign policy behaviors to account for COW’s classification. That attempt, using survival analysis, and resulting in extensive, contradictory findings (see Corbetta 2006b) led to the present effort. 28. Deng (2008) indicates that Chinese foreign policy makers did not begin to seek major power status until the mid- 1980s. 29. Note Chinese cautiousness versus Russian questioning of both global security and economic regimes (“Russia and Western Clubs: No Thanks Geneva,” The Economist, June 20, 2009:55). 30. Although it finally achieves unusual levels of diplomatic recognition, starting in 1980. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_02_ch01.indd780230104648_02_ch01.indd 2626 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:51:334:51:33 PMPM CHAPTER TWO The United States as Global Leader, Global Power, and Status-Consistent Power?1

William R. Thompson

Editors’ note: Chapter 1 argued for a status- based club of major global powers, a club in which the United States is the only member to demonstrate status consistency across the entire post–World War II period. This chapter contests both arguments, making the alternative case that (a) there is a separation between the club of major powers and another club of global powers (in which the United States is now the sole member as global leader with a global reach); (b) there may be several types of status inconsistency; (c) the United States appears to exhibit far more status inconsistency than indicated in chapter 1; and (d) in the case of the United States, its global leadership has more causal implication for its conflict and cooperation activities than its status.

More than a generation ago, status inconsistency theory enjoyed moderate prominence in the annals of empirical international relations (IR). It possessed some face validity, an evident theoretical structure, and could be operationalized. Yet, it died out for several decades after a number of studies were published in the 1960s and early 1970s. Why IR research

programs die is an interesting question in its own right but the present - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright chapter is concerned with its resuscitation in the form of this volume’s project on major power status inconsistency. My assignment is to discuss the new theory’s application to the United States, with the understanding that I regard the United States as a global system leader, which makes it a rather special major power. Only one major power can occupy this role at any given point in time. The editors’ data analysis shows that the United States has been a status- consistent power from their perspective since

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 2727 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:494:50:49 PMPM 28 William R. Thompson 1945. I am less confident of that conclusion because global system leaders have persistent problems with more than one type of status inconsistency. One in particular is that their lead in military capabilities exceeds and tends to outlast their economic lead. They thus appear to be quite powerful, both to themselves and to others, when it comes to power projection capacity but much less so when it comes to financing the maintenance of the global structure that they build to frame the type of global order they most prefer. Thus, their military and economic capabilities tend to be increasingly dissynchronized over time. The outcome is a fairly special kind of status inconsistency that ultimately causes problems for the system leader. To show why I arrive at different conclusions, some attention must also be given to the nature of the editors’ theoretical and empirical undertak- ing. I am unconvinced of US status consistency in part because I disagree with some of the basic premises of the editors’ approach to tackling status inconsistency. I do not dispute their finding that the United States scores consistently high on a variety of indicators. The question is how best to frame and interpret the indicators that are or are not selected. Different assumptions and interpretations, unsurprisingly, lead to different analytical conclusions. I begin by describing very briefly the findings in chapter 1 as they pertain to the United States. This is followed by some preliminary discussion of assumptions about anarchy and hierarchy and their implications for variable systemic order. I then propose an alternative version of their status consistency theory that emphasizes rise- and- decline trajectories in preference to uniform behavior by “under” and “over” achievers. The discussion then turns to the notion of status inconsistency in the context of systemic leadership, which takes us back to the application of status consistency to the United States.

Findings on the United States as a Status- Consistent Major Power

Volgy et al. (chapter 1) argue that while anarchy and inequality set the parameters for competition among major powers in world politics, international relations scholars do not fully appreciate how capabilities and sta- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tus attribution mix to drive state behavior. Some states have capabilities and lack status. Some states have status but lack capabilities. A few states, labeled status-consistent, have both capabilities and status. It is these states that are predicted to “be the ones most likely to intervene in interstate conflicts, but also more likely to create structural cooperative arrangements, and to do so more successfully than either status inconsistent major

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 2828 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:494:50:49 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 29 powers or non-major powers.” In contrast, major powers with more capability than status will also have some propensity to intervene in conflicts. Major powers with more status than capability will be more likely to construct cooperative organizations. Examining indicators on economic capability, military capability, foreign policy activity, and status attribution, Volgy et al. find that the United States is a status-consistent state in the post-1945 era. They also note that it is at the “upper end of status attribution,” the strongest of the major powers, and even a superpower. I will suggest that these characterizations are accurate and noncoincidental, but that they have various implications for their project other than the face validation that they assigned to the US empirical outcome.

Anarchy, Hierarchy, and Order

Anarchy is unlikely to be a critical assumption about the state of international affairs if it is a constant.2 What can constants tell us about varying behavior? The usual purpose of anarchy is to differentiate domestic from international politics. Domestic politics is assumed to be characterized by a centralized political entity that imposes order. International politics lacks a centralized governmental entity. Therefore, there is no political entity to impose order and states must resort to self-help in self-defense and/or to advance their interests. Yet in a world of nearly 200 states, the notion that all domestic politics is characterized by centralized political order is rather difficult to defend. Some states have it while others do not.3 Moreover, the utility of the anarchical self-help dictum is optimized by ignoring inequality. Traditional realists, for instance, distinguished between great powers and nongreat powers but then tended to treat all great powers as roughly equivalent in capability and standing. If international politics is a great power game and all great powers are roughly equal, the absence of order is a constant that perhaps can be explained by another constant (anarchy). If international politics is not exclusively a great power game, or if all great powers are not roughly equal, and/or if order is variable, the explanatory limitations of the anarchy constant become more clear. Imagine, for example, a regional subsystem in which one state is much - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright more powerful than all of the rest of the states in the subsystem. Think of the United States in North America, South Africa in southern Africa, or India in South Asia. High structural inequality in such subsystems does not guarantee an absence of conflict but it does create some potential for regional hegemony in which one state imposes an order on the region that generates some level of governance. The quality of the governance

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 2929 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:494:50:49 PMPM 30 William R. Thompson may not be constant, of high quality or even all that overt, but something should be expected. These subsystems may still be anarchical (e.g., no central government), but the anarchy characteristic explains little about order or behavior. What if great powers are not roughly equal in capability and inf luence? This “what if” is not really very interesting because at no time in modern history have the great powers been roughly equal in capability and influence. Italy was always the “least of the great powers.” Between 1848 (focusing on Piedmont initially) through Mussolini to 1943, Italian decision makers were extremely reluctant to do anything in Europe without the support of another, more powerful great power (initially France, later Prussia and Germany). Prussia began as a land of scattered domains that experienced a number of military setbacks and, on occasion, Polish- like partitions that do not jibe with its reputation as a powerful state in the annals of European international relations. It eventually became a powerful state once it shed its Prussian identity after 1871. Spain in the sixteenth century was the wealthiest and most powerful state in Europe. By the end of the seventeenth century, it was one of the weakest major powers in Europe. England/Britain was at various points in time the leading European sea power, but it could accomplish little in the European region by coercion if it did not have a major land power on its side. Inequality within the major power elite is not a constant, but it is a more useful structural characteristic and one with more explanatory power than anarchy alone. Order in international relations is variable. Some early modern European philosophers once thought that the natural order of things is one of dog-eat- dog, constant struggle. Perhaps it is, but conflict is not constant and never has been. The history of international politics, especially in the last 500 years, is characterized by bouts of intensive warfare in which all major powers participate. Yet most of the last 500 years did not experience these intensive wars. There are also periods of respectable length with little or no great power conflict. We continue to disagree about how to explain the intensive–extensive wars and “long peaces.” Yet it should be clear that constant anarchy cannot explain these nonconstant propensities. Whether or not we equate long peaces with order, there are periods with more apparent order and there are periods with little apparent order. Order is variable in international politics. Inequality among the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright major powers probably has something to do with that. One argument that has been broached before by more than one research program is that high inequality in the great power pecking order is more likely to generate systemic order than low inequality. To the extent that this generalization is supported, it is inequality that explains variable amounts of order, not anarchy.4

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3030 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:494:50:49 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 31 Status Consistency and Systemic Leadership

Chapter 1 singles out three types of status attribution: “community,” “in- group,” and “self” attribution. We may assume then that status discrepancy can encompass multiple problems—discrepancies between others’ attribution and capability, others’ attribution and willingness, and capability and willingness or self- attribution. There is another type of status discrepancy that is especially characteristic of system leaders. It may apply to nonsystem leaders as well, but there should be little question that it is a perennial problem with system leaders. The problem, basically, is that system leaders start with relatively more military capabilities of global reach and economic wealth than others possess. They do not lose their wealth quickly, but their relative economic position decays more quickly than does their relative military position. This is confusing for decision- makers both within and outside the system leader. Militarily, the system leader remains far ahead of everyone else. Economically, it struggles to pay for its expensive military capability, extensive foreign policy activities, and domestic policies. As the world moves away in time from the system leader’s peak position shortly after the last global war, the system leader remains quite powerful but more in military terms than in economic terms, and not as relatively powerful overall. With no replacement in sight, it is still widely expected, as the strongest state in the system, to provide some informal governance but finds it increasingly difficult to accomplish as much as it once could. Since it still is the strongest state in the system, expectations at home and elsewhere can easily exaggerate what it is still capable of accomplishing. This problem can be interpreted as a special form of status attribution, but it does not fit comfortably within a framework oriented toward differentiating generically between states with more (less) capability than status. It may be a special case of possessing more status than one type of capability, with the caveat that system leader status is retained with corresponding military capabilities but without corresponding economic capabilities. System leaders are usually slow to develop their capability (and willingness) to be system leaders. The core of the capability or foundation for leadership is based on economic innovation and being much better at it than others. This aptitude does not always translate immediately into Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright international politics. It often leads first to a radical transformation of the domestic economy and an initially inward focus that may or may not be linked quickly to economic exports of the innovated products. Pressure groups in support of the implications of developing the system’s lead economy emerge equally slowly. Both the economic innovations and related pressure groups must contend with vested interests associated with older ways of doing things.

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3131 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:494:50:49 PMPM 32 William R. Thompson Then a systemic crisis vaults their country into a politico-military lead. The vaulting process is quite literal. A system leader’s military foundation for acting tends to be built mainly during the global war that precedes the ascendancy of a new system leader. There is some likelihood but no guarantee that the leadership opportunity will be seized if only to better pursue the state’s own strategic interests. Whether others will follow the lead depends in part on the size of the capability gap between the leader and prospective followers, in part on the degree of exhaustion experienced in the systemic crisis by potential followers, and in part on the attractive- ness of the direction in which the system leader wishes to go. System leaders have been increasingly likely to receive some period of opportunity to exercise leadership at the end of the systemic crisis. In more recent iterations, they establish various institutions and commitments early on. The crux of the status discrepancy problem for system leaders is that the early commitments are made at a time when the operational context is optimal. The commitments are sticky and new commitments are taken on even though the operational context becomes less optimal. Most important, the system leader’s absolute capabilities may well wax but its relative capabilities are likely to erode. In addition, the edge in military force projection over long distances is likely to exceed considerably its still impressive economic lead. As its relative capabilities erode, its ability to perform effectively as a system leader declines. Historically, there is a strong tendency for system leader decision makers to be quite slow in adjusting to a world in which their relative capability has been diminished, or even to acknowledge that their relative position is not what it once was. Some of this lag is due to the fact that the economic lead erodes more quickly than the military lead. Thus, self- attribution of systemic leadership tends to persist longer than the capability foundation on which it is based or the consequent attribution of others.5 The problem is also complicated further by the slow rate of decay in the economic foundation and the even slower rate of decay in the military foundation. The scope of global system leadership is always constrained and less than worldwide. Not only is the system divided into a variety of regional subsystems—each with their own rules and pecking orders—but the nature of the system tends to generate at least two different types of states from an international relations perspective. There are states that follow traditional paths emphasizing military capability on land and political - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright expansion to neighboring territories. Such regimes may be absolutist, revolutionary, democratic, or totalitarian in their domestic constitution, but they focus on improving their position most of all in their immediate neighborhood and home region. Call them type I states. A less common type of state (type II states) pursues an industrial/commercial/trading path, evading excessive territorial responsibilities close to home and specializing

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3232 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:494:50:49 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 33 in expanding control of markets on a global basis.6 System leaders are most comfortable with this latter type of strategy. As the leader of the trading states, system leaders focus first and foremost on establishing an order for the global economy encompassing interregional commercial transactions. It does not police the world. It does make some effort to police trade routes, especially critical maritime routes. System leaders also seek to protect the world economy from serious assaults and disruptions. One need not look for altruism in these roles. System leaders have the most to gain from a stable global political-economy and they have the most to lose from a lack of stability. As a consequence, they attempt, increasingly so, to establish rules and institutions at the end of the systemic crisis that vaulted them into power. The opportunity window to establish the foundation of global political- economic order is open widest when other states are too exhausted to resist. The window begins to close as other important actors improve their ability to resist. On occasion, though, even exhausted states can resist quite early on in the postglobal crisis era.7 Systemic leadership is thus global in scope, not worldwide. “Global” refers to long- distance transactions and the activities that support them. “World” refers to planetary scope. Some parts of the planet will lie outside the global reach of the system leader, either due to the inability of the system leader to penetrate these areas and/or because of the great resistance to penetration. Over the past 500 years, the territory beyond the pale of global systemic leadership has gradually diminished. The system leader’s tendency to have its military capabilities exceed its economic capabilities, which experience relative decline over time, appears to fit well within the broad parameters established by the editors: “status inconsistency occurs either when major power status attribution is not in sync with the capabilities and/or foreign policy pursuits of the state in question; or if states are inconsistent in awarding status to a major power” (chapter 1). System leaders’ capabilities, at some risk of exaggeration, are almost always out of sync with their behavioral expectations— both their own and those of others.8

An Alternative Interpretation of Status Consistency and Contests among Major Powers Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright One of the arguments that the editors make is that status-consistent actors, in contrast to status-inconsistent powers, are more likely to intervene in conflicts and to create cooperative structures. The logic for these predictions is not entirely straightforward. The argument appears to take the following form: status-consistent actors are powerful elite states. They recognize their relative power and accept some responsibility to act when

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3333 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:494:50:49 PMPM 34 William R. Thompson problems emerge. Others recognize their relative power, expect them to act when international problems emerge, and are likely to be receptive to their undertakings. Thus, status- consistent powers are the most likely states to act in world politics. Or, alternatively, more powerful states are more active than less powerful states. This part of the argument is plausible and straightforward up to a point. One irony, however, is that the argument seems to apply best to global system leaders—as opposed to all major powers. Major powers are definitely elite states but questions of legitimacy and other states’ expectations about who should act in given issue areas are usually applied to system leader behavior because they have capabilities that exceed and are unlike other states. They possess the system’s lead economy and, often, are the system’s leading financial power and thus can be expected to be excep- tionally attuned to defending the world economy when it is under attack. The global system leader also possesses the system’s leading edge in global reach capabilities. It has the best chance of actually being able to apply coercion to distant locales. There are always limitations on long-distance applications of force but other states tend to be much more limited than the incumbent global system leader. So, if anyone is to act, it is most likely to involve the system leader in some form, even if it is only to provide logistics and transportation resources. There is an authority that applies to the state with the most capabilities in the global system. It is not equally applicable to all issue areas. It tends to be restricted to interregional transactions but also emerges in global system crises and postwar settlements. The global system leader assumes the lead of one side in the crisis. It may not provide all or even most of the ground troops, but it does produce more than its share of the financing, sea/air power, and strategic decision- making during the crisis. After the crisis or global war is over, it leads the victorious side in deciding what will change and what will remain the same in the postwar era. These decisions range from territorial allocations to the creation of new institutions (as in the cases of the League of Nations and United Nations). The winning side, led by the global system leader, is expected to make these decisions, has some considerable authority to do so, and the decisions carry some legitimacy— even if not everyone accords them equal legitimacy for all time.9 System leaders are likely to be active interveners in conflicts and creators of cooperative structures. A bit murkier is the major power connec- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tion to the frequency of activity and conflict intervention or the creation of cooperative structures. Conflict intervention and cooperative institution building are activities. If the generalization is that high levels of power lead to high levels of activity, then it may follow that any types of activity will also stem from high levels of power. But the creation of cooperative structures tends to have a certain periodicity. The most prominent

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3434 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:494:50:49 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 35 organizations are most likely to be created in the aftermath of major wars to deal with postwar problems. That is not the only time that they might emerge, it has simply been the historical probability because it is more difficult to obtain sufficient agreement to cooperate as one moves away from the systemic crisis period. Status-consistent major powers, other things being equal, are likely to be more powerful than status-inconsistent major powers. In that sense, the more powerful major powers may be more active and interventionary than the less powerful ones. Yet bringing in different types of status inconsistency compounds the reader’s uneasiness. Two types of status inconsistency are singled out. “Underachievers” have the capability to act but lack full attribution as major powers. “Overachievers” possess attribution as major powers but lack some of the capabilities that support activity. We are told that underachievers may be more aggressive as they attempt to improve their standing. But since they lack some of the legitimacy accorded to status-consistent major powers, they may be less likely to be aggressive. Risk- averse overachievers are less likely to be as aggressive as underachievers but, for reasons not explicated, more likely to create cooperative arrangements. Presumably, the cooperative arrangements are safer than acting aggressively and will thus be more appealing to overachievers. But it seems that for hypothesis derivation purposes, risk adversity may be more critical than overachieving. The editors recognize that overachievers reflect a more heterogeneous category than underachievers, especially depending on the trajectory of the actor. Even so, they still think the categorical context of overachieving is likely to trump the nature of the rising or falling trajectory. A different theory construction strategy might involve not relying solely on status inconsistency to drive behavior. Very much implicit to these discussions is the tendency for great powers to be rising, maintaining, or declining.10 The argument is not that they go through a full relative power cycle. Serious defeats, for instance, can interrupt the relative power cycle and abruptly demote once relatively powerful actors. But, rather than inject risk acceptance/adversity as a freestanding, additional variable, one might anticipate that risk adversity is likely to be a contextualized variable. Rising powers may be more risk-acceptant, given the attractions of perceived gain and the hubris associated with expanding power, than declining powers that are more likely to be risk-averse, given the perceived costs of further losses - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and the demoralization associated with falling status. Underachievers, in this context, might then be most likely to be rising powers while overachievers would tend to be declining powers. But a corollary problem here is that the terms are awkward. Underachievers are usually thought to be actors who perform at a level less than their capabilities would suggest. Overachievers are actors who perform at a level

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3535 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:504:50:50 PMPM 36 William R. Thompson greater than their capabilities would suggest. Employing these terms in a status inconsistency exercise might work better if we flipped their meaning. Rising powers with capability but less attribution, assuming that they are apt to be aggressive, may be more likely to be overachievers. Declining powers with attribution but capability deficiencies are more likely to be underachievers.11 Which categories of actors are most likely to intervene in conflicts? Offhand, it is not quite clear whether we should differentiate between engaging in conflict as opposed to joining ongoing conflicts at this stage. However one feels about this distinction, we probably need another variable to answer the more general question. Consistent powers (high capabilities and full status attribution) would seem to be more likely to act or intervene in situations that they perceive as opportunities to defend the status quo from which they benefit. Rising powers (improving capabilities [but not necessarily evenly] and less than full status attribution) would be most likely to act or intervene in situations that they perceive as opportunities to overthrow the status quo that is likely to be seen as thwarting their rise to full elite status. Declining powers have the motivation to try to defend a decaying order but lack the capability they once had. All things being considered, they are more likely to be more risk- averse than either rising powers or consistent powers and, therefore, less likely to act or intervene than the other two categories of actors. In all three cases, the situation is apt to be complicated further by calculations of external support or opposition to acting. All three types of powers are more likely to act if they perceive that their intervention will receive more support than opposition. Consistent powers may need to worry least about supportive capability assistance from allies but may be more interested in legitimation. Rising powers have to estimate whether their actions are premature. If they wait, they can anticipate being more powerful farther down the road and, therefore, more likely to be successful. However, the opportunity may not become available farther down the road. One of the important questions then is whether their intervention is likely to invite counterintervention by more powerful actors. Decision makers in declining powers may sense great urgency in doing something to stop the status quo from unraveling further yet feel compelled to restrain from acting with access to fewer capabilities than once was the case. The restraints can be overcome by promises or expectations - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of external support. One illustrative case that comes to mind is Austria- Hungary in 1914 with a “blank check” of support from its German ally. Another example is the Anglo-French- Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956. Would Austria-Hungary have declared war on Serbia in the absence of support from Germany and the probable intervention of Russia? Would Britain or France have acted in 1956 if they had known the United States

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3636 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:504:50:50 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 37 would strongly oppose their actions?12 Such counterfactuals cannot be answered concretely, of course, but they do serve to reinforce the need to introduce some calculation of external support/opposition.

On Membership, Indicators, and Behavior

The approach taken in chapter 1 assumes that there is an objective threshold for membership in the great power club that can be tapped for operationalization purposes. On the one hand, there is little choice in taking this measurement path. The only alternative is to do a survey of experts on diplomatic history, assuming that enough would cooperate, and even then the outcome would be a mixed bag of different perspectives and often idiosyncratic thresholds. Perhaps the real problem is that the great powers themselves had no real concrete threshold. Like the evaluators of pornography, they knew one when they saw one. Then the question becomes when did they see a particular state as one of their own kind? Reconstructing this information might require more precision than the opinions of diplomatic historians would be likely to muster. Hence, we are back to objective indicators, but of what? The choice of indicators is predicated in part on how one views the great power club. If one sees it as essentially the most powerful European states that are gradually expanded by a few non-European powers, the indicators are likely to reflect eurocentric attributes. The reason for this is that this perspective adopts a eurocentric interpretation of the evolution of the international system. It is quite common in international relations and probably the most common perspective. Basically, it equates European international relations with the world’s international relations up to the late nineteenth century point at which it becomes impossible to continue being quite so eurocentric. It is international relations’ equivalent of the idea that the solar system revolved around Earth. In this IR foundational myth, first there was European international relations until a few other powerful non- European states came along. It does not matter that various regions of the world were dominated by strong, non- European states and that some of these states were more than competitive with European states. China managed to hold Europeans at bay for several hundred years. Moghul India was too strong for European - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright attacks until the early eighteenth century and the collapse of the Moghul dynasty. Aztecs and Incas succumbed early but Moroccans did serious damage to the Portuguese attempts at penetrating North Africa in the same era. The Ottomans are given some great power credit up to the end of the seventeenth century even though they continued to fight the Austrians and Russians (as well as the Persians) for another two centuries. In the

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3737 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:504:50:50 PMPM 38 William R. Thompson nineteenth century, the United States competed with Britain, France, Germany, and Spain in North and Central America and the Pacific but is not considered a great power until it defeated a rather weak Spain that had not been a major power for quite some time. Japan earned its great power laurels by surprising everyone and knocking off a nongreat power in East Asia with apparent ease even though it had been competing with Russia and other European powers before that time. A generation earlier, Italy had been awarded great power spurs for not actually defeating anyone and was later (1896) badly embarrassed in Abyssinia without losing said spurs. So there are some analytical costs to buying into a eurocentric version of the great power elite if one thinks that eurocentric interpretations dis- tort what was going on in the international relations of the past 500 years. What was going on? One way to look at it is to suggest that the world system of the past 500 years has consisted of multiple regions in which some states are more powerful than others. Moreover, some states became increasingly powerful in multiple regions and most of these states were European initially (as long as we are focusing on the past 500 years)—but not all European states nor all European states that were deemed powerful within Europe were also powerful in multiple regions. Only some European states could project force beyond their own region. Even then, it took hundreds of years to be able to project force into the more distant regions (except in Latin America) as opposed to the offshore variety of coastal intimidation. As I understand it, my approach is not identical to the one advocated in chapter 7, although it may be kindred in spirit. The editors use intra- and inter-regional power projection as their conceptual threshold. The most powerful intraregional players that are not yet capable of interregional projection are regional powers. One gathers that there is only one at best of these actors per region and that they are considered to be major powers restricted to their respective regional circuits until they demonstrate otherwise. Examples would include India, Brazil, and Australia. A second group of major powers are capable of, and have demonstrated activity in more than one region even though they may not operate on a truly global scale. In contrast, what I am proposing is that all states be assessed on their capability to project power over some distance. Those states that can project power, however operationalized, beyond their home region would be - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright designated global powers even if they operated only in some regions but not in others. Those states that can operate only in their home region would be regional powers. Each group would have its own pecking order. The number of global powers would be limited by the costs involved in long-distance force applications and foreign policy ambitions. The number of regional powers would probably vary from region to region. In

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3838 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:504:50:50 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 39 some regions, power might be highly concentrated and the most powerful regional actor might also be a global power (for instance, the United States in North America). In other regions that are less concentrated in power, there might be several states of roughly equal capability, albeit still arrayed in hierarchical order. The difference between my approach and that of the editors (see chapter 7) is that they take major powers and divide them into two groups: regional and extraregional actors. I take the regions as givens, assume that different hierarchies can characterize each region, and distinguish between those states that have the capability to operate interregionally and do so (global actors or powers) and others that do not (regional actors or powers). This is not the place to rewrite the history of international relations. I think, however, this version of IR history lends support to the notion that there is more than one system at work. There are regional systems and there is an emerging transregional or global system. There was no single European great power club that encompassed all regions before the twentieth century. That generalization implies that there is probably no single threshold for elite status until we approach more recent times (post- 1945?) and perhaps not even then. That is, it may be worthwhile to continue viewing the world system as constituted by multiple regions and a global transregional system in which elite states are either regional elites, global elites, or both. Nonetheless, this particular perspective does not dictate what threshold indicators would be most pertinent. It only suggests that we frame whatever indicators are adopted in regional and global categories. Chapter 1 suggests military expenditures, military expenditures divided by military personnel, gross domestic product, and trade as a proportion of global trade. In many respects, these indicators are more attractive than older emphases on bulk attributes such as population and army size. Yet, they still seem to mix regional and global categories. Trade is certainly more of a global indicator than a regional indicator, although it might be able to go both ways if one framed it in terms of regional trade versus interregional trade. Military expenditures divided by military personnel is meant to capture military reach, which also has both regional and global implications. However, its interpretation is marred to some extent by the fact that affluent economies spend more money on military personnel. Thus, it is - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright possible to have a high military expenditures/personnel indicator without having much military reach either regionally or globally.13 World inequalities in military expenditures are a good divider of elite and nonelite armed forces. A small number of states spend a great deal and most states spend comparatively little. Presumably, more sophisticated military forces cost more (as in the military expenditures/personnel

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 3939 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:504:50:50 PMPM 40 William R. Thompson indicator). Here again, though, without knowing something about what the expenditures are for, it is not clear that all high military spenders have regional and global reach. If, for instance, a relatively high spender must book commercial airline seats to get its troops to the combat zone, the face validity of the indicator is weakened somewhat.14 Gross domestic product (GDP) certainly has its uses as well but must be viewed carefully. Large economies may not be very technologically sophisticated. Kugler and Organski’s (1989) anointment of Russia as the nineteenth- century hegemon based on the size of its economy is a case in point. Sometimes GDP can be treacherous for interpretation purposes, especially in global terms. Adding them together probably works to smooth some of their rough edges. But it does not get around the regional versus global problem. The only way to do that is to tackle what distinguishes global power from regional power head on. Leadership long cycle theory has customarily relied on naval power to make this distinction.15 For much of the past 500 years, naval power has been the principal way to move force interregionally. Yet, aerospace technology has clearly altered the situation and we need to supplement a focus on naval power with air and outer space power. Fortunately, a new index of global military reach has been devised recently that does that by combining indices of sea power, air power, and satellites—what Posen (2003) calls “command of the commons.” The idea is that power can only be projected interregionally or globally by reliance on ships, planes, and space vehicles. 16 By looking at the distribution of these capabilities, it is possible to assess who has global military reach and who does not. Those that do not, remain at best, regional powers. An emphasis on global reach does not support the traditional approach to assigning major power status any more than Volgy et al.’s measurement approach does. What we can do here is to use the new data to illustrate the system leader’s status inconsistency problem. Plotting the heights attained in relative global reach against a crude indicator of economic capability (share of world GDP) for the current system leader, the United States, and the states that it supplanted (Britain) as well as two other major powers (France and Germany) for comparison purposes should help to demonstrate the status inconsistency problem(s) that I wish to draw attention to in this context.17 It is one thing to score high on a number of tests. It is still another thing to score much higher on one test than on others. Therein - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright lies one of the system leader’s status inconsistency dilemmas.18 Figure 2.1 depicts two indicators of the military and economic dimensions of the United States’ rise to systemic leadership after 1945. The US share of world GDP expands gradually from the first observation plotted in 1820. The relative share peaked in 1950 at the end of World War II and then fell off in subsequent decades. Its relative share in global reach

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Figure 2.1 US relative economic and global reach capability.

capabilities oscillated around its share of aggregate economic resources up to 1945. In World War II, the US global reach share soared abruptly. This share declined in the face of the early Soviet challenge but then climbed again when the USSR collapsed in the late 1980s. To be sure, the gap between the two indicators in Figure 2.1 is manu- factured artificially to some extent. The economic share is calculated with total world GDP as its denominator. The military share is calculated with a denominator composed of the total global reach capabilities possessed by a handful of global powers. Still, most global reach capabilities are monopolized by these same global powers so that if a world inventory of the same weapon systems was used instead, a considerable gap between the system leader’s military and economic clout would remain. Prior to US global leadership, Britain experienced something similar as global system leader (see Figure 2.2). Throughout the nineteenth cen- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tury, a considerable gap characterized the differences in the relative shares of global reach and world GDP. The gap had shrunk somewhat prior to World War I, as Britain’s relative global reach capabilities declined but it still remained large. It became even greater during the global crisis of World War I. Thereafter, the gap between the two indicators diminished quickly as Britain gave way to the United States. Around 1960, Britain’s

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Figure 2.2 British economic and global reach capability.

military and economic indicators more or less converged and fluctuated in close proximity. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that the problem to which we are drawing attention is not entirely unique to system leaders. Other major powers experience gaps between military and economic indices that are either smaller in size or shorter in duration. France generated nearly a third of global reach capabilities by 1860 on an economic base that was smaller than the one relied upon by either Britain or the United States. After 1910, though, France’s global reach share more closely approximated its economic share. In contrast, the German global reach capabilities spiked around the time of the two world wars but not at other times. In Figures 2.5 and 2.6, the relative standings of the four states on economic (GDP shares of world GDP) and relative global reach capabilities respectively are plotted. Figure 2.5 shows the extent to which the United States broke away from the pack in the twentieth century, peaked in 1950, - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and then declined somewhat in relative standing through the rest of the century. Intriguing is the mild upbeat in US GDP share in the 1980s and 1990s, which may or may not be suggestive of things to come in the twenty- first century.19 Note that Britain’s relative standing was passed by the United States in 1870 but led France and Germany’s positions up to the twentieth century.

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Figure 2.3 French economic and global reach capability.

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Figure 2.4 German economic and global reach capability.

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One implication of Figure 2.5, however, is the economic disparity between the United States and the three European powers after the beginning of the twentieth century. Assuming most analysts would include the United States, Britain, France, and Germany as major powers at some point in the twentieth century, would one threshold for elite major powers serve us well? At the least, we might have to consider first and second class elite standings. Alternatively, Figure 2.5 gives us more reasons to fall back on the regional and global distinction for distinguishing elites in world politics. Introducing similar information for Russia and China would only reinforce the point.20 Figure 2.6 supports the same observation as does Figure 2.5. The US position eclipses all others after 1950, while British, French, and German global reach pretty much bottoms out in the second half of the twentieth century. Britain’s relative position before World War II was almost as equally impressive as the United States’s after World War II. Taking - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright together the information displayed in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, one comes to the conclusion that there are a number of asymmetries at work in distinguishing elites. One elite state tends to overshadow the others in one or more dimensions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on. Establishing any threshold for major power needs to take that fundamental asymmetry into account.

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Perhaps the numbers depicted in the preceding figures are not exactly the right ones to be examining. An alternative to looking only at a state’s relative position within the system is to ask how much of a gap is there between the leader and its closest rival. For instance, any state that possesses 45 percent of the system’s capabilities might seem relatively formidable, especially if no other state approaches something like a 20 to 25 percent position. Yet, how formidable is a 45 percent position if the rival claims 40 percent? Whatever else it may mean, a 20 to 25 percent lead over the second most capable state in the system is much different than a 5 percent lead. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 contrast the positions of the leader and the state that is closest to it in relative capability position. Figure 2.7 looks again at global reach capabilities and adds the Soviet/Russian position. The two states moved toward convergence until the early 1980s and then began to diverge considerably. By 2000, the gap in first and second place global reach capabilities had returned to a 1960s position. In our new measure- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ment system that combines naval and aerospace capabilities, the 1960 gap was .682 while the 1970 gap was .346. In 2000, the gap was .439 and growing. There is no strong reason to expect significant diminishment in the global reach capability gap before the 2020s, if then. The Chinese position should improve slowly. The Russian relative position may improve. Even the British and French relative positions may improve or stay about

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the same a decade or so from now. There is no radical decline in relative global reach capabilities just around the corner. Figure 2.8 shows a different pattern as it plots US, Chinese, and Japanese GDP capabilities. Focusing on relative GDP shares is admittedly treacherous. The leadership long cycle argument emphasizes surges in technological growth, not GDP.21 With GDP, all economic assets are not easily transformed into political- military resources—whether it be foreign aid or tanks. A large state that is still handicapped with a fundamentally agrarian economy can conceivably muster a large GDP, as Russia did in the nineteenth century and China does in the twenty- first century. Nonetheless, we often fall back on GDP as one useful, however treacherous, measure of economic capability. As Figure 2.8 illustrates, in the 1980s, Japan, the second largest economy in the world, looked to be on a trajectory that might surpass that of the declining United States. The Japanese economy faltered in the 1990s and has yet to resume its ascending trajectory that some thought would lead to Japan becoming the system’s lead economy.22 The Chinese - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright challenge may turn out to be something different, depending largely on whether the Chinese economy becomes the leading pioneer of new, radical technology in the twenty- first century. Figure 2.8 shows that China has passed Japan in terms of raw overall GDP. It could, and is expected to surpass the US GDP share at some point later in this century.

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The point here is not that China will become the new system leader after it surpasses the US GDP share of the world economy. It could do that and still remain relatively underdeveloped and specializing in inexpensive man- ufacturing. But it would be an increasingly affluent economy nonetheless. If one were to combine the relative GDP shares of France, Germany, and the UK as a rough proxy for the European Union, their combined wealth (in 2000) exceeds the Japanese position and approximates the Chinese position depicted in Figure 2.8. The United States is still certainly ahead, but several economies are gaining on its relative position. Figure 2.9 summarizes the differences between system leader military and economic resources. One line (with triangles) measures the size of the gap between the top two states’ shares of global reach capabilities. The other line plots the size of the gap between the top two states’ share of world GDP. Figure 2.9 should not be taken too literally, but it shows exactly the pattern one might expect if our argument about the different types of capabilities is accurate. Both World Wars I and II increased the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright size of the gaps, in part because war places stress on improving relative military positions. Both gaps declined after the 1950s and might even be said to have converged toward 1980. But after that point, they are clearly diverging. The system leader’s relative global reach capability is improving with little in the way of competition. The same cannot be said of its decaying relative economic position.

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It would seem that we find similar results whether we stress the relative position of the system leader or the size of the lead vis-à- vis challengers. The global reach capability gap is actually increasing while the economic gap is decreasing. That propensity of system leaders to experience greater or faster decline in their economic foundation, as opposed to their military foundation, causes various problems. It encourages the system leader to continue acting as before, when its overall relative capability foundation was stronger. It encourages others to regard the system leader with somewhat less awe than once had been the case.23 It leaves the international system still concentrated in terms of power, but the nature of the concen- tration is unraveling slowly and unevenly.

Back to the United States as a Status-(In)Consistent Power - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

We have strayed considerably from the original assignment to discuss the status consistency of the United States as a major power. Yet the preceding observations are not irrelevant to the task. There is no challenge to the idea that the United States scores high on economic and military capabilities and status attribution in the post-1945 period. In that respect, it can be

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 4848 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:524:50:52 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 49 considered status-consistent. In other respects, an argument can be made for status inconsistencies. The United States currently stands unrivaled in global reach military capabilities. Even with Russia/the Soviet Union added to the mix, the generalization stands since World War II. The US relative economic standing remains quite strong but has experienced some relative decline over the past 50–60 years from its high point in the 1950s (Figure 2.5). What should we make of its conflict behavior and cooperative structure building during this time? Since 1945, the United States has participated in a number of conflicts. The most significant ones have been the Korean War, Vietnam, the first and second wars against Iraq, and what may come to be called the first and second Afghan Wars. Korea, Vietnam, the f irst Iraqi and the second Afghan War (at least its second phase) were ongoing conflicts that the United States joined.24 The other two were initiated by the United States. In each of the six conflicts, the United States went to some trouble to organize a coalition of states and in some cases to receive UN sanction for its military campaigns. Why? Should we attribute participation in these conflicts to status consistency or something else? I would be willing to acknowledge that status consistency in the sense that high economic/military capability scores and status attribution made participation in the conflicts more likely. The United States would have been unlikely to participate in conflicts in East, Southeast, and Southwest Asia in the early nineteenth century. It would have had neither the motivation nor the capability to do so.25 However, the motivation and the capability to engage in these conflicts do not appear to be associated exclusively with status attribution and consistency per se. Rather, I would link them first to US systemic leadership. Whether one appreciates or not the US activities in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the probability of US activity stems from its perception of global system leadership responsibilities. Korea and Vietnam were intended to stem Chinese and Soviet expansion in eastern Eurasia. The first Persian Gulf War was intended to contain Iraqi expansion into Kuwaiti and Saudi oil wells. The first Afghan War was retaliation for Talibani harboring of 9/11 terrorists who had attacked the United States as the leader of “Crusader”/Western penetration into the Middle East and as the supporter of conservative Arab regimes in the area. Presumably, the second phase of the Afghan campaigns is a continued concern for preclud- ing Taliban forces from returning to power. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright The motivation for the second Persian Gulf War was officially to remove the possibility of a future Iraqi nuclear threat primarily in the Middle East. However one views the official motivation, the likelihood of doing something early in the twenty- first century—either removing Saddam Hussein or lifting the sanctions imposed on Iraq—was linked to the incomplete ending of the first Persian Gulf War in the previous decade. One could also

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 4949 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:524:50:52 PMPM 50 William R. Thompson argue that the willingness to leap into the second Iraqi war while still dealing with the initial intervention in Afghanistan betrayed a sense of omnip- otence that stemmed from Cold War triumphalism and overwhelming US global reach position after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this respect, there is more than a slight flavor of what I have been referring to as one of the system leader’s particular forms of status inconsistency at work here. But, overall, it is systemic leadership—not status consistency—that seems to be the main culprit in explaining US conflict behavior after 1945.26 What about the creation of cooperative structures? The answer on this dimension seems even more clear-cut. All of the cooperative structures of which the United States was a main constructor after 1945 took place within ten years of the end of World War II. The United Nations and its main suborganizations, the Rio Pact, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Souteast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and even the The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) agreement were created between 1945 and 1955. Since then the United States has participated in these cooperative endeavors to variable extents depending on the perceived efficacy and utility of the organizations. In short, NATO has come to be more useful for US purposes than the United Nations. Again, however one interprets US participation in international organizations, their construction has been limited to that window of postwar opportunity that system leaders have to construct their initial vision of world order. Although the United States continues to prefer, at least most of the time, cloaking itself in collaborative efforts, it seems prepared to act on its own when it deems it vital to its own interests. Even the more extreme unilateralism of the second Bush administration did not eschew entirely the appearance of supportive coalition building. Nor is it conceivable that this unilateralist episode in recent US foreign policy can be attributed to low scores on economic/military capabilities, or status attribution. Rather, it seems more likely that the high scores on economic/military capabilities encouraged US decision makers to sacrifice concerns about systemic leadership legitimacy.27 This outcome, presumably a temporary situation, is still a far cry from loss of major power status.

Conclusion - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

There is no question that we need to address how we view major powers. Previous interpretations, and especially the industry standard of the Correlates of War project, are difficult to defend. How best to address this problem will continue to be debated, but my own preference is to distinguish between regional and global powers—as opposed to a single

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 5050 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:524:50:52 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 51 threshold for all major powers. The main question here, however, is what status inconsistency means and how best to apply it. I have argued that system leaders have particular problems with status inconsistencies. Their global reach is much greater than their economic foundation and their leadership status tends to persist after their platform for leadership behavior has eroded. Thus, what one set of analysts call status consistency for the United States I have preferred to view as a specific form of status inconsistency. The problems of asymmetrical capability development and relative capability erosion are not unique to system leaders, but these problems are much more salient in system leader foreign policy activity. Does status consistency explain US conflict behavior and the construction of cooperative endeavors in world politics? In this case, I prefer the rival hypothesis that it is the special status of global system leader that best explains US conflict and cooperation behavior. In the absence of the systemic leadership status, it seems doubtful that the United States would have gone to war in various parts of Eurasia. If the United States had been one great power among many, it could conceivably have found itself embroiled in some of the postwar military campaigns. But it appears unlikely in retrospect that the United States would have participated in all of its post–World War II campaigns, or even many of them. The construction of cooperative institutions for global transactions that took place in the immediate aftermath of the last global war seems clearly a function of systemic leadership. Systemic leadership does not predict to continued participation in these institutions once they have been created. Once the system leader loses control over the organizations, their utility to the system leader is diminished and so is its participation. Both conf lict behavior and the creation of cooperative organizations may be explicable in various ways. Other major powers may not, and probably are unlikely to, behave in the same way as the system leader. This chapter argues only for a N of 1 (in the post- 1945 era) not appearing to conform as well to chapter 1’s major power status consistency predictions as might otherwise seem to be the case. Needless to say, an N of 1 cannot disconfirm a theory. My chapter should be viewed as more of an intellectual skirmish with the assumptions of the editors and perhaps the search for scope conditions on how best to apply and interpret status discrepancy explanations. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Notes

1. Thanks to the editors for comments on an earlier version of this paper. 2. A useful place to begin with anarchy is Buzan and Little’s (2000) discussion of “anarchophobia.” 3. Moreover, some states with federal systems possess centralized government in which the central government possesses little in the way of political power. Only when a hierarchical pecking order emerges between the federal government and state/provincial governments,

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 5151 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:524:50:52 PMPM 52 William R. Thompson if one does, is there a genuine centralized government. Not surprisingly, weak federal systems are sometimes compared to small interstate systems. Yet the point remains that it is the hierarchy that is crucial to whether a centralized government operates and not whether a centralized government exists “on paper.” Something similar might be said about medieval feudal systems with nominal monarchs and powerful barons. 4. I think the difference between the editors and myself on this point is that the editors wish to retain anarchy as a contextual factor within which actors struggle to find some semblance of order. The underlying assumption is that actors must struggle to find order because they lack central government. But this takes “local” government arrangements as the reference point against which other arrangements are compared. My preference would be to simply drop references to anarchy altogether and stress struggles to find security, order, and wealth within a hierarchical world. 5. No doubt, the durability of higher than justified self-attribution is a generic problem for major powers. 6. In the exceptional US case, the United States essentially conquered most of its home region as a type I power even while it was developing type II capabilities. The norm going back to Dilmun (third millennium BCE Persian Gulf), Minoa (second millennium BCE Aegean), and the Phoenician city states (first millennium BCE Mediterranean) and continuing through Genoa, Venice, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Britain is that type II actors emerge on the fringe of expanding type I actors and, eventually, are taken over by the type I empires. Of the Dilmun to Britain sequence encompassing nearly 5,000 years, only Britain evaded being conquered and occupied by a type I state. 7. See, for example, the findings on “IGO architecture” in Volgy, Fausett, and Grant (2009). 8. There is also the problem of accurately interpreting just where a system leader is in its ongoing trajectory. Since relative decline sets in early and almost imperceptibly at first, it is just as easy to exaggerate the rate of decline as it is to miss it altogether. Relative decline is harder to perceive than absolute decline which, in turn, is much less likely. Add in the “unipolar” decades after the end of the Cold War—which were more about improving relative military position than relative economic position—and it is hardly surprising that we disagree about how to interpret the trajectory. 9. An exceptional case in point is the creation of the contemporary Arab- Israeli conflict, which to a considerable degree can be traced back to contradictory wartime promises made by Britain to multiple parties followed by British Mandate policies in Palestine. 10. Volgy et al. (this volume) explicitly recognize that trajectories can make a difference but do not follow up on the theoretical implications of rise and fall dynamics. 11. Here again I disagree with the editors of this volume. They see underachievers as states with more capability than status. Overachievers are states with more status than capability. But I think that may both bestow more causal power on status as a behavioral driver than is warranted so far and restrict the interpretation of opportunities. Is it not possible, for instance, that overachieving might result from a situation in which a state with limited capabilities enjoys an exaggerated self-attributed status? Alternatively, states with an accurate assessment of their capabilities and status might feel inclined to be more aggressive to overcome community attributions. This sort of approach places its emphasis on behavior as opposed to the categorical relationship between status and capability to identify “over” and “under” achievers in international politics. 12. In this case, we do know that Britain and France backed down once US opposition was declared. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 13. Japan is an obvious outlier in this respect. 14. This weakness does not preclude, of course, requiring some additional evidence of military operations beyond the home region, as the editors do. 15. The naval power index (Modelski and Thompson 1988) encompasses the 1494–1993 period and has been updated subsequently to 2009 by the author. The index focuses on armed warships through the eighteenth century with increasing thresholds in number of cannon required for first line ships of the line. This emphasis is continued through the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century as ships of the line gave way to battleships but is

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 5252 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:524:50:52 PMPM The United States as Global Leader 53 smoothed by introducing information on naval spending. The second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty- first century is measured in terms of the distribution of heavy aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, and the lethality and accuracy of sea- launched ballistic missiles. We have required that global powers possess at least 10 percent of the pooled global reach capabilities and demonstrate sustained activity beyond their home sea. 16. The new measure, constructed by the author with the co- authorship of Michael Lee at Indiana University, does not attempt to measure every possible weapon system relevant to projecting force at long distance. Cruise missiles, for instance, might be included but are not, given problems encountered in attempting to count them. The new measure includes strategic bombers (from 1916 on), intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from land, and military satellites weighted by their duration in space. Relative shares are calculated for each type of capability (including naval power) and averaged. 17. Maddison (2010) at http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison is the source of the GDP data. GDP is considered a weak indicator from a leadership long cycle perspective because we draw attention to leading sectors reflecting radical technological breakthroughs as the source of the system leader’s economic dynamism. System leaders pioneer radical new ways of doing things. By doing so, they move the world economy’s technological frontiers outward and everyone else must either catch up or fall behind in productive and commercial capacity. This lead in innovation certainly translates into GDP terms but GDP encompasses a number of other kinds of activities that do not reflect radical innovation. 18. The other one is the tendency for system leaders not to be replaced before their capabilities have declined. 19. Maddison’s GDP data extend only to 2003 at present. Leadership long cycle theory does not preclude declining system leaders reinvigorating their leadership foundation and replacing themselves. Britain did this via the Industrial Revolution after an eighteenth century lead based on commercial leadership (Modelski and Thompson 1996). 20. Russian/Soviet power projection figures fluctuate tremendously but never exceed about a third of global reach capabilities and that was in the periods usually considered bipolar during the Cold War. The Chinese global reach index is very small in magnitude and exceeds 0.01 only in 2008. 21. However, we have demonstrated empirically that the surges in technological change are a driver of US GDP (Reuveny and Thompson 2001, 2004). So, they are hardly unrelated phenomena. 22. For the record, no leadership long cycle argument was ever put forward on the likelihood of Japan surpassing the United States. Given our theoretical biases, Japan seemed an unlikely candidate for systemic leadership. See, for instance, Thompson (1997). We were also underwhelmed by the Soviet challenge and the significance of the Cold War to long- term probabilities. 23. For evidence of “less awe,” I would point to increased challenges to the preferences of the of the system leader. Examples include UN General Assembly voting patterns, allies passing on participation in the Second Gulf War, the adoption of tougher foreign policy stances by China and Russia, and fundamentalist jihadi attacks on the United States. 24. One could add the Balkan intervention over Kosovo as well without changing any asser- tions being made about US behavior. 25. Some North African and Mexican adventures were as far as the United States could go in the first half of the nineteenth century. 26. I do not rule out the application of status consistency/inconsistency to systemic leadership - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright behavior farther down the road of relative decline. 27. The emphasis here is on self- attribution of high status across the board and not on community status attribution. Observers outside the United States may have a better sense of the military- economic discrepancy than those inside the United States. However, I am not aware of systematic evidence on this possibility.

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99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 5353 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:524:50:52 PMPM Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_03_ch02.indd780230104648_03_ch02.indd 5454 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:524:50:52 PMPM CHAPTER THREE USSR/Russian Federation’s Major Power Status Inconsistencies

Maria Raquel Freire

Editors’ note: This chapter focuses on the Russian Federation, a state that has historically struggled with its community-based and in-group based attribution as a major power, and in recent history went from underachiever and “superpower” to its present, overachieving major power status. The chapter explores the struggles of Soviet and Russian policy makers to achieve and hold their status in the major power club in the context of changing exogenous and endogenous constraints.

This chapter looks at the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and its successor, the Russian Federation’s major power status inconsistencies, from the period following the Second World War until the present. Following the analytical framework utilized in chapter 1, the definition of a status-consistent major power requires the combination of material capabilities, including economic and military resources (opportunity), a willingness to implement globally encompassing foreign policy goals, and recognition by other countries of this major power status (this ability to

gain status is linked to perceptions, both self- attributed and of the self as - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright defined by others, implying a strong normative dimension). In the case of the USSR/Russia, opportunity and willingness are dependent first on endogenous conditions, but also on exogenous constraints, including the leading role a major power might assume in the international system, the creation of structural cooperative agreements, the management of competitiveness, and the manner in which these roles are interpreted by others, in the sense of conferring on them status attribution and recognition.

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 5555 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM 56 Maria Raquel Freire Major power status attribution might vary between consistency and inconsistency, depending on a range of characteristics that allow states to be recognized as fundamental players in the international system and to be legitimized (or not) by others, as a result of a community-based recognition process. Recognition of status by the international community is closely related to the Russian democratization course, with illiberal trends constituting a source of suspicion for the West. The formulation of “sovereign democracy” has not matched Western concerns about the limited Russian transition to democracy. Then and now, the illiberal Russian regime has constituted an obstacle to status recognition by informing Western perceptions of Russia as a dubious player. Status- consistent major powers are recognized as holding these capabilities and do act in order to promote and maintain an international order that they understand as favorable; as for status-inconsistent players, they seek change, either in their attribution of status, or regarding the nature of the order where this status’ attribution takes place. However, they are limited in different ways: underachievers might have the capabilities and motivation to act as major powers, but these might not be recognized by others, and therefore they are not attributed sufficient major power status; overachievers are recognized as having full major power status, but lack critical attributes (e.g., economic, military) associated with being one. The USSR/Russia case is paradigmatic of changes beneath consistency, showing that as a major power it was never fully status- consistent, though, as further analysis will demonstrate, its status has changed from an underachiever to an overachiever. These inconsistencies result from domestic factors regarding leadership, foreign policy options, economic and military power, and also from external factors that have functioned as constraints to reaching the desired status. Building off of this reasoning, this chapter looks at the USSR/Russia’s status, inconsistencies from the Second World War through the present, analyzing how foreign policy makers throughout this time span attempted to pursue their national goals in international politics. Additionally, the chapter seeks to identify how changes in attributed status have affected this pursuit of major power recognition, and particularly how Russian efforts favorably alter the course of international affairs. Finally, the chapter investigates how major power status attribution impacts willingness, as well as on the prospects of success in shaping the global order. The post-Georgia context constitutes an interesting example of how - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Russia plays the game. It demonstrates the extent to which the attributes of major power and status (in)consistency might minimize or enhance the state of anarchy in international politics, especially when driven by counterbalancing motivations. In particular, this has been the case in the post-Soviet area where Russian actions have been directed at limiting US influence and power.

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 5656 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 57 Domestic and external factors combine in foreign policy formulation, resulting in a formula where internal capacities, resources, and political will are added with external threats and opportunities, leading to multiple policy options, where the result underlines the search for a maximization of gains. These gains are the result of how the national interest is defined, which in turn becomes the guiding basis for the pursuit of specific objectives. As such, the internal/external relationship is asymmetrically bidirectional: these two dimensions are closely intercon- nected, though with different weights. National interest, identity, and perceptions rise above external dynamics, in the sense that states confer primacy to national goals (along with human and material capabilities to pursue them) in the formulation of foreign policy, but are not immune to both domestic and international forces that hinder or foster the pursuit of these goals.1 As Hill notes (2003: 28), “Foreign policy-making is a complex process of interaction between many actors, differentially embedded in a wide range of different structures. Their interaction is a dynamic process, leading to the constant evolution of both actors and structures.” This evolution allows for the identification of the USSR and Russia as both a status-inconsistent underachiever and then overachiever in the international system, marking their evolution and influencing the course of their foreign policies. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc have led to a redrawing of the European geostrategic map, extending it further east into Central Asia, with the emergence of 15 new independent states demanding a restructuring of the old Soviet space. 2 The Russian Federation, reduced in various dimensions of power, has sought to maintain its influence and perpetuate the memories of a past already gone. However, diminished capabilities forced the Russian Federation to read- just to a new context in an attempt to recover the status it has constantly claimed, but really never achieved in a consistent manner. The process of foreign policy formulation is especially complex in times of transition, where it becomes even more difficult to dissociate power and preferences, internal drivers, and external pressures. It is a process in which the definition of the self does not occur in isolation, but instead involves different sectors of society and political elites, as well as international influences. The case of Russia is illustrative of the combination of these different dimensions in a context of post- Communist transition; - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright wherein, much difficulty and uncertainty lead the whole process, all of which culminates not, in a return to Soviet communism or the experi- ment of liberal democracy, or even of market socialism, but rather to a centralized and authoritarian style of ruling, with characteristics that have been shaping Russian foreign policy and its path toward attempts at reaffirming its major power status.

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 5757 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM 58 Maria Raquel Freire The chapter follows a sequential overview of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and then of the Russian Federation, looking at how the different vectors that play in its foreign policy have influenced their course, leading to the country’s status of either underachiever or overachiever. The chapter argues that Russia has not been following a straightforward course as a major power. It has clearly been at moments an underachiever, such as during the Cold War, but also an overachiever, clearly before the breakup of the USSR and afterward. However, it should be understood that Russian self- attribution of its major power status has been consistent through its history, despite major difficulties in securing consistent community-based status attribution. This is clearly evident in current Russian foreign policy, which aims at maximizing economic gains, particularly from energy assets, while seeking to modernize military capabilities and continuing to be a major player in the post- Soviet space. This desire is evidenced by the case of Georgia in August 2008; the creation of international organizations that might to some extent make its foreign policy goals more realistic, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, the pursuit of these strategies has met with substantial difficulty. Russia currently faces slippery economic ground, its attempts at military modernization occur despite deficient and insufficient technological, material, and human conditions, it faces a dramatic demographic shortage and the restricted membership that defines Russia’s participation in the CSTO, along with the mutual containment rationale underlining the SCO, is clearly limiting its leverage. These are some of the issues analyzed in this chapter.

The Cold War Years: From Status- Inconsistent Underachiever to Overachiever

The early Cold War years were marked by a growing distrust between the two main approaches toward development—capitalism versus communism—as well as clear attempts at safeguarding from external influences areas of interest that were understood as implying a menace to the hegemonic ambitions of the USSR in East and Central Europe—all of which was a response to the US presence in European territory. The ideologi- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright cal factor became a major driver of Soviet foreign policy, expressed in its social, economic, and security policies. Stalin’s actions against alternative communist movements, such as in China or Yugoslavia, were a sign of the menace external instability could cause, as well as an acknowledgment of the frailties of the Soviet bloc, including in economic terms. This resulted in the reduction of contacts with the Western world, and it propelled

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 5858 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 59 an introspective and closed posture, a position that was fundamental for the need to project a strong image of the Soviet Union, independent of its domestic problems. Other states’ perception of Soviet “grandeur” was fundamental in its search for status recognition, which largely due to its ideological nature faced severe constraints. The development of military capabilities and the directing of economic resources to the militarization effort were illustrative of the strategy to reassert major power status in the bipolar context. Additionally, by the end of the 1940s, Soviet behavior was already manifesting its willingness to maintain and oversee control of an enlarged area, well beyond its satellite states. The Korean War (1950–1953) is one such example, and it was Soviet behavior and ideology that provided incentives for Ho Chi Minh’s offensive in Indochina against the French. These moves were part of a broader understanding that gathering ample support to the ideological cause would confer additional power and status, adding to in- group and community attribution. In Korea, Stalin supported the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in his efforts to strengthen control over the Democratic Republic of Korea and eventually to extend his power to the Korean Republic (to the south), thus pressing against the US area of influence. The result of this engagement was unsuccessful and costly, and the lessons learnt from this experience demonstrated the real possibility of armed confrontation between two nuclear powers, but also that its leaders could opt for constraint (Gaddis 2005: 61). Khrushchev’s emergence after Stalin and his pursuit of “de- Stalinization” delineated a new course, beginning in 1956, against the “cult of personality” and the internal crude procedures implementing collectivization reforms. This meant a new direction for Soviet politics that implied not only the definition of new economic objectives, but also a different political approach resulting also from the post-Korea positioning. This new approach defined “peaceful coexistence” as the realization of nuclear mutual destruction capability (Sakwa 1998; see also Kenez 2006) and the notion that armed confrontation between capitalism and communism should be replaced by economic and ideological confrontation. Soviet leaders intended their country to overcome US economic power by the 1980s, which would allow them to pursue the goal of ideological communist expansionism. The Soviet Union was a major power throughout most of the Cold War, - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright though an inconsistent one, as its capabilities and its willingness to act as a major power surpassed the status attributed to it by the global community. Its ideological orientation remained a fundamental factor regarding this inconsistency in status recognition. Interestingly enough, throughout the first half of the Cold War years, the Soviet Union received substantial state visits but unaccompanied by high levels of diplomatic recognition. These

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 5959 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM 60 Maria Raquel Freire included various US presidents (Nixon, Ford, Reagan), European and other leaders (e.g., Nehru from India). Moreover, between 1955 and 1962, Soviet leaders multiplied their trips to foreign countries, consistent with Soviet self-attribution of major power status. For instance, Khrushchev met Eisenhower in the United States in September 1959; de Gaulle in France in March 1960; and Kennedy in Austria in June 1961. However, this openness toward the West did not correspond to a Western recognition of Soviet status. Seeking to oppose the power and influence of the Western bloc, in May 1955 the Warsaw Pact Organization was created as a challenger to the Atlantic Alliance, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This military structure centered around the Soviet Union, and included satellite states such as Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This resulted in a unified command structure under Moscow’s control, and became an extension of Soviet military forces throughout its zone of influence in order to fulfill myriad purposes, including an unchal- lenged monopoly over the status of forces, impeding competitiveness with regard to military representation of member- states, and legitimizing the presence of Soviet troops in the territories of Warsaw Pact members. The creation of these structures was also meant to send a strong signal to the Western bloc about its capabilities, while at the same time finding a structural answer to Soviet fears about losing control over in- bloc dynamics, including economic centralization and military command and control strategies. These contradictory trends underline the difficulties faced not only within the bloc, but also how Soviet leaders understood these as limiting their capability to act globally. Nevertheless, the 1950s also gave start to the development of the first thermonuclear bomb, of intercontinental ballistic missiles, advanced space technology with the launching of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite, and Yuri Gagarin as the first man in orbit. These developments sought to demonstrate to the world the Soviet Union’s major power capabilities, and its status as a global power, despite the internal economic difficulties that are today well known, but were then much less visible. These technological advances, despite various failed collectivization experiments and overconcentration on hard industrial production, conferred on the Soviet leadership the confidence to pursue an active role inside and outside its area of influence. This was also part of its strategy of international - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright affirmation as a major power. Khrushchev’s successor, Leonid Breznev, proclaimed the Breznev Doctrine: the Soviet Union would act in the face of any attempt to undermine the central power of Moscow, particularly through revolutionary regime change or any attempts at leaving the bloc (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, see d’Encausse 1983: 159–218). Thus, bloc states would not be permitted to challenge Soviet leadership

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6060 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 61 on ideological or material grounds, or its approach to governance in the region. The doctrine was extended further beyond the satellite states, as shown by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. However, Moscow clashed with China about different interpretations of the path toward communism, leading to an ideological differendum and the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s. That split further weakened international recognition of the Soviet Union, and appeared to have justified once more its limited status attribution compared to its capabilities and willingness to act as a global power. The Soviet Union sought to reposition its major power status in the 1970s after in-bloc upheavals and the tension of the early 1960s, with the erection of the Berlin Wall, and in particular the Cuban missile crisis (1962). At the time, Khrushchev deployed medium and intermediate range missiles for Cuba with expectations of spreading communist revolutionary presumptions across Latin America. It was also a move demonstrating anxiety about Western aggressiveness, demonstrated by the installation of missiles in Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey, all pointing to the USSR, and to which the Cuban deployment could be a substantial reply. The high tension resulting from the crisis drew attention to the need for a new strategy in face of mutual assured destruction, and the insecurity associated with this military capability gave place to dialogue, which in turn allowed for concrete steps toward the negotiation of agreements on arms limitations. Examples include the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), and the Strategic Arms Limitations Interim Agreement (1972), which initiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). These developments are illustrative of two fundamental aspects of the quest for status: first, the need for favorable domestic conditions for advancing foreign policy goals, underlining the recognition by Soviet leaders of internal constraints; and second, the understanding that for international recognition the USSR needed to open itself and show capacity for dialogue, in order to change its image of an illiberal power, a characteristic that constrained its search for increased status attribution. In this context of détente, in 1975 the Helsinki Final Act was signed establishing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Helsinki Final Act 1975). The aim of this political body was to foster dialogue between the two blocs, with diplomatic contacts reach- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ing a substantial level at the time, and as a bridge with which to approach differences. These were political moves that showed the USSR’s inten- tion to play a major role in stabilizing bipolarity as would a state with global power status, and thereby raising its status in the global community while at the same time countering US power and influence. However, these moves simply masked structural problems that the Soviet Union

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6161 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM 62 Maria Raquel Freire was already facing and were worsening at the same time, consistent with the period when the USSR’s status changed from underachiever to overachiever. There were no summits with US leaders in the first half of the 1980s decade; the United States did not participate in the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980 and, in 1984, it was the Soviet turn to boycott its participation at the Los Angeles Games. By the mid-1980s, not only were political conflicts increasing, but the Soviet economy was also becoming unsustainable. The war in Afghanistan, not favorable to the Soviets, further strained limited resources: “Between 1986 and 1990 the deficit as share of GDP of the Soviet Union ranged between 5.7% and 9.1%, reaching 12–14% in 1991” (Kaufman and Hardt 1994: 47). The transition from an underachiever to an overachiever is well illustrated during the 1980s, when Soviet capabilities continued to weaken (the engagement and commitment to military limitation agreements is illustrative of the difficulties in coping with an increasingly limited budget). It is interesting to note in this context the role that US foreign policy played under President Ronald Reagan in the Soviet transition toward overachiever, with a strong confrontationist rhetoric matched by a military program, Star Wars, pressing against limited Soviet capabilities needed to correspond to its status as a global power in the Cold War context. Starting in 1981, the Soviet Union flipped from underachieving to overachieving status (see chapter 1 , Table 1.2). This change from a status- inconsistent underachieving major power to an overachiever matches the diminution in military and economic reach, critical attributes associated with full major power status. In fact, this change is revealing of the constant concern about domestic politics as the basis for an active foreign policy. The absence of major power status consistency was a permanent concern for Soviet leaders, as demonstrated by successive attempts at gaining status recognition, even if masking severe domestic problems. This historical legacy associated with Russian major power status remains present in the transition period as well as in today’s Russian politics.

From the Soviet Empire to the Russian State: Redefinition and Readjustment

The fall of the Soviet Union implied a deep transformation in the Russian - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Federation, not only in political, ideological, and economic terms, but also regarding its size and capabilities, despite inheriting the Soviet nuclear arsenal and its seat at international institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, the demise of the Cold War and the end of bipolarity meant a potentially diminished status in the international system, including possibly plunging from an overachieving global power

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6262 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 63 status to becoming a regional power. Therefore, “the shape of the new Russian political project depended not only on what the country inherited from the Soviet Union in material terms, but also on the political ‘software’ that would be applied to transform Russia” (Godzimirski 2008: 15). Status attribution is very much dependent on internal conditions, and in face of many domestic limitations, Russia needed additional soft power in its foreign policy dealings, particularly in the post- Soviet area, in order not to lose its major power status. But the challenges were many. The fall of the USSR implied the end of a unified ideology that was built on Marxist-Leninist principles and allowed for social cohesion: The collapse implied the loss of identity, aggregated for decades under the Communist Party’s centralized planning and ruling; it implied a process of transition toward a model of governance Russia had never experienced before; it implied new borders, and the whole redefinition of relations with a new unstable neighborhood. This undefined setting unleashed nationalism as both a catalyst for reform and an obstacle to change. The old Soviet elite remained tied to old principles; while a civil society and social movements were almost nonexistent, the business elite profited from internal political struggling and unplanned and unorganized privatization; they also strengthened themselves into an emergent class with political and economic power—the oligarchs. This complex process of change had a clear impact on the definition of a differentiated foreign policy in the post–Cold War context. This process also helps in explaining the inconsistent overachiever status Russia inherited and was unable to overcome, especially in the first post–Cold War decade. Mikhail Gorbachev was a key politician in the transformation of the Soviet Union after the general disenchantment following the Brezhnev years, and the short leaderships of Yury Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko (1982–1985). Whereas Andropov focused on the struggle for discipline, Chernenko concentrated on the struggle for conformity, without understanding the deep frailty of the Soviet system. Gorbachev, instead, focused on the struggle for change, which he felt had to be an in-out process that would allow for modernization and growth (Sakwa 1998: 72, 75–76). The fundamental capabilities for a sustainable status- consistent major power were clearly missing. However, the policies of restructuring the economy (perestroika), of acceleration (uskorenie), and of openness (glasnost), indicating a serious reform course aimed at political - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright transformation and economic development, both domestically and in foreign policy, were not capable of changing deeply rooted practices. Thus, these goals ended up overreaching what could reasonably be expected to be accomplished, given the circumstances faced by the Russian Federation. Gorbachev’s foreign policy was a reflex of his reformist course at home, proclaiming the “common European house” as a priority in

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6363 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM 64 Maria Raquel Freire defrosting relations with the West as a necessary step for the consolidation of economic growth and the inversion of trends particularly regarding increasing social problems. In addition to a policy of rapprochement with the West, reinforced by the signing in December 1987 of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with its American rival, in 1988 Gorbachev announced the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan and a policy of openness and proximity toward the East. These moves reflected the search for in- group status, hoping to find added legitimacy based on a confluence of world views with Western major powers. However, this search for in- group attribution would be limited as long as the Soviet Union continued on its previous path domestically. Therefore, Gorbachev put in motion the human dimension principles contained in the 1975 Helsinki Declaration (by promoting civil liberties and public discussion). This attempt encountered immediate opposition from the bureaucratic apparatus, which sensed a loss of its powers, and was aggravated by nationalist movements that demanded independence throughout the Soviet space. In this process of change, widespread social contestation diminished the recognition and legitimacy required for status attribution. This experience exposed the difficult task of reconciling deep structural reforms at the political and economic levels with strong remnants of the old system, and it resulted in little success in either policies or political support. As an accelerator of the process, Gorbachev tried to consolidate his power but was unable to implement most of his reform projects as the party apparatus remained a strong challenger to perestroika.3 Nevertheless, Gorbachev managed to put in place fundamental political- administrative reforms, such as the establishment of the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989, under his leadership, and with higher decision- making power than the Supreme Soviet. In fact, a new Supreme Soviet was elected by the new parliament and Gorbachev managed to gather additional power, allowing the dismissal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the only legal political organization. Gorbachev “ended up eradicating not only Stalinist tyranny and bureaucracy but also the Leninist party dictatorship and Marxist ideology ushered in by that same October Revolution.”4 Despite the many difficulties associated with an intricate process of political, social, and economic transition, Gorbachev’s agenda allowed - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright for a changed foreign policy, more democratic toward the East—the Soviet satellites since the Second World War—as well as more flexibility regarding the constituent republics of the USSR. This allowed for a response to concerns at a time of deep change with openness and adaptability easing the normative claims of the West, and potentially helping Russia maintain its major power status. Yet, these deep changes allowed

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6464 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 65 the end of the Cold War and led to the fall of the Soviet empire. “It was Gorbachev who symbolized the transcendence of the progressivist revolutions and thus allowed Russia’s return to ‘normal’ politics, a type of politics that lacked an emancipator edge. The subject of emancipation turned out not to be the people in the sense of the sovereign subjects of democracy, but a transformative elite guided by the principles of leadership and top- down modernization” (Sakwa 2005: 272). As a reaction to fast-moving changes, the rebirth of nationalism came as a countereffort at a weakened federation, as a way of propelling unity and cohesion. Despite the identification of continuity in Russia’s authoritarian course, “[t]he new Russia is not the Soviet Union, moreover nor is she the Old Russian Empire. Her new borders, option, culture, civilization, inner development did make Russia another state that previously had not existed on the global political or geographical map” (Kortunov 2000: 7). Russian identity is still in the making, combining inheritances from the past and trying to learn how to deal with a new political, social, economic, and strategic context. While this evolving identity still carries many elements of yesterday, the current Russia, despite growing political assertiveness, centralized ruling, and authoritarian style, is a new Russia, seeking status affirmation in a changed context. It remains, however, particularly due to its diminished economic and military capacity, a status-inconsistent overachiever. Boris Yeltsin came to the fore of politics at the time Gorbachev became president of the USSR. Despite a sinuous trajectory, in 1989 he was elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies and later became the president of the Russian parliament. By this time, Gorbachev and Yeltsin had incompatible goals, with the former facing internal hostility toward measures that had proven difficult and unrewarding, and the latter harshly criticizing Gorbachev for moving slowly with the reform of the system, demanding a faster pace and measures that were more resolute. The all- union referendum of March 1991 was favorable to direct presidential elections, ending in Yeltsin’s victory. The failed conservative coup d’état in August 1991 was a clear sign of a fragmented Soviet Union that officially ended on December 25. Even before the disruption of the Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established (December 8, 1991), and sought to constitute an aggregating mechanism and a swift transformation of the old USSR in a new form of organization that per- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright petuated Russia’s power (already diminished) in the former Soviet space. However, this did not prevent the republics from following their own course (Breault et al. 2003), and further reduced Russian influence. The Russian Federation emerged as an independent entity on June 12, 1990 under Yeltsin’s leadership.

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6565 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM 66 Maria Raquel Freire The Post–Cold War Decade: Boris Yeltsin’s Major Power Status Inconsistencies

In June 1991, proclaiming pluralist democracy, Boris Yeltsin was elected president of Russia, legitimized by the leading role he played in defending fundamental rights and freedoms at the time of the coup. In addition, as a follow-up to these events, the Communist Party was banned. Elected as a new face of reform, Yeltsin was not very successful in the democratization course, becoming progressively attached to power, centralizing authority, and leaving little room for maneuver to alternative views that were taking shape in the new Russia. Critics of Gorbachev’s European house appealed to a more Eurasian look, while nationalists pressured for an inward view and a strong focus on Russia’s “near abroad.” Yeltsin faced difficulties in balancing interests with Parliament, leading to a referendum and a presidential vote of confidence in April 1993. In the summer, Yeltsin convened a Constitutional Convention to draft a new post- Soviet constitution, reflecting the changes that occurred, and better reflecting the new Russia taking shape. However, in the interstitial fights for power, the Parliament also set up its Constitutional Committee for the same effect, leading to divergent drafts. In a demonstration of power, on September 21, 1993, Yeltsin dissolved Parliament and imposed presidential rule, scheduling the referendum on the new draft constitution for December. The Parliament declared Yeltsin’s move as illegal, impeached him, and swore in his vice-president, Aleksandr Rutskoy. Tensions rose and in early October, the siege of the Parliament’s building led to armed clashes, and the declaration of a state of emergency. On Yeltsin’s orders, the Parliamentary building was set on fire and everyone inside arrested, including the speaker of Parliament and Rutskoy. After these incidents, elections for a new Parliament and the constitutional referendum were scheduled for December 1993. The constitution was approved, granting the president additional powers, including the power to exercise “leadership of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation” (Chapter 4, Articles 80 and 86). Just like Gorbachev, Yeltsin’s foreign policy aimed at a stable external setting in order to concentrate on domestic issues, thus propelling an inward-looking approach.

This is a period well- known for the promotion of good relations with the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright West—demonstrating further pursuit of in-group status recognition, consistent with Gobachev’s earlier rapprochement policies. Meanwhile, the Sinatra Doctrine—“I will do it my way”—allowed the former republics to become independent, many of them for the first time. This period was marked by efforts aimed at redefining Russia’s national identity, which required the building of new institutions capable of ruling the country

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6666 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 67 after the decades-long one- party system. In the words of presidential advi- sor Sergei Stankevich in March 1992, “foreign policy with us does not proceed from the directions and priorities of a developed statehood. On the contrary, the practice of our foreign policy . . . will help Russia become Russia” (cited in Richter 1996: 69). However, Yeltsin’s policies were more based on ideology than on nationalism, which became a fabrication for acquiring or maintaining political power. Despite an understanding of the reform package needed, both at the institutional and economic levels, the transition from a socialist centrally planned economy was not easy, with a system of production spread across the Soviet republics, a pattern of organization that in times of disruption caused further disruption to the whole system. In addition, Soviet industry was inefficient and mostly concentrated on heavy industrial production, with reconversion processes demanding huge investments that were not available. There was no plan for economic reform at the short or medium term, further complicating the path toward the design of a market economy. The privatization of Russian companies, understood as a way of invalidating a return to a communist system, benefitted mostly Yeltsin’s entourage.5 The policy discredited the president and increased organized crime and corruption. The seeds of democratic change definitely dried up: authoritarianism and centralization prevailed, a new class with wide political and economic power emerged, and the general population was exposed to the effects of a transition doomed to failure. The fragilities of the governing system and its transition course became evident, and the old suspicions about the illiberal regime returned. In early 1992, the Foreign Ministry of Russia was handed to Andrei Kozyrev, who followed on the steps of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and privileged good relations with the West, including integration into Western institutions. The promotion of human rights, concerns about global environmental conditions, and nuclear security were all voiced in the new foreign policy of Russia, reflecting a deep change from Soviet global high politics. In a pro- Western context after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia pursued rapprochement with the West, defining itself as a natural ally of Europe. This approach was evinced in its seeking membership in the Council of Europe, joining Partnership for Peace in the context of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), deepening relations with the European Community based on the Partnership and - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994, and strengthening of ties with Washington. However, the expected Western financial assistance proved late and insufficient, and the conditionality associated with assistance generated anti-Western feelings and a demand for internal political change, mainly from nationalists and communists. Criticism about Western med- dling in Russian affairs, particularly regarding the treatment of Russian

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6767 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM 68 Maria Raquel Freire minorities abroad (former Soviet republics), raised discontent and pushed the authorities in Moscow for a more interventionist policy. This was justified on the need for recognition of its status as a continuing major power, with willingness and capabilities to act, and for its role in influencing favorable changes in international relations. This positioning marked the acceptance by Russia of its overachiever status, marked by its willingness to act within the post-Soviet space and to use force if need be, while remaining less aggressive outside this area of influence and pursuing its goals of changing the international order in a favorable manner through rhetoric and soft power. A new foreign policy concept was approved in April 1993 by President Yeltsin, and it reflected a reaction to the growing disenchantment with the Western option and the low benefits arising from it, leading to an equation of democracy with chaos, opportunism, and corruption. The “near abroad” became the new focus of attention in Moscow, a trend that has been kept since then. It was referred to as matching “vitally important interests,” constituting a “top priority,” and being of “fundamental importance,” and reflecting also a more balanced policy between West and East.6 By November 1993, Yeltsin announced Russia’s military doctrine, identifying the main guiding lines in military policy, the nonthreatening character of Russian military means (both nuclear and nonnuclear assets), the identification of existing and potential sources of instability, as well as of potential threats. It stated that the “Russian Federation’s vitally important interests in no way impinge upon the security of other states and they are secured within the framework of equitable and mutually ben- eficial interstate relations,” while noting the strictly defensive orientation of activity: “to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, enshrine the Russian Federation’s commitment to the aims of averting wars and armed conflicts, their elimination from the life of humankind, universal disarmament, the elimination of military blocs, and affirm its determination to strive for the materialization of the ide- als of humanism, democracy, social progress, and universal security and peace.”7 This new foreign policy concept and military doctrine reinforced the national interest, the close interconnection between politics and the military, and the search for Russia’s place in international relations as a major - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright power that has a voice that needs to be heard. However, Yeltsin’s personality and eagerness for power acted to define the contours of a volatile and not always clearly oriented foreign policy. Russian foreign policy operated at two levels: “what Russia really wanted (foreign policy A), and what it was forced to do (foreign policy B). The tension led to incoherence and confusing signals” (Sakwa 2008: 242).

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6868 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 69 Beginning in 1993, the Kremlin sought to reaffirm its role as an influential actor, particularly in regional terms. This change in policy orientation was pursued through economic influence and leverage, political pressure and military strongholds in the former Soviet space, and much to the discontent of some of these republics. Russia, as a guarantor of stability in its neighboring area, refocused on former Soviet space as an area of strategic national interest where outside interference would not be welcomed. From 1995 onward, the Kremlin consolidated this approach, with the initial definition of a multivectored foreign policy. By the mid-1990s, Russian foreign policy revolved around two main circles: an inner one, encompassing the former Soviet republics, and an outsider one, including the Western (European and United States) and Asian dimensions, and reinforced through the end of the first post–Cold War decade. After the 1995 elections, Yevgeni Primakov assumed the Foreign Ministry with the understanding that “Russia doesn’t have permanent enemies, but it does have permanent interests” (Donaldson and Nogee 2009: 131), and laid the groundwork for its domestic and foreign options. Known as the “Eurasianist,” he pursued a policy more balanced than Kozyrev, by adding the Eastern dimension as a fundamental piece to the foreign policy interests of Russia. This is also a demonstration of discontent toward Western policies that were read in Russia as aggressive, and countering the Kremlin’s interests and a threat to its status as a major global power.

Putin and Medvedev’s Politics: Seeking to Overcome Russia’s Inconsistent Overachiever Status?

Since gaining the Russian presidency in 2000, Vladimir Putin has defined its foreign policy as multifaceted and multipolar. The main documents adopted at the beginning of his first mandate state the potential destabilizing role of a “unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States,” the CIS as an area of strategic importance, and the Eastern dimension (the Asia- Pacific region) as a relevant region in Moscow’s external policy.8 Thus, Russia seeks a balanced foreign policy where the search for multiple poles aims at diversifying allies and allowing the shifting of privileged relations in a constant search - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright for counterbalancing and primacy. This approach signals Russian willingness to change its status from that of an overachiever to a status-consistent major power. Despite this renewed multifaceted formula with Putin, the objective remains distant. The attacks of September 11, 2001 added another element to this foreign policy layout: a new international order under the primacy of a much more

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 6969 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:244:50:24 PMPM 70 Maria Raquel Freire proactive United States. Putin offered Russian support to the global fight against terrorism, silencing critical Western voices about human rights violations in Russia and the Chechen Republic. This Western response played favorably to Russia’s search for greater status attribution. However, the toughening of Russian politics at home and in the post- Soviet space turned this favorable context into a rather limited window of opportunity. With a realist look over Russian national interest and external policy priorities, the so-called “pragmatic nationalism” (Light 2003: 48), Vladimir Putin’s power projection and affirmative course rested on an internal stable order and economic growth, mainly sustained by increasing oil and gas revenues, which conferred on Russian policy more independence and self- confidence regarding its role and place in international affairs. This course was acknowledged by Russian authorities, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stating that “Russian foreign policy today is such that for the first time in its history, Russia is beginning to protect its national interest by using its competitive advantages” [energy geopolitics].9 The combination of internal and external factors rendered possible this affirmative stance, with order and growth at home sustaining the search for recognition and legitimacy in regional and global political dealings. Figure 3.1 shows the dramatic evolution in Russian GDP between 1990 and 2008 with a con- tinuous crescendo particularly after 2000 when Vladimir Putin assumed presidency. The huge growth in GDP had much to do with the external context of escalating prices for fossil fuels and other natural resources. The effects of the financial crisis during the autumn of 2008 are not reflected in Figure 3.1, although they had an immediate and substantial impact on a Russian economy that is extremely dependent on energy resources. The election of Dmitry Medvedev as president of Russia (March 2008) brought a new approach to economic issues. The approach was expressed

45000 40000 35000 30000 25000 GDP 20000 15000 Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 10000 5000 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Figure 3.1 Russian GDP (billions of current US$ for 1990–2008).

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 7070 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:254:50:25 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 71 in a policy of diversification in investments and on the development of other sectoral areas (nonenergy) in order to overcome a clear overconcentration on energy resources. The overdependence on one economic sector has rendered the Russian economy highly vulnerable to exogenous economic shocks. Adjustments to the entire economy are needed to avoid unexpected fluctuations in oil and gas prices, which have substantial consequences for Russian economic performance. The new economic approach was understood in the Kremlin as an essential part of an affirmative and effective foreign policy. It was understood as well that in order to become a status-consistent major power, resources have to match goals, and this combination has to be evident for third parties in order to be legitimized. The course of Russian politics is therefore both the result of inward- and outward- driven processes, following a multilevel asymmetrical approach where inner developments have primacy, but are not independent from the external context, visible in tough politics at home and in an assertive stance in international affairs. The most recent example of this assertiveness was the war in Georgia in the summer 2008. 10 The events of the summer of 2008 prompted a full- scale Russian intervention, leading to a quick and full control of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Moscow. Russia saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate its enhanced power and its primacy in the context of intensified confrontational rhetoric, demarcating lines with regard to spheres of influence and intervention, both seeking to weaken Georgia and reinforce the policy of containing US and NATO influence in Eurasia. However, the end result of Russia’s war did not match the Kremlin’s expectations and led to consequences consistent with an overachieving major power. “Rather than being cowed into obedience, as most Western observers feared, the former republics seem to have grown even more protective of their sovereignty.”11 The events in Georgia demonstrated the simultaneously assertive and defensive course of Russian foreign policy, in reaction to various developments beyond its control and wishes. Russia is aware of the changing dynamics in the area, which are often to its dissatisfaction and has sought support for its movements within the SCO, as a way of enhancing and leg itim izing its demonstration of force in Georg ia. Th is search for suppor t clearly demonstrates limited capabilities and the need for institutional sup- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright port to overcome its limitations. Just after its military moves and before the SCO August Summit in Dushanbe, Moscow sought support from the Central Asian capitals, as well as China. However, nonconsultation of the organization’s members prior to its actions was interpreted within the forum as an exclusionary move, not welcomed among its members, as

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 7171 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:254:50:25 PMPM 72 Maria Raquel Freire well as demonstrating the concern of Russian partners within the SCO about possible Russian interference in their internal affairs. The final declaration of the summit referred to the need for “the relevant parties to resolve existing problems in a peaceful way through dialogue, to make efforts for reconciliation and facilitation of negotiations.” It also stated satisfaction with the “six principles” for the settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia, approved on August 12, 2008, and “the role of Russia in promoting peace and cooperation in the region” (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2008). Russian president Medvedev immediately declared that this outcome demonstrated a “united position” of the member states and added that he expected it to “serve as a serious signal to those who try to turn black into white and justify this aggression [against Russia]”.12 However, Medvedev’s reading seems to be overly optimistic in the face of the SCO positioning. Caution regarding issues of separatism was voiced regarding the potentially destabilizing effect that the recognition of the two “republics” could have on the region. The final declaration of the 2008 SCO Summit (Dushanbe Declaration) did not include any mention of the issue, and all SCO members reiterated their concerns (and in particular China) (Freire and Mendes 2009: 42). In fact, “the SCO’s refusal to support dismemberment of a sovereign Georgia and the ensuing independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia contradicted Russian expectations. Perhaps more importantly, this refusal also showed the limits to Russo- Chinese partnership, which, though robust, is not by any means an alliance” (Blank 2008: 78). The pragmatic and assertive positioning of Russia in Georgia during the summer 2008 and the subsequent control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia give clear indications concerning the direction Russian foreign policy is taking, matching rhetoric with action when its interests are at stake, although limited by its capabilities. Later comments by Admiral Vysotsky, commander of Russia’s Navy, about the acquisition of a Mistral warship from France, claiming that if Russia had possessed thus type of equipment at the time of the Georgian war, it could have won “in 40 minutes instead of 26 hours,”13 is a further illustration of limited Russian capabilities. These actions and words appear to be consistent with those of an overachieving major power that does not have the range of capabilities to act globally. Even in the post- Soviet region, in the face of the Eurasian mosaic - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright regarding political options, security goals, and economic orientations, Russian foreign policy faces a complex arena of differentiated interests that are very often in competition with one another. This fact clearly supports the initial proposition in the introductory chapter, that “in no small part have status concerns motivated both Russia and China to develop new governance mechanisms for the conduct of relations in Central Asia

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 7272 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:254:50:25 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 73 after the Cold War, and the status attributed to them by other states in the region made their success far more likely.” The actions toward Georgia show Russia’s willingness to act as a major power, seeking opportunity to make use of diverse capacities, and reaffirming its major power status where its limited capacities are least likely to show. Additionally, it is important to note the counterbalancing effect of the SCO, not only regarding the United States, but also on the Russia- China relationship. This is illustrative of Russia’s overachiever status, despite different levels of economic, political, and military development and achievement. Their involvement in external affairs is also distinct, with the Russian Federation pursuing a more proactive foreign policy, despite its limited capabilities. As for Beijing, its foreign policy offers signs of more engagement, such as regarding its growing concern with securing markets in its neighborhood, and with Central Asia becoming a focus of attention. This change clearly adds to its rising capabilities and to the matching of these with foreign policy options. Russia’s recent moves seem to point to attempts at imposing regional governance, minimizing US presence in an area it defines as vital to its interests, and trying to limit Chinese involvement, though with many restraints since the post-Soviet states have increasingly been assuming more autonomous and independent foreign policy courses vis- à- vis Russia. These developments render the task of Moscow more difficult. Nevertheless, Russia has been tr ying to define rules of procedure for maintaining the status quo it favors. Russia endeavors to accomplish this task through the creation of institutional mechanisms that it seeks to manipu- late to the extent possible (the CSTO and the SCO), as well as drawing on shared interests regarding counterterrorism activities. Moreover, they continue to reinterpret norms, as in the case of the Georgian war, seeking for justification from previous exceptions (mainly the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 and Kosovo’s independence). Additionally, they challenge the status quo set forth by the system leader by signing agreements with anti-U.S. states, such as Syria, Venezuela, and Iran, which build on existing U.S. rivalries. Finally, Russia uses soft power through the development and implementation of cultural, educational, and other cooperative arrangements and programs that allow rapprochement and closer ties particularly with neighboring states. These complementary procedures appear to reflect some understanding of the importance of status as a “soft - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright power” that Moscow seeks to develop and hopes to use in order to reassert its influence at the international level when its capabilities are limited and continuing to decline. Major power status is perceived by policy makers of other states as being relevant for influencing the course of global affairs, and they act toward Moscow consistent with that perception. U.S. actions and

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 7373 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:254:50:25 PMPM 74 Maria Raquel Freire reactions show this to some extent—as seen, for example, in Russia’s invitation to be part of G8, or in the response to the Georgia war (after a few months, all contacts and Russian positions in international organizations and other institutions were resumed)—acknowledging that despite its status inconsistencies, Russia has a role as a major power in international affairs. Russia’s attempts at revival, and its efforts to project the image of being a global power, seem to be working, despite facing many internal issues.

Conclusion

The complex setting where Soviet and later Russian foreign policy making and shaping has been taking place demonstrates that “Russia is still driven more by great-power nostalgia and a longing for internal stability than by any attraction to Western-style reform. It dreams of imperial revival, not global cooperation” (Daniels 2008: 36). In fact, the transition from Soviet foreign policy to a new model did not manage to break old ground. It seems that major power status has been slippery especially during the transition from an underachiever to an overachieving major power. Major power capabilities and willingness have defined Russia as a status-inconsistent overachiever, a status that has been confirmed by the above analysis of the constraints to its options and actions, and how it perceives itself and is perceived by others. Perceptions of Russia as being a major power clearly do not match its capabilities, albeit they may be more consistent with its willingness to act as a major global player. Opportunity and willingness to be a global power are dependent on endogenous constraints, including material capabilities to pursue an active foreign policy; combined, they may allow Russia to continue to maintain its leading role as a major power in the international system, a status that it continues to seek. Russian foreign policy has become more assertive: it now combines both hard and soft power approaches; it has participated in the creation of structural cooperative agreements, particularly in trying to manage its neighborhood; it attempts to manage conflict, especially in areas defined by Moscow as vital to its interests. The manner in which these more active roles have been interpreted by others, have shown ambi- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright guity, leaving Russia with even greater uncertainties regarding its status in international affairs. Thus, the Russian Federation remains an overachiever, continuing to achieve major power recognition in the international system, despite its most recent moves to challenge this status quo in a more assertive manner. Where these actions and reactions will lead Russia still remains to be seen.

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 7474 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:254:50:25 PMPM USSR/Russian Federation 75 Notes

1. See for example Saideman and Ayres (2007: 191). 2. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 3. Shevtsova (2007: 892) is worth quoting: “At the crucial moment when Gorbachev threw open Russia’s windows to the world in the late 1980s, Russia had neither an opposition that presented a credible alternative to the system nor pragmatists inside the ruling team capable of functioning in a politically competitive atmosphere. No less influential is the fact that Russia missed out on the period in European history when the spirit of constitutionalism flourished. [ . . . ] Without that basis Russian society could not successfully move to the next stages of transformation, ‘the hour of the economist’ and ‘the hour of the citizen’.” 4. Daniels, Robert. 2008. “From Gorbachev to Putin,” The Nation, October 20, 2008, p. 32. 5. “[O]ld Soviet officials gladly supported [Yeltsin] while they grabbed public assets—anything from retail shops to the oil industry—and transformed themselves into capitalists while inflation was decimating the incomes and savings of ordinary people” (Daniels 2008: 33). 6. “[T]he Russian Federation, despite the crisis it is experiencing, remains a great power in terms of its potential, its influence on the course of world events and the responsibility it bears as a result of this. It is responsible not only for the new world order that has arisen since the collapse of the socialist camp, but especially for the creation of a new system of positive relations among the states that used to make up the Soviet Union, and it is the guarantor of the stability of these relations.” (Foreign Policy Concept, Russian Federation, 1993). 7. The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. “Edict 1833 of the President of the Russian Federation,” RMD, November 2, 1993. [Available at http://www. fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia- mil- doc.html.] 8. National Security Concept 2000; Russian Military Doctrine 2000; Foreign Policy Concept 2000. 9. “Russia: Kremlin sees its foreign policy star on rise.” RFE/RL, March 21, 2007. 10. The following discussion draws from Freire (2010). 11. Barry, Ellen. “Russia’s Neighbors Resist Wooing and Bullying,” The New York Times, July 2, 2009 [Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/world/europe/03russia.html.] 12. Medvedev cited in Chan, John. “Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Cautiously Endorses Russia over Georgia,” RFE/RL, September 3, 2008; “Support for Russia at SCO Summit,” Agence France Presse , August 29, 2008; “China, Central Asian States Back Russian Role in Georgia Conflict,” RIA Novosti, August 28, 2008. [Available at http://en.rian.ru/ russia/20080828/116345088.html.] 13. Pop, Valentina. “Georgian Leader Warns Europe Against Russia Warship Deal,” EUObserver, February 19, 2010. [Available at http://euobserver.com/13/29507.] Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 7575 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:254:50:25 PMPM Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_04_ch03.indd780230104648_04_ch03.indd 7676 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:254:50:25 PMPM CHAPTER FOUR The Power and Politics of Recognition: Status in China’s Foreign Relations1

Yong Deng

Editors’ note: This chapter on China highlights the dynamics of a state, rapidly rising in terms of capabilities and possibly global influence, yet having overachieved major power status. The analysis particularly focuses on the dilemmas involved with how China benefits both from its surplus of status and the status quo, while it holds substantial normative disagreements with a Western-engineered global order. It hints at the difficulties involved for Chinese (and other major powers’) foreign policy makers in navigating across policy alternatives that will not expose China’s continued weaknesses.

The concept of status, generally considered under the purview of sociology, has great analytical potential in explaining major power motivations in the post–Cold War era. It is particularly apt to account for the rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Deng 2008). But to do that, one has to adapt the concept to international relations where power, violence, and even war still figure in decision-makings—albeit less prominently than in the past. One also needs to reconsider it in light of the distinctive dynam-

ics behind the way China relates to the world—although the Chinese case - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright shows significant similarities with the strategic patterns of other emerging powers. As is typically understood in sociology, “status is social esteem and respect that typically yields influence” (Ridgeway 2006: 301). Only a minority of international relations (IR) scholars have been concerned about “status,” as it seemed far removed from activities under the anarchy of sovereign states. Those focused on great power politics posit that states

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 7777 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:584:49:58 PMPM 78 Yong Deng are preoccupied with their power positions in the international pecking order; none of them is satisfied with where they are, and all are prepared to fight wars in order to dominate. When status is used, it is no different from what Robert Gilpin calls “prestige,” which he defines as “reputation for power, and military power in particular” (Gilpin 1981: 31). In this vein, one study concludes, “it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things” (Wohlforth 2009: 57), suggesting jos- tling for status is even more irreconcilable than the simple form of power struggle. In the broader IR field, besides being considered in terms of the exercise of power, status is about the extent to which certain states matter over others, which can be objectively determined. The latter proposition has spawned a rich body of empirical work designed for scientific measurement. Taken together, the literature underscores and illuminates the importance of status for its entwinement with power and influence. As it is here applied to China, status is about developing the domestic political economy and the nation’s power, on the one hand, and, on the other, increasing overall positive recognition of its foreign policy practice and prospect for growing into a great power within the globalized world. During the reformist era, China has reconfigured its concern over international standing to suit its domestic agenda and, as such, its foreign relations have developed in tandem with its domestic transformation. The post–Cold War world and reformist China seems particularly conducive to a mutually adaptive process of reconfiguration of great- power politics. Since established major powers states play a critical role in withholding and conferring recognition (referred to in chapter 1 as in- group attribution), the danger of traditional balance- of- power, security dilemma, and war aimed at emerging powers weighs heavily in the calculations of the latter’s leaders trying to improve their country’s lot under system-changing globalization. Emerging powers like China would then take measures to deliberately limit power politics in their foreign relations. They strive to engage the world on their own terms while coming to terms with the realities, expectations, and standards of existing arrangements. The post–Cold War world where China found itself was dominated by the United States and like- minded advanced democracies. While complaining about the prejudiced treatment China received, its reformist leaders judged that their nation’s domestic and international future ultimately depended on working within the globalized world. The view, - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright coupled with the need for real synergy between their agenda at home and aspirations abroad, has led to an overall positive Chinese evaluation of the international system, emphasizing the latter’s opportunities and mal- leability. Yet, as an outsider and an emerging power, China finds itself dissatisfied over the power, institutional, and normative structures of the world.

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 7878 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 79 As a result, China’s foreign policy has been a process of realigning its international environment to suit the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders’ domestic transition. Its strategy entails careful management of deepening economic globalization as well as of the hostility, suspicion, and expectations from the outside world. The PRC resorts to a mixture of participation, adaptation, and leverage designed to integrate itself into the world while paving the way to become a wealthy and respected great power. Some twenty years later, the country has moved from post-Tiananmen international estrangement to the center of world politics where it appears to belong to any proposed group of great powers in the twenty- first century. That success has fundamentally limited China’s revisionist impulse while enhancing the country’s stakes and participation in the existing world order. The foreign policy path that China has travelled suggests the possibility of a status competition where roles and interests are sufficiently differentiated among great powers in the globalized world order to create a real alternative to the war-prone power politics of the past.

China’s Status Pursuit: Conception and Dynamics

The PRC contributed its share in the defeat of the Soviet empire, but was sidelined in the making of the new post–Cold War world order. Worse still, the Tiananmen incident in June 1989 thrust the CCP government into the category of anachronistic regimes ill suited for the new world order. After initial shock and panic, Deng Xiaoping and other CCP leaders took a realistic measure of their country’s position and regrouped to join the world. The choice was determined by China’s identity as a reformist, modernizing, and globalizing country. Equally important, the international community lent support to Chinese reformers with recipro- cal openness. The Tiananmen incident turned China’s world upside down; reform plans at home were derailed by regime crisis. Internationally, in its aftermath, the PRC faced all but universal condemnation and sanctions led by the West that had just defeated the Soviet bloc and moved on to restructure the world. With their country’s domestic and international fate hanging in balance, Chinese leaders would quickly try to put both fronts on track. Domestically, it was a matter of restoring CCP control and resuscitating - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright reform agenda. Internationally, however, they were confronted with the much more daunting task of engineering a foreign policy comeback from a drastically downgraded and denigrated status compared to what it had enjoyed prior to the Tiananmen tragedy. Fundamentally China’s predicament lies with the fact that it is an illiberal rising power in the relatively established international arrangement

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 7979 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM 80 Yong Deng dominated by the United States and other advanced Western democracies. In the parlance of the social psychology, it belongs to the “out- group” as opposed to the great power “in-group.” 2 As noted in chapter 1, being cast outside the established dominant in- group is for the outsider to be denigrated in large measure in terms of its overall standing in the whole international system. This group division and inequality underpin the new international status quo in lieu of the bloc politics of the Cold War, when the world was effectively divided into two separate camps guided by diametrically opposite ideologies. The out- group hardly represents an alternative world order. For China, the post–Cold War world was hierarchical, unfair, and even discriminatory, but it was also contested, in f lux, and ultimately open to newcomers. The standards of great powers could be either reachable or negotiated. Critically, Chinese leaders believed it imperative and possible for China to capitalize on globalization to strengthen its material capacities and domestic governance. It was with this belief that they insisted that the world offered opportunities for “peace and development” that China could not afford to miss (Xiaoping 1993; see also Peng and Yao 1994; Wang 1996). This decision made it possible for the Chinese reformers to tie domestic reforms to deepening participation in the global market and to pivot foreign policy on self- socialization and adaptation into the existing world system. With these considerations defining its international role, China’s status pursuit has shown three patterns. First, at the start China was a rising power and also an outsider in relations to the established great powers. Hence status is not just about recognition of the power the country has, but also about securing the international environment that makes the power growth possible. Since power may change quickly, giving due recognition has less to do with the level of power than with the rate and prospect of the power growth. Chinese leaders desire an international environment where balancing and containment are mitigated such that the world remains open and supportive to its growing profile. Specifically, Chinese leaders have to manage the fear of, and antipathy toward, an illiberal power on the fast track to the center of the world. In these terms, status must be earned through means acceptable to the existing world order. Second, China was judged to be inadequate in regard to democratic values, market reforms, and foreign policy practice. Yet, great power - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright standards are not given; they are contested in their definitions and varied in their interpretations and executions. The PRC will resist calls for compliance if it believes them to be out of ill-intentioned exaggeration of its capacity or responsibility. Nor does it respond well to what its leaders perceive to be self-serving manipulations of global standards by Western powers. The ruling CCP-state is wary of giving credence to denigration

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8080 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 81 of its polity and the danger of domestic destabilization. It promises continued political reforms at home but insists on doing so on its own terms, suitable for its own interests and the nation’s history and culture.3 China has made strides in improving its people’s economic welfare, social- economic rights, private property protection, and overall governance. The state even allows for some opening of political space and popular participation in the decision-making process. But it has drawn a line in preventing development leading to two- or multiple- party democracy.4 Thus China’s political reforms have fallen short of Western expectations, creating a political problem the Chinese polity must contend with in its foreign relations. While market reforms seem more open-ended than political change, they too are shaped by legacies of the Maoist command economy and by the herculean task of transforming a backward, unevenly developed economy into a modern one. In an economy as complex as China’s, even when there are pockets and segments of the society that have reached the developed rank and its aggregate numbers look impressive, its capitalist practices will exhibit strong state regulation and features typical of a developing country. In terms of foreign policy, the post–Cold War world order generates imperatives for China to redefine sovereignty, nationalism, and national interests. From the start, the engagement policy toward China as pursued by the United States and its democratic al lies was predicated on both a judgment and an expectation that the country needed change toward greater compliance with the dominant global standards. The policy beliefs culminated in the US call for China to become a “responsible stakeholder.”5 The two countries never came to a clear, shared understanding of its precise meaning. In particular, China suspected self-serving US motives, but it accepted the call although implicitly as an invitation for conditional but positive interaction within the world. But a shared, cosmopolitan understanding is hard to come by for any country, much less China whose relationship with the world has been particularly tumultuous. The painful domestic transition gives rise to a peculiar set of shortfalls in terms of social and regional inequity, of the gap between low per capita income and impressive aggregate strengths, of problems threatening sustainability of growth, and of the CCP’s struggle for enhanced governance and legitimacy. Those domestic problems only - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright add to tentativeness and event timidity in international commitments. 6 Internationally, as various sociologically informed studies show, the inten- tion and behavior of a rising and “other” power like China would be subject to particularly close scrutiny (Mercer 1996; Larson 1997; Haas 2005). Thus what the CCP leaders deem to be the best course of actions often falls short of international expectations.

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8181 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM 82 Yong Deng Third, international recognition may fluctuate and become subject to inf luence by political expediency. Since the end of the Cold War, key components of the great- power arrangement have undergone major realignment, adjusting the playing field for China’s international engagement. The PRC’s policy preferences and options have evolved accordingly. Its domestic politics, while rife with challenges for governance and social stability, has not escalated into real organized opposition to the party-state. Thus, the CCP has generally kept domestic politics from derailing China’s international strategy. Overall there has been no rupture in the interactive process between China and the world. Power redistribution such as the one created by China’s rise historically tended to generate intense great-power rivalry only to be resolved by war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1980; Kennedy 1987; Mearsheimer 2001). The PRC’s status politics are characterized by an acute awareness of that historical pattern and a self-conscious effort to avoid that worst violent outcome by both China and the established great powers. But as the systemic power configuration affects how status competition plays out (Wohlforth 2009), so have China’s relative power gains brought about changes to the interaction between the Chinese and other powers’ policy choices. Status may not and often does not match power, but the importance of hard power is not lost on national leaders. The leaders may overestimate or underestimate their country’s status, but international politics is such that their strength will be frequently tested in foreign policy practice. Thus there is a constant reality check on hard power, namely the material resources at the possession of states and especially those resources that could be potentially mobilized to serve a foreign course. In the case of China, the CCP’s preoccupation with the domestic front only reinforces its leaders’ awareness of how far China has to go before it truly arrives as a fully developed great power. Moreover, status is not just about whether the state’s coercive power is accurately estimated and recognized. It also critically entails positive recognition of the contribution that the emerging power can make in terms of its benign intentions. Status is not just about how big you are, but also about how “good” you are. The latter, by definition, is intensely contested in international politics. The hegemonic bias in favor of the dominant in- group (Volgy and Mayhall 1995: 69) will be frequently tested by intragroup politics (Barnes 1992) and changed power relations in general. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Views on the International Order

China’s concept and pursuit of its major power status both result from and shape how China looks at the world order. The analytical scheme

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8282 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 83 in chapter 1 considers China as an “overachiever” whose status is more than satisfied considering its relative backwardness in development. In fact, quite a few observers have pointed out the tendency of the international community to overstate China’s importance on the world stage while accusing Western powers of pandering to Beijing.7 Indeed, despite China’s complaints about mistreatment by the West, objectively the country might have enjoyed the greatest status gains among all the major powers. Nevertheless, the linkage of CCP legitimacy and China’s development to the outside world, coupled with the contemporary international politics that encourages and rewards participation and responsibility for newcomers like China, also powerfully shapes the country’s evaluation of the international status quo. The post–Cold War global architecture essentially concerns the power arrangement, the institutional framework, the global economic system, and the normative structure. Chinese revisionist impulses have been focused on the US-centered hegemony and its corresponding normative order, and to the extent that these components of the international arrangement are perceived to be the biggest drawback to China’s status quest. Yet, discontent has also been mollified and channeled by a host of institutions and by economic globalization. In this section, I review Chinese assessment of these pillars of the world order to decipher motives behind its participation as well as sources of its discontent. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the hegemony of the United States and its fellow advanced democracies collectively had a firm hold on an international society that cast China to an outlier position. Within the Chinese policy and the scholarly community a debate soon followed as to the strength and durability of Western hegemony. In the end the mainstream view came to accept that, despite Chinese wishes to the contrary, the US- led grouping of advanced democracies would be the fundamental geopolitical reality China had to deal with during the vital period of its great power rise. Also stressed was “multi-polarization”: an open-ended process of power diffusion suggesting both Chinese discontent with the existing power distribution and hope for improved international environment. These views quietly gained ascendency. But they were called into question in times of crises, particularly when sanctions were imposed on China following the 1989 Tiananmen incident, and a decade later when NATO mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright war over Kosovo (Deng 2001; Pillsbury 2000). To the extent that such debate was tied to the assessment of what strategy made sense, recognizing Western hegemony, even if grudgingly, was consequential. It supported the view that confrontational resistance to the world order was futile and counterproductive. Through much of the post– Cold War era the view of a relatively strong and flexible international

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8383 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM 84 Yong Deng hierarchy has remained constant, and so has the PRC’s determination to work within the system. As for international institutions China has pursued active participation while enhancing representation of its own preferences and interests. Perhaps the most dramatic event was its accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in late 2001 after long, tortuous negotiations, thereby completing its membership in all of the post–World War II Bretton Woods institutions. For Chinese reformers WTO accession demonstrated two things that have preoccupied their status concern: deepening their country’s integration into the world was possible, and such opening could be harnessed to serve their country’s domestic transformation. While they had complained that the long process was “politicized,” ultimately the negotiations were framed by the established rules stipulated in GATT/WTO. The end result certainly proved that the United States and other major trading powers were ultimately receptive to China’s entrance. Such acceptance did not come without certain demands for change on China, but the ensuing pressures did not unduly undermine the state autonomy. Rather, the CCP leadership was adept at capitalizing on the external stimuli to enhance state- building and governance. The result is a country better positioned to compete in economic globalization and world politics at large. Also consequential was its gradually increasing profile in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, giving China a larger voice in shaping the global economic and financial order. A similar pattern was also evident in the United Nations (UN), where China has seen its influence grow in the UN’s political and security decision-making on a range of issues including human rights, nonproliferation, and peace-keeping operations. The only major institution that China is still absent from is the G-8. The exclusion was a source of bitter, if muted rancor among the Chinese political elites. Until most recently, they tended to overstate the group’s ability to aggregate and promote the collective Western preferences and interests. As the new century began, China began to show a willingness to engage with the great power forum. It sent high-ranking officials to join G- 7 dialogue on economic and financial issues, and President Hu Jintao attended several G-8 meetings at the host countries’ invitations on global development and political issues. The global financial crisis in 2008–09 pushed the G-8 into near oblivion. The creation of G- 20 included China as an inaugural member of the new premier global economic platform. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Concurrently, prominent and influential analysts in the United States floated the idea of a G-2 “between the United States and China to steer the global governance process” (Bergsten 2008: 66). While premature, the idea raises tantalizing possibilities for the Chinese leadership about their country’s promising international future. Global institutional reforms must now take into account China’s central role in every global issue.

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8484 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 85 In Asia, regional institutions are not formally structured, and their emphasis on preserving sovereignty and mutual accommodation has matched well the Chinese style of diplomacy. In subregions (except for Southeast Asia), institutional development was so lacking as to invite Chinese leadership. The most long-standing regional institutions are those centered on, if not always led by, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). They are comprised of the annual security dialogue through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN cooperation with Japan, China, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) individually via ASEAN Plus One in addition to ASEAN Plus Three (PRC, Japan, and ROK), and the political East Asian Summit. While this institutional cluster has a geographically East Asian focus, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) includes, in addition to East Asian economies, many of the states in Oceania and the Pacific east coast. China has taken a high-profile role in multilateral endeavors in Northeast Asia and Central Asia, respectively, hosting the Six-Party Talks to address the North Korean nuclear issue, and leading the Beijing-headquartered Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), that focuses on influencing Central Asia and beyond. China’s turnaround in showing such a high level of enthusiasm, entre- preneurship, and profile in regional multilateral institution-building did not begin until the late 1990s. By the end of that decade, China’s development both at home and abroad prompted a new look at its role in the region. The neighboring region was no longer a launch pad for extraregional powers to contain China, nor was its structure so fixed that it left little leeway for China to maneuver. Twenty years of reforms had elevated China from merely the latest developing economy to an economic pow- erhouse. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, the PRC became an engine and a leader of regional growth as well as for economic and financial cooperation, which previously had been dominated by Japan and the four tigers (Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan).8 Development on both domestic and international fronts had evolved toward a new nexus whereby regionalism figured prominently. Deng X iaoping and other Chinese reform ist leaders f irst saw the reg iona l and global capitalist systems as ideologically suspect, but they also realized that their attempt to reinvigorate the badly tattered Chinese economy could not succeed without joining that world. Early openings were lim- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ited by tentative experimentations, tight central control, and scrupulous political oversight. While the party- state has always sought to regulate interdependence, the Chinese economy and, for that matter the whole country have been gradually drawn deeper into globalization. Adapting to the changing realities, Deng and his successors drew up ambitious plans to proactively position the economy globally, to spur domestic market

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8585 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM 86 Yong Deng reforms, and to enhance international competition. Success and CCP leadership confidence gave rise to an open recognition of the new reality of “economic globalization” in Chinese foreign relations, even though the same process also generated occasional backlashes from antireform political conservatives and nationalists. Moreover, an expanded view of market forces as an impetus for opening economic and foreign policy opportunities for China started to take hold in the country.9 China’s heavy state regulations, mercantilist practices, and the sheer scope of its economic expansion have led to accusations of free-riding on issues ranging from trade to climate change. They also left China vulnerable to punitive sanctions by its trading partners, either unilaterally or through the World Trade Organization (WTO) rulings. China has reacted with complaints about unfair treatment and with its own retaliatory measures or recourse to institutional settlement. Overall, the PRC has benefitted greatly from the open global market and, with its rising economic power, it has carried greater weight than before in shaping international capitalism. Amidst its enthusiastic embrace of economic globalization, the country has resisted “westernization”: refusing to adopt a liberal polity and values both at home and abroad. The wave of globalization on which China has ridden has so far succeeded where past phases of globalization failed, namely, to lay the foundation for an economically based international community of peace (Brooks 2005; Rosecrance and Thompson 2006). Deeply intertwined interests, coupled with intensified and institutionalized social and political interactions, have the potential to create a semblance of social and geopolitical community necessary for China to pursue status compatibility with other major powers.10 Yet, as trade disputes have proved manageable, how China fits into the global normative framework has proven highly intractable. Particularly intractable is the problem that China’s own practices at home and abroad do not live up to the Western promotion of democracy and human rights. As the PRC moves further to the center of world politics, its polity will present a real test as to how far the established powers will go in accepting the illiberal Chinese power. As China’s global footprint extends further into every corner of the world, its alignment and protection of rights- abusing states from Sudan to Myanmar has already come under criticism. Stalled democratizations in China’s neighboring countries in Asia also have - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright raised concern about China’s political role in the region and beyond. Compared with human rights, China is more amenable to contribute its share to other issues of global governance, including weapons proliferation, climate change emissions, trade protectionism, and financial instability. To be sure, extracting compliance is not easy on any of these issues, particularly when the terms of the trade-off may not be preferential

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8686 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 87 to its own immediate interests. Pressing global challenges often blur and dilute the political division between China and other democratic powers. China’s role in dealing with these issues has been part of its growth as a great power. China has in general accepted the broad contours of international global arrangements. Despite various refrains in its international preferences, the country has not pushed for a truly “Chinese” world to replace the existing international system. This does not mean China does not prefer less Western dominance, greater say in international institutions, more influence in rules-making in the global marketplace, and greater representation of its own values and interests in the global normative framework. However, China has judged that its status can be best advanced presently within the global status quo. Success in making their country more pros- perous at home and more respected abroad has reinforced an overall positive sense among the Chinese elites about their country’s role in world politics. Alternative ideas of either retreating from the world or radically revamping the established order have not made inroads in Chinese debates about its international strategy.

Foreign Policy Practice

In terms of foreign policy practice, China has to reassure the world that it is not a traditional revisionist power, to address the international standards and expectations placed upon it, and to manage the inherent uncertainties in its status politics. As E. H. Carr noted more than half a century ago, “Every country wanted to achieve the aims of its policy without war, and therefore stood for peace” (Carr 1946: 140). Hence professed intent of benevolence can only be made credible through behaviors. Legitimate recognition does not just follow power, but entails demonstrating how China’s rise can also benefit others as well as continuously negotiating, if not complying with, certain prevailing norms and standards. For status advancement, the country must balance supporting and accepting the realities in world politics, on the one hand, and, on the other, pushing its interests and preferences. Thus, in its foreign policy practice, China opts to live within the constraints of a US- led global order. Consistent with the framework in - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright chapter 1, as an overachieving status-inconsistent major power, China has been extremely cautious in directly challenging the basic components of global order. It has shunned confrontation with the United States, even when major crises severely tested the Sino- American relationship. It has sought participation in global and regional institutions and multilateral regimes, even when doing so required significant unilateral adaptation

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8787 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM 88 Yong Deng and sometimes rethinking of national interests (Johnston 2008; Wu and Lansdowne 2008). Its challenge to the global normative order in terms of human rights and democracy has so far been limited to protecting the security and legitimacy of the CCP state in both domestic and international politics. Its search for a new great power path is even evident on issues involving border disputes or irredentist claims, although dangers of militarized conflicts over several territorial conflicts persist. China’s economic integration into the world has brought great welfare and wealth to the country, but the benefits to the larger world are also balanced by the great pains of adjustment. The Chinese leadership from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao has set nonconfrontation as a fundamental policy toward the United States. Such a strategic choice has even stood the test of several major crises that, if mishandled, could conceivably have derailed China’s status pursuit. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, had opponents of reforms prevailed in Chinese domestic politics, the country would likely have reacted to Western condemnation with isolation and confrontation. In 1995–96, China fired missiles to deter Taiwanese independence, and the United States in response dispatched two carrier groups near the Taiwan Strait. In May 1999, the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy during the war against Yugoslavia inflamed vociferous anti- Western nationalism. Two years later, a US surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet in the airspace over the South China Sea. These crises could have led to accidental militarized conflicts or to a Chinese turn away from the world and lasting hostilities toward the West. Invariably, while setbacks to Chinese foreign relations followed, the crises did not cause any radical change. They led to some joint efforts to enhance mutual confidence and communication, albeit with limited effect on the deepest level of strategic suspicion (Swaine and Zhang 2006). A materialist explanation does not seem adequate to explain China’s responses to these crises. True, it would be a strategic folly for a relatively weak China to prematurely challenge the United States. But a much weaker Maoist China was clearly much less restrained by the vast power asymmetry. What is at work in post–Cold War Chinese decision- making is the reformist leaderships’ search for a revamped relationship between their country and the world. The imperative of cultivating positive recognition as an international actor effectively raised the costs - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright of confrontation to a prohibitively high level. China’s steady ascent in great power status has not pushed China to a reckless foreign policy; rather, it has firmed up confidence in its carefully paved international path. China’s emphasis on positive recognition and restraint stand in sharp contrast to Russian policy makers who, in a more severe status predicament, opted to express frustrations with the status quo through

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8888 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 89 adventurism abroad, coercive diplomacy, and even violence against small neighbors. While China’s steady military modernization is unsettling for the United States and China’s neighboring states, it has not attempted to form an alliance with non- Western powers or a power bloc against the international system. Its strategic partnerships with Russia and India formed respectively in 1996 and 2005 were more about managing bilateral relationships than traditional Waltzian “external balancing” against the West (Waltz 1979). The PRC shunned Russian prime minister Yevgeniy Primakov’s suggestion for a separate Russia- India-China coalition in the late 1990s (Lo 2008: 161). The Sino-Indian partnership proved lacking in substance, especially since India’s subsequent tilt toward the United States and Japan. The three emerging powers have found a united voice in limiting the dominance of the developed countries in the world order, but their coordination has been mostly on development issues of common concern, and not on geostrategic issues. How to handle territorial disputes represents the hardest test of the PRC’s status pursuit, designed to differ from both its earlier Maoist revolutionary diplomacy and more traditional great power politics. The use of violence figured prominently (Vasquez 2000; Whiting 2001) in both cases. During the reform era, China’s approach to territorial disputes with neighboring countries and Taiwan reflects its own great-power mentality, but also often involves its relations with other major powers. Since the end of the Cold War, China has managed to devise negotiated settlements on land border disputes with the majority of neighboring countries, including Russia, Vietnam, and Central Asian states. While permanent resolutions of maritime disputes have proven more elusive, China and its neighboring claimants have managed to prevent occasional incidents from escalating into militarized conflicts. Taiwan is in many ways a unique territorial issue for China, but the mainland’s policy toward the island is telling in terms of its great power mindset. Mainland China has resorted to deterrence and coercive measures against the proindependence forces, particularly those of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). At the same time, it has appealed to a common Chinese nationalism with the pro-one China Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan. More importantly, it has taken concrete measures to solidify social, economic, and cultural ties across the Strait. The result is a Taiwan already - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright deeply integrated in the mainland economy and a China with greater leverage than before in setting the terms for cross-Straits relations. But it must be sensitive to the limits on its policy options, bounded by Taiwan’s domestic politics and the international politics surrounding the issue. Liberal institutions under the postwar US hegemony introduce a unique ability for the international status quo to mollify and regularize

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 8989 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM 90 Yong Deng the otherwise rough- and- tumble, and sometimes even cut- throat, great- power competition (Ikenberry 2001). Hence China’s end of revolutionary diplomacy coincided with its receptivity to those institutions. The late 1970s marked the beginning of a mutual acceptance between the PRC and the institutions of the postwar international capitalist order (Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990). China’s accession into WTO in 2001 completed its membership in all of the leading financial, economic, and trade institutions. While its share of contribution and political weight have remained relatively small, they have trended upward having had its financial quo- tas increased in both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the first decade of the new century. The global financial crisis of 2008 added impetus to increasing China’s representation. These institutions have given others, particularly the strong established powers, a platform to push for change in China’s practices. Despite the many risks, the reformist leaders consider participation as essential in integrating and expanding the role of their country in the global political economy. Equally important, China has called on and sometimes demanded the international institutions to give developing countries and emerging powers greater say in global governance. And in so doing, it has collaborated with other emerging powers, projected an image as an advocate of the developing countries, and pressed the global institutions to come to terms with the new realities, and above all, with the rise of China. The PRC invariably places the UN at the center of its world visions, not least because of China’s special role in the Security Council and the sovereignty principle the international body upholds. Over the years, China has tried to make it into an effective organization governing global affairs. If in the past much of its support had been rhetorical, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the country’s contributions to the UN turned substantial. While its share of the UN budget has seen some increment, its participation in the UN peacekeeping missions has been considerable compared to other major powers. At the same time, depending on its interests, the PRC has also used its veto power in the Security Council to deflect and soften international pressures on human rights and prolifera- tions by countries like Sudan, Myanmar, Iran, and North Korea. Since the late 1990s, China’s proactive engagement with multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region was perhaps the most remarkable shift in the PRC’s foreign policy—a pattern consistent with the suggestions - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright in chapter 1 about investments in cooperative architecture by overachieving status inconsistent major powers. From our status perspective, the change is hardly surprising. Chinese power would have the most immediate impact on its neighbors, and so statecraft in handling regional relations crystallizes its international intent. The underinstitutionalized regional order offers a great opportunity for China to utilize multilateralism to

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 9090 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 91 complement bilateral relations without being tied down by a fixed structure. Also, these Asian institutions have helped with conf lict management and confidence building in the region effectively buying time for China to focus on developing itself into an economically and technologically advanced great power. The new Chinese approach is marked by a support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality, real efforts to promote meaningful regional economic and financial cooperation, and reassurance of its disinterest in exclusive regionalism or military blocs. China’s new role in regional institutional development has earned trust and influence while promoting its economic, security, and political interests. In terms of a normative global framework, while compliance with liberal democratic values has been most problematic for China, its foreign policy is hardly guided by a systemic, alternative value system or ideology. Its protection of unsavory regimes is as much out of pragmatic interest in energy access as about lessening international pressure on itself. The country’s unsettled domestic transition imposes a sense of humility and real limits, even if the Chinese leaders were to contemplate exporting its developing model. As late as February 2009, in a speech at Cambridge University, Premier Wen Jiabao insisted, “China will be a peaceful power, learning power [Xuexide Daguo], and cooperative power, dedicated to building a harmonious world.”11 Tellingly, the fast spreading Confucius Institutes, which the Chinese government has helped to create across the world since 2004, are named after an ancient sage philosopher born some 2,000 year ago. And the traditional value system of Confucianism has heavily influenced the most successful capitalist societies in East Asia. The institutes’ foreign partners, mostly institutions of higher education, are motivated first and foremost by the opportunities the collaborative project creates for language and cultural learning. China’s domestic reforms, economic competitiveness, and overall great- power rise are tied to the global marketplace and transnational forces, which both underpin and transform the world order.12 The PRC has benefitted greatly on all three fronts. Yet, with its economic growth, the need for energy and other natural resources may create “lateral pressure” for armament and even foreign military adventurism (Choucri and North 1975; North and Choucri 1983; Choucri and North 1989). Less ominous than the threat of war is the issue concerning how China manages its eco- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright nomic leverage in dealing with other third world countries.13 Even with the best of intentions, economic interdependence inevitably raises issues of power, control, interference, unfairness, and even outright exploita- tion of developing countries, which China is loathe to be accused of, yet with which it must contend (Blanchard, Mansfield, and Ripsman 2000). As the economy reaches its current scale, China is called on to do its part

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 9191 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM 92 Yong Deng in contributing to the fairness and sustainability of the global economy. The new demand will challenge the role it is accustomed to as well as the habitual thinking among its political elites. China has vowed to pursue a new mode of great-power politics, but the foreign policy pursuit is still confronted with myriad unresolved issues. Its unfinished, CCP-led Chinese style of modernization, experimentations, and reforms at home are integral to the risks and opportunities China’s rise creates for the international arena. Historical problems and contemporary geopolitical competition give rise to the persistent mistrust that has marked China’s relationships with both Western powers and emerging powers, including its “strategic partners,” Russia and India. China’s neighboring countries in Asia have also reacted to China’s rise with apprehension, which Beijing’s reassurance alone has proven inadequate to dissipate. Regional states prefer their autonomy to be guaranteed by all major powers’ engagement in the regional architecture, which limits each other’s influence. Territorial disputes on land and at sea remain unsettled with India, Japan, Vietnam, and others. In its role as the host of the Six-Party Talks, China has presented itself as part of solution to the North Korea nuclear crisis, but the uncertain outcome of the process has raised doubts about China’s role. The Taiwan issue by its nature defies an easily available permanent solution, as the US- PRC- Taiwan triangular dynamics are rife with potential sources of surprise. China’s economic expansion and growing power to transform patterns of regional cooperation has prompted questions about institutional building and reforms in Asia and beyond, and more profoundly, debates over the future of globalization across the world. The adaptability of the existing world order to reflect the values and interests of the newcomers such as China will be even more severely tested as we proceed deeper into the twenty-first century, where China must face greater challenges in managing its ambitions, particularly as it wields greater leverage in determining the terms of its foreign relations. Rising powers are by definition dissatisfied with what they have. In China’s case, that dissatisfaction drives domestic reforms and foreign policy adaptations. Compared with its views on global markets and institutions, China’s revisionism is particularly strong vis- à- vis the Western hegemony and wide normative acceptance of what its political elites believe to be exclusive “Western” democratic principles. But even in these - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright areas, Chinese foreign policy practice is marked by an absence of hostile balancing or a zealous global campaign to undermine democracies. Its discontent with the international status quo has been assuaged by the global marketforce and institutions (both regional and global) that have offered the rising power opportunities for economic growth and great- power recognition.

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 9292 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:49:594:49:59 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 93 The fast track in status advancement has reassured China, and reinforced for itself the belief that its own choices can increase international confidence, trust, and acceptance in lieu of fear, suspicion, and hostilities toward its increasing power. Through the process, China has resisted calls it deems as unreasonable for either compliance with international standards or contribution to global governance. While accepting the international arrangement, it has also succeeded in negotiating the terms of participation. When the CCP marked the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic in 2009, it highlighted China’s new found great-power role, in stark contrast to the century preceding 1949 and the subsequent Maoist era.

Conclusion: Toward a New Start in China’s Status Politics

China’s status conception must be understood in terms of how its reformist leaders’ definition of national self- identity is based on how their domestic agenda fits within Western-dominated, but heavily globalized world politics. Chinese leaders have frequently voiced their complaints about the unfair international system, some of which echo discontent common to developing countries. More importantly, they are indignant at what they believe as deliberate denial of rightful support and recognition exhibited through politically motivated discrimination and unwarranted fear of Chinese power. However, there is recognition that overall the world has positively reacted to China’s policy choice as a reformist country whose fate is tied to the globalized world. The patterns of Chinese foreign relations have conformed to what is predicted of an “overachiever” in chapter 1. Indeed China’s foreign policy is marked by following Deng Xiaoping’s “lie low” strategy.14 At the same time, it has struggled to enhance influence, to live up to international expectations, and to deal with the mixed reactions from abroad to its great power aspirations. The CCP leadership’s preoccupation with myriad domestic problems means that China’s foreign policy activism would be even more limited than what is expected from structural factors associated with the country’s relative power. The international arrangement is always in flux and great-powers relations are inherently uncertain. Hence, status politics is more complicated - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright than simply determining and conferring “due” recognition. This was made particularly clear in 2008–09 when the global financial crisis suddenly highlighted the many forces that seemed to be leveling the playing field for China’s interaction with other powers. The enormous financial assets China holds and its role as the largest creditor to the United States have not led to dramatic shifts in China’s America policy (Drezner 2009a).

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 9393 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:004:50:00 PMPM 94 Yong Deng From our status perspective, such continuity is expected. The crisis did by no means solve the difficulties in, or break the link between, China’s domestic and international transition. In certain circumstances, it in fact aggravated some of the problems compelling caution in Chinese foreign relations. However, from the same perspective, the long-term impact could be far-reaching in reshaping the terms of China’s engagement with the world. By all accounts, China’s status has now entered a new stage. Events in the first decade of the twenty-first century have thrust China into a global position it has long sought but for which it is hardly prepared. Chinese nationalism since the Opium War of the 1840s has been defined by “a continuing struggle for recognition, by others, as their equal” (Fitzgerald 2006: 100). As one Chinese diplomat and senior policy adviser declared in 2009, China has not only achieved “equal status” with the West but has joined “the center of the world stage.”15 Most of the mainstream Chinese commentary took note of China’s new global position with satisfaction and confidence. Meanwhile, at the popular level, a book voicing frustrations with the state of China’s domestic and international affairs, while calling for more Chinese assertiveness in dealing with the West, turned into a best seller.16 As relative power shifts in their country’s favor, Chinese leaders and analysts also are prompted to reconsider the new opportunities and demands for its status quest; they are both optimistic about China’s international future and deeply concerned about the uncertainties of its international environment. A debate seems to be brewing both inside and outside over what are to be the next steps for Chinese foreign relations. With all its successes, the PRC now finds itself in an unfamiliar position in the twenty-first century. For established powers, hard questions regarding recognition of an illiberal new power, questions that have been more or less deferred, are being pushed to the fore. Yet, China’s international activism amidst the global financial crisis showed unprecedented integration and participation in the world. In accommodating China’s rise, the world has also transformed China. The country must learn to share status with other emerging powers, including India and Brazil, while managing its nationalist aspirations. The same forces that have made possible China’s rise will likely continue to shape how it defines a new international role both commensurate with its own interests and acceptable in the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright globalized world. Lacking presently is the country’s sense of complete integration into and ownership of the globalized world as well as the corresponding sense of obligations and leadership that come with great power status. Getting there should be the central task for the next stage of China’s foreign policy transformation and the engagement policy toward the country by other major powers.

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 9494 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:004:50:00 PMPM The Power and Politics of Recognition 95 Notes

1. I would like to thank the editors for most useful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. 2. The pioneering study is Tajfel (1981); see also Hogg and Abrams (1988). 3. See Cheng (2008); Perry (2008). 4. See O’Brien and Li (2006); Yang (2006); Tsai (2006); Cheng (2008). 5. The US deputy secretary of state, Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” September 21, 2005. [Available at http://www.ncuscr.org/ articlesandspeeches/Zoellick.htm.] 6. Shirk (2007) highlights some of the problems limiting China’s international role. 7. See, for example, Segal (1999) and Mann (2007). 8. For the logic of regional development in East Asia in the early stages, see Bernard and Ravenhill (1995). 9. See Zweig (2002); Deng and Moore (2004); Wang (2007); Pearson (2006); some typical antiglobalization views were expressed in Fang, Wang, and Song (1999). 10. On geopolitical dimensions, see Deng and Moore (2004). 11. “Excerpts of Premier Wen Jiabao’s Speech at the British Cambridge University,” Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (overseas edition), February 4, 2009, p. 4 (italics added). 12. For an excellent overview on economic dimensions, see Naughton (2007). 13. The classic study is Hirschman (1945). 14. Deng’s instructions to the CCP leadership on Chinese foreign policy in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen incident is—“Calmly observe the situations; secure our footing; cope changes with confidence; conceal capacities and bide our time; skillfully keep a low profile; avoid sticking [one’s] head out; be proactive.” For further discussions, see Xiaoping (1993); Peng and Yao (1994); Wang (1996). 15. Jianmin, Wu. “Yige laowaijiaoguan de gankai [A Veteran Diplomat’s Ref lections],” People’s Daily (overseas edition), September 7, 2009, p. 1; ibid, “Zhongguo: Zoudao shijie wutai zhongxin [China: Arriving at the Center of the World Stage],”People’s Daily (overseas edition), December 31, 2009, p. 1. 16. Song Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Huang Jishu, Song Qiang, and Liu Yi (2009). The book in my possession is marked with “eleventh printing.” Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 9595 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:004:50:00 PMPM Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_05_ch04.indd780230104648_05_ch04.indd 9696 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:004:50:00 PMPM CHAPTER FIVE French Power-Seeking and Overachievement

Bertrand Badie

Editors’ note: This chapter, focusing on France, illustrates both the salience of high status for certain major powers, and the difficult foreign policy options available to those states with limited resources in pursuing status above and beyond resource capabilities. Note in the French case the extent to which the pursuit of status appears to be impacted by both changing exogenous and domestic political conditions.

Power appears as a paradox in French politics as well as in the French policy. The French sociologist Michel Crozier (1957) pointed to his motherland as “the land of Command” and stressed the exceptional role of power in French political culture. We can hardly f ind a country in which power was so debated and was finally so inefficient. France was defeated at least three times within one century: the 1871 defeat resulted in the construction of the French Republic; the 1940 trauma has never been overcome and is still ignored by generations of young pupils who imagine that their country was among the “four winners” of the World War II. Moreover, the colonial wars led to a strange combination of military victories and political defeats. Among the P5 members, France was the first to understand that,

in the new world, power was not always powerful (Badie 2004). - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright For these reasons, power has generated a real schizophrenia, which is the cultural background of French political development, but which also helps to understand the exceptional French management of foreign policy. If 1945 does represent a clear break, and perhaps more, in the French lineage, it was also the starting point of a new experience of reshaping power, by actively seeking new niches (Cooper 1997), and by retraining

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 9797 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:567:10:56 PMPM 98 Bertrand Badie efficiently the old vision of power into new fields. The process was rather successful, leading to an overachievement of French major power status— quite the opposite of the British approach. However, the overachievement was very fragile, and paradoxically did not really resist some features of the current post- bipolar world. The recognition of this status is frail and volatile; it implies strong domestic debates, costs, efforts, and even tricks that can be challenged at any moment. Such a risk jeopardizes the French ruling class.

The French Schizophrenia of Power

France was at first one of the major actors of the Westphalian Peace. All the components of the “first” new world order were tested by the French state- building process. The very notions of nation, state, dynastic center, territory, borderlines, and sovereignty were largely shaped through French political development, while England started playing on her exceptionalism and leaving her continental ambitions. Thus, the first Westphalian wars brought into conflict the major European states and sovereign powers seizing territory as the major stake. Moreover, France was the main reference for the coalition systems that were actually built to contain or balance Louis XIV’s power. This new perspective paved the way for new international practices and prepared the return of England during the nineteenth century; it completed the new significance of international power, which was deeply state-centered and mainly achieved through public actors, public conscription (levée en masse), and taxation for the financing of war. The new process entailed the decay of empires—particularly the Habsburg Empire—while convincing the French elites that France was the new standard of international power. In this perspective, the French diplomatic network started growing: it swiftly boasted to be the most elaborate in the world. The French language was accepted as the major diplomatic instrument, while international law blossomed mainly through the French school of law. In the military field, the second wave of the revolutionary (the Bonaparte Italian Campaign) and Napoleonic wars definitely helped to create the idea of what a major power was in the modern Westphalian context. This history structured the international system up until 1939, through - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright both concert diplomacy and club diplomacy, with the latter being initiated at the end of World War I. In Locarno (1925), Stresa (1935), Munich (1938), as well as the Council of the League of Nations, France became used to being part of the oligarchy that had the charge of ruling the European Continent and even the world. The summits held during World War II (Moscow, Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam, and even Dumbarton Oaks) excluded

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 9898 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM French Power-Seeking 99 French diplomacy for the first time in modern history, and most likely initiated the Gaullist militancy for a proactive return to the international arena. From then on, the ritual French diplomacy of power holding had to move to the diplomacy of power seeking challenged by a diplomacy of power decrying that promotes a foreign policy that would definitely exclude power politics. This debate was largely fuelled during the tenure of the Fourth Republic. While the Atlantist wing was deeply rooted into the French Socialist Party (SFIO), the Christian Democrats (MRP), and the liberal right (CNI), the Communist Party (PCF) and the far left settled into an attitude of power decrying and pacifism. Meanwhile the Gaullist Party (RPF) opted for a power seeking foreign policy, in an attempt to restore French predomi- nance through original devices that were somewhat artificial or fragile. This triangle (Atlantism–pacifism–new greatness) is still active today in the elaboration of French foreign policy: it is only the proportions of these three components that change along with the outcome of French elections and the changing international context. The triangle was strongly affected during the 1950s: the greatness policy was supported by those who considered France as one the winners of the World War II, while the Atlantist attitude was promoted by those who regarded themselves as having been saved and protected by the Western allies. The status of French power was thus partly captured and partly negotiated. France was, on the one hand, barely accepted as a major power under British pressure, at a time when the UK felt alone and uncomfortable in front of the Soviet- American couple. On the one hand, the European decay helped French diplomacy to keep a part of its status. On the other hand, the French colonial defeat, the weakness of Fourth Republic institutions, growing domestic dissension, strong social conflicts, and the domestic political debate over the orientations of foreign policy marginalized French diplomacy onto a lesser role (Frank 1994). The Suez crisis led to a clear dilemma. France and Great Britain clearly overestimated their power and influence, as their capabilities were not substantial without superpower support: they could either survive as privileged allies or no longer play a decisive role inside the international arena (Louis and Owen 1989). When General de Gaulle tried to bargain for a diarchy with McMillan in Europe, he was contradicted at the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Nassau Summit (December 1962), which confirmed the Bermuda one (March 1957): the UK chose to stay in the major power club by settling her power (especially nuclear power) under the American umbrella. When de Gaulle tried to bargain for a joint management of NATO, the French leader faced the same disappointment. De Gaulle understood that major power status could not be attained through bargaining within the bipolar

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 9999 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM 100 Bertrand Badie system; he concluded that he could only acquire it through a power seeking strategy. This kind of strategy is particularly hard to carry out. It would be effective as long as it could be supported by a minimal capability, political willingness, and minimal acceptance by partners. Gaullism and post-Gaullism frequently met these three conditions, but hampered the main foreign policy decision makers when they tried to realign French power in new directions. A break of this nature occurred around 2004, for several reasons that have to be explained.

The Retrained Power

Political willingness relied clearly on the Gaullist charisma and the exceptional figure of the French Liberator. This charisma developed new capabilities through thirty years of economic development ( Les Trente Glorieuses), which raised France to the fourth position among the world’s economic powers. It was also fuelled by the test of France’s first nuclear bomb (1960) and by a French consensus around the greatness diplomacy, which gathered together the new Left parties (emancipated from Atlantism). The new French middle class considered an autonomous power seeking process as a useful instrument for dealing with the emerging process of globalization facing France. It preferred to build its strategy as an independent state rather than as a civil society integrated into a Western global world. The point was made by de Gaulle when he met Eisenhower and observed lucidly that France has lost its capabilities and would have to offset them by something else, which, in his mind, would be la politique de grandeur [greatness policy] (Vaïsse 1998). Greatness policy was the driving force of a status overachievement policy, which would be feasible and would provide status only if it was acceptable to most allies, including major and minor powers. In a world strongly and sharply dominated by bipolarity, this policy met the expectations of a great number of significant actors: first, the Third World, as it gave some slack to the partition of the world; the Soviet bloc, as the strategy weakened Western solidarity; the European nationalist movements as it was a way of surviving; and even the American administration, insofar as it was convinced that the French would never - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright take the place of the United States as the favored negotiating partner. At the same time, France could be a useful bridge, as potentially in the case of talks over Vietnam. All these perspectives paved the way for setting up new niches offered to French diplomacy. Thus, even under bipolarity, foreign policies can generate significant roles for midpowers or “secondary major powers” (Vaïsse 2009).

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 100100 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM French Power-Seeking 101 The New Niches

Bipolarity offered many niches to France for fuelling her policy of overachievement (Cooper 1997). The first step in the process of building Europe was deeply functional: Europe’s integration progress was to be limited in its size, while the German power was to be contained. Even though de Gaulle was reluctant to have a federal Europe, he was convinced that France could play a hegemonic role in the new game. He ran a campaign against the European Defense Community (1954) because its scheme was connected to NATO, yet he promoted, some years after, the Plan Fouchet which was aimed at stronger political integration, probably in order to allow France at the helm of European leadership. In a bipolar context, Europe had to find its way between an Atlantist submission to NATO and a semiautonomous standing, which directly led to a stronger France and an increase in her status as a major power. The small European states were constantly aware of the dilemma, as they protected themselves from the possibility of French hegemony by promoting a pro- NATO policy, which Belgian prime minister Spaak and Dutch prime minister Luns actively did. This containment lasted even beyond the Soviet Union’s collapse, and was especially apparent during the 2003 Iraqi crisis when Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the Eastern Europe countries preferred to participate in the US coalition rather than supporting and strengthening the Franco- German antiwar alliance. However, step by step, the French leaders understood that the European niche could not provide the primary basis for France’s status as a major power. That is why de Gaulle pushed for the Franco- German reconciliation (Elysées Treaty, January 1963) that promoted a real diarchy in Europe. But this diarchy was asymmetrical, as the Soviet Union did not accept Germany as a true partner. Thus, the new couple worked at the benefit of French power, protecting its hegemony and strengthening its bridging role. The postulate was admitted by all the French presidents up to Chirac, including the leftist president François Mitterrand (Soutou 1998). Europe played the role of a virtual actor on behalf of whom French leaders were speaking as the main diplomatic representatives. The major power status conceded to France was not the result of regional integra- Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tion, but by some of its idiosyncratic features including its size (excluding the UK as requested by de Gaulle), the diplomatic unacceptability of the German partner (and one that François Mitterrand probably wished to keep divided), and the bridging appeal of peaceful coexistence. In the meantime, French status as a major power was clearly overachieved. It appeared strong provided that it operated in the passive or symbolic realm. “Verb diplomacy” was active and the French diplomatic

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 101101 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM 102 Bertrand Badie network was expanding, but Paris was alone when facing the colonial war nightmares. The USSR did not echo the French invitation to build up a privileged dual cooperation, limiting her reactions to symbolic welcom- ings. Moreover, the French leadership within Europe failed to enforce its own policy, both on institutional reforms well as on the common agricultural policy (CAP). The development of a French preserve was another pillar of this policy of overachievement. De Gaulle managed French decolonization by schem- ing to set up a French Commonwealth (La Communauté Française), which was supposed to rebuild a French zone of influence. The new Communauté was institutionalized but took place too late, at a time when sovereignty was deeply rooted into a new state builders’ ideology. However, a strong (mainly informal) clientelist network was weaved; it involved first the new African states (la Francophonie) but was later enlarged to some Arab countries, and even Latin American ones. France was striving to define a new leadership partly constructed on a special relationship with the Third World (Wauthier 1995). The end of the Algerian war, as well as the support given to the Arab camp in 1967, played an important role: the well- orchestrated de Gaulle visit in Latin America (in 1964) was highly effective. The strategy was largely successful, as it brought many votes in support of French positions at the UN. French diplomacy could now play a mediator role between African and Arab countries, on one hand, and the Western world on the other. At the same time, this new orientation provided additional prestige that further underscored the vision of grandeur [greatness]. The promotion of this symbolic dimension of power was at the very center of the de Gaulle’s foreign policy: the French leader tried to cumulate a huge volume of symbolic power to balance against American material power. He was thus aiming at two targets: creating the conditions for a symbolic dissuasion on the most powerful actors and promotion of a diplomacy of influence. Symbolic dissuasion aimed at making France accepted and included into the inner circle of the major powers, and at preventing any kind of exclusion and loss of status afterwards. Diplomacy of influence stressed the role of the public opinion, the values, the rhetoric, and even the coup d’éclat (for instance when de Gaulle delivered his famous “ Vive le Québec libre” from the City Hall Balcony of Montreal). All these initiatives helped France - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to play a major role in setting the international agenda. But diplomacy of influence also included the mobilization of soft power: the promotion of French language, French culture, and the processes with which to defend a French cultural exceptionalism. All these instruments were particularly efficient in the francophone area, from Quebec to Africa, containing and even balancing an Anglo Saxon world. Soft power provided (and still

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 102102 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM French Power-Seeking 103 provides) many of the ingredients needed to maintain major power status by producing symbolic capabilities and a degree of coalescence among those who claim to have the same culture. The French investment into multilateral institutions became the third pillar of the overachievement strategy. Even though General de Gaulle was skeptical of the UN system (he never delivered a speech to the General Assembly), his successors, particularly Jacques Chirac, became more and more committed to it. This strategy was especially promoted after 1989, in the context of the collapsing bipolarity, when the midpowers realized that they were too strong to stay out of the new game, yet too weak to win by themselves. Multilateralism was clearly a way of playing a role in the international arena at the very moment when the superpower rivalry was no longer automatically blocking multilateral institutions. This outlook was clearly shared by France, Japan, Germany, and later Brazil and even South Africa. The 1990s were the golden age of this scheme. French diplomacy played an active role in promoting the principle of the responsibility to protect, initiated by the well- known Kouchner resolution (December 1988). France participated in many interventions, although more so in the decision-making processes than in the implementation. As one of the P5 in the Security Council, she could get an important piece of the limelight: she was particularly active in the elaboration of Resolution 688, paving the way for a humanitarian (and then military) intervention into Iraqi Kurdistan just after Operation Desert Storm. Similarly, French diplomacy created pressure for a multilateral intervention in Somalia, through the Restore Hope operation. France actively participated in the Alba Operation in Albania (March 1997), ran the multilateral intervention in Ituri (Artemis Operation), multilateralized her own intervention in Ivory Coast (Licorne Operation), headed the multilateral force in Lebanon, and tried to set up a multilateral operation in Sahel for containing the Darfur instability. She participated in the NATO intervention in Kosovo and played an active diplomatic role in launching, with the United States, the second intervention in Haïti (2003). Step by step, French diplomacy considered itself commissioned to promote the responsibility to protect principle, drawing it further than previously expected. French diplomacy argued for diplomatic, rhetorical, and material support, while the military participation was substantial without - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright being dominant (leaving to Third World countries the main part of the “blood participation”). By playing out their role as decision maker (as one of the most active P5 members), as defender, and even as moral propagan- dist of intervention, the French found a new niche in multilateralism as an attractive investment for a surviving overachieving major power with limited capabilities.

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 103103 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM 104 Bertrand Badie Jacques Chirac further stressed this foreign policy approach by developing close relations with Kofi Annan, actively supporting his reformist aspirations and backing the new vision of an open multilateralism clearly oriented toward new international social issues (on health, development, human security, etc.). For instance, with Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Chirac promoted the scheme of taxing airplane tickets to help finance an ambitious world health program, as a means of promoting the old French topic of an international social solidarity.1 Meanwhile, this promotion reactivated the fading support from the Third World (and particularly the French preserve), attributing France with continuing major power status despite its limited resources. These three pillars (Europe, the French preserve, and multilateralism) are obviously embedded in a period and context of a decreasing bipolarity which optimized their prospects for success. Détente and destabilized bipolarity led to the peak of this overachievement, at a time when southern countries were eager to find a partner in the Western world, and when the two superpowers needed a thaw inside bloc policy. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) restricted French autonomy while the Vietnam breach into American power opened the way for de Gaulle’s speech in Phnom Penh, where French diplomacy claimed its independence from Washington (August 1966). This demonstration of French autonomy really reshaped the world order. After Phnom Penh and the newly initiated French Arab Policy (1967), the Western bloc cracked and the very notion of a Western world became less meaningful. Israel and South Vietnam were no longer the advanced bas- tion of the West: from then on, conflicts in the world’s periphery were no longer predetermined by their alignment along the East- West cleavage. French diplomacy got its power from an ability to define for international audiences the main issues at stake. Although they were increasingly reluctant to get involved in new conflicts, the French became even more active and partisan in the political and diplomatic management of ongoing conflicts. For example, the UN military intervention in the Congo was denounced by de Gaulle, who refused to participate in the operation; the French president explicitly supported the Biafra separatists and thus gave a new dimension and a new meaning to a conflict that promptly became an archetype. For these reasons, autonomy was easily safeguarded since the1960s: in - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the face of US intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965), or Vietnam, Israeli- Arab wars, Bangladesh independence (1971), Granada (Operation Urgent Fury, 1983), and even in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where French diplomacy tried to distinguish itself from the Western camp. Through these strategies, French power could take up an autonomous space and stand on the foreground of the international arena (Melandri and Ricard 2003).

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 104104 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM French Power-Seeking 105 The Trapped Overachievement

Nevertheless, French diplomacy had to face three risks:

1. Overachievement is essentially unstable. 2. Overachievement depends narrowly on a special and fleeting context. 3. Overachievement revolves around an ideology that can be easily challenged or made irrelevant.

An overachieved diplomacy is easily hurt, as it is short of credible resources. The Soviet leaders were rather offhand with Valery Giscard d’Estaing when he visited Moscow for the first time, suspecting a movement toward a more Atlantist foreign policy. François Mitterrand was kept in a very marginal role when the Berlin Wall came down; he was even put in the background, confined to a reactive and a conservative policy (Bozo 2006). The overachiever thus depends on the acceptance of her partners and their willingness to consider her as a major actor. She is capable of performing only when she is expected to do so: she must play the exact role assigned to her and will be considered only if she does not overstep it. Otherwise, she risks becoming inaudible or marginalized. Moreover, the overachiever is heavily dependent on symbolic resources that drop in value during crises. Grandeur diplomacy and diplomacy of verb were brought into disrepute in 1962, 1989, and even in 1973 for exactly this reason. A diplomacy of overachievement is different from deviant diplomacy, which is much stronger and active during crises as it expects to get dividends from this own affirmation and its ability to hold out on superpowers (Iran is a strong example). Thus, the overachiever is more reserved, cautious, and discrete when material resources become more important than symbolic ones: the Chirac- Jospin government appealed to the Clinton administration during the Rambouillet Summit to intervene in Kosovo when French policy makers realized that they were not able to do the job by themselves, even with their European allies (1999). A certain amount of autonomy is conceded to the overachiever, either

as an instrumental initiative or as a last resort without dangerous con- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright sequences. In the first case, a free rider strategy could be functional to the main partners: in 1982, François Mitterrand saved Yasser Arafat as he was facing the Israeli invasion of Beirut. The operation was exclusively a French one, but was probably accepted with relief by Ronald Reagan and Alexander Haig. In 1999, Jacques Chirac put pressure on his partners for mentioning a viable Palestinian State in the Berlin European Union (EU) Declaration. Even though President Clinton did not follow his French

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 105105 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM 106 Bertrand Badie counterpart, the Chirac initiative was welcomed as a way of rebalancing the situation in Middle East. In the second case, autonomy is accepted as far as its consequences are clearly limited or containable. France was reluctant to get involved into the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and refused to sign. Moreover, she decided to postpone her endorsement of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT) of 1995. These two initiatives were clearly in line with an independent nuclear policy which, contrary to the UK, led France to join the major power club as a free rider. But, this typical case of overachievement was limited by her commitment to the main rules of the club, and also by the bet that a slight transgression would not result in a global collapse of the new international regime. This case is another illustration of the gap between deviant diplomacy and independent diplomacy. Even though it is a fragile process, the frailty of overachieving diplomacy serves to reinforce the major power status of a state such as France. Even though it depends on a fluctuating context, it generates a global perception (community- based status attribution), and a perception among its major partners (in- group status attribution) that is lasting and provides opportunities for its reuse given the appropriate circumstances. It also promotes a very subtle and indirect influence, especially in the Third World, among its middle class and through public opinion. This type of political capital of support was probably the cornerstone of the Arab diplomacy managed by General de Gaulle and Jacques Chirac, and was successful enough to attract François Mitterrand into pursuing the same path. The risk of using this approach is higher when structural factors are in flux: either because of a dramatic transformation of the international context or when ideological changes occur. French strategies operated within a favorable context during the Europe building process, in the French preserve, and in the development of multilateralism; a strong break in any of these dynamics would have easily undermined French successes. European enlargement recast the show. As we suggested, the first stage of the EU, up to the 15 member union, reinvigorated French power. As long as the United Kingdom opted for a noncontinental focus, French and German influences were undisputed. But from 2004 onward, the French pretension to dominate was dearly trapped by a centrifugal process. The French ability to formulate European foreign policy was contested, and France’s position as the European spokesman suddenly faded. As the EU - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright splintered during the Iraqi crisis, French power dwindled: even as the “American disaster” proved French foreign policy correct, the division within Europe deprived France of a part of her resources and her ability to act as a major power. By way of comparison, de Gaulle challenged his American counterpart in the periphery of the bipolar world, and marked his solidarity when facing the major conflicts. Jacques Chirac marked his

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 106106 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM French Power-Seeking 107 autonomy in a conflict that became central to the new post-bipolar system, while the Western alliance was still active through NATO. This potentially crossed the line and lost French dominance in leading Europe. The overachiever overstepped his role, one that was limited by the alliance contract. Evidence for this assertion was provided by Jacques Chirac himself, who hastily made repeated and conspicuous concessions to George W. Bush (SC resolutions 1511 and 1546 endorsing and legalizing the US intervention in Iraq; Franco-American operation in Haiti, and Franco-American SC resolution 1559 on Lebanon, putting an end to an old rivalry in Near East). These steps underscore the fact that the overachiever is in a situation of permanent probation: she cannot himself change the rules of the game; she is prisoner of her own alliance, unless she drastically changes her own foreign policy. Retracting the French preserve had the same effect. French power could no longer afford to solve or even contain the conflicts inside its previous settlements. The Ivory Coast crisis was particularly turbulent: the Marcoussis Agreement (January 2003) was a short- lived success for French diplomacy as it had to eventually appeal to the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) and then to the UN (February 2004) for continued support. This internationalization of the French preserve marked a watershed in the overachiever’s career and probably a downgrade to her soft power. It was obtained by bargaining with the US superpower—a bargaining made necessary once the autonomy of African actors was increased. The same process is observed in Madagascar where the French had to step aside and let the African Union act after the President Ravalomanana was dismissed (Spring 2009), in Mauritania, after the military coup, and earlier, in Central African Republic. While in Gabon, Nicolas Sarkozy was given a cool reception at President Bongo’s funeral. The evolution of the UN multilateralism followed a similar path. The election of Ban Ki Moon as a new Secretary General marked a break in the UN’s development, more precisely in its transformation toward open multilateralism which involved a deeper focus the main world social issues and pressures for a deep institutional transformation. This decreasing influence of the UN is strongly connected with a neoconservative approach to multilateralism, its distrust of international institutions, and - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright its reluctance to link other states (especially nondemocratic ones) to the responsibility to protect. This decline of the UN institutions deprives the French overachiever of one of her niches and leads her to revise her multilateral diplomacy away from institutional instruments. This evolution was hardly balanced by the promotion of her bilateral relationships with some of the rising powers (Brazil more than India or South Africa). However,

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 107107 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM 108 Bertrand Badie the promotion of bilateralism is much less fruitful for an overachiever than multilateral orchestration. Ideology also plays a major role through the shaping of a state’s choice to be an overachiever and through the structuring her self- perception vis- à- vis every state. The return of the traditional French rightist ideology clearly realigned France into Atlantism and lessened her pretension to play the role of the lonely horseman. By closing the Gaullist bracket, the Sarkozy election resulted in a renewed schizophrenia: national independence was actually devalued while the French political class did not want to lose its rank on the international arena. Given these conflicting directions, the future looks uncertain. The reputation of the overachiever is obviously affected, especially when the privileged ally status is firmly seized by the UK. The lame overachiever has to offset her weaknesses by a strong symbolic and media gesticulation: she must be active and visible when facing an international crisis, as Sarkozy did during the G8 and G20 meetings in 2009. This tendency becomes stronger as the new dominant ideology settles down around a new reference to the West, which strengthens the solidarity of Western countries, impedes the lonely rider strategy, and emphasizes the North/South cleavage, which makes the rider the new gendarme of the world. The pillars of the previous French foreign policy have been strongly shaken, while the new orientation does not leave any room for real autonomy. An active Occidentalism results also in a renewed identity in foreign policy, stressing the Western and even Christian roots of the involved countries. It generates new restrictions on immigration policy and a closed society policy that jeopardizes the international reputation of the overachiever. The overachiever needs to promote an open society, as she must actively mobilize soft power and symbolic goods. It is probably in this context that General de Gaulle put an end to the French colonial wars, especially the Algerian one. Conversely, Japan is contained in her overachievement by a conservative closed society policy, while China restricts her global activism in foreign policy for the same reasons, even as she accepts greater and greater involvement in processes of globalization. The lame overachiever optimizes her status by promoting a minilater- alist or a major power club diplomacy. Participation in this club is a way for making one’s rank and distinction recognized and even granted. It is - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright also a good instrument for contributing to world governance and showing one’s power. For these reasons, France stresses her role in the UN Security Council P5. That is why she initiated the creation of the “G diplomacy” when, in 1975, President Giscard d’Estaing launched the first convention of the G5 (now the G8) in Rambouillet. The target was explicitly to create an informal club of the world leaders for facing the first global economic

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 108108 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM French Power-Seeking 109 crisis (Canada and Italy struggled to join the new club and then to live up to being leaders of the world). The more the overachiever loses her status, the more she will refer to her participation in the major power club that now becomes an important source of (in-group) status attribution. Nicolas Sarkozy especially stressed his leading role during acute moments of the global economic crisis in London (April 2009) and again in Pittsburgh (September 2009). The main issue then becomes the enlargement of the club: the midpowers and status overachievers have an interest in opting for an open strategy, for keeping their links with the rising powers, and for preventing the risk of an outside controversy. Yet in the meantime, they strive to contain the new appli- cants, as the aristocracy did in the past with the parvenus. This dilemma generates uncertainty and great instability, which peaked when the diplomatic adviser of the French president denounced the Pittsburgh G20 summit as “a railway station concourse” and considered a return to the G8 for dealing with certain issues: development; nonproliferation; and global political problems.2 While the successfully performing overachieving major power is keen to look detached from all the kinds of clubs (De Gaulle was inclined to play the “empty chair”), a weakened overachiever invests excessively into club diplomacy, redeploying her foreign policy within it and optimizing the aristocratic orientation of the club, while distinguishing it from an oligarchy (which is then constituted by the rising powers: the nouveaux riches and the upstarts who are not permitted to interfere into the political issues). The G20 should cover the economic problems at stake, while the G8 has to face the political ones. By pursuing this policy, the weakened achiever gets involved in a vicious circle: she strengthens and legitimizes the Western core of G diplomacy, giving more salience to the West, and getting more involved in the Western alliance (i.e., NATO), which in turn downgrades her status of major power.

Toward a Structural Overachievement?

Major power status does not depend exclusively on the international environment, which obviously contributes to the shaping of policies, the gen- eratation of new assets, and the blocking of some options. But major power - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright status is bound to more than just structural factors. As it is related to the willingness to act as a major power, it is strongly connected to a recurrent political choice and the charismatic aptitude to implement it. French overachievement was first boosted by the political proactiveness of Charles de Gaulle, even if his successor, Georges Pompidou, tried to contain it somewhat by seeking to emphasize French alliances and European integration.

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 109109 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM 110 Bertrand Badie But Giscard d’Estaing, Mitterrand, and Chirac swiftly understood that they had to follow suit, most likely in order to maintain their electoral bases. Status is also related to civil society. As a sociological concept, status refers to several subjective dimensions that have been oversimplified through the notions of national culture and national character. French arrogance, the Asterix complex, or French nationalism have been currently mentioned and used as explanatory factors. It would probably be more relevant to stress the high rate of anti- Americanism in French society, which provided substantial support for French foreign policies seeking major power status even in the context of limited resources, and which contributed tremendously to building de Gaulle’s popularity. This anti- Americanism is deeply rooted in a French consensus, mixing conservative French nationalism (even exceptionalism) and the very strong anarchoso- cialist culture that shaped the early French social movement. For historical reasons, and in contrast to smaller European nations, France was never attracted by alliances; for cultural reasons, she never stuck to the dominant vision of a unified West. More deeply, the French pattern of political development opposes a strongly differentiated state in favor of a contained civil society. Unlike the British and Scandinavian civil societies that were close enough to the US pattern and became more and more interdependent, French civil society was more reluctant to participate in a common bloc and continued to look toward the French state for printing its own autonomy in the new globalization, entailing a French transnationalism. Such transnationalism was expressed through a variety of mechanisms ranging from French nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), firms, and official French diplomacy of influence. If we combine these factors, we can understand the restoration of France’s status as an overachieving power as a structural property, which becomes a profitable commodity in French domestic politics and a potentially successful instrument for electoral mobilization. This is confirmed by certain features of the new post-bipolar international system. The fall of the Berlin Wall has deeply transformed the concept of security as it is used in France. The extinction of the Soviet threat has put an end to the classical appeal to the superpower protection: the loss of sovereignty as an insurance against the risk of a Soviet invasion, which was hardly accepted during the Cold War, currently appears as a useless cost and meaningless - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright investment. The protection by the strongest is no longer considered as the pivot of national security, and new threats (epidemics, environment risks, social violence) are disconnected from the actions of the superpower, at least in the public’s opinion. These new parameters directly lead to a new vision. The post-bipolar system is considered as boosting the autonomy pretensions of the

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 110110 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM French Power-Seeking 111 status- overachieving major power. This conviction emerged when François Mitterrand and his foreign minister, Roland Dumas, prompted George H.W. Bush to dissolve NATO. This vision led to a neutralist trend in public opinion, much more sensitive to the efforts deployed by development and human rights NGOs than to the power politics of states. The Afghan and Iraqi wars (which revived the Algerian trauma) further pushed this tendency, while the new French culture of the post-bipolar world perceives power politics, alliances, and classical national security concepts as irrelevant. Instead, autonomy is accepted as the main principle that would reshape the new foreign policy: autonomy would minimize risks and optimize gains. Autonomy is thus a major principle of the new international strategy commonly shared by rising powers and declining overachievers, and perhaps even more so in an environment such as today’s contested unipolarity. It is clearly supported by Brazil, South Africa, India, and even strongly committed allies of the United States, such as Turkey, Mexico (especially during the Fox Presidency), Germany (under Schroeder’s rule), and even Canada (when Jean Chrétien was in power). It is a principle that underscores and helps to structure French politics, even when other powers may wish to play a different game. In fact, the postbipolar system confirms globally the continuation of the overachievement strategy, strengthens the status of autonomy, and prompts challenges to the superpower. On this point of view, the Sarkozy presidency and post-2004 Europe probably go against the grain, indicating a much more complex set of variables than are summarized in Table 5.1, which follows. The risks of substantial inconsistencies in French foreign policy continue to fluctuate, depending on the varying emphasis on maintaining high status with limited capabilities. Some regional and global conditions impede efforts at autonomy, as rigid bipolarity did during the Cold War, which partly explains the cautions of the Fourth Republic leaders as well as the commitment to NATO by General de Gaulle in 1962. Post-bipolarity in general had a similar effect but in a more moderate way: fluctuating partners and the absence of strict rules generate a situation of risk that can overstress and expose the extent to which a major power has overachieved its status. It is probably why Jacques Chirac had to put an end to his overachieving foreign policy in 2004, even though he was comforted - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright by the failure of US intervention in Iraq and even when he tried to protect himself by promoting a Franco-German- Russian triangle. Globalization, by its high complexity of factors and actors, endangers those powers with limited resources. European enlargement, by increasing the number of EU members, creates a risk of uncertainty, limiting the ability of the regional powers to

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 111111 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM 112 Bertrand Badie

Table 5.1 Factors Affecting France’s Overachievement Strategy

Factors of foreign Description of the Impact on foreign policy Risks of Examples policies factors overachievement Inconsistencies

International Rigid bipolarity – •• IVth Republic; factors . Missile crisis; Second Cold War; Fading bipolarity ++ De Gaulle’s rule after 1962: 1968–1979; 1984–1989, Post bipolar ++ 1989 structures Domestic French social +NR factors structure and French state tradition French culture + • NR Impact of ++ • Post 1970 globalization Individual Charisma ++ • Gaullist moment factors Issues at stake French + Post 1962 postcolonialism Upgraded + Kofi Annan era multilateralism Europe building ++ 1957–2004 European – • Post 2004 enlargement

Note: Factors promoting moderate to strong overachievement are indicated by “+” and “++,” respectively. Factors diminishing the pressure to overachieve are indicated by “–.” Finally, those factors promoting moderate to strong inconsistencies in foreign policy are indicated by “•” and “••,” respectively.

control foreign policy decisions, and thus jeopardizing their individual foreign policy initiatives. The same would be said about idiosyncratic factors that may overestimate the capabilities of the actor: charisma, or a sense of nationalism that push toward risky initiatives and fragile results (e.g., the Montreal appeal to a “Free Quebec” by General de Gaulle in 1967). The greatest risk for a state is when a combination of factors comes together to prompt autonomy and generate risks of inconsistency: post- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright bipolar system, globalization, and charisma. We are then facing the real French dilemma in foreign policy and the difficulties of choosing the right way of solving it. That is why globalization does not favor the French overachiever: Valery Giscard d’Estaing, who saw this trend, was nevertheless unable to retain France’s major power status policy as it was built by General de Gaulle; he opted instead for the weaker version of club diplomacy. François Mitterrand opted to underestimate the reality of

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 112112 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:577:10:57 PMPM French Power-Seeking 113 globalization and took refuge in a traditional vision of the world. The same is true for the post-bipolar system that has puzzled and disconcerted all the French presidents (François Mitterrand during and after the German reunification; Jacques Chirac after 2003 when he was unable to continue his break up with United States; Nicolas Sarkozy as he chose to go back to Atlantism). French foreign policy has now reached a crucial moment: it is currently challenged by new parameters that suggest a need for greater autonomy, while at the same time state actors are critically unable to have a good grip on how to achieve such autonomy. Meanwhile, French overachievement in continuing to seek consistent major power status is once again dependent on a power- seeking process, a process that is difficult to pursue when strong transformations are taking place. France is thus torn between a structural trend—to continue to seek her status as a major power—and events (or eventualities) often beyond her control, making such aspirations highly problematic.

Notes

1. As it was suggested at the very beginning of the twentieth century by Leon Bourgeois in a Durkheimian perspective (Badie 2009). 2. World Policy Conference, October 31, 2009 (reported by Nouvelobs.com, November 1, 2009). Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 113113 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:587:10:58 PMPM Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_06_ch05.indd780230104648_06_ch05.indd 114114 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:10:587:10:58 PMPM CHAPTER SIX Japan as an Underachiever: Major Power Status in Climate Change Politics1

Norichika Kanie

Editors’ notes: Most of the work on status attribution focuses on the quest for status in general, and there is insufficient work on states seeking status in one or more specific issue areas. Therefore, this chapter, focuses on Japan’s interest in greater status attribution by examining the Japanese role within the context of the global climate change issue area and highlights the complexity between demonstrating the leadership needed to achieve greater status and the stress that such initiatives may create with alliance partners and in domestic politics.

This chapter examines Japan’s status as a major power through the case of the international discourse on climate change, a key issue in the twenty- first century. In particular, it focuses on efforts to establish a post-2012 international institutional architecture to address the climate change problem. This issue presents mounting political stakes, given both a great diversity in individual state preferences, and a growing “competition” for status in promoting a new institutional architecture aimed at creating a

new problem- solving structure to address concerns over global climate - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright change. The data presented in chapter 1 show that Japan emerged with major power status after 1990 through its military capability and the willingness to engage globally, both key criteria in obtaining major power status. Until then, Japan’s military apparatus had been constrained by Article 9 of its Constitution. Interpretation of the Constitution changed at the end of the Cold War, when Japan began to bolster its “self defense force” in

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 115115 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:314:50:31 PMPM 116 Norichika Kanie the name of making “international contributions.” Prior to this, Japan was not considered to have had major power status since the Second World War, despite the fact that its economy had grown to the second largest in the world.2 Japan’s major power status then transitioned from overachiever (1991–1995) to status consistency (1996–2000), and then to underachiever (2001–2005). The start of serious global climate talks coincides with the emergence of Japan’s major power status. The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC/FCCC) was founded in 1991, which led to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. In 1997, Japan hosted the Third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP3), which adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. Despite signing the Kyoto Protocol, the United States’ Bush administration decided against its ratification in 2001. This decision by the nation responsible for one-quarter of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions nearly dashed hopes that the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force.3 After years of coalition building, however, the February 2005 Russian ratif ication f inally gave the protocol critical mass to enter into force. However, debate over the future institutional framework on climate change began around the time of COP8 in 2002, coinciding with the US’s decision to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Only after this period did the issues of global climate change begin to attract the degree of international political attention it does today. This chapter focuses on Japan’s status attribution in the shaping of post- 2012 climate change politics, during which time Japan is an underachieving major power. Looking closely, Japan conforms to the status attribution defined in chapter 1. It appears that Japan’s post- 2012 climate change discourse is a perfect case of an underachiever that takes greater risks and pays greater costs to augment its status. The fear of taking these risks, then, keeps the country from moving past the status of an underachiever. By empirically examining Japan’s major power status, this chapter looks at whether or not, and how Japan fits into the category of underachiever. The case of climate change is selected because the issue mirrors the unstable nature of Japan’s major power status, which has moved from status overachiever to status- consistent and finally to underachiever. The chapter first describes the changing nature of climate change politics in recent years, showing that environmental politics has made a departure from its conventional - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright image, and has become a high stakes political issue. Next, Japan’s status attribution in terms of this international political issue is explained using the framework provided in chapter 1, demonstrating that Japan can be considered a major power. Finally, I examine the nation’s decision-making processes that produced its medium- term target for 2020, and further examine the source of Japan’s underachiever status.

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 116116 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:314:50:31 PMPM Japan as an Underachiever 117 Climate Change as a Highly Political Issue

Traditionally, climate change had been considered an exclusively environmental issue and its political dynamics did not necessarily have great impact on the course of the world order. After the end of the Cold War, social issues were becoming increasingly important in world politics, but only claimed tertiary position after military security and economic issues (Porter and Brown 1993). As political realism asserts, security is considered to be the most pressing issue in international relations at all times. However, the situation changed after the year 2000. While the essence of the climate change issue may not have changed, political leaders around the world began to realize the magnitude of the political impact that the climate change issue and its related policies would have. Climate change increasingly began to take on the salience of security policy, and to generate significant and increasing domestic political interest in many states. Moreover, the emergence of a global economic downturn provided a window of opportunity to explicitly link climate change to more immediate economic concerns, with emphasis on the long- term environmental sustainability of any global solution to the economic recession. Since the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 2005, climate change has constantly been one of the major themes of subsequent G8 summits. The UN Security Council discussed climate change for the first time on April 17, 2007. Early in September the same year, climate change was chosen as one of the most important issues to discuss at the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. In 2007 and 2009, the United Nations convened special sessions on climate change, and in 2007, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Al Gore. Moreover, 119 heads of state, the greatest number of heads of states in UN history, gathered at the UNFCCC COP15 in Copenhagen in December 2009. These events clearly underscore the fact that climate change is no longer a marginal issue, but instead has been politicized to make it a key issue of the twenty-first century. Climate change, by itself, is an enormous threat to human society. As the IPCC has summarized it, the global average mean temperature appears to be rising, having already risen by around 0.74 degrees Celsius from the preindustrial level. As this occurs, sea levels are rising and small island Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright states such as Tuvalu or the Maldives could eventually sink beneath the sea level. If this happens, it will be the first time in contemporary international relations that a nation state “physically” disappears from the Earth. Moreover, climate scientists argue that more frequent and severe droughts, floods, typhoons, and hurricanes are likely to occur in various parts of the world. Changes in agricultural patterns are predicted, as well as a loss of biological diversity, leading to negative impacts on health such as increased

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 117117 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:314:50:31 PMPM 118 Norichika Kanie instances of malaria. These changes have the potential to create huge increases in refugee populations and substantial increases in mass migration, which in turn result in conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2007; Webersik 2008). Even though there are uncertainties involved in the science, most results suggest that, in these and other unforeseen ways, climate change is likely to become a source of substantial threat to human society. However, these are not the only reasons why climate change has become a dominant political issue of the century. Another reason, which may be more appealing to political leaders, is related to the response to threats. The primary cause of the climate change problem is the excessive use of fossil fuels. Energy has been an integral part of human development, not only in economic activities but also in contemporary daily life; even military activities depend on energy. Since the Industrial Revolution, energy has mainly come from fossil fuels such as oil and coal, as well as natural gas. Therefore, political leaders have a direct national interest in obtaining and utilizing fossil fuels, and the securing of energy and resources has been critical to determining international order in modern times. In fact, major power status, as defined in this book, derived in part from energy consumption, and consequentially, from states’ access to energy resources. To avoid shortages in energy supplies, especially oil, states use oil reserves, explore, and try to secure supplies, sometimes through coercive means. Energy conservation has also been used for this purpose, as well as diplomacy and other means. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the desire for adequate and secure supplies of fossil fuels has played a major role in the balance of power among nations: one factor behind Japan’s entry into World War II was its lack of domestic natural resources. However, the relationship between status and energy resources may be in flux as policy makers and leaders increasingly recognize the seriousness of climate change. It has gradually become clear that the emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHG) that enter the atmosphere as unin- tended “outputs” of unchecked energy use are causing a major damage to environmental sustainability. Preventing this, in return, has to do with a constraint on the “inputs” side of the conventional source of energy, that is, fossil fuels. Of course, there are possibilities for further technological innovation in which emissions from fossil fuel combustion can be captured or stored in some way. So far, however, such technologies have yet to be applied on a large scale. Technologies may be invented to capture GHG - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright emissions, but those are only for newly emitted ones and capturing and reducing those already in the atmosphere is much more difficult. Therefore, unlike in the past, energy security is now “constrained” by climate change policy. This means that any international framework dealing with climate change, and the politics surrounding it, at least to a certain extent, affect national energy policies and energy security. Furthermore,

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 118118 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:324:50:32 PMPM Japan as an Underachiever 119 as utilization of a new source of energy is related to the utilization of technology that makes the energy usable, the competition for dominant status on this issue also applies in the technology (and thus, military) realm. Because climate change will continue for at least the next 50 to 100 years, the winner of this competition may be expected to prevail for a relatively long period of time. Thus, interests in the issue converge on the politics of creating a future institutional framework addressing climate change, which started around the time when the United States decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (post-2012 politics), create the opportunity for new leadership and led to the emergence of Japan as an underachieving major power (Kanie 2010). This period overlaps with the time when Japan shifted to being an underachiever in terms of its major power status (2001–2005).

Japan’s Status Attribution

This section reviews Japan’s major power status attribution in the post- 2012 politics on climate change. As described in chapter 1, there are three processes of major power status attribution: in- group status attribution, self-reference, and community attribution.

In- group Status Attribution Japan’s presence in the major power clubs of post-2012 politics confers major power status upon the country. It was among the 20 to 25 countries that negotiated the final deal of the Copenhagen Accord. Although such a negotiation process by the heads of states within the UN is controversial, these countries obviously represent the political leaders’ “sense” of who the major powers are.4 Japan is also a part of US-led climate talks among 17 major economies, called the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), and its predecessor, the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (MEM). It is also a member of the G8 countries, in which climate issues have been discussed frequently, especially since 2005, and also participates at the G20 meetings, is a member of the Organization for Economic Co- Operation and Development (OECD), and of the Annex I countries to the UNFCCC, who hold the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright primary responsibility to address currently occurring climate change. As another example, the Diplomatic Yearbook 2009 noted the following:

At the elections held in October 2009 for nonpermanent membership in the UN Security Council, Japan was elected for the tenth time, the most frequent among all UN members. Japan began its

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 119119 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:324:50:32 PMPM 120 Norichika Kanie two- year term of membership in the Council in January 2009. This reflects the high reputation Japan’s diplomacy has established in its achievements and approaches at fora such as the UN, and indicates that further contributions are anticipated of Japan in the future. Japan will continue to develop proactive diplomacy by using its experiences and intellectual capital, working towards the resolution of numerous challenges facing the international community and the creation of a new world order towards that end.

With regard to this particular issue- area, it is safe to say that Japan has been conferred major group status through in-group status attribution. Of course, as chapter 1 has noted, such attribution is in part determined by the extent to which a major power is willing to forge a direction, independent of other powers, in effectuating the course of international politics. To the extent that Japan has been unwilling to act with such independence, even in this issue area (as I illustrate below), may be partly responsible for the shifts in its status across the post–Cold War period.

Self-referenced Status Attribution Major power status can also be conferred through self- reference. Japan’s foreign policy gives significant standing to the pursuit and possession of major power status. Terms that represent Japan’s interest in being a major power, such as leadership and initiative, repeatedly appear in foreign policy documents. For example, the 2008 ODA White Paper on Japan’s official development assistance to developing countries carries sections devoted to the Japanese leadership. A section on climate change and development has the subtitle “Japan’s Leadership,” and a section on African development carries the subtitle “Japan’s Leadership and African Development.”5 The sa me k i nd s of st atement s ca n be fou nd i n con secut ive yea rs, a lthoug h the exact terms used differ somewhat. The Diplomatic Bluebook 2001, a white paper published every year by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, states that Japan is a “principal member of the advanced industrialized democracies and as a constituent member of the Asia-Pacific region,” and its 2002 edition states that Japan is a “leading member of the international - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright community.” The turning point in self- reference pertaining to major power status came around 1988, when the government first introduced the idea of “contributing to international peace and prosperity” in Japan’s foreign policy strategy, in its attempt to define the country’s position in the international community during the preceding year, and stated that it was at “a

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 120120 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:324:50:32 PMPM Japan as an Underachiever 121 major turning point in its history.”6 The Diplomatic Bluebook 1988 included the following:7

Occupying a relatively inconspicuous place in the international community for many years following World War II, Japan considered the international environment as a given. It was inconceivable then that Japan would have any major impact on the international situation. Yet today, Japan is an economic power accounting for well over one-tenth of world gross national product (GNP) and is, along with the United States and Western Europe, on the forefront of scientific and technological developments. Japanese actions today have a major impact, which they have never had, not only economically but across the entire spectrum of international relations. [ . . . ] The basic position in Japanese foreign policy is that of contributing to international peace and prosperity while ensuring Japan’s own security and prosperity in the realization that Japan is both a member of the free and democratic world and at the same time an Asia-Pacific nation.

Japan’s giant economic boom “bubble economy” started around the late 1980s, as self-confidence was growing. It was also around the year when Japanese calendar changed from Showa to Heisei, which has brought about the feelings within the nation to seek to overcome its negative history of war and surrender. Together with the emergence of issues such as the globalization of the economy and deeper interdependence, the environment, refugees and so on, Japan started to be increasingly conscious about major power status around this time.

Community Attribution Community attribution is the primary focus of this book and of this chapter. An empirical look into the elements of community attribution illustrates Japan’s shifting and unstable status attributes, as it appears to have the mixed capabilities and desire to act as a major power. Its capabilities and willingness have changed over time, yet and it has failed to receive the full attribution of major power status consistently. Status attribution depends on opportunity and willingness. Apart - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright from COW measurement, we can also confirm Japan’s opportunity using data specifically related to major power opportunities in climate change. Sjöstedt (1999) points out that there are three different layers of power base: competencies/resources, issue-specific power, and general structural power. The first layer, competencies/resources, is related to what we call “willingness” in this project, but the latter two are related to opportunity.

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 121121 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:324:50:32 PMPM 122 Norichika Kanie General structural power derives from the possession of a military capacity. At first glance, this would seem to bear no relation to environmental negotiation, as the use of military force in addressing environmental issues would be either excessively costly or simply not instrumental. But Sjöstedt argues that it “does have some significance” in environmental negotiations as well, for such power is related to the status of a nation, and “the higher the status of a nation the more willing are other countries to listen to its proposals” (Sjöstedt 1999: 248). This is even more the case given the recent politicization of the climate change issue. More relevant to climate change politics, however, is what Sjöstedt calls issue- specific power. In the situation where military capacity is too costly and not instrumental for problem solving regarding a given issue, issue-specific power is evidently “much more important as a source of influence” (Sjöstedt 1999: 248). In this sense too, quantitatively measurable figures such as the size of present and potential future GHG emissions and economic resources are important. I have made an attempt to aggregate the major sources of opportunity, such as military expenditure and the size of the gross national income (GNI) and gross domestic product (GDP), and issue-specific power such as the amounts of CO2 emissions and total energy consumption, by using principal component analysis. All Annex I (industrialized) countries and selected large non- Annex I countries were chosen for the analysis. The data used are for the year 2000 unless otherwise stated, and the results of the analysis are shown in Table 6.1. Indicators used for the analysis are as follows:

● Military expenditures (Stockholm International Peace Institute: Military Expenditure Database) ● GNI (UNICEF Statistics Division) ● GNI per capita (UNICEF Statistics Division) ● GDP (United Nations Statistical Yearbook, Vol. 43) ● GDP per capita (United Nations Statistical Yearbook, Vol. 43) ● Population (U.S. Bureau of the Census: International Data Base) ● 1999 CO2 Emissions from all fuels (WRI/Earth Trends) ● Total energy consumption (WRI: “Energy Consumption: Total from all sources”) Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ● Total primary energy consumption (BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2003) ● Renewable energy production (US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (EIA): International Energy Annual 2002) ● World net hydroelectric power generation (EAI: International Energy Annual 2002)

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● Oil production (EAI)8 ● Crude oil reserves in billion barrels (EAI)9 ● Coal production (EAI: 5.2 World Coal Production 1980–2002) ● Coal reserves (EIA: Annual Energy Review 2002)

Although it is difficult to draw a dividing line between a major power and other powers, and there may be other indicators (or combinations thereof ) of the sources of power in climate change politics, the results here show one way to rank power in climate change politics. These data illustrate that Japan holds a relatively high rank. Besides the above self-references implying major power status, Japan has also shown its willingness to be inf luential in the climate change f ield. A most recent good example is Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s speech

Table 6.1 Result of the Principal Component Analysisa

USA 2.1404 EU25 1.6915 EU15 1.4347 China 0.5495 Russian Federation 0.2148 Japan 0.0061 India –0.1835 Canada –0.2038 Brazil –0.2883 Mexico –0.3258 Australia –0.3560 Norway –0.3889 Indonesia –0.4728 South Africa –0.4779 Ukraine –0.4983 Republic Of Korea –0.5087 Switzerland –0.5271 Argentina –0.5277 Malaysia –0.5531 New Zealand –0.5690

Liechtenstein –0.5748 - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Iceland –0.5763 Romania –0.5770 Monaco –0.5907 Bulgaria –0.6022 Croatia –0.6095

aProper value of the principal component is 11.07, and proportion of variance is 69.2%.

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 123123 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:324:50:32 PMPM 124 Norichika Kanie at the United Nations Summit on Climate Change on September 22, 2009:

Japan has relatively strong potential for technological development as well as considerable financial capacity. Thus I recognize that Japan is expected to take the lead in the international community in setting its own reduction target, and to achieve such target through the development of innovative technologies. I have full confidence in the abilities of the Japanese people and our companies. Political leaders at this time also have a responsibility to future generations to create a sustainable society by transforming the social structure that we have known since the Industrial Revolution.

Prior to the era of post-2012 politics, Japan’s hosting of the Kyoto Conference (COP3 to the UNFCCC) was a symbolic event representing its willingness to assume leadership on the issue. It expressed at COP1 (1995) its readiness to host a Conference of the Parties (COP) at its third or later session. The next year, at COP2 in July 1996, Japan officially announced its candidacy, accepted at COP2, which brought Japan into the leading role of managing the processes leading up to the Kyoto Protocol (Hattori 1999). Although it has been debated whether Japan’s role in the process leading up to Kyoto could be called “leadership,” many have evaluated it positively for its efforts to make an agreement in Kyoto, and for its willingness to work to influence the politics of climate change (Hattori 1991; Kawashima 2000; Schreurs 2002, 2004; Fisher 2004; Van Asselt, Kanie and Iguchi 2009). Furthermore, the protocol named after the historic Japanese city that hosted the conference became “a symbol of the pressing problem of global climate change and Japan’s bid to be a larger foreign policy player and a leader in global environmental protection.”10 Importantly, this symbolic willingness on the climate change issue has consistently been supported by the Japanese public. An opinion poll conducted in 1998 showed that 82 percent of respondents were concerned about climate change. Later, in 2002, after the US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 49.8 percent wanted Japan to show international leadership by ratifying it.11

Constraints on Japan’s Status Attribution - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

The empirical evidence described above shows that Japan has major power status in climate change politics, but actual status attribution has shifted over time, moving from an overachiever to a status- consistent power to an underachiever, consistent with its capabilities and willingness to act in this issue area. It may also be possible to argue that Japan’s hosting of the

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 124124 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:324:50:32 PMPM Japan as an Underachiever 125 Kyoto Conference in 1997, leading to the Kyoto Protocol, correlates to general major power status attributed to it by the international community during that time frame. As the politicization of the climate change issue rose thereafter in the context of post-2012 politics, Japan’s independence in leadership has gradually been undermined. Constraints imposed by the United States are a source of status inconsistency here. After the Second World War, Japan saw its economic status grow thanks to the Far East policy of the United States, in that it defended Japan against communist states under the US military umbrella, while at the same time demilitarizing it. Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution states as follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Demilitarization, in turn, allowed Japan to concentrate on economic development, while military and security issues, which are traditionally considered by realists as being at the core of international politics, and especially during the Cold War, became areas where Japan could not contribute to the creation and reorganization of international order. Thus, Japan had no major power status until the end of the Cold War, and building strong security ties with the United States was a necessity. These security ties with the United States, together with trade relations as Japan’s main trading partner, functioned as constraints on gaining major power status,12 and later to create inconsistent major power status attribution for Japan. Facing the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Gulf War, Japan’s quest to “contribute to international peace and prosperity” was pursued diplomatically following the beginning of “bubble” economic boom and coinciding with the change of Japanese calendar from Showa to Heisei due to the death of the emperor Hirohito. In 1992, Japan’s Self Defense Force stepped outside its own territory for the first time. The government managed to dispatch a minesweeper to the Persian Gulf without changing its Constitution; however, the decision was controversial. Even though Japan - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright managed to send troops abroad, its maneuverability continues to be limited, and domestic constraints as well as international pressure from Asian nations stemming from its history have been substantial. Therefore, consecutive prime ministers, starting with Noboru Takeshita (in office from 1987 to 1989), identified environmental issues as an area where Japanese policy makers could take a lead in the global political arena without

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 125125 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:324:50:32 PMPM 126 Norichika Kanie appearing threatening (Matsumura 2000; Broadbent 2002; Kawashima 2000; Miyaoka 2004; Schreurs 2002; Oshitani 2006). In particular, climate change “allowed the government to present a leadership role in an issue area of global significance, mitigate the intense economic competition of the early 1990s, and construct a new national identity centered on the concept of sustainable development” (Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007: 80). In other words, Japanese pursuit of major power status was basically limited to those issue areas where traditional sources of capability (and especially in the military realm) are not the vital sources of its ability. After the Second World War, the “United States and Japan worked as allies and the Japan–U.S. alliance became the cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy.”13 Thus, if the policy directions sought by Japan differed from those of the United States, Japan would have a difficult choice to make and give up its ambition for exerting a leadership role. Its climate change policy during the Bush administration symbolizes this relationship. International cooperative arrangements on climate change were divided into two blocs after the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. One was the Kyoto track, most symbolically represented by the European Union’s policies and measures and associated institution- building, while another was a non- Kyoto track led by the United States. Although countries falling into the latter category still maintain global cooperation within the framework of the UNFCCC, they refuse a Kyoto Protocol type of cap-and- trade approach based on legally binding national emission reduction targets, and are developing various non- UN- based initiatives outside the Kyoto process, as represented by US policy. As the host country for the Kyoto Conference in 1997 and as part of its aspirations to achieve major power status and contribute to world politics, Japan has been interested in promoting climate policy. Given the internationally divided perspectives on how to deal with the issue, however, Japan chose not to take the lead in partnership with the European Union to tackle climate change, as it always had to pay attention to the position of its closest ally. When it comes to post- 2012 politics, it turns out that Japan’s leading trade partners—the United States and China—were not obliged to achieve emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, domestic economic power-holders strongly opposed any moves by Japan to take the lead on the climate issue without being joined by these other - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright economic competitors.

Japan’s Target- Setting Process

A struggle between “constraints”, often linked with domestic interests, and “willingness” can typically be seen in the mid-term target setting

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 126126 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:334:50:33 PMPM Japan as an Underachiever 127 debate, which is centered on post-2012 politics. Constraints on the pursuit of status, at least in Japan’s case, may be based not only on alliance relationships externally, but as well through constraints imposed internally between competing bureaucratic structures, whose goals are not necessarily about increasing status for the state. Traditionally, there have been two conflicting views within the Japanese government on the issue of climate change—views formulated and represented by different ministries, namely, the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Environment (MOE) (e.g., Takeuchi 1998; Kawashima 2000; Fisher 2004; Oshitani 2006). When it comes to international policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) coordinates the country’s international position on climate change. The Global Warming Prevention Headquarters was established in 1998, headed by the prime minister, and is mandated to coordinate policy measures among relevant ministries and government agencies (MOE 1998). However, the headquarters has not yet been able to exert sufficient leadership in coordinating between the different ministries in order to reach a common, consolidated climate policy position (Fisher 2004; Kameyama 2008). METI has a history of contributing to the economic growth of Japan after the Second World War, increasing its power within the bureaucracy. This ministry has a strong connection with industry, in particular with a comprehensive umbrella organization called Keidanren (Japan Business Federation). METI’s concerns and interests on the climate issue revolve around ensuring the competitiveness of Japanese industry, because climate change policy, inherently linked with energy policy, changes the prices of export goods in relation to those of other economic partners, such as the United States and China. The MOE, on the other hand, has a rather short history. Established in 1971 as an agency, it was upgraded to a ministry only in 2001. Although the MOE is responsible for coordinating environmental affairs, it is rather weak compared to other ministries due to its relatively limited financial and human resources. This makes it difficult for the MOE to effectively coordinate government deliberations on environmental issues, especially when it comes to an interlinked issue with great political importance such as energy. In 2009, the Cabinet Office of the Japanese government launched a - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright process to investigate Japan’s possible midterm GHG emissions reduction target for 2020 as part of preparations for the Copenhagen negotiations in order to exert international leadership.14 It set up a committee for scientific study on the equal mitigation potential of major powers (major economic competitors of Japan), which was evaluated in terms of marginal abatement cost (MAC).15 Calculations were made by emulating domestic emissions reduction potential, provided that the same cost would be

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 127127 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:334:50:33 PMPM 128 Norichika Kanie

Compared with 2005

± 0%

Technologies & measures on par with those for US and EU targets (−4%) 1 1: −4% from 2005 level − 5%

Kyoto Protocol target (−7.9%) 2 2: −6 to −12% from 2005 level − 10% Targets* of the US & EU (US: −14%, EU: −13%) *Including purchases of emissions credits 3 3: −14% from 2005 level − 15%

4 4: −13 to −23% from 2005 level − 20% 5 5: −21% from 2005 level − 25%

− 30% 6 6: − 30% from 2005 level

Figure 6.1 Six Options for Japan’s midterm target under the Aso cabinet.

spent for mitigation actions in each country. The calculation was made by a few research institutes, one associated with the MOE and two with METI. Guided by the Cabinet Office, six options were presented in the end (Figure 6.1). In the meantime, the Keidanren launched a strong media campaign. On March 17 and May 21, it published a full-page advertisement about considering “appropriate” GHG emission targets and burdens, in terms of economic cost, to reduce GHG emissions. Its argument was that Japan has already achieved the world’s highest level in energy efficiency, and further reductions would be too costly. Prime Minister Taro Aso announced on June 10, 2009 that Japan would set a 15 percent reduction target for 2020 from the 2005 level, which is 1 percent additional to what the governmental calculation suggested in its third option. However, it accounts for an 8 percent reduction from the 1990 level. Considering that the Kyoto target for Japan is a 6 percent reduction, - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright this was said to be a very low ambition. The main concern about this figure was obviously international economic competitiveness. International fairness, in economic terms, was the first in the three “ground rules” for the midterm target. It appeared that higher reductions of GHG would weaken the country’s economy disproportionately to others, especially to other major powers such as the United States and China, weakening the

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 128128 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:334:50:33 PMPM Japan as an Underachiever 129 economic dimension, and the main source of its major power, and possibly diminishing their status. Ultimately, by creating domestic bureaucratic conflicts, possible economic damage, and substantial pressures from Japan’s main ally, may have combined to make the pursuit of status in the climate change issue area a lose-lose proposition for Japan. Environmentalists condemned this decision right after the announcement was made, on the grounds that its ambition was far less than a medium-term target of reducing emissions within the range of 25–40 percent from the 1990 level, indicated as the amount of emissions reduction necessary to limit the impact of climate change at the lower level described by the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR4).16

Conclusion

Unlike a status- consistent major power, which “may work to create institutions and norms that pressure other states to privilege those that concur with its leadership,” Japan’s foreign policy behavior in post- 2012 climate change politics is highly dependent on the behavior of others.17 Such a position is even more apparent when observing Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s announcement of a 25 percent reduction target from the 1990 level in September 2009, after the change of the ruling party and the cabinet from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). This figure is in line with the IPCC’s suggestions, but Japan’s commitment is on the condition that other major powers take equivalent positions. Even though the European Union has taken a position of a 20–30 percent reduction from the 1990 level, industry is still cautious about the setting of ambitious targets, and industry’s views still have substantial influence on the government’s position.18 To date, Japan’s major power status is very much driven by economic resources, and issue- specific leadership attempts, which are typically in issues not related to traditional capability, and are always bound by economic concerns. Climate change and low- carbon policies have potentials to go beyond such limits, as it may be possible to manage economically costless development patterns, but so far such paths are presented only in theory and not in place in the real world. This case clearly shows that Japan in post- 2012 politics is not able to - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright sustain consistent major power status attribution because of its traditional constraints from the United States, and more recently from China, a growing competitor next door, and from internal domestic pressures that fear the impact of its global ecological leadership on economic growth. Chapter 1 suggests that Japan was an underachiever during 2001–2005. Underachievers “appear to have the capabilities and desire to act as major

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 129129 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:334:50:33 PMPM 130 Norichika Kanie powers, yet do not receive the full attribution of major power status by other states.” This applies to Japan’s case. Underachievers are “willing to take greater risks and pay greater costs to achieve status consistency,” and are “more likely to intervene in conflicts.” These descriptions applied, too, in early 2000 when the future of the Kyoto Protocol was in question due to the US’s rejection. Japan has increasingly taken up an intermedi- ary role (Kanie 2006). For example, the compromise text of paragraph 38 of the Johannesburg Plan of Action, stating that “States that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol strongly urge States that have not already done so to ratify it in a timely manner,” was originally proposed by Japan (Kanie 2003). The same kind of behavior was seen at COP- 6bis in 2001, which determined political deals to make the Kyoto Protocol functioning, held right after the US rejection. Japan held a vote on the future of the treaty, because of its close consultative relationship with the United States. Japan finally accepted the deal proposed by the president of the COP, Jan Pronk (Hamanaka 2006). The then Japanese prime minister Koizumi is said to have made the final decision on his way to the G8 summit, in response to a consultation with his minister of the environment. Although this is not a traditional example of conflict intervention, Japan did play a role between Kyoto parties and the non-Kyoto US position and intervened in a conflict situation. It is unclear whether this description still applies to the period after 2004 when politicization of climate change was taken to a higher level. Japan was one of the main drivers, together with Germany, in incorporating a long-term target of reducing global emissions by 50 percent by 2050 into the text of the G8 agreement. While this text was an important step forward towards a low-carbon society, the stated reduction is a global, long- term target, and no concrete figures were declared for individual countries, or for developed countries. Japan announced its own medium- term target after the EU did so, but before the United States, although Japan’s position is premised upon similar efforts to be made by other major emitters. Japan faces strong domestic opposition to taking unilateral action, over concerns about paying exceedingly high costs, and domestic leaders have yet been unable to exert enough political leadership to convince and lead the country to materialize its willingness. As it stands, Japan seems to be a perfect example of an underachiever at present. Domestic interests are deeply embedded. However, changes in political dynamics that took place - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright in August 2009 have also shown that there is a growing proportion of con- stituency who demand changes to the situation. This is the first time since mid- 1950s when the Liberal Democratic Part y lost a drastic number of seats and stepped down from the cabinet. The choice of the voters has begun to influence elite politics. The change is just starting and the results are yet to be seen, but more demand on status may come out of the new political

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 130130 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:334:50:33 PMPM Japan as an Underachiever 131 dynamics. It is widely recognized that Japan’s traditional power is declining, especially in relative terms, as the population is predicted to decrease, but new ideas may also emerge to find a new strategy regarding what is to be considered to be Japan’s real power, or in different ways to utilize the powers it has. Low-carbon technology and technology transfer to Asian developing countries may be one example for the former, and creating regional institutions and enhanced multilateralism may be an example for the latter. Going beyond the current status it holds requires even greater risks and may result in greater costs, but refining strategy under the current status it holds may not be any less expensive. Unless it gains extra power, be it soft power or the hard variant, Japan will remain in its present position for some time, unable to influence the course of either regional or global affairs.

Notes

1. I am grateful for funding provided by the Environmental Research and Technology Development Fund of the Ministry of Environment, Japan (S-6, H-91), and Mitsui & Co., Ltd., Environmental Fund. I would like to thank IDDRI at SciencesPo, Paris for their con- genial support during Marie Curie Incoming Fellowship of the European Commission. 2. Only recently being passed by China’s economy in the second quarter of 2010. [Available at http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08- 16/china- economy- passes- japan- s- in- second- quarter- capping- three-decade- rise.html]. 3. The condition for entering into force, as set out in Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol, is that “not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I, which accounted in total for at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I [developed countries], have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” 4. “Earth Negotiations Bulletin,” December 18, 2009. [Available at http://www.iisd.ca/ vol12/enb12459e.html], see also Guerin and Wemaere (2009). 5. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/index.html. 6. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1987/1987-1.htm. 7. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html. 8. Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/petroleu.html#Production. 9. Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/crudeoilreserves.xls. 10. Tiberghien and Schreurs 2007, p. 22. 11. Inoue, T. “Yoronchouse ni Miru Chikyuu Ondanka no Henyou,” Mitsubishi Research Institute Eco Weekly, August 21, 2006. 12. This is consistent with the argument in chapter 1, requiring substantial independence in foreign policy orientation before receiving substantial major power status attribution. 13. Diplomatic Bluebook 2008. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 14. Speech made by Prime Minister Taro Aso on June 10, 2009. 15. Using MAC calculation was, by itself, controversial, because MAC is said to be dependent on many conditions set by the calculators, and is very much data driven. In addition, MAC is emission allocation focusing on efficiency of the emission reduction, but does not consider other criteria such as responsibility and capacity to reduce. See, for example, Ott (2004) and Kanie et al. (2010). 16. Press release by WWF Japan [available at http://www.wwf.or.jp/activity/lib/press/2009/ p09061001.htm], CASA [available at http://www.bnet.jp/casa/teigen/090610seimei%20

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 131131 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:334:50:33 PMPM 132 Norichika Kanie tyukimoku.pdf], and Kiko Network [available at http://www.kikonet.org/iken/ kokunai/2009- 06-10.html ]. 17. Ikenberry 2001, from chapter 1 of this book. 18. See for example press releases of industry leaders: [available at http://www.fepc.or.jp/news/__ icsFiles/afieldfile/2010/03/12/0312press.pdf, http://www.jisf.or.jp/news/comment/docs/ 20100312komento.pdf]. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_07_ch06.indd780230104648_07_ch06.indd 132132 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:334:50:33 PMPM CHAPTER SEVEN Identifying Regional Powers and Their Status1

Kirssa Cline, Patrick Rhamey, Alexis Henshaw, Alesia Sedziaka, Aakriti Tandon, and Thomas J. Volgy

Much of the international relations literature has focused on the most powerful states, although the politics of regions and the role of regional powers have become increasingly salient in the post–Cold War environment. Many scholars now contend that regional powers are critical, if not central, to our understanding of world politics (Acharya 2007; Lemke 2002; Lake and Morgan 1997; Sbragia 2008). Regional powers are important to our understanding of global politics for at least two reasons. First, these states often shape and establish order within their respective regions. Regional powers vie with challengers within the region as well as states outside of the region to establish mechanisms for governance, as they seek to create order in accordance with their policy preferences. Among the regional powers we identify, this behavior is quite common. South Africa, for example, has made a concerted effort to shape its region by stressing the “recovery of Africa” and “the realization of the ‘African Renaissance’ ” as foreign policy priorities through the promotion of regional institutions and regional integration (Nathan 2005: 362). The club of regional powers plays a second important role, as it consti- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tutes the pool of potential challengers to existing global powers (Hurrell 2006). Regional powers can use their geographic base to develop alternative systems of rules and norms that may challenge salient aspects of the international status quo.2 As their capabilities and activities increase, many within the regional powers club have received attention as global power aspirants (Cooper, Antkiewicz and Shaw 2007; Soares de Lima and Hirst

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 133133 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:217:14:21 PMPM 134 Kirssa Cline et al. 2006; Tammen 2006). A number of these regional powers “share a belief in their entitlement to a more influential role in world affairs” (Hurrell 2006: 2), consistent with self- attribution- based status noted in chapter 1. Due in part to self-attribution as well as increasing capabilities, their rise has been described as the “major challenge to world stability in the twenty- first century” (Tammen 2006: 579). This dual role of regional powers—as global power aspirants and as creators of regional governance—makes this club of states an important part of the international landscape.3 Despite the increasing importance of regional politics, there have been relatively few attempts to systematically identify and compare members of the regional powers club.4 This chapter creates a method for such a comparison, using an approach we adapt from the conceptualization and operationalization of global powers presented in chapter 1. We utilize a three- part framework of opportunity, willingness, and status attribution, identifying regional powers as those states that possess an “unusual amount”5—relative to their region—of each of the various indicators that capture aspects of these three concepts. Note that this framework differs from the original in chapter 1, where opportunity and willingness are matched against various constraints acting against attribution for global power status. Here, we are not specifying the range of constraints for regional status attribution. While they clearly exist and likely influence how much status will be attributed to states in regions, the specification of such constraints requires a theory of regional dynamics, a subject that is too complex for the space limitations imposed on this chapter. Therefore, we leave these constraints formally unspecif ied, although we speculate about some of them in our concluding discussion. Opportunity, which includes both military and economic capabilities, constitutes a well- known aspect of international relations. With greater resources to coerce or entice, powerful states are better able to pursue their interests. The willingness of states to use their capabilities provides a second necessary dimension, indicating a desire to interact with and potentially structure their region. Finally, high status accounts for a state’s legitimacy as a regional power, representing substantial independence from other regional or global powers, as well as additional capacity to inf luence other states. A state that is viewed as a legitimate regional power will have a greater ability to establish and build regional architecture, negotiate with powerful states outside of its region, and will be better able to mount a - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright challenge to global powers.6 We proceed by first describing our approach to identifying regions. After delineating the contours of regions, we determine the set of potential regional powers and challengers through the application of this framework to data collected from 1990 to 2005. What emerges is a distinct club of regional powers that meet the thresholds for opportunity, willingness,

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 134134 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:217:14:21 PMPM Identifying Regional Powers 135 and status. This group includes each of the countries identified as global powers in chapter 1,7 as well as Australia, Brazil, India, Nigeria, and South Africa. Thus, we find that the exclusively regional power club has only five members, fewer even than the number of global powers. We also introduce an additional concept—“regional challengers”—to aid in our discussion of regional dynamics. This group of states meets some, but not all, of the thresholds of our framework for regional powers. Therefore, these states are not regional powers since they fail to cross all the thresholds required of regional powers; however, they demonstrate either the potential (unusual capabilities) or the interest (unusual activity) to become regional powers, and in some cases are attributed substantial status inside the region and/or globally. We highlight their existence since they may pose one of the more significant challenges to regional powers as they attempt to develop regional governance. The presentation of these results, as well as a discussion of our findings, focus on six of what we deem to be the most interesting regions (listed in Table 7.1). We conclude with a consideration of where our conceptual framework compliments or diverges from existing literature.

Table 7.1 Regional Membership, Regional Powers, and Potential Regional Challengers

Middle East South Asia East Asia South America West Africa South Africa

Bahrain Afghanistan Brunei †Argentina Benin Angola †Egypt Bhutan Cambodia Bolivia Burkina Faso Botswana †Iran Bangladesh *China *Brazil Chad Burundi Iraq *India Vietnam Chile Cape Verde Comoros †Israel Maldives Indonesia Paraguay Cote d’Ivoire Congo Jordan Nepal *Japan Uruguay CAF DR Congo Kuwait †Pakistan Laos Gambia Kenya Lebanon Sri Lanka Malaysia Ghana Lesotho Oman Myanmar Guinea- Bissau Madagascar Qatar Palau Guinea Mauritius †Saudi Arabia Philippines Liberia Malawi Syria North Korea †Libya Mozambique UAE South Korea Mauritania Namibia Singapore Mali Rwanda

Taiwan *Nigeria *South Africa - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Thailand Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Swaziland Togo Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

Note: *Indicates regional powers; †indicates regional power challengers.

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 135135 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:217:14:21 PMPM 136 Kirssa Cline et al. Defining Regions

Necessarily prior to any comparative discussion of regional powers is the determination of the region itself. Currently no consensus exists in the literature on the appropriate method for defining regions. Almost four decades ago, Thompson (1973) identified over 22 distinct definitions, a number that has only grown since. At its most simplistic, a region is a clustering of contiguous states in geographic space often following the contours of continents (Katzenstein 2005). These “meta-regions” are readily recognizable to a lay audience, and the use of the meta-region is frequently deemed sufficient.8 However, a number of more nuanced conceptualizations have also been employed in the literature including definitions focused on global and regional architecture (Buzan and Wæver 2003; Katzenstein 1998; Sbragia 2008; Haftel 2007; Goertz and Powers 2009), identity and culture (Huntington 1997; Hymans 2002; Young 2002), or issue externalities (Lake and Morgan 1997; Väyrynen 2003; Beeson 2006; Kelly 2007). Our definition of regions integrates elements of these various approaches, with particular attention paid to avoiding both arbitrary determinations and potentially tautological operationalizations. We begin with the following conceptualization: a region is a cluster of geographically proximate states with similar patterns of political, economic, and cultural interactions. First, we maintain the criterion that regions possess a geographic component. Insisting upon contiguity prevents states with strong interests outside their geographic neighborhoods from being included elsewhere, such as Saudi Arabia, and it prevents the inclusion of global major powers into regional membership when they interject themselves into regional politics, such as the United States in the Middle East. However, as this definition includes no consideration of the meta-region, no state is excluded arbitrarily by a continental border. Second, by our definition, states that comprise a region interact similarly with one another and the international system, but the presence of institutional architectures or a regional power is unnecessary for the existence of a region.9 By focusing on similar patterns of interaction between states, however, our definition is consistent with attempts at identifying regions by cultural considerations or issue externalities. States manifest similar cultural preferences or issue concerns Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright in their behaviors, but by expanding the focus to all types of behaviors we are not restricted to a single issue- area. To operationalize our definition, we employ an opportunity and willingness framework (Most and Starr 1984) to identify patterns of political and economic interaction. Given the combined constraints of geography and capability, we first determine which states are capable of reaching one another in either the military or economic realms. Of those that do, we

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 136136 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:217:14:21 PMPM Identifying Regional Powers 137 then identify states that also engage in political or economic interaction exhibiting a willingness to interact. Finally, by combining a state’s opportunity and willingness, we identify similar patterns of interactions across states to parse out various regions. Operationalizing Opportunity: We propose (consistent with the approach taken in chapter 1) that economic issues play an important role in molding state preferences and should therefore be included independent of military capabilities. As a result, we use two distinct opportunity measures— military and economic. We consider a state to have the “opportunity” to interact with another if it clears our threshold for either the military or the economic dimension. Military capabilities are measured by the dollar amount of military expenditures,10 while economic capabilities are measured by market capitalization of domestic firms.11 While not a perfect representation, market capitalization of domestic firms provides a more conceptually valid measure of economic capabilities than gross domestic product (GDP)—at least at the regional level. Market capitalization is an indicator by investors of an economy’s worth and should be more sensitive to an economy’s strength than the simple aggregation of gross domestic product.12 Furthermore, GDP is highly dependent upon population size and does not account for the degree of output that is necessary to simply sustain the domestic population. Use of market capitalization as an indicator had been limited in the Cold War period due to the presence of communist states. However, with the proliferation of market economies following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the rapid expansion of market capitalization statistics allows now for an important alternative to GDP. In general, the two measures are very strongly correlated throughout the time period (.93) and result in identical findings for major powers to those found in chapter 1.13 Yet at the regional level, the aggregation problems of GDP create potentially serious concerns for the identification of economic strength. A most notable example is in the South African region, where poverty- stricken and war-torn nations such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique are in the top half of regional GDP statistics due to their relatively large populations. Market capitalization, however, corrects this measurement problem, resulting in the more stable and economically viable states at the top, despite their smaller population size. Similarly in East Asia, Singapore is an important economic presence - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright in the region, but discounted by GDP to the realm of less economically powerful states such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Market capitalization, however, places the small though economically vigorous state with more intuitively plausible peers: fellow Asian Tigers Taiwan and South Korea. While at the global level the differences between the two measures may be minuscule, those same differences can have a substantive affect

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 137137 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:217:14:21 PMPM 138 Kirssa Cline et al. with the potential to alter results among the smaller subset of states that comprise regions.14 After determining each state’s military expenditures and market capitalization, the measures are converted into the proportion of a state’s capabilities out of the international total.15 Since the ability of a state to act is constrained by geography, a reach variable is calculated using Boulding’s (1962) loss of power gradient, as refined by Bueno de Mesquita (1981), and applied to both the military and economic dimensions of opportunity. The gradient equation results in a “bubble” of capabilities radiating outward from each state, with capabilities decreasing at a greater rate the further the distance from the capital. Each directed dyad is coded 1 if the projecting state is capable of reaching the target state through either military or economic means, and 0 for all others.16 Operationalizing Willingness: To determine if two states are willing to interact, we again distinguish between the military/political and economic realms. First, we generate a simple dichotomous variable coded 1 if a pair of states has any interaction as coded by the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) in a given year, and 0 otherwise (Bond et al. 2003). For economic interactions, we use trade: if two countries exchange any trade in a given year, we code the measure as 1 and 0 otherwise.17 We use this most basic level of interaction to avoid the arbitrariness necessary to creating thresholds. Finally, to integrate the opportunity and willingness dimensions, we generate a variable indicating whether a directed dyad has both opportunity and willingness by multiplying the two dichotomous measures. This final dichotomous measure is 1 if two states have both the opportunity and willingness to interact along either the military or economic dimensions. By combining these various measures in a simple manner, the final variable represents a pairing of states (constrained by geography) that interact with one another. Evaluating all dyads in a given year, it is then possible to determine which states have similar patterns of interaction with the international system as a whole and thereby comprise our set of regions. Identifying the Region: We identify similar patterns of interactions between states using clique analysis, a networking algorithm that identifies “a collection of actors all of whom ‘choose’ each other” (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 254).18 Applying clique analysis to our measures results in states with the opportunity to interact and willingness to do so clustering - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright together. These groupings of similar states represent our set of possible regions, illustrated by a cluster diagram.19 Our relevant regions are lifted from the diagram, with the stipulation that they must cluster together in a group of more than two and also be contiguous. This was done at five- year intervals beginning in 1990 and ending in 2005, leaving us with four snapshots of the potential regions. A state is considered to be a member of

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 138138 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:227:14:22 PMPM Identifying Regional Powers 139 a given region if it clusters with a group of states in at least three of the four intervals or two intervals if it is a member of the region in 2005. We use these time- based criteria for two reasons. First, doing so creates regions with consistent memberships throughout the time period and therefore not dependent upon the particular circumstances of any given year. Secondly, using the thresholds above provides only regions that are consistently present. A Central Asian region is present in 1995, for example, but is not consistently present throughout the post–Cold War period. Not all states, however, have the capabilities or willingness to interact with their neighbors, such as microstates. These isolated states are placed within a relevant region if a clear region is obvious due to a historical relationship with a non- isolated neighbor, such as Sri Lanka with India. Other states are “torn” between regions, having relatively equivalent patterns of opportunity and willingness with multiple groups. We classify this group of states as “border states” between regions and list them separately from regional clusters.20 In many cases, groups of states separated from one another clearly and cleanly, allowing us to determine regions using capabilities and willingness measures alone. The greatest challenge came in separating one large cluster of states encompassing Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. The further division of this cluster into regions was accomplished using the cultural aspect of our definition. We created a linguistic similarity variable ranging from 0 to 3, capturing the degree of similarity in language and script between two states.21 While not intended to fully capture cultural considerations, it is an effective minimal proxy for identity and it allowed for a separation of the Middle East from the European region.22 The results of this process are presented in Table 7.1. While we uncovered 11 distinct political clusters, for the purpose of our discussion we focus on the six regions that should be of substantive interest for determining members of the regional power club: South America, the Middle East, West Africa, South Africa, East Asia, and South Asia.23 We believe that the regions we identified here have substantial face validity, and serve our interests well, as our regional classifications are neither preordained by institutional structures nor by regional power membership. We do not claim that this exercise in identifying regions is (or should be) the preeminent word on what regions exist in the international system. The conceptual and empirical differences in the literature are based on - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright differing theoretical approaches and more importantly, differing substantive questions. Depending on the type of question being pursued, one delineation of regions may be more appropriate than another, as long as the delineation does not create a tautology. The primary concern driving the delineation of the regions described in this chapter is the identification of regional powers, and in that context we find our opportunity and

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 139139 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:227:14:22 PMPM 140 Kirssa Cline et al. willingness approach to regional identification appropriate. However, in order to avoid the problem of identifying “false” regional powers (due to erroneous placement of states into certain regions), we took extra steps where substantial arguments could arise over the boundaries of a certain region. For examples, Turkey has been placed into Europe; Venezuela and Colombia appear to interact far more with what is typically classified as North American, Central American, and Caribbean states than they do with South American states. In such cases, we took care to run alternative analyses to determine whether or not the changed placement of these states (placing Turkey in the Middle East region; shifting Venezuela and Colombia to South America) would impact the delineation of regional powers. Despite these changes, the identification of regional powers (below) did not change.

The Regional Powers Framework

While a number of different scholars have discussed the concept of regional powers, little of the research has sought to identify systematically which states belong in this club. One of the few to delineate regional powers in a systematic, empirical context is Lemke (2002, 2008). Lemke begins with the meta- region, and defines his local hierarchies as groupings of states that are able to interact with one another militarily. The regional power is the state with the greatest capabilities within the local hierarchy, and while the focus is on military power, GDP is used as the primary operational indicator.24 By comparison, our framework for regional powers rests on a foundation that identifies regional powers on the basis of their opportunity and willingness to act in the region, as well as the status that is attributed to them as a consequence. Our conceptualization of regional powers is distinct in the literature, and (drawing from the framework laid out in chapter 1) the inclusion of the status dimension also allows us to distinguish between status- consistent (awarded recognition for their capabilities and willingness) and status-inconsistent (where status is incommensurate with capabilities or willingness) regional powers. Our framework for regional powers is also distinct from the framework used for global powers. Although the global powers framework provides - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the foundation for our work, we diverge from it in a number of ways to account for the particulars of regional dynamics. While a global power can be any state in the system, a regional power must be embedded geographically within its region. While a global power must have opportunity and willingness above and beyond other states in the system, regional powers must be strong and active relative to the region. Additionally, working in

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 140140 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:227:14:22 PMPM Identifying Regional Powers 141 the regional context facilitates the use of certain measures that are problematic at the global level, but necessitates a reexamination of others that function well at the system level. In the next section, we discuss our measurement strategies for each of the three dimensions of our framework in greater detail, as well as the results we obtain from their application. After determining whether a state has unusual levels of opportunity or willingness to become a major power, we can identify both regional powers and regional challengers. To be labeled a regional power, a state must consistently possess both opportunity and willingness over time and receive significant recognition as a regional power, whether in the form of regional or global status. We consider a state to be consistently capable if it is at least one standard deviation above the regional mean on any opportunity measure for more than half the years under study. The same logic is applied to the willingness measure.25 We identify interactions by states as either cooperative or conflictual, allowing us to compare the behaviors of regional powers across the different regions. If a state surpasses either the cooperation or conf lict threshold for more than half the years under study, it is considered a consistently willing state. Consistency in status attribution follows the same criteria—if a state passes either the regional or global status measures for more than half the years under study, it is labeled as being attributed status. In addition to regional powers, we identify another group of states that we label regional challengers. These states do not meet our criteria for being a regional power, but have unusual amounts of some combination of capabilities, willingness, or status with which to influence relations within the region nonetheless. Some regions come without any challengers, others contain one or two in addition to a regional power, and as we note below, there is at least one region with a substantial number of challengers but without a regional power. We identify regional challengers as well as regional powers since it appears that the mix of challengers and regional powers may have important implications for both regional governance and the manner in which status is attributed to states within regions. We identify challengers as those states that are not regional powers but pass two of our three regional power attributes for more than half of the years under study (Table 7.1 notes the regional powers and challengers).26 Table 7.2 illustrates the criteria for differentiating between regional powers and regional challengers. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Opportunity In the regional context, opportunity refers to a state’s military and economic size relative to its region. A state is considered to have an unusual amount of military capabilities if either its military expenditures or

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Table 7.2 Criteria for Classifying Regional Powers and Regional Challengers Opportunity Willingness Status Attribution by Type of State Regional Global Community

Yes Yes Yes Yes Regional Power/ Status Consistent Yes Yes Yes No Regional Power/ Status Inconsistent Yes Yes No Yes Regional Power/ Status Inconsistent Yes Yes No No Challenger Yes No Yes Yes Challenger Yes No Yes No Challenger Yes No No Yes Challenger No Yes Yes Yes Challenger No Yes Yes No Challenger No Yes No Yes Challenger

military personnel are at least one standard deviation above the regional mean.27 Unlike for global powers, whose capabilities are dependent upon extensive military reach, we simply use the raw value of military personnel and military expenditures. Given the geographic proximity of states within a region, the inclusion of a military reach variable was deemed unnecessary. In def ining econom ic oppor tunit y at the reg iona l level, we again employ market capitalization. The indicator measures the market- determined value of each state’s economy, independent of population. In determining a state’s economic opportunity, we again leave out a measure of reach due to geographical proximity: economic size should suffice as an indicator of a country’s capabilities in the regional context. The application of these measures to our regions of interest is shown in Table 7.3. 28 Most notably, the opportunity dimension of our framework appears to display a substantial degree of stability over time.29 Indeed, more often than not, there appears to be an “all or nothing pattern”: if a state passes the threshold for the opportunity variables, it will pass the threshold for each of the 16 years under study or in no years at all. Typically, states are quite strong throughout the period or fail to pass the threshold.30 - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

Willingness A regional power must be willing to use its capabilities to achieve wide ranging policy goals within the region. Willingness is measured using the

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Table 7.3 Military and Economic Opportunity, Regional Powers, and Challenger States, 1990–2005

Military Economic

Middle East Egypt Y (0, 15) N (1) Iran Y (0, 15) N (2) Israel N (8, 0) Y (12) Saudi Arabia Y (16, 0) Y (15) South Asia *India Y (16, 16) Y (16) Pakistan N (0, 0) N (0) East Asia *China Y (8, 16) N (5) *Japan Y (16, 0) Y (16) South America Argentina N (0, 0) N (2) *Brazil Y (16, 16) Y (16) West Africa Libya Y (14, 15) N (0) *Nigeria Y (13, 16) Y (16) South Africa *South Africa Y (16, 14) Y (16)

Notes: 1. To qualify as a “Y” (yes), a country must be one standard deviation above their regional threshold for more than half of the years under study. The number of years a state breaks the threshold for each measure is in parentheses. 2. For military capabilities, the first number is military spending and the second is military personnel. *Indicates regional powers.

level of interaction by a state with others in the region using the IDEA events data base.31 Nearly identical to the measures used at the global level, we include both cooperative interactions, such as bilateral treaties and positive endorsements, and conf lict events, ranging from negative rhetoric between states to military disputes. In the discussion of global powers in chapter 1, both cooperative and conflict events were included to identify the broad

range of activities by major powers willing and able to both entice and - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright coerce others to advance their goals. Within the regional context, however, we recognize that a regional power may be primarily conflictual or cooperative (Destradi 2008), responding to the degree of regional cooperation or conflict existing in that particular geographic space. Unlike our opportunity measures, there is less stability on the willingness dimension, which may reflect greater variability in states’ interaction

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 143143 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:227:14:22 PMPM 144 Kirssa Cline et al. Table 7.4 Willingness, Regional Powers, and Challenger States, 1990–2005

Conflict Cooperation Middle East Egypt N (0) N (7) Iran N (0) N (5) Israel Y (14) Y (9) Saudi Arabia N (0) N (1) South Asia *India Y (13) Y (11) Pakistan Y (16) Y (13) East Asia *China Y (14) Y (16) *Japan N (4) Y (16) South America Argentina N (3) Y (9) *Brazil Y (11) Y (9) West Africa Libya N (2) N (6) *Nigeria Y (9) Y (15) South Africa *South Africa Y (10) Y (16)

Notes: 1. To qualify as a “Y” (i.e., yes), a country must be one standard deviation above their regional threshold for more than half of the years under study. The number of years a state breaks the threshold for each measure is in parentheses. *Indicates regional powers.

as well as the nature of events data.32 Plausibly, a state may engage in widely different types of events from one year to the next. However, we find that some states are more consistent in their foreign policy behaviors than others. Moreover, while some states’ unusual capabilities match their active engagement in regional affairs, others appear to be consistently willing to act extensively without having regional power capabilities. Our findings across each component of the willingness dimension are displayed in Table 7.4. Of the states displaying consistently high levels of - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright opportunity, we find that Brazil, China, India, Israel, Nigeria, and South Africa all engage in unusual levels of conflict and cooperative behavior throughout the 16-year period. Japan, a very strong state, is largely a cooperative power. This unique behavior from Japan may be the result of a number of different factors: constraints imposed by Japan’s domestic politics, emphasis on economic growth and development, or efforts to

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 144144 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:227:14:22 PMPM Identifying Regional Powers 145 mend its global and regional image following World War II (Katzenstein 2005).33 Pakistan is the only state that does not have the opportunity to be a regional power, but it consistently passes the conflict and cooperation thresholds on willingness. Likely, the India- Pakistan rivalry has provided a number of opportunities for both highly conflictual interaction as well as cooperative reconciliation, driving the high level of activity Pakistan displays.34 There are also a handful of states that have consistently high levels of opportunity but fail to engage in unusually high levels of foreign policy activity. This group of states includes a number of Middle Eastern states— Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran—as well as Libya. The data illustrate both the relative isolation of Libya in regional and global politics during the period, and the lack of consistent leadership activity by Middle Eastern states, effectively leaving the Middle East without a regional power (as we will see, Israel receives little status).

Status Attribution The application of our opportunity and willingness measures to the regional setting provides a great deal of variation—some states have unusually large amounts of both capabilities and willingness, while others have high amounts of either one or the other. Given this variation, which states are awarded status? Furthermore, is status attribution essentially automatic for regional powers? Important to the discussion of status is the recognition that different groups of states can attribute status. Status can be attributed by actors within the region, by states outside of the region, and by the state itself. The attribution of status from within the region signifies recognition of the state as a regional power and acceptance that the state will seek to establish governance and order within region. Global status attribution, or recognition from the global community, reinforces legitimacy as a regional power. The recognition of a regional power’s role allows the state to represent regional issues at the global level. Finally, self-attribution signals motivation and interest—does a state intend for itself the regional power role? Unfortunately, finding quantitative, systematic measures for self-attribution has proven especially difficult. For this reason, we restrict - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright our current discussion to regional and global attribution, leaving self- attribution for the case studies below on regional powers in South Asia and South America. We measure status along two dimensions: state visits and diplomatic contacts.35 State visits are a largely symbolic act reflecting the desire of a state to consult with another country of presumed importance, while the

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 145145 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:227:14:22 PMPM 146 Kirssa Cline et al. presence of embassies signals the perception of relevance by the sending state to the receiving state. We measure regional and global status attribution separately since status attributed from the region and international system broadly constitute two different types of community- based sources of status for regional powers. A state is considered to have regional status if it exceeds the regional mean by one standard deviation in hosting embassies or state visits from regional actors, and regional status from the global community if it does likewise for embassies or state visits from outside the region. A second aspect of status attribution relates to what has been termed “status consistency.” For regional powers, we conceptualize status inconsistency as occurring when a state is not attributed status at both the regional and global level. It is possible for a state to pass the threshold for both capabilities and willingness, for example, but be recognized and attributed regional power status by only the global community or only its regional community. To determine status consistency, we compare the level of status received with a state’s opportunity and willingness. A state with opportunity, willingness, and status at either the regional or global level is labeled a regional power. States are status-consistent regional powers if they have opportunity and willingness and are attributed status at both the regional and global levels. Our findings suggest that by and large, states with consistently high levels of both opportunity and willingness are rewarded with proportional status at both the regional and global levels— they are largely status consistent (Table 7.5).36 The one exception is Japan: it is both a global and a regional power, yet it fails to generate an unusual amount of regional status. Note that status inconsistency, however, is not a synonym for regional power challengers. Had we used the operational definition in chapter 1 for delineating status inconsistency, all challenger states would be status inconsistent, since they lack at least one of the attributes in our regional powers framework. However, challengers are not regional powers and therefore cannot be status- inconsistent regional powers. For these reasons, we do not discuss the status consistency of the challenger states, as it makes little sense to do so. Nevertheless, the extent to which they are attributed high status regionally or globally, or fail to receive high status when they have the opportunity and demonstrate the desire to act as regional powers, represent cases of community- based status attribution that are out of sync - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright with either capabilities or willingness to exercise a leadership role in the region. Thus, the status accorded to regional challengers appears to represent an important phenomenon: recognition (or rejection) by either the regional or global community of the potential salience of the challenger state to the region. Thus, we focus on the extent to which the regional and international communities recognize the potential salience of these states.

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Table 7.5 Regional and Global Status Attribution for Regional Powers and Challengers, 1990–2005

Regional Attribution Global Attribution Status Consistency

Middle East Egypt Y (10,0) Y (10,6) na Iran N (3,0) Y (3,4) na Israel N (2,0) N (7,0) na Saudi Arabia Y (6,4) Y (4,5) na South Asia *India Y (10,4) Y (13,6) SC Pakistan Y (11,1) N (8,2) na East Asia *China Y (16,3) Y (16,6) SC *Japan N (5,2) Y (15,6) SI South America *Brazil Y (9,na) Y (16,6) SC Argentina N (6,na) Y (5,4) na West Africa Libya N (4, 3) Y (12, 6) na *Nigeria Y (12,6) Y (12,6) SC South Africa *South Africa Y (8,4) Y (16,4) SC

Notes: 1. In parentheses: the number years a given country passes the one-standard- deviation-above- the- mean threshold for state visits followed by embassies hosted. 2. To receive a “Y” (i.e., “yes”), a state must pass the state visits threshold for more than half the years of study (i.e., at least 9 years) OR pass the embassies threshold for more than half the years we have data (i.e., at least 4 years). 3. “SC” refers to “status consistent.” A state is status consistent if it receives both regional and global status, and displays the constant opportunity and willingness to be a major power (e.g., passes the opportunity and willingness thresholds a majority of the time). 4. “SI” refers to “status inconsistent,” a state that has both opportunity and willingness but lacks status on either level, or a state that is given status despite its lack of capabilities or willingness. 5. In the cases of Brazil and Argentina, “na” notes that both states receive the maximum number of embassies from the region, but cannot surpass the one sd criterion since all other members of the region receive virtually the same number of embassies. * Indicates regional power.

The amount of recognition received, as proxied via embassies and state visits hosted, is listed in Table 7.5. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Three of the more interesting cases here are Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the one hand, and Israel on the other. The former two states fail to cross the threshold on the willingness measure, yet are attributed high levels of status both at the regional and global levels. While Saudi Arabia is clearly recognized for its strength (as the unquestionable military and economic power in the region), the Egyptian case suggests that status attribution

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 147147 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:227:14:22 PMPM 148 Kirssa Cline et al. may be a slow moving process that lags substantially behind the ebbs and flows of opportunity and willingness.37 Status attribution to Egypt is likely a remnant of its past role in the region, a role which it can no longer afford nor is willing to maintain.38 Israel, on the other hand, demonstrates both sufficient opportunity and willingness to be a regional power, yet it receives insufficient status at either the regional or global levels to meet the requirements of being a regional power. The remaining challenger states, albeit not regional powers, nevertheless receive substantial regional or global recognition, evidently linked to either their capabilities or their willingness to engage in substantial activity within their regions. While we do not have space here to discuss this issue further, the finding does suggest that additional attention should be paid to the conditions under which challengers receive recognition both regionally and globally and whether such status attribution, especially from outside the region, impacts regional politics and makes order creation and regional governance more problematic for regional powers.

Looking Closer at Challenger States: When Opportunity and Willingness Diverge

The application of our framework identifies not only a club of regional powers but also a group of potential regional challengers. Consistent with our expectations, there is a clear group of regional powers that is unusually strong, highly active, and rewarded with status both globally and regionally. Challenger states, however, may receive high status, but lack either opportunity or willingness.39 These challenger states provide two interesting puzzles: why do highly capable states fail to interact with their region? And alternatively, why do states that lack the capacity to shape regional politics consistently behaving assertively in their regions? We propose the source of these anomalies to be domestic responses within countries to their regional context (Table 7.6). First, domestic politics defines how challengers utilize the limited capabilities they possess. Pakistani activism, for example, is driven by domestic political support fueled by millennia of violent conflict between Muslims and Hindus in the South Asian continent. Nationalistic desires reacting to regional politics can result in a rise in activism, as is the case in the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright rivalry between India and Pakistan (Thompson 2001). The activities of these states are often the manifestation of nationalist or ethnic politics, fueling the attempts by challenger states to use their limited capabilities to affect the existing regional order. Domestic cleavages in both the Middle East and South Asia have often dictated the foreign policies of challenger states, creating much opportunity for conflict as well as cooperation.

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Table 7.6 Summary of Findings for Opportunity, Willingness, and Status, 1990- 2005

Opportunity Willingness Status as regional power

Military Economic Conflict Cooperation Regional Global Consistency

Regional Powers Brazil Y Y Y Y Y Y SC China Y Y Y Y Y Y SC India Y Y Y Y Y Y SC Japan Y Y N Y N Y SI Nigeria Y Y Y Y Y Y SC South Africa Y Y Y Y Y Y SC Challenger States Argentina N N N Y N Y na Egypt Y N N N Y Y na Iran Y N N N N Y na Israel N Y Y Y N N na Libya Y N N N N Y na Pakistan N N Y Y Y N na Saudi Arabia Y Y N N Y Y na

Notes: 1. To receive a “Y” (i.e., “yes”) in the military opportunity column, a state must pass the military threshold in either the personnel or expenditures categories for a majority of the years under study. To receive a “Y” in the economic category, a state must pass the threshold for market capitalization the majority of years under study. 2. To receive a “Y” for either of the willingness measures, a state must pass the relevant threshold for a majority of the years under study. 3. To receive a “Y” for regional or global status, a state must pass either the state visits or diplomatic contact threshold for the majority of years under study (i.e., at least 9 years for the state visits measure, or at least 4 years for the diplomatic contacts measure). 4. “SC” refers to “status consistent,” “SI” to “status inconsistent.”

Second, fluctuations in activism by challenger states can also be domestic reactions to regional events. Iran, for example, engaged in significant levels of cooperative activism from 1997 to 2000, coinciding with the election of Mohammad Khatami. The particulars of the state’s leader, a man who sought to improve Iran’s relationship with the region and the global community, resulted in an observed attempt by Iran to become the regional power in the Middle East, already possessing sufficient capabilities and global status. However, this attempt was short-lived, as domestic reactions to American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq preceded the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright replacement of Khatami with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a retreat by Iran from involvement in the region. Saudi Arabia provides another interesting case of an unwilling potential regional power, similar to a number of Middle Eastern states. However, Saudi Arabia is the only state with both substantial military and economic capabilities. Yet unlike other Middle Eastern challengers, the Saudis

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 149149 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:237:14:23 PMPM 150 Kirssa Cline et al. almost never demonstrate high levels of regional activity. This extreme unwillingness by Saudi Arabia is driven by the intersection of domestic political and economic preferences with global and regional context. Compounding the high levels of conflict in the region with economic interests outside the region, the benefits to Saudi Arabia of taking the leadership role in the Middle East simply do not justify the costs. Saudi politics focus on oil production to states beyond the region, not regional leadership. Yet, Saudi capabilities are strong enough to effectuate more regional order: while they do not exhibit high levels of interaction, they have formed the most authoritative regional infrastructure in the Middle East (Hooghe, Marks, and de Vries 2006). Both activism without capabilities and unwillingness to act as a capable power are substantially driven by the domestic politics of regional challengers. While incapable activist states may attempt to shape regional politics as they can despite their limited ability, the capable inactive challenger illustrates that in order to engage the region and shape regional politics, the domestic political sphere must be amenable to regional leadership. Our findings indicate that Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia all have the ability to become a major regional power in the Middle East and provide much needed order. However, the realities of each state’s domestic political situations, often fueled by their relationship with other states in the region, results in an unwillingness to lead by any of them. This hesitation has left the Middle East in a state of perpetual conflict40 without a regional power and therefore regional order.

Concluding Thoughts

The post–Cold War era has been described as a “world of regions,” and the study of regional orders has been declared “vital to our understanding of how the world works” (Acharya 2007: 630). Given these strong com- mendations for a greater understanding of regions and regional powers, surprisingly little work addresses these issues in the literature. While a number of scholars have presented different operational criteria for regions (e.g., Lemke 2002; Buzan and Wæver 2003; Lake 1997), there has been virtually no attempt to systematically identify regional powers. Most of the approaches used to identify regional powers typically range from ignoring the problem of identification (e.g., Destradi 2008) to iden- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tification by “common knowledge” or by using a single indicator such as military capabilities or economic growth (Lemke 2002;41 Cooper et al. 200742). Attention to regional powers is often focused on the “BRIC”— Brazil, Russia, India, and China—due to their substantial military, economic, and political capacity (Hurrell 2006; Tammen 2006; Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006). Yet their relations to the regions in which they

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 150150 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:237:14:23 PMPM Identifying Regional Powers 151 reside, their memberships in the clubs of regional or global powers, or their aspirations to move from one club to the other, are not typically discussed in a systematic and comparative context. The method of identifying regional powers presented here is comparative and systematic. The framework presented in this chapter allows the researcher to identify the time period when a state rises to regional power status as well as when it is no longer able or willing to actively structure the politics of its region. As the Egyptian case illustrates, perceptions of regional power status change slowly over time, while the willingness of a state to fulfill the role of regional power may disintegrate much more rapidly. Our analysis suggests that the regional power club is just as exclusive, if not more so, than the club of global powers. Only Australia,43 Brazil, India, Nigeria, and South Africa are uniquely regional powers. Further, this group of states is overwhelmingly status-consistent, indeed much more so than the club of global powers. This unique group provides the set of potential “rising” powers from which a new global power could emerge in the future. However, the prospects of global power status are not distributed equally upon all regional powers. In fact, membership in the “club of regional powers” very much depends on capturing a large chunk of the resource base in the region to which the power belongs, and thus it would be very unlikely that the members of the “club” would be highly similar in capabilities needed to seek global power status. While all regional powers are substantially more powerful than the remaining members of the region, regional power status does not make them equal across regions. For instance, South Africa and Nigeria fail to demonstrate the capabilities of a rising global power, holding less than half the capabilities of other regional powers.44 Observing changes in capabilities during the time period presented in this chapter indicates that only Brazil and India demonstrate the capabilities needed to move from the regional to the global club of powers. The development and application of our framework is but a small step toward a better identification and understanding of regional powers, even if it represents a systematic attempt to identify the regional power club. It also raises a number of salient questions that we do not answer, including critical issues about the circumstances under which regional powers can create regional order, and the ability of regional powers to - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright become major powers. The following chapters examine Brazil and India, which are, in many ways, the two states most relevant to these questions. As their region’s clear and only regional power, these states are best able to establish order and architecture. Yet, there is also a strong challenger state within each of their regions, making the task more difficult.45 The two case studies that follow highlight both the ability of these

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 151151 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:237:14:23 PMPM 10.1057/9780230119314 -MajorPowers andtheQuest for StatusinInternational Politics, Editedby Thomas J. Volgy, RenatoCorbetta, Keith 99780230104648_08_ch07.indd 152 7 8 0 2 3 0 1 0 4 6 4 8 _ 0 8 _ c h 0 7 . i n d d

1 5 2

Table 7.7 Additional Regions, Regional Powers, Challengers, Isolated States, and Border States A. GrantandRyan G. Baird East Africa North/Central Europe Maghreb Oceania Isolated States2 Border States3 America1

Djibouti Antigua Albania Malta Algeria Australia Afghanistan Liechtenstein Azerbaijan Eritrea Bahamas Andorra Moldova Tunisia Fiji Albania Madagascar Cameroon †Ethiopia Barbados Armenia Monaco †Morocco Kiribati Andorra Maldives Eq. Guinea Somalia Belize Austria Netherlands Marshall Islands Antigua Marshall Islands Gabon Sudan †Canada Belarus Norway Micronesia Armenia Micronesia Kyrgyzstan Yemen Colombia Belgium Poland Nauru Bahamas Moldova Kazakhstan Costa Rica Bosnia Portugal Palau Bangladesh Monaco Mongolia Cuba Bulgaria Romania Papua New Belarus Nauru Niger Guinea Dominica Croatia *Russia Samoa Belize Palau S.T. & P. Dom. Rep. Cyprus San Marino Solomon Islands Benin Papua New Suriname Guinea Ecuador Czech Rep. Serbia Tonga Bhutan Samoa Tajikistan El Salvador Denmark Slovakia Tuvalu Bosnia San Marino Turkmenistan 44/4/2011 7:14:23 PM / 4 Grenada Estonia Slovenia Vanuatu Brunei Serbia Uzbekistan / 2 0

1 Guatemala Finland Spain Cape Verde Solomon Islands 1

7 : 1 4 : 2 3

P M Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 10.1057/9780230119314 -MajorPowers andtheQuest for StatusinInternational Politics, Editedby Thomas J. Volgy, RenatoCorbetta, Keith 99780230104648_08_ch07.indd 153 7 8 0 2 3 0 1 0 4 6 4 8 _

0 Guyana *France Sweden Djibouti Sri Lanka 8 _ c

h Haiti Georgia Turkey Dominica St. Kitts and 0 7

. Nevis i n d

d Honduras *Germany *UK Dominican Rep. St. Lucia

1 Jamaica Greece Ukraine Grenada St. Vincent 5 3 †Mexico Hungary Haiti Tonga Nicaragua Iceland Iceland Tuvalu Panama Ireland Kiribati Vanuatu Peru †Italy Lesotho St. Kitts Latvia

A. GrantandRyan G. Baird St. Lucia Liechtenstein St. Vincent Lithuania Trinidad Luxembourg *United States Macedonia Venezuela

Notes: 1. This large group of states is characteristically dominated by the United States. While there are unique elements to groups such as “Central America” or “the Caribbean,” these relationships are subsumed by states’ similar patterns of behavior with the US. 2. This group consists of states that do not have similar interactions with any of our identified groups. Each state was placed in an intuitively plausible region as described in the chapter (see Table 7.1 in the chapter). 3. This group of states lies on the borders between two regions and did not appear to clearly belong to any region in the original analysis. * Indicates regional powers; † indicates regional power challengers. 44/4/2011 7:14:23 PM / 4 / 2 0 1 1

7 : 1 4 : 2 3

P M Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 154 Kirssa Cline et al.

Table 7.8 Language Families and Scripts Used to Calculate the Linguistic Similarity Measure

Language Families Scripts

Afro-Asiatic Ge’ez Nilo- Saharan Tifinagh Niger- Congo N’Ko Niger- Congo/Bantu Perso- Arabic Khoi- san Latin Austronesian Cyrillic Austro- Asiatic Devanagari Kradai Chinese Sino- Tibetan Khmer Altaic Dravidian Indo- Iranian Caucasian Balto-Slavic Germanic Uralic Romance Quecha Guarani Mayan Korean Albanian

regional powers to order relations in their geopolitical space and the conditions under which they may contend for membership in the club of global powers.

Notes

1. We would like to thank Sverre Bodung, Beau James, and Mark Thornton for major contributions to our thinking, data, and data analysis. All the mistakes, however, are ours. 2. Note for instance Brazil’s challenge and attempts at leadership (as a regional power) over the maintenance of the global Non- Proliferation Regime. See “An Awkward Guest- list,” The Economist, May 1, 2010: 60–61. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 3. Brazil’s struggle (chapter 8) to manage its global ambitions with its limited, regional base exemplifies this dilemma. 4. Buzan and Wæver (2003), Lemke (2002), and Lake (1997) provide alternative conceptualizations of regions, but few have sought to operationalize the concept of a regional power. 5. For our purposes, a state possesses an “unusual amount” of a given component if it is at least one standard deviation above the regional mean for that measure. 6. See chapter 1, this volume, for an extended discussion of the role of status. 7. China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 154154 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:237:14:23 PMPM Identifying Regional Powers 155 8. For examples of authors who employ the meta- region, see Soderbaum (2004) and Solingen (2005). 9. This conceptualization of regions for instance does not force us to rely on institutional structures to define the relevant region. Doing so would make it difficult to distinguish between types of orders being sought by regional powers, making the definition of region tautological when it comes to assessing whether or not regional powers are willing and able to impose an institutional framework on the region. 10. Our military expenditure data is from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. SIPRI leaves entries vacant if the number is in doubt, resulting in a number of missing data points. To fill these gaps, data were generated by first calculating a ratio of the missing country’s military expenditures to its neighbors’ military expenditures using data collected by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The SIPRI scores of neighboring states were multiplied by the previously calculated ratio; if multiple neighboring states were available, an average was taken. 11. Data for the market capitalization of domestic firms are taken from the World Bank (2009). 12. GDP includes both government spending and trade. Government spending may not readily ref lect economic strength and is closely related to military expenditures, while trade should be less a measure of economic opportunity and more that of willingness. Market capitalization, however, does not suffer from the same aggregation problems of GDP, more accurately reflecting the perceived total value of an economy. 13. Market capitalization is actually more generous to the identified major powers than GDP, with only Canada surpassing a major power (Russia) in the most recent available statistics. 14. The missing data for market capitalization, post–Cold War, is concentrated among African states (Togo, Sudan, Niger), microstates (Vanuatu, Tonga), and closed economies (North Korea). 15. This process is similar to the Correlates of War’s CINC score. 16. A directed dyad is coded 1 if the power gradient of State A at State B’s capital is greater than or equal to 50% of State A’s raw power percentage, consistent with Lemke (2002). For further discussion of the loss of power gradient, see Lemke (2002: Chapter 4). 17. We use the Correlates of War (COW) Trade Data Set (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009). 18. A clique is a “sub-set of a network in which the actors are more closely and intensely tied to one another than they are to other members in the network” (Hanneman and Riddle 2005, Chapter 11). The clique algorithm estimates the maximum group of states with similar opportunity and willingness that could comprise a region. Clique analysis was done with the use of UCI networking software (Borgatti et al. 2002). 19. This illustration of clustering takes the form of a dendrogram, wherein subsets of the dendrogram represent similar states determined by the correlation of their opportunity and willingness indicators with other actors in the system. 20. Lists of isolated and border states can be found in the Table 7.7. 21. Generating data on linguistic similarity can become impossibly complex given the sheer number of different dialects spoken and the difficulties in determining what makes one language similar to another. We employed a simpler, albeit cruder, technique to determine linguistic similarity using data from the CIA World Factbook. The final measure ranges from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating no linguistic similarity. To create the measure, we first identified the language spoken by majority of people within a given country. In this first step, we did not identify the language family but the language itself. Nor did we identify to the level of - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright dialects. A portion of the population in Cote d’Ivoire, for example, speaks Congo- Niger languages; however, there are around 250 separate dialects spoken by different groups. This simplification allows the standardization of languages listed in the CIA World Factbook as the data are not presented in a uniform manner. For example, in Cote d’Ivoire the majority language is French. Secondly, the majority language was then assigned to a language family, so that ultimately we compared the language families of the majority language across countries. The same process was done to find the largest minority language spoken (must be spoken by at least 10% of the population). Next, this process was done for the dominant

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 155155 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:247:14:24 PMPM 156 Kirssa Cline et al. script used by the majority and minority language. The list of languages used and scripts identified can be found in the Table 7.8. If a country shared the same majority language with another, it earned one point. If the minority languages matched, it earned 0.5 points. If a majority language of one country matched the minority language of another, 0.25 points was assigned. The same process was done for script (1 point for matching majority scripts, 0.5 for matching minority, and 0.25 if a majority script matched a minority). The sum of these scores results in the 3- point measure of linguistic similarity. 22. Using this cultural indicator, the most notable state that is left out of the Middle East is Turkey. Therefore, we ran calculations twice for the Middle East, once with Turkey included and once excluded. Turkey’s inclusion in the region did not alter the findings we report below on the Middle East. 23. The remaining regions we identified are listed in the Table 7.7. We chose to focus our analysis on the six regions identified in Table 7.1 because the regional powers are less obvious in these regions. Oceania and North America are dominated by Australia and the United States, respectively. Within Europe, a sophisticated regional architecture exists over a portion of its members, inducing unique patterns of interaction, and four global powers, embedded within the region—France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia— dominate regional dynamics. The Maghreb region and East Africa include only a very small number of states, with neither region providing potential regional powers in the near future. We leave further consideration of these regions to future research. 24. While Lemke primarily relies on GDP, he also uses COW’s CINC scores as a robustness check and references the differences obtained from using different measures (notably in the Middle East). Lemke’s emphasis on GDP is justified through his theoretical underpinnings (power transition theory). 25. We chose this threshold for two main reasons. First, exceeding our thresholds for over half the years signals consistency, whether in capabilities or willingness, suggesting that the country is a substantial player in its given region. Secondly, the data also supported this cut off. For capabilities, as will be discussed below, there is a rather clear pattern—states tend to have high capabilities throughout the 1990- 2005 period, or not at all. While the willingness measure has greater variance, there is a relatively clear break in the data. The only real ambiguous case given our threshold is Egypt, which is active for 7 years (and the cut- off is 9). 26. Regional challengers are those states that either (1) consistently pass both the opportunity and willingness thresholds, but neither of the status thresholds; (2) consistently pass opportunity and status thresholds, but not willingness, or (3) consistently pass willingness and status, but not opportunity. Each of these types of challengers is present in the data. 27. Military expenditures data are from SIPRI; missing data were imputed using COW’s military expenditures data. Military personnel data are from COW (1990–2000) and from The Military Balance after 2000. 28. Only states that are identified as either regional powers or regional power challengers are included in Tables 7.3–7.6. 29. This stability in regional power capability is noted by Lemke (2002) as well over a much larger time frame, albeit using different measures of regions and regional powers. 30. The major exception is Israel; it passes the military expenditures measure in eight years and the capitalization threshold in 12. Overall, Israel appears to be getting weaker (in comparison to Saudi Arabia). 31. As in chapter 1, we measure both cooperative and conflictual interactions, operationalized as the weighted sum of cooperative or conflict events per year toward another regional - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright player in a given year (Bond et al. 2003). We use the Goldstein scale values (Goldstein 1992) for each event. 32. For major global powers, the events data measures do contain substantial consistency. This divergence may also reflect the more limited capabilities of most regional powers (compared to global powers). 33. A more robust diagnosis is provided for Japan in chapter 6, although there the focus is on Japan’s global role.

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 156156 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:247:14:24 PMPM Identifying Regional Powers 157 34. For an elaboration of the Pakistani-Indian relationship, see chapter 9. Note that if we exclude all the Pakistani Indian interactions, India still qualifies as a major regional power. 35. The diplomatic contacts data are from the Diplomatic Contacts Database (DIPCON) (Rhamey et al. 2009). State visits (at the ministerial level or higher) are measured using IDEA. 36. Note that the hosting of regional embassies is fairly static over time and in certain regions has little variation between countries, especially in the number of regional embassies hosted. In South America, especially, neither Brazil nor Argentina passes the threshold for hosting an “unusual” number of embassies. Both countries, however, do indeed host embassies from nearly every country in South America. Due to the lack of variation in the data, however, almost no country in South America is able to pass the one-standard- deviation-above- the- mean threshold for hosting regional embassies. 37. In 1990, Egypt held a very high percentage of Middle East capabilities, capabilities that diminished rapidly after 1991. Its status (on our measures) however, has not changed nearly as much as its capabilities. 38. For a similar analysis of Egypt, see El- Sawi and Isaac (2010). 39. Israel is the only exception, which has both opportunity and willingness, but lacks substantial status. 40. The mean level of conflict in the Middle East for 1990–2005 was about 1,226, the mean level of cooperation around 1,455, compared to the second most conflictual region (East Asia), with mean conflict and cooperation scores of 963 and 2,382 respectively. 41. Lemke (2008) expands this definition of regional powers, based on three dimensions of “hard power”—economic, demographics, and military capabilities. While this is a more nuanced definition than simply GDP or COW’s CINC scores alone, it still focuses solely on the opportunity dimension, excluding both willingness and status from the regional power conceptualization. 42. Cooper et al. include “Brazil, Russia, India, and China as the core group (the BRICs), extending to South Africa . . . , ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand), Mexico, South Korea, and other non- emerging economies, especially a set of regional powers such as Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, and Turkey, as the other major powers” (2007: 675). 43. While we have not discussed the role of Australia here, its capability measures compare favorably with those of India and Brazil. Its willingness as a regional power in Oceania is also demonstrably present. Furthermore, the IDEA database indicates Australia’s substantial and growing involvement recently in East Asia. Further research should focus on Australia’s role at both the regional and the interregional levels. 44. Nigeria and South Africa are rather weak in comparison to Brazil, India, and Australia. In terms of military expenditures, South Africa averages around 25% of Brazil’s military expenditures and 20% of India’s. Nigeria, on the other hand, spends about three percent of India’s military expenditures. The economic picture is more complex. In 1990, South Africa had greater market capitalization than either Brazil or India. However, by 2005, these three states were roughly at parity. Another economic indicator—GDP—tells a much different story. In 1990, India’s GDP was roughly 2.5 times larger than South Africa’s, while by 2005 it was around six times greater. Brazil’s GDP was five times greater than South Africa’s in 1990 and by 2005 about seven times greater. Nigeria is less ambiguous: in terms of both market capitalization and GDP, its economy is about one-tenth the size of India’s. 45. Albeit with different consequences for establishing regional order: Argentina in South America has demonstrated significant interest in deepening integration processes with - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Brazil. In South Asia, the ongoing rivalry between Pakistan and India poses far greater difficulties for India’s “rise” to global status, as is noted in the chapter on India.

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99780230104648_08_ch07.indd780230104648_08_ch07.indd 158158 44/4/2011/4/2011 7:14:247:14:24 PMPM CHAPTER EIGHT Brazil: Major Power in the Making?

Monica Herz

Editors’ note: The chapter on Brazil shows a state that is increasingly confident in its regional power status, one that has aspirations for additional leadership in the meta- region, and desires to craft a major global role outside of its region. Being historically aware of US power, the Brazilian case illustrates a pursuit of status based on a strategy of “insertion” into existing global norms and institutional architecture. Moreover, Brazil seeks an expanded leadership role as it attempts to convert additional status into soft power. In particular, note the difficulties a regional power experiences while seeking to expand its leadership beyond its immediate region, especially in the context of a global power looming in the neighborhood.

Introduction

Gaining major power status became a central and explicit goal of Brazilian foreign policy during the second term of Lula’s presidency (2007–2010). The terminology used by the governing elite, which repeatedly appears in foreign policy documents and declarations to the media, reflects a deter-

mination to being on the road to major power status. As noted in chapter 1, - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright a country “has major power status if it is perceived . . . as being unusually powerful and willing to influence the course of global affairs . . . ” Status attribution according to this conceptualization can derive from the global community of states, a group of major global powers, and/or the country itself. Brazil’s status is discussed in terms of all three forms of status attribution. In this chapter, I examine Brazil’s pursuit of major power status,

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 159159 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:114:50:11 PMPM 160 Monica Herz evident primarily through its efforts to produce regional and global governance, a priority of its national leadership. Brazil’s situation provides an excellent example of the difficulties facing rising powers in their quest for status. Brazilian policy makers clearly view Brazil as a power on the rise: a dominant regional power at the forefront of regional integration and an emerging force in the global arena. Yet the Brazilian perspective is only partially mirrored by dominant global actors. While acknowledging Brazil’s important role in its own region, other major powers, and even members of the meta-region, seem content to relegate Brazil to that position. Despite the general attribution of regional status—both from within and outside the region—the Brazilian bid for a more elaborate role in global politics has been met with indifference, if not apprehension from the global “in-group,” as well as doubt from its regional base. Consequentially, Brazil’s self- image is both partially affirmed and partially refuted, creating a unique dilemma in its continuing quest for status. In order to understand the present movement toward attaining major power status, it is necessary to look at the history of the changing perceptions of the country’s role and place in international politics, paying special attention to the production of international norms. Thus, I work with a subjectivist perspective, in line with a social constructivist framework (Onuf 1989). Additionally, I adopt a constitutive, rather than an explanatory, approach. While the social construction of major power status is pursued directly through the interactions with other actors within the international sphere, these interactions also transform the rules that frame the relations between Brazil and other states. It is not surprising that there is a deeply embedded expectation among the ruling elite1 that Brazil must play a greater role in world affairs, creating a dissonance between the country’s potential and real power, similar to the notions of status inconsistency and self- attribution of status identified in chapter 1. Brazil’s geographic size, population, gross domestic product, level of industrialization, diversity of commercial links, and the institutional robustness of the state apparatus all point toward the high expectations put forth by the ruling elite. In particular, since the end of dictatorship in 1985, the Brazilian elite has sought to generate conditions necessary for the country to pursue its self-attributed place in the international system as a major power with major responsibilities. Domestically, - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright no other alternative was possible: economic advancements, including both increased flows of foreign investment and expanding commercial links created domestic pressure to attain international status corresponding to its increased role in global economics. Two different paths toward gaining major power status are evident: the acceptance of the international governance mechanisms produced by the

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 160160 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:114:50:11 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 161 Western powers, in particular the United States, and the affirmation of the specificities of the Brazilian position and role. Elected governments pursued a “strategy of insertion” (Lafer and Fonseca 1994), which includes the acceptance of international regimes, a growing participation in UN operations, a wider participation in commercial multilateral negotiations, and the affirmation of the country’s peculiar capabilities in terms of its capacity to negotiate and mediate. On the regional front, we see this implemented through emphasis on regional stability and the increasing potential for cooperation and coordination. Brazil is a regional power much more than it is a global one. Its military and economic capabilities dwarf those of other Latin American countries. It hosts diplomatic missions from 134 countries, and receives state visits disproportionate to other countries in the region, highlighting its elevated status at the regional level. In lieu of this reality, I analyze the Brazilian attempt to position itself at the center of the of governance mechanisms in South America.

In Tune with International Institutions

The relevance of international institutions, in terms of how the international system functions, their specific importance for countries that lack significant military capabilities, and the desirability of the stability generated by a well-respected normative structure, has been a core idea for the Brazilian governing elite since the nineteenth century. As Pinheiro (2000) notes, a Grotian reading of international relations is widespread among political elites and the idea of respect for the international legal system has been reenacted over and over again. Since the country became a republic in 1889, it has systematically pursued participation in international forums (Lima 2005). In 1907, when the country took part in the II Peace Conference in Hague, the Brazilian representatives stressed the relevance of the norms of international law and the role of negotiation in the resolution of conflict. In that context, the so-called Hague paradigms were generated, as well as a tradition of searching for international recognition through the defense of the principles of a lawful international society based on universal principles. From this, the support for the role of reason and mediation in solving inter- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright national conflicts was born (Correa 1995). Based on this approach, the country aspired to be a member of the Council of the League of Nations (Garcia 2000) and took part in the creation of the United Nations System in 1944–1945. As the world became increasingly interdependent, particularly after the end of the Cold War, rules and institutions became more central to

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 161161 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:114:50:11 PMPM 162 Monica Herz international politics, playing a major role in defining the bargaining position of individual countries. In this context, the traditional Brazilian attitude toward multilateral institutions and the existence of a large and sophisticated diplomatic bureaucracy allowed the country to boost its position in the global sphere. From the realist perspective, where international norms are created insofar as they express the interests of the most powerful states in the system, international order may only be produced when there is a congru- ency between the structure of international institutions and the distribution of power. This along with the multilateralism and legalism is another pillar of the Brazilian perspective on the international system. Thus, the acceptance of the core values of the post–Cold War liberal world is the base from which attitudes toward international institutions departs today. The country’s representatives have openly and repetitively supported the idea that democracy and liberalism have now become norms that carry near-universal legitimacy. By the end of the 1980s, the decision- making elite had accepted that these new international norms had become hegemonic. A 1995 UN speech by Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia, is representative of this view: “The current configuration of international relations converges towards the two concepts that have inspired the revolution of the 90s: democracy and economic liberty with social justice. This is the main characteristic that will shape the century that approaches us and will assure liberty and prosperity for all of us” (Lampreia 1995). Brazil’s desire to participate in the international decision-making process has become increasingly strong. Moreover, this desire to participate has been a guiding force, reflecting the internationalization of power and authority, while being crystallized in the growing web of international norms. Expanding its participation in multilateral forums has been Brazil’s main response to this desire. Thus, the Brazilian government has sought to actively participate in the debate on the regulation of international commerce and of environmental issues, on the reform of the human rights regime and the nonproliferation regime, and on the reform of the United Nations system. It has also sought alternative forms of policy coordination such as the G3 and the G20. In this manner, the country is expanding its soft power base. In the 1990s, association with the East-West confrontation and the North- South divide was substituted by a drive to take part in a globalized - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright world, defined by economic competition, deregulation, financial liberalization, liberal democratic institutions, expanded foreign trade, and investment. Initially motivated by the need for sustainable economic growth and access to international finance and investment, Brazil moderated its criticism of the main rules and regulations, instead accepting broad con- formance with international regimes. However, Brazil maintained that

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 162162 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:114:50:11 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 163 sovereignty and independence in the international arena were top priorities. This defense of sovereignty was accompanied by efforts to affirm the legitimacy of the country as a primary actor in international politics. Hence, Brazil created a balance between the acceptance of a growing web of international norms and conditionalities and the protection of state sovereignty.

Responding to the Post–Cold War Era

The first president to come to power by means of democratic elections in Brazil since the 1960s—President Collor de Mello—began his term in office just as the Cold War came to an end. During this period, we observe a concern with the removal of disputes that could interfere with the project of internationalizing and liberalizing the national economy. The end of the Cold War was seen as an opportunity to deal with North-South issues in a more cooperative manner, and policies toward environmental issues, nuclear nonproliferation, and intellectual property legislation changed accordingly (Hirst and Pinheiro 1995). After the impeachment of President Collor de Mello, a more defensive position was adopted with regard to interventionism in matters such as human rights, ecology, drug traffic, and terrorism, responding to concerns from sectors of the political elite, in particular the military establishment. After the mid-1990s the defense posture regarding the concept of sovereignty was encapsulated in some issues, such as autonomy regarding the Amazon region and toward the level of inspections in nuclear facilities, while the acceptance of the internationalization of authority acquired deeper roots. Substantial changes in Brazil’s security policies have occurred since the country returned to civilian rule in 1985. Despite decades of open criti- cism2 regarding the management of international security by the superpowers, Brazil now abides by virtually all formal and informal norms, treaties, rules, and regulations that govern international security affairs.3 The most significant step in the direction of accepting international security norms was the change in policy toward the Non-Proliferation Regime after the transition to democracy in the 1980s. In 1987, the Brazilian government acknowledged the “parallel” nuclear program (Brazilian Autonomous Program of Nuclear Technology), under mili- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tary direction, and by 1991, the International Atomic Energy Agency was allowed to inspect formerly secret nuclear facilities.4 The 1988 Brazilian Constitution allowed for nuclear activities only for peaceful purposes and with the approval of the national Congress. In 1994 the decision was made to become a full member of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 5 In 1998, Brazil deposited the instrument of accession to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 163163 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:114:50:11 PMPM 164 Monica Herz Treaty (NPT) (Lafer 1995). Then in 1995, Congress approved legislation to control the export of nuclear materials, allowing the country to apply for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which admitted Brazil as a full member in 1996. In 1991, two years before Brazil signed the chemical weapons treaty, the country joined with Argentina and Chile in the Declaration of Mendoza, pledging not to produce, buy, stock, use, or transfer chemical or biological weapons. The parties also agreed to establish on a national basis appropriate inspection mechanisms. Four other South American nations (Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay) later signed the declaration. Mercosul (Mercado Comum do Sul, the Common Market of the South) declared its geographic region and Bolivia and Chile free of arms of mass destruction and a “zone of peace” in 1998 (Declaration of Mercosul as a Zone of Peace, Ushuaia, Argentina). Despite Brazil’s cooperation in numerous security arrangements,6 Brazilian diplomats have always noted the inequality of the NPT. In 1998, Brazil collaborated with South Africa, Egypt, Slovenia (no longer a member), Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden to create the New Agenda Coalition, pursuing a nuclear disarmament policy. In fact, this theme has become more central to the country’s foreign policy, especially as the Lula administration tends to be more assertive about what they consider “national interests” and the NPT regime itself is in a state of crisis. The National Defense Strategy of 2008 mentions Brazil’s expanding role as a major power (consistent with the self-attribution status processes noted in chapter 1) and stresses the relevance of technological autonomy in strategic sectors such as the nuclear area.7 In 2009, Brazil joined the group of countries capable of enriching uranium. Despite signing the NPT and abiding by its rules, the country is yet to sign the NPT’s Additional Protocol and has systematically endorsed the idea that the regime is only sustainable if disarmament is put at the center of the international agenda. Although Brazil did not adhere to the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2004, which aimed to control the circulation of weapons of mass destruction, the position it took does not change its general positive posture toward arms control norms, as the NPT is inscribed with a rule that con- tradicts the equal sovereignty rule highlighted by Brazilian leaders. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Growing Economic Capabilities Leading to Global Activism

The relation between foreign policy and a wider project of economic development has been present in the country’s practices for many decades, and stresses a clear shift favoring neoliberal economic policies. In fact, the

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 164164 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:114:50:11 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 165 search for a wider international presence in the commercial sphere is one of the main foci of Brazil’s strategy for insertion into the major power club. Brazil was present at the International Trade Organization meeting in Havana, and was one of the original 23 countries to sign the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947. It also played a relevant role in the coordination of Third World coalitions aimed at a trade regime that focused on development during the Cold War period. However, in the 1980s, trade negotiations become central to Brazilian foreign policy in an effort to address the debt crisis. Accordingly, Brazil’s participation in international commerce became more diversified, and norms and arbitra- tion in this field were perceived as fundamental (Sato 2006). Regarding the international trade regime, after the 1980s, Brazil’s aims were limited to avoiding norms that differentiated between developing countries, and to expanding the trade regime agenda. At the same time, Brazil saw a weaker multilateral trading system as a problem to be avoided (Lima 1986). As an indicator of its activism in this issue area, Brazil (together with India) has filed more complaints before the WTO Dispute Settlement System than any other country (Gratius 2007). Moreover, during the Doha Round of trade talks, Brazil played a decisive role as one of the leading negotiators prior to the breakdown of the talks. In this context, Brazil has demonstrated a vanguard position, demanding changes to the rules governing the commerce of agricultural goods (Abreu 1999), and leading to the formation of the commercial G20 together with China, South Africa, and India in 2003.

Responding to Environmental Concerns

Since the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the Brazilian position has changed dramatically with regard to the constitution of international norms that protect the environment. During the 1970s and 1980s, the idea of incom- patibility between development and environmental protection prevailed. During Jose Sarney’s government, which followed 21 years of military rule, Brazil, despite a defensive position with regard to international pressure on the development of the Amazon region, implemented several measures in order to generate an environmentally responsible image. These measures included monitoring the clearing of land by burning, a suspen- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright sion of incentives for agriculture and cattle-raising in the region, and the creation of reservations for extractivism. The subsequent government, which hosted the 1992 conference on the environment, continued this effort of changing Brazil’s environmental image. In this field, as well as in others, the decision-making elites tended to take an active part in multilateral initiatives and accept the norms established by the most successful

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 165165 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:114:50:11 PMPM 166 Monica Herz regimes such as the protection of the ozone layer and the Antarctica regimes (Ferreira and Viola 1996). By expressing a focus on sustainable development, Brazil has attempted to bring to the debate on development to the forefront of the environmental agenda. During the 1992 conference, a balanced treatment of development and environmental protection was sought. The Brazilian government supported the contention that environmental problems are global in nature and that there should be a differential responsibility in dealing with these problems, with the richest countries assuming greater costs, a position that continues today. Finally, when the limited climate change agreement was negotiated at the December 2009 Copenhagen Summit, Brazil played a major role in the negotiation of the final accord along with representatives from the United States, China, India, and South Africa.

A New Human Rights Agenda and a New UN

The end of the authoritarian phase of the country’s history made it possible for the government to reestablish its role in the international debate on human rights, with the Vienna Conference becoming an important turning point. This process started in 1985, when the decision was made to adhere to the three treaties for the protection of human rights (the American convention and the two UN pacts on human rights), although the treaties were only ratified in 1992. In 1997, the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was recognized, and created a Secretary for Human Rights. At the 2nd International Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993), with Ambassador Gilberto Sabóia presid- ing over the report committee, the Brazilian representatives stressed the relationship between human rights and development (Trindade 1994), in line with a wider tendency to treat human rights in political, social, cultural, and economic terms. Furthermore, Brazil defended the creation within the United Nations system of a program for technical, material, and financial assistance to national projects and institutions directly related to human rights and the strengthening of the rule of law. Today, Brazil is party to all major humanitarian law and human rights treaties. After the end of the Cold War, Brazil perceived the new relevance of the United Nations in the context of the strategy of insertion. Brazilian - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright representatives took part in the debates over the reform of the United Nations system and in the discussions leading to new mechanisms of collective security, as Brazil occupied a nonpermanent seat in the UN Security Council in 1988 for the first time in 20 years. Brazil has always favored a discussion of procedures, rather than substantive policy changes. Hence, Brazilian diplomats were skeptical of some propositions present in the 1992

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 166166 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:114:50:11 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 167 report “An Agenda for Peace,” particularly the view that the UN should exert a pacifying function, regardless of the position of the parties involved (Macieira 1994). At the same time, Brazilian diplomats stressed the need for reforms of Security Council membership, as well as a renewed role for the General Assembly.8 According to Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, representative to the UN in 2003, there is a growing “institutional imbal- ance” in favor of the Security Council, with grave consequences for the role played by the General Assembly. Furthermore, he referred to the dangers of the creation of a world “Jurassic Park,” where coercion will be the main instrument of implementing decisions, in contrast to the use of diplomatic instruments.9 There has also been serious Brazilian concern about the abyss between the decisions made by the Security Council versus established criteria on the authority of this organ (Sardenberg 1994). In general, the official view has been that the organization should preserve its universal and representative credentials, and that Brazil should play a pivotal role in this context. As one diplomat noted, our “capacity to formulate and mobilize” is recognized by the international community and Brazilian behavior is marked by preoccupation with the preservation of “democratic principles” (Macieira 1994). There is a clear Brazilian preference for a revival of the collective security functions of the UN, as described in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, rather than the transference of this role to military regional organizations that lack universality (Amorim 1998). In line with the legalist posture adopted by Brazil, the cooperation between regional organizations and the UN should follow the parameters established in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.10 Brazil strongly opposed the NATO operation in Yugoslavia and the American and British intervention in Iraq, stressing the contradiction between the unilateral use of force and the legal venues offered by the United Nations. Finally, Brazilian diplomats have insisted that development and the reduction of inequality on an international level be treated as equally important to security issues. They argue that the root causes of instability and violence are social and economic, and international organizations should make greater investments in these spheres. Therefore, Brazil advocates conf lict management through eradicating the primary causes of violence and instability. The revival of peace operations, since the end of the Cold War, places this practice at the center of the debate on the UN - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and collective security. The Brazilian military has taken part in peace and observation operations since the genesis of the process that transformed the original collective security project in the 1950s. Brazil has participated in 33 multilateral missions since the 1960s (Canabarra 1996; Diniz 2006). After the end of the Cold War, as peace operations became more diversified and numerous, Brazilian diplomats took part in the debate over

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 167167 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM 168 Monica Herz a new peacekeeping format, with efforts at home toward readiness to take part in the process. Nevertheless, between 1988 and 2002, Brazil participated in only 42 percent of operations (Diniz 2006: 320), because as the missions became increasingly interventionist, the Brazilian government became cautious about getting involved. Changes in the scope and nature of peace operations were met with considerable concern by diplomats and the military establishment, particularly the move toward resolutions based on Chapter VII of the Charter. The principles on which peace operations were previously based were traditionally supported by Brazilian governments—previous agreement of all involved parties, impartiality, and minimum use of force. As a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, Brazil was consistently critical of resolutions that involved the UN in coercive interventions. Only in 1999 did Brazil take part in an operation, involving East Timor, with a more coercive mandate (Brigagão 2002). The Brazilian ruling elite has viewed positively the move toward a wider range of activities and functions in the context of UN peace operations. Activities that involve building institutions and development projects are widely endorsed. Brazil’s role in recent overseas operations of this type has been particularly significant. In Angola, it contributed in both the verification missions (United Nations Angola Verification Mission [UNAVEM] I, II, 1991–1997) and the observer mission (United Nations Observer Mission in Angola [MONUA] 1997). Brazilian forces were also present in Mozambique (United Nations Operations in Mozambique [UNOMOZ], 1992–1995), Uganda, Rwanda (United Nations Observer Mission in Rwanda-Uganda, [UNOMUR], 1993–1994 and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda [UNAMIR]), and Liberia (United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia [UNOMIL]). The participation of Brazilian troops in UNOMOZ between 1992 and 1995 represented the f irst deployment of combat troops in a foreign country since the 1965 OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic. In Angola and Mozambique, Brazil was particularly active, partly due to linguistic and cultural affini- ties. In Angola, Brazilian officers acted as important mediators between Cuban and Angolan authorities, as well as guerrilla leaders. Brazil was also present in Central America, verifying electoral processes in Nicaragua (United Nations Nicaragua Verification Mission [ONUVEM], 1989), overseeing El Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Honduran, and Nicaraguan - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright compliance with the Esquipulas II accords (United Nations Observer Group in Central America [ONUCA], 1990 –1992), super vising the internal accords in El Salvador (United Nations Obser ver Mission in El Salvador [ONUSAL], 1991–1995), and verifying the human rights situation in Guatemala (United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance w ith the Com m itments of the Comprehensive Ag reement on Hu m a n R ig hts

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 168168 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 169 in Guatemala [MINUGUA], 1994). In the Balkans, Brazil was part of the UN protection force (United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR], 1992–1995), and the missions in Croatia (United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation [UNCRO], 1995–1996; United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka [UNMOP], 1996) and Macedonia (United Nations Preventment Deployment Force [UNPREDEP], 1995). Additionally, Brazilian troops joined the mission in East Timor (United Nations Mission in East Timor [UNAMET]), in response to Australian request for troops, and in Asia, as electoral observers in Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC]). During the Lula administration, Brazil continued to support peace operations while trying to adapt to the changing landscape in this issue area. The participation in peace operation increased: by 2009, Brazil was present in seven peace operations and had deployed nearly 100,000 troops. While such participation is significant, Brazil is not a main provider of troops or financial support for these UN activities.11 The operation in Haiti is a significant departure from previous policy, where Brazil heads a mission under a Chapter VII mandate, making it the country’s biggest foreign military deployment since the Second World War. Brazil is commanding a UN peacekeeping force of 6,700 troops and 1,600 police, having taken over operations from American and French forces. The pacification of Port-au- Prince before the 2010 earthquake allowed Brazil to portray the broad, multifaceted operation as a success. Additionally, Brazil views an active role in the humanitarian sphere as part of the responsibilities of major powers; therefore, it is generating a new role for itself in this arena. In 2004, President Lula declared in his inaugural speech at the UN General Assembly12 that regional policies should be guided by the principle of non- indifference, the Brazilian answer to the growing link between security and human rights expressed in the concept of “responsibility to protect.”13 Attempts at doctrinal changes have followed this new engagement. The white paper “National Defense Policy” of 1996 establishes new foundations for conceptualizing national security.14 According to this document, one of the objectives of the national defense policy is the participation of the country in the international decision- making process, and stresses the relevance of Brazil’s contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. Among the directives contained in the document, ref- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright erence is made to Brazil’s active contribution to “the construction of an international order based on the rule of law which should promote universal and regional peace and the sustainable development of humanity” (1996: 3). The 2005 National Defense Policy moves further in this direction, mentioning participation in peace operations as one the priorities of national defense.

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 169169 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM 170 Monica Herz The Lula administration has also been trying to form new coalitions that reflect the multipolarity of the post–Cold War period and the new role of emerging powers. As Flemes (2007) argues, Brazil is pursuing a strategy of “latent multi- institutionalisation,” which is reflected in its presence on the global stage in flexible alliances characterised by low degrees of institutionalisation. In this vein, the Brazilian government formalized a cooperative and strategic relationship with India and South Africa, known as IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) or G3 (Lima and Hirst 2009). The forum—launched in 2003 during the 58th UN General Assembly—has been pressing for fundamental changes in the agricultural subsidy regimes of the developed world, for a reform of the United Nations and, in particular, the Security Council. Collaboration in the fields of trade, energy security, and transport has also been on their agenda. The group resisted attempts by the United States to promote new norms regarding the use of force including preemptive war, the conditionality of sovereignty, or the right to use force to promote regime change (Hurrell 2006: 11). In line with this stance, IBSA countries opposed the US-led Iraq intervention in 2003 at the UN. Brazil is also a leading member of the Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors: the G-20 represents 85 percent of global gross domestic product and 80 percent of international trade.15 At its 2009 summit in Pittsburgh, Brazil and its IBSA partners played a leading role with the G-20 advocating for a shift in country representation at the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Brazilian International Identity

Since the end of the nineteenth century, one can find references to the relevant role Brazil was to play in international politics (Lafer 2001; Cervo and Bueno 2002; Lima 2005). In a 2001 survey among the Brazilian ruling elite, there was near universal consensus (99 percent) that becoming a world leader was a fundamental objective of Brazilian foreign policy, with 76 percent considering membership of the Security Council relevant (Souza 2002). Several characteristics of the country— its economic potential stemming from substantial and significant natural resources; the lack of religious, ethnic or regional violent disputes - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright in a context of cultural and ethnic diversity; peaceful relations with its neighbors; the tradition of peaceful resolution of disputes consistent respect for international law; and the existence of a highly sophisticated and professional foreign service—combine to support arguments against Brazil’s apparent marginalization in international decision-making (Abdenur 1994).

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 170170 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 171 In 1907, during the Hague International Conference, under the leadership of Ruy Barbosa, Brazil’s right to participate in the elaboration of international norms was put forward for the first time (Correa 1995). Brazil sought a permanent seat in the League of Nations and withdrew from the organization when it failed to obtain this status after Germany’s accession. At the end of the Second World War, once again Brazil put forward its candidacy for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, but was instead granted a two-year, nonpermanent seat in response to the pressure it exerted. Despite the failure of these efforts, it did play an important role in embedding the image of the country as a potentially major player in international affairs and the view that multilateral universal forums should be a target of a policy of international insertion. This fraction of the cognitive map of the ruling elite combines easily with other elements, often referred to as the country’s “permanent diplomatic stock”: pacifism, noninterven- tionism, and the defense of the equal sovereignty of all nations. The attempt to become a relevant player in international politics has corresponded with its bilateral relations with the United States. At certain moments in history, alignment and cooperation prevailed, while at other moments, there were tension and opposition; regardless, there has been a constant recognition that relations with the United States will ultimately determine the possibility of attaining a major power status (at least through the in- group attribution processes noted in chapter 1). After the Second World War, the Eurico Dutra government pursued a policy of alignment with the United States, accepting the organization of the Cold War as structured by Washington.16 In contrast, during the 1960s and the 1970s, criticism of the international order—involving both development and security issues—was central to Brazilian foreign policy as new economic and political actors joined the ruling elite. In the 1970s the NPT became a focus of this criticism and in 1975 a nuclear accord, which profoundly soured bilateral relations with the United States, was signed with Germany. After the end of the Cold War and its dictatorship, Brazil rebuilt relations with the United States, based on a shared understanding of the liberal economic order. The relevant role Brazil saw itself playing on the international scene became congruent with the view prevalent in Washington: regional powers should guarantee stability in their own zone of influence, and Brazil should play a positive role in the region as a stable - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright liberal democracy. Brazil manifests its contemporary expression of its overall aspirations for increased global status and a major power role by continuing to seek a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, in large part on the basis of its ability to contribute uniquely to the existing world order. Once Brazil became a democracy and motivated by the UN’s renewed relevance after

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 171171 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM 172 Monica Herz the Cold War, Brazil formally applied to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. For Brazil, a more representative Security Council that is also reflective of the developing world would carry greater legitimacy and function more efficiently (Amorim 1995, 1996); moreover, Brazil sees itself as a strong candidate due to its diplomatic tradition as a mediator and as an active member of the UN. Its unique contribution lies in the belief that Brazilian diplomats have a special capacity to be competent negotiators, mediators, or facilitators and to find the way to reach peaceful solutions to conflicts has become a relevant part of the country’s international identity. As Fonseca (1998) notes, a capacity to “de-dramatize the foreign policy agenda” is part of Brazilian diplomacy. Brazilian diplomats seek to utilize its soft power in mediating with other states in conflict. Brazil has ten neighbors, a large number compared to any other country, yet its borders were settled peacefully, a notable achievement by the Baron of Rio Branco, first as representative and counsel in international arbitrations, and later as foreign minister. The same diplomat led the institutional building of Itamaraty, which is the Brazilian foreign office. His role and the manner in which he facilitated the negotiation of Brazilian borders is replicated by diplomats, academics, and political leaders, and is constantly present in the discourse and taught to young diplomats as the pillar of the Brazilian tradition in international diplomacy. The ability of Brazil to negotiate and influence through argument is reflected in its lack of a significant military capability, especially when compared with existing major powers. As a country relatively satisfied with the status quo, satisfied with its own borders, and focused on development, a policy of creating a significant military capability with power projection capabilities has not been part of the country’s reality (a factor that almost certainly limits its prospects of attaining global major power status). Perhaps in response, the 2008 White Paper focuses on a recon- struction of the armed forces, and Brazil has been acquiring new weapons systems while developing its defense industrial base. Irrespective of its relative satisfaction with the status quo, Brazil has found room for developing a critical position regarding an international system dominated by Western institutions and values. There is a strong tendency among Brazilian specialists and political leaders to stress that - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright faults found in the country’s social and economic development result from the presence of some form of colonialism. This element has been incor- porated into Brazil’s national identity. The view that international politics and economics have been dominated by Western powers (or a condominium controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union), and that developing countries should have a differentiated agenda has had different

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 172172 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 173 weights in the formulation of foreign policy, but it has been present among the ruling elite’s formulations since the 1960s. In 1963, Foreign Minister Araújo de Castro, in his iconic “Three D’s” speech at the United Nations—decolonization, development, and disarmament (Correa 1995: 157)—set the tone for this aspect of Brazilian international identity in the context of what became known as Brazil’s independent foreign policy. During the 1960s, the country played a role in leading developing countries within United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and GATT negotiations. The search for recognition of the specific needs and rights of developing countries, based on the logic of distributive justice, and thus the call for special treatment in the context of international institutions, has been stressed ever since. This vision of the international system can also be understood in terms of the national search for more autonomy and greater influence, usually though the diversification of international links (Soares 2005). Today the policy of engagement with other regional and global powers such as China, Russia, India, and South Africa is an expression of this drive. While Brazil has never denied its Western identity, the attempt to connect to the countries in the southern part of the globe has become a hallmark of the Lula administration. The formation of IBSA, mentioned earlier, created links with developing democracies with regional leadership capacity. Consistent with Brazilian identification with the South, Brazilian leaders have been meeting with heads of state from South America (2005, 2006, 2009), Arabia (2005, 2009), and Africa (2006), in the hopes of for- warding the idea of Brazilian leadership in the developing world.

Brazil as a Regional Power in South America

South America is the base from which Brazil can launch its quest for a major power status, and where it plays the role of peacemaker, negotiator, and bridge builder. Thus, the ruling elite portrays the country as a leader in the context of regional stability, democracy, and peace, and are prepared to seek projection elsewhere. There is no dispute that within South America, Brazil is the predominant economic power; in terms of GDP or export capacity, the country stands alone within its geographical sphere. Lately Brazilian investments in the region and the presence of Brazilian- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright based multinationals have made its economic prominence even clearer. Chapter 7 notes Brazil as a regional power in the subregion of South America to which it belongs, a region with “similar patterns of political, economic and cultural interaction.” Others have claimed definitions of the region to be broader, encompassing all of South America (Lemke 2001). Other ideas of region have also been constructed in this part of

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 173173 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM 174 Monica Herz the world, in particular the ideas of the Western Hemisphere or of Latin America as distinct regions with distinct identities.17 Cultural, political, and economic differences, as well as the power asymmetry between South American countries and the United States has led to the constitution of several perspectives that stress the importance of consolidating collective action on this regional base. The Brazilian governing elite has consistently defined South America as a region, and Brazil’s regional power status in it at least since the 1990s, with other states in the region sharing that perspective and attributing to Brazil its regional power status. In South America, the conceptualization of the regional dimension took place in the 1990s and was a response to the need for physical integration through increased communication, transportation, and energy (Galvão 2009). The initiative for the integration of the South American Regional Infrastructure, stemming from the perception of an urgent need for physical integration, is a potent symbol of the new drive toward the definition of South America as a source of identity.18 It drew on economic necessities, but also on the idea of geographic realities that needs to be surpassed—specifically the Andean mountains and the Amazon basin—which bar South Americans from each other. In addition, a reaction to the asymmetries of globalization was part of a discourse that created the possibilities for the generation of the regional collective identity. The demise of the regional economic integration project in the Americas after 2005, the existence of Left-leaning governments in several countries that stressed the importance of South American integration in the context of social and political change, and the change in foreign policies of important countries such as Chile (Heine 2006), also contributed to the construction of the idea of a South American region with a common des- tiny and strong common interests. The foreign policy of the United States toward the region also stimulated a differentiation between the subregions of the hemisphere (Hirst 2003). The move toward the affirmation of South America as a unique region with a common project and a common history is relatively recent in Brazil (Bernal-Meza 2002). The South American regional project was launched when relations with Argentina dramatically changed in the 1980s, and became core to the country’s foreign policy in the 1990s when the previous development model (import substitution) was replaced by a more open and liberal one. In this context, Brazil saw the regional base as fun- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright damental for the country’s economic development and participation in international commerce (Vaz 2002). The end of the rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, the creation of Mercosur, the proposal for the creation of a South American Free Trade Accord,19 and the initiatives associated with greater economic and physical integration with Andean and Amazonian countries are all part of the scenario. Mercosur was especially part of a

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 174174 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 175 wider strategy of insertion that stressed Brazil’s position as a growing power and the demarcation of South America as its area of influence (both in the context of the region as defined in chapter 7 and in terms of the South American meta-region). During the last 30 years, Brazil has been the leading proponent of the view that seeks to consolidate Mercosur as a building block of increasing regional integration. On March 26, 1991, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay signed the Treaty of Asunción, creating Mercosur. The 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto gave the body a wider international status and formalized a customs union. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are associate members; Venezuela is now a full member. The Olivos Protocol of 2002 created a Permanent Tribunal and a parliament directly elected by member states in 2014, all of which further institutionalizes the organization. Brazil also will finance a large part of the Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM) that benefits the less developed partners in the region. The South American Presidential Summits, inaugurated in 2000, were a significant step toward establishing South America as a region with specific characteristics, cooperating in a specific forum that excluded other parts of the Western Hemisphere (in particular the United States), led by Brazil. But the regional initiatives of the Lula administration have introduced a shift toward even greater emphasis on the South American region and on Brazilian leadership. The focus of Brazilian foreign policy shifted from an emphasis on trade and investment to a more political- strategic focus, concentrated on the construction of a regional power base for global diplomacy. The connection between the Mercosur project and Brazilian leadership in South American can be noticed as Mercosur membership was extended at the same time that a new organization was being designed. Today Mercosur is—apart from Surinam and Guyana—geographically congruent with UNASUR (União de Nações Sul Americanas, or the Union of South American Nations). At the Third South American Summit in 2004, presidents and representatives from 12 South American nations signed the Cuzco Declaration, a two- page statement of intent announc- ing the foundation of the South American Community. The organization is a long- term project, including prospects for the creation of a common currency.20 The role of regional mediator, as in the case of the territorial dispute - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright between Peru and Ecuador (Herz and Nogueira 2002), is one expression of Brazil´s contribution to regional governance. More significantly, Brazil has intervened diplomatically in the internal conflicts of its neighbors in a manner it did not do previously. In 1996, Brazil acted with Argentina and the United States to forestall a coup in Paraguay, in recognition that the defense of democracy in the region may take precedence over a tradition

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 175175 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM 176 Monica Herz of nonintervention in the affairs of neighbors. Henceforth, Brazil intervened in several crises in Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, and Venezuela.21 It has also offered to host talks between government and guerrillas in Colombia, should these occur, and aided in the return of people kidnapped by armed groups. However, greater involvement in the war in Colombia has not occurred; Colombia provides a clear case of limitations for Brazil when the United States is directly involved in military/security relationships in the meta- region. Whether by sharing government intelligence from Sivam (its satellite- based monitoring system for the Amazon) with neighboring countries, abating the debt of poorer countries (e.g., Bolivia, $50 million; Paraguay, $1 billion), or renegotiating accords (e.g., the Itaipu hydroelectric accord between Brazil and Paraguay), Brazil continues a pattern of shouldering of responsibility for regional governance. Yet, Brazil still has significant challenges to face as the meta- region is struck by transnational criminal activities, the war in Colombia continues, and the United States strikes bilateral deals with countries in the region that prevent regional foreign policy coordination. Moreover, political and social changes taking place in the Andean region have created an alternative leadership project emanating from Caracas, which resulted in the creation of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas). Hugo Chavez has been constructing a different discourse, as he heads his Bolivarian Revolution, establishing a clear distinction between the social and political model being generated and the liberal paradigm to which Brazil and other South American countries adhere. Thus, the goal of Brazil extending regional order and governance past the region to the entire meta-region, that is South America, and one that would be peaceful and stable under governance mechanism led by Brazil, is unlikely to be reached in the near future.

Conclusion

Brazil is increasingly recognized as a significant player in world affairs, but at this point, does not shape the global environment in which it operates, and its contribution to global governance is limited. The participation of emerging powers in global decision-making processes, a fairer commercial regime, the maintenance of the core tenets of equal sovereignty, the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright inclusion of development in debates on security, and the access to new technologies in the South are issues raised by Brazil’s representatives and no doubt this practice has had an impact on international negotiations. Nevertheless, Brazil has not offered an alternative to the current system of rules that are central to global governance, seeking instead increased status within the established system.

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 176176 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 177 Brazil’s seeking of major power status is clearly observable as the idea of a potential major power transforms into the idea of status inconsistent, yet rising major power. The two paths mentioned at the beginning of this text involve the acceptance of international norms (albeit with pressure to change those norms at the margins) and the affirmation of the country’s particular roles in the international environment. As a state substantially below major global power capabilities, but with potential capabilities that could allow it to eventually reach the global power threshold, the country’s foreign policy currently accepts the norms generated at the core of the system. At the same time, Brazil seeks reason- able means to guarantee a wider participation in global forums stressing the universalistic and legalist principles that grant greater autonomy for states that are willing to subordinate themselves to rules they did not create in world affairs.22 As a significant increase in hard power is currently unfeasible, there is emphasis placed on international institutions that allow Brazil to raise its influence in the international arena through generating more status and with it more soft power, while continuing to protect its sovereignty. Brazil has adopted this posture across numerous issue areas: commercial negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) context (previously GATT); attitudes toward nonproliferation regimes, environmental regimes, and human rights regimes; and patterns of behavior of the Security Council. Even in the regional sphere, where the country does hold a dominant position, the looming presence of the United States underscores the importance of wide support for universalistic institutions, regional or globally based. The country considers its peaceful practices and traditions, its role as negotiator, and even its role as a mediator between powerful and weaker countries as important resources toward seeking greater status and influence in international affairs. Moreover, it is clear that there is a disconnect between its aspirations and the status attributed it by the international community. Brazil has been included in forums relevant for global governance, but only as a regional power. Thus, there is a discrepancy between its self- image and the attribution of status by other relevant actors. In line with the projection of an image of a major power, Brazil has put forward candidates for posts in international organizations; nevertheless, the country does not hold any important positions in the WTO, the UN, or at the meta-regional level (the OAS or the Inter- American Development - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Bank (IDB)). It is, of course, neither a member of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) nor of the G-8. Although South American countries accept Brazilian leadership in designing new institutions for the region and in crisis management, the attribution of global major power status is challenged at times even by its immediate neighbors. For example, Argentina and Colombia (as well as

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 177177 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM 178 Monica Herz Mexico in Central America) failed to support the Brazilian candidacy to the UN Security Council. While Brazil is accepted as the main player in regional governance building, it is not seen by its neighbors as either representing them in the global sphere or as a generator of international norms. The perception that Brazil will not “listen” to its neighbors as it moves into a more influential position in world affairs stems from its lack of accumulated experience or coordination and robust regional institutions. The perception that Brazil is not central to the production of international norms stems from perceptions that Western powers control international regimes, and particularly the United States.23 Most importantly, many of the norms that frame interaction on the regional level and that threaten to question the unique contribution of Brazilian leadership in the region, are drawn internationally: on commerce, on fighting terrorism, on establishing liberal democracy as a model of domestic governance, on arms control and disarmament, on human rights, and on the environment. Brazil has not been a driving force in drawing these norms, in spite of its greater presence in international institutions. These are based on the liberal governance paradigm that became hegemonic and global after the end of the Cold War in particular and are still at this point in time the result of norm building processes led by the United States and Europe.

Notes

1. The ruling elite refers to those in control of strategic decision-making processes in society. The ruling elite changes constantly and includes actors who have access to economic, military, political, and cultural resources that allow for a significant impact in the way a given society is governed. The competition between various regional or functional elites, clearly present during the democratic phase of Brazilian history, will not be analyzed although it has core relevance to the debate developed here (Albertoni 1987). 2. During the Cold War era, decision-makers in Brasilia believed that a condominium of great powers controlled and froze the global distribution of power. According to this view, the United States and the Soviet Union reached a sort of accommodation that was dangerous for international security and detrimental to the interest of developing nations. 3. The notorious exceptions are the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and the additional protocol to the Non Proliferation Treaty. 4. Brazil never engaged in research necessary to develop employable weapons. Regarding the competition between Brazil and Argentina, Brazilian military and diplomatic thinking was based on the notion of latent technological deterrence (Barletta 1997). - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 5. Despite being the original proponent of the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone, Brazil only became a contracting party of the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco until 1994. For a discussion of the Brazilian position, see Barletta (1997). 6. Brazil also belongs to the 1972 Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, the 1991 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the 1993 Convention for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Regarding antipersonnel land mines, the Brazilian government announced that it had suspended the use or export of mines on an informal basis since 1984. Brazil acceded to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 178178 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM Brazil: Major Power in the Making? 179 October 1995 and signed the Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Land Mines. Brazil did not sign the Convention on Cluster Bombs, arguing that there already is a treaty that covers such weapons, and that the convention was not negotiated in the framework of the UN. Brazil has never used cluster munitions but is one of the 13 countries that produce these weapons. 7. Diehl, Sarah and Eduardo Fujii. 2009. “Brazil´s New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Development,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 30, 2009. 8. For example, see Rona ldo Mota Sardenberg (Secretar y for Strateg ic Issues of the Presidenc y). 1995. “Conselho de Segurança: Equilibrío e Representatividade.” Carta Internacional 32 (October): 8. 9. Ronaldo Sardenberg. 1993. “Conselho de Segurança Pode Legitimar “Jurassic Park” Mundial.” Carta Internacional 6 (August): 2. 10. See, for example, Ronaldo Sardenberg’s argument during the Security Council meeting on the role played by the OAU within the Arusha peace process in Rwanda. March 12, 1993. 11. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2009.pdf; accessed January 12, 2010. 12. Speech at 59 UNGA New York Repertório de Política Externa: Posições do Brasil, Funag, 2007. 13. “Lecture at the University of Beijing May 25, 2004 Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Secretaria de Planejamento Diplomático Repertório de Politica Externa:Posições do Brasil Brasilia, Funag, 2007. 14. For the 1996, 2005, and 2006 White Papers, see www.defesa.gov.br 15. Available at http://www.g20.org/. 16. Clear expressions of this policy are the decisions to break relations with the Soviet Union and the vote against China joining the United Nations. 17. The debate over whether the countries of South America or Central America are part of the “West” has concentrated energies in this part of the world since the nineteenth century. This theme is related to the process of constitution of collective identities in the region but will not be analyzed here. For this subject see Domingues (2008). 18. The South American Regional Integration Initiative, created in 2000 with the participation of the 12 countries of South America seeks the physical interconnection of the region, energy integration, and changes to legislation, rules, and national regulations that hinder commerce and investment. 19. The proposal for the creation of this free trade area was made in 1994 largely as an alternative to the American proposal for the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 20. The Constitutive Treaty of the Union was signed at the Third Summit of Heads of State in Brasilia. According to the Constitutive Treaty, the Union’s headquarters will be located in Quito, Ecuador. The South American Parliament will be located in Cochabamba, Bolivia, while its bank, the Bank of the South will be located in Caracas, Venezuela. 21. The mediation of the internal crisis in Venezuela was one of Lula´s first foreign initiatives. In January 2003, Brazil created a Group of Friends with Venezuela (also integrated by Chile, the United States, Spain, and Portugal) to support the OAS’ conflict prevention work. Lula also visited Caracas on several occasions in an attempt to convince the Venezuelan president to respect democratic rules. 22. This argument also parallels Lake’s (2009) argument about hierarchy in the international system. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 23. This applies to those such as Chile or Colombia that endorse most international regimes and to those that contest them such as Venezuela and Ecuador.

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 179179 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_09_ch08.indd780230104648_09_ch08.indd 180180 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:124:50:12 PMPM CHAPTER NINE India: A Major Power in the Making

Rajesh Basrur

Editors’ note: This chapter on India highlights the difficulties encountered by a strong, and status-consistent regional power, to move beyond the regional club and onto recognition as a global power, despite (a) its own desire to do so in principle; (b) the willingness of the only superpower to assist it in becoming one; and (c) continued and substantial growth in its own capabilities. Part of the problem appears to be the range of unresolved issues retarding stability in its own regional order; the lack of strong and clear domestic political demands for pursuing the path for global status; and continued domestic weaknesses, including substantial poverty and inequality, and inefficiencies in its political regime.

India is a major power in the making. In this chapter, I assess India’s power and status at the regional and global levels. I argue that it has the capabilities of and is accorded the status of a limited hegemon at the regional (South Asian) level. The nature of this limited hegemony has changed since the 1990s, from a relatively aggressive to a relatively benign role in the region, which has brought it growing but still incomplete acceptance from within the region. This has been facilitated by its rising profile at the

global level, where it is increasingly recognized as a significant player by - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the sole superpower, the United States—an attribution that lowers India’s costs as a power at both the regional and global levels. On the latter plane, India has exhibited a relatively limited capacity and willingness to influence developments via traditional modes of power politics, but has been active in reshaping the politics of military and nonmilitary regime formation and development. In terms of both capabilities and status attribution,

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 181181 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:119:11:11 PMPM 182 Rajesh Basrur it is status-consistent as a major regional power and as a global power in the making. It has limited autonomous capabilities at the global level and is not in the near term expected—either by itself or by others—to play a major role in shaping the world except in conjunction with other powers in the restricted arena of international regimes. As such, it is neither likely to generate significant tensions within the system nor to play the role of a major stabilizer should systemic tensions appear. Barring severe shocks, it is likely to grow into major power status over time. In the first part of this chapter, I attempt to come to grips with how power and status attribution are understood in international relations. Thereafter, I examine India as a regional power. Finally, I shift the frame of reference to assess India’s power at the global level. The analysis at the regional and global levels revolves around India’s military and economic capabilities, its willingness to use these capabilities, its role in shaping the regional and global orders, the extent to which other powers bestow recognition to its role as a power, and its actual efforts to shape the international order in the two settings. Its regional and global strategies are closely related, each aimed at enhancing its position in the other sphere. In an implicit acknowledgement of its limitations, it bandwagons with the United States in regional and global strategic politics and collaborates with China in global nonstrategic regime politics.

Power and Attribution

Measuring power is difficult; assessing its impact harder still.1 It has been a traditional practice among scholars of international relations to estimate a state’s power by looking at its attributes relative to those of others. The standard components of military power are military hardware and spending, while the distribution of economic power is usually assessed with reference to gross domestic product, indebtedness, and other economic indicators. Classical realists, who emphasized the vital importance of power in determining the course of interstate politics, also acknowledged the importance of nonquantifiable factors such as leadership, morale, the quality of diplomacy, and political, economic, and social stability (Morgenthau 1973: 112–119). However, periodic efforts to rank states by adding some measure of qualitative characteristics have not yielded more than a loose - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright and general expectation about a state’s power in terms of its capacity to influence the behavior of others.2 It is more useful to observe how states behave—as powers themselves or in response to other powers—to gauge status attribution. Throughout this chapter, I use both hard military and economic indicators as well as the strategic responses of other states to judge India’s status as a regional and as a major power.

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 182182 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:119:11:11 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 183 How does one pinpoint the attribution of status? One way is to look at membership in status groups—a state is a major power if it is accorded membership in the club of major powers. But that is not always the most useful method. Chapter 2 claims that in the global system today, the United States may be the only member of the great power “club.” Even if it acts in consultation with other aspiring powers, this does not necessarily mean it is according them equal or approximate status. Similarly, in South Asia, India’s power far exceeds that of any other state. A state can be said to be a major power if other major powers respond to it as if it is one. This by no means presumes they must put out a welcome sign. Some states may indeed do so, by seeking alliances or by inviting a potential major power into a coalition. Other states may act in a hostile or defensive way by balancing against it, distancing themselves from it, or by adopting a threatening stance. Strong power–weak power relationships generally exhibit a typical pattern within an international system (Mandelbaum 1988).3 First, strong states tend to extend their control within a system in order to maximize their security; weak states tend to resist it, though they submit if they are unable to resist. Second, strong states insist on negotiating disputes with weak states bilaterally; weak states try to involve others through alliances or through multilateral organizations. Third, strong states try to draw weak states closer in order to exercise more influence over them; weak states are inclined toward distancing or building barriers, notably to restrict trade and investment. The international politics of South Asia clearly reveals these patterns, though there are significant exceptions. Before moving forward, two clarifications are needed. First, about the nature of power and its role in the shaping of the international order: to the extent that there is interdependence between and among states, power has limited utility (Keohane and Nye 1978). In economic relationships, states interlocked in the global economy are unlikely to view the prospect of a system breakdown as palatable. This is true of economies that are highly developed, and is increasingly true of those classified as “emerging markets,” of which India—increasingly integrated into the global economy—is one. In military- strategic relationships, owing to the rising cost associated with it, war is said to be on the decline (Väyrynen 2005). This may be due in part to the economic interdependence of so many of the big players. But there is also a state of strategic interdependence - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright between nuclear- armed states who cannot afford the extraordinarily high costs of nuclear conflict. Power can be used rather more freely when the interdependence wrought by economic integration or by nuclear weapons does not exist. Since the majority of states possess neither developed economies nor nuclear weapons, there is quite a bit of room for conflict. In this context, I will demonstrate that India is increasingly inclined to

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 183183 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 184 Rajesh Basrur limit its use of power as a traditional resource in strategic politics at both the regional and global levels. Second, to the extent that power is not an easily usable commodity in international politics, states collaborate in constructing regimes in order to regulate issues critical to their survival and well- being (Krasner 1983). Here, power may be a relevant factor, but it hardly works in the same way. Power among interdependent entities has two facets. Negative power involves the ability to resist a particular set of rules and processes sought to be established; positive power involves the ability to actively shape regimes through processes of generating ideas, persuasion, and bargaining. In regime building, India exhibits greater readiness to use its capability than it does in traditional strategic relationships, but thus far it has exer- cised only negative power in resisting the construction of regimes it sees as inimical to its interests. Until it shows the capacity to wield traditional power in bilateral relations or positive power in the politics of regimes, it will remain, at best, a state aspiring to become a major power.

India as a Regional Power

As a starting point, it is useful to draw a broad picture of the distribution of power in South Asia. Table 9.1 gives us a quick glimpse of the enormous disparity between India and the remaining states of South Asia in physical size, population, and economic strength. In the last case, I use both well- known ways to measure India’s relative power: gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Both reveal India’s predominant position: it constitutes a very high percentage of the region’s total on every count. Table 9.2, similarly, shows a huge gap between India’s military spending and forces and those of its neighbors, with India at least double that of all the rest combined in every category. Yet, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 do not provide a very accurate story. Despite its apparent dominance, India’s position in South Asia is best viewed as a limited hegemony. It has been able to inf luence developments substantially in some but not all of its neighbours. Its military power, though much greater than that of others in conventional terms, has been effectively stymied by Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Moreover, its economic influence has been restricted to three of them—Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright With respect to Pakistan, its strongest neighbor, ever since the 1950s India has consistently sought to enhance its power by augmenting its military hardware and, where possible, using it. In 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took advantage of an internal crisis in Pakistan to intervene militarily and facilitate the birth of Bangladesh as a separate state. Pakistan, as the weaker of two countries, has resisted Indian preponderance and sought

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Table 9.1 South Asia’s Nonmilitary Power Indicators, 2000 and 2008

Country Surface Area Population, GDP (US$m, GDP, PPP (000 sq. km) (thousands, 2008) 2008) (US$m, 2008)

Bangladesh144 160,000 79.0 213,504 Bhutan 47 687 1,359 3,266 India 3,288 1,139,965 1,217,490 3,388,473 Maldives 0.3 310 1,260 1,709 Nepal 147 28,582 12,615 31,791 Pakistan 796 166,037 168,276 439,036 Sri Lanka 66 20,156 40,714 91,921 India’s % of Total 73 75.2 84.44 81.26

Sources: 1. For surface area: World Bank. 2000. World Development Report, 1999/2000. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2. World Bank. Data and Statistics. [Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/ Resources/POP.pdf (for population), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ GDP.pdf (for GDP), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf (for GDP,PPP); all accessed January 21, 2009.]

Table 9.2 South Asia’s Military Balance, 2008

Country Military Armed Main Submarines Principal Combat Aircraft Spending Forces Battle Naval Surface (including (US$m, 2007) (Active) Tanks Combatants naval)

India 26,513 1,281,000 4,065 16 47 632 Pakistan 4,530 617,000 2,461 8 6 396 Bangladesh998 157,053 232 — 5 75 Sri Lanka 975 150,000 62 — — 22 Nepal 167 69,000 — — — — India’s Total 79.90 56.31 59.60 66.67 81.03 56.18 as % of Grand Total

Note: NB: Figures for Bhutan and Maldives not available. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2009. The Military Balance, 2009. Abingdon: Routledge.

to balance Indian power by means of alliances with the United States and China. In the 1950s, it became a member of the US alliance system by - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright joining the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Its critical role in assisting the United States to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s brought it substantial military and economic aid. At present, it continues to obtain large-scale aid of both kinds in its role as a frontline state in the American “war on terrorism” in Afghanistan and on its own territory. Such aid has

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 185185 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 186 Rajesh Basrur tended to undermine Indian preponderance, and India has responded by obtaining arms from outside as well—primarily from the Soviet Union during the Cold War period, but from very diverse sources in the present era. Pakistan has also leaned on China for political as well as military support and the two see themselves as “all- weather friends.” But China, while plying Pakistan with military hardware, has not intervened on its behalf, notably in 1971. India’s success in breaking up Pakistan caused the latter to pursue and eventually obtain nuclear weapons with substantial assistance from China.4 This has given it a measure of confidence and India has, for all its threats to punish Pakistan militarily for pushing terrorists into its territory, implicitly acknowledged Pakistan’s capacity to deter it. Yet, there is periodic evidence of a continuing small power mindset in Pakistan as its officials regularly harp on India’s hegemonic intentions—a fear greatly aggravated by India’s growing closeness to the United States.5 On Kashmir, in typical strong power fashion, India has stuck to its position that any resolution of the dispute must be bilateral. Pakistan, also typically, has consistently sought to bring pressure to bear on India by appeals to the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and other international bodies, but to no avail. Finally, while India has granted Pakistan most favored nation (MFN) status and urged expanded trade, Pakistan has not reciprocated on MFN and has kept its formal trade links with India marginal, as illustrated in Table 9.3. There is increasing awareness in Pakistan that the gap between the two countries is widening with respect to conventional military forces, economic power, and domestic stability. The power relationship between India and her other neighbors has been more clearly one of major power–minor power relations. From time to

Table 9.3 South Asian Neighbours, Trade with India as Percent of Total Trade, 1997

Country Exports to India as Imports from India as Trade with India as % of Total Exports % of Total Imports % of Total Trade

Bangladesh2.37 14.68 10.15 Bhutan* 95.18 73.89 84.32

Maldives 2.13 7.61 6.95 - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Nepal 59.17 55.42 56.31 Pakistan 0.03 0.05 0.04 Sri Lanka 6.74 20.31 15.25

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2009. * For Bhutan: International Monetary Fund. “Bhutan.” Statistical Appendix, December 2009. [Available at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09335.pdf; accessed January 21, 2010.]

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 186186 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 187 time, India has shown its willingness to exert pressure on them. In 1981, Indian forces occupied the disputed New Moore/South Talpatty Island at the mouth of the Hariabhanga River, which divides Bangladesh and India. In 1987, India underlined its intervention in Sri Lanka’s Tamil–Sinhala conflict with a show of force when combat aircraft accompanied a relief mission dropping supplies for refugees. The Sri Lankan government was compelled to allow an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enter the country to maintain order (though that turned into a fiasco). In 1988, Indian forces intervened to help quell a brief coup in the Maldives. In 1989, India allowed difficult negotiations with Nepal over trade and transit to break down and their existing treaty to lapse, after which it restricted Nepal’s access to maritime trade. This caused a major economic and political crisis in Nepal. Again, in 2008, with Indian support, an internal crisis caused Nepal’s Maoist-led government, a government friendly toward China, to collapse. While India has behaved like a typical regional power, other regional actors have resisted its dominance. The only state that has consistently accepted Indian dominance has been Bhutan, which has never sought to balance against India or to limit trade with it (Table 9.3). All the rest have sought at some time or another to diminish India’s capacity to determine their fates. Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have sought closer relations with China and Sri Lanka with the United States. All have tried to use multilateral forums to exert some pressure on India. Bangladesh has appealed at the United Nations for the Bay of Bengal to be designated a “pocket of peace,” as has Nepal appealed for a “zone of peace”; and the Maldives Republic has approached the United Nations for a special mechanism to protect the security of small states. It is widely understood that the impetus for the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 came from a common desire among the smaller states to strengthen their bargaining position vis- à- vis India. Not surprisingly, India has consistently insisted that SAARC’s agenda cannot include political disputes, and that the organization must focus on economic and social cooperation. Equally unsurprising, those of its neighbors who are not landlocked and dependent on India for access to the ocean have not engaged in much trade with it (Table 9.3). Sri Lanka is an exception, having made a conscious decision to build trade via a free trade agreement with India and trade between the two has increased - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright significantly.6 Resistance from the smaller states has not worked. As a result, by the first decade of the twenty- first century, most have become more accepting of Indian power than in the past. Sri Lanka was the first to change its stance, shifting in the mid-1990s from economic moat-building to a preference for free trade—a conscious bandwagoning decision taken for

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 187187 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 188 Rajesh Basrur pragmatic reasons: there was more to be gained than lost from a closer relationship with India.7 Ironically, India, which learned a hard lesson from the IPKF’s failure to tame the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), played a subdued role in the eventual defeat of the LTTE. Still more ironically, apparent abdication of its regional power role in Sri Lanka, which had constantly pressed it to intervene, had no visibly detrimental effect on the relationship between the two countries. President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka affirmed in the aftermath of his military victory of May 2009 that “nothing is more important to me than what India thinks,” and his brother, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, termed India his country’s “closest ally.”8 Nepal has periodically resisted Indian power and unsuccessfully sought China’s help. The 1989 episode revealed the extent of its dependence on India for access to the rest of the world—a geographical reality that cannot change. Bangladesh has long kept India at arm’s length, refusing potential agreements on transit, resisting a major pact to transfer gas from Myanmar to India, and responding tardily to offers of Indian investment. But by the 2000s, this policy had clearly yielded only negative dividends in the form of failed deals and withdrawn investments.9 By about 2007, the tendency in Dhaka to view the relationship with India as a zero sum game had receded and a trend toward cooperation became visible (Choudhury 2010). The China factor has and continues to loom large in the region. The long- standing border dispute between India and China, unresolved since their 1962 war, has produced a competitive history. From the perspective of subcontinental relations, the smaller regional states have leaned—with limited success—on China to balance Indian power. On its part, China has made consistent efforts to penetrate the region by plying the weaker states with military and economic assistance. Most prominently, China has built an “all-weather” relationship with Pakistan, which has extended to providing nuclear weapons–related assistance in an effort to contain India within the region (Jeffrey and Warrick 2009).10 Indians worry about China using Pakistan to contain India while penetrating the region in order to encircle it. To date, the smaller states within the region have not gained much leverage with India through China. Pakistan has benefited significantly from Chinese assistance but such help has failed to shift the balance of power in the region, as Pakistan remains a weak state wracked by internal strife. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Post–Cold War, India has assumed a more benign role in the region. It has agreed to engage in a “composite dialogue” with Pakistan, in an attempt to try and resolve all outstanding problems. Remarkable progress was made until 2007, including both sides making major concessions on Kashmir; however, it faltered when Pakistan entered a period of prolonged political turbulence. In Nepal, India appears to have played a

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 188188 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 189 partisan role contributing to the fall of Maoist leader Prachanda’s government, but that in part is attributable to his failure to keep his weak coalition afloat. During Prachanda’s tenure as prime minister and later, India affirmed its willingness to redefine its relationship with Nepal through a series of new treaties. With no pressure to do so, India revised its treaty relationship with Bhutan in 2007. The original treaty of 1949 had been one that effectively formalized Indian dominance over the tiny Himalayan state; the new treaty explicitly acknowledged India’s respect for Bhutan’s sovereignty. India’s more benevolent approach toward the region has been guided by three motivations. First, Indian leadership understood that regional acceptance would be more conducive to India’s global ambitions: the use of force can be politically costly, as the IPKF episode had shown, as well as inconceivable in a nuclear environment vis-à- vis Pakistan. The “Indira Doctrine,” which envisioned South Asia as India’s exclusive preserve, had exaggerated both the threats faced by India and its capacity to maintain a stable order in the region. Now, the United States was proving to be not a threat but a useful resource for cost sharing in stabilizing South Asia. For instance, the US presence in the region was valuable in exerting pressure on Pakistan and pressing it to stop backing terrorist activity in India.11 Similarly, US pressure compelled Bangladesh to pay more attention to India’s warnings about the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist activity in its territory. In Nepal, as Maoist violence threatened to overthrow the state, the United States forced the Maoists to soften their stance and come to the negotiating table (International Crisis Group 2006: 22). In short, India’s rising global profile and its warming relationship with the United States helped India generate regional order without having to bear a high cost. While the United States may have adopted a policy of “containment” toward India during the Cold War (Nayar and Paul 2003; Rudolph and Rudolph 2006), American acknowledgment of India’s self- assumed role as a “regional security manager” was implicitly forthcoming well before the Cold War’s end (Bouton 1987: 160). Indian interventions in the region throughout the 1980s evoked no response from US policy makers, in part because the region was not viewed as critical with the exception of Afghanistan on the periphery but where India’s role was marginal. In the public eye, India was viewed with some admiration as a “regional super- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright power” and—prematurely—as an emerging “great power on the world stage” (Copley 1988).12 Today, the India- US relationship is far stronger, involving rising trade and investment, considerable cooperation in defence, and consultation on regional political issues. The US strategy of cultivating India as a global partner has greatly enhanced India’s regional position. Still, India remains a limited regional hegemon, its capacities

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 189189 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 190 Rajesh Basrur restricted in both military and economic terms. Then again, the hallmark of a major power is not so much its ability to control its environment—the United States has failed repeatedly without losing its status—but its place in the calculus of its interlocutors. In this sense, India has long been the preponderant power in South Asia. What is changing slowly is that its position is today derived less from others’ fear than from their acceptance. Not a small part of this is due to its considerable success in sustaining its democratic political system.13 A hegemon is not just a power that pushes smaller powers around; if benign, it can also provide certain public goods and maintain systemic stability (Keohane 1980; Snidal 1985). It is widely recognized that the United States has, among other things, underwritten a liberal world economy and acted as the lender of last resort. India’s capacity to play a similar role may appear to be nonexistent. Yet the Indian economy has absorbed a large amount of labor from two neighboring countries, Nepal and Bangladesh, in the former case by formal agreement. Nepalese citizens are permitted to enter India freely and to work without employment permits; India also employs Nepal’s citizens in its armed forces. From Bangladesh, the flow is largely illegal, the consequence of poverty- ridden people seeking a liveli- hood wherever they can. In this case, while there is no formal agreement, it is significant that India has not really tried to stem the flow. Though this is but a small quantum of public goods that India provides, it is nonetheless remarkable since India itself is a poverty-stricken society. Future efforts to create regional economic order, a positive use of its power, will depend on its capacity to take some weight off its neighbors’ shoulders in other ways, for instance by making trade-related concessions to them that override purely cost–benefit calculations.

India as a Global Power

India has been widely viewed as an “emerging” power, but one which is held back by numerous difficulties, notably its large and poor population, innumerable domestic conflicts, and the many imperfections of its democracy (Basrur 2009; Cohen 2001).14 Some have argued that it has potential, but has a considerable way to go: it can resist strong pressures to alter its strategic behavior, but it is not yet able to exercise significant influence - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright on others (Mistry 2004; Nayar and Paul 2003; Perkovich 2003/2004). Indian power in the global system needs to be understood in a nuanced way. Power itself cannot be treated only as an instrument that is used—in military or economic terms—directly to achieve political goals. In an increasingly interdependent world, the direct application of power is often not a viable strategic option. Where there is interdependence, rules and

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 190190 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 191 institutions are central and bargaining is critical to outcomes. In assessing India’s position as a power, then, it is important to consider both aspects— its capacity to utilize power directly; and its capacity to shape the rules and institutions through which states interact in important ways. Where the direct utilization of power for political ends is concerned, India has very limited capabilities. Its strategy has focused on institutional power within a multilateral framework, generally attempting to do not much more than obtain a seat at the table in every conceivable institution relevant to it. Much of its energies have gone into circumventing and then penetrating one regime that it views as an obstacle to its strategic choices—the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In another case, the global trading regime, it has similarly resisted the imposition of rules it considers detrimental to its interests, but is now attempting to undertake a more positive role in giving shape to the regime as it evolves. Historically, Indian leaders, conscious of their country’s rich culture and long civilizational history, have tended to take for granted its status as a major global power. Before independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, who became its first prime minister, simply assumed it would do so (1946: 547). Nehru strode the world stage in pursuit of a grand design to sidestep the Cold War and build an egalitarian postcolonial order committed to wip- ing out colonial rule, apartheid, and nuclear weapons. This was the core of a national self-image of global leadership fed by an abundance of optimism and confidence arising from a successful independence movement built on a foundation of the principle of nonviolence. But that confidence was shat- tered in 1962, when Indian forces were dealt a severe blow by China during a short border war. In one stroke, India’s strategic horizon was reduced to that of a struggling power with no more than a regional shadow. Even that was under challenge from Pakistan, a state far smaller yet still willing to go to war with India over Kashmir. India’s inability to meet the challenge adequately—it had been unable to win a decisive victory in 1947–48 and again in 1965—left it with a tattered image and little influence except among some of its very small neighbors. Under Indira Gandhi, India retreated into its regional shell and began to focus on building its hard power and influence. Following some of the same strategies toward the world as its neighbors did toward it, India sought influence through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (including UN peacekeeping), the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the Group of 77 developing countries (G77). When it felt threatened by external powers in what appeared to be an emerging US-China- Pakistan nexus in 1971, it built an alliance-like relationship with the Soviet Union for arms and for political support on Kashmir. It also demanded the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace, opposed any external military presence in the region (including the Soviet move into Afghanistan), and followed

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 191191 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 192 Rajesh Basrur an economic policy that kept out most foreign investment and attempted to go it alone through import substitution. It did not go very far with this strategy. In 1990, it was still a relatively weak power, its global position marked by a defensive struggle against regimes (nonproliferation, trade) that threatened its autonomy, while economic stagnation and a lack of technological dynamism seemed endemic. Two events transformed its approach. First, the end of the Cold War rendered its political worldview obsolete. The overarching East- West dimension of world politics had collapsed, taking its most reliable friend, the Soviet Union, with it. Second, and perhaps even more profoundly, the North-South dimension of its strategy disintegrated at the same time. Caught in a serious balance of payments crisis, India had no choice but to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan, which made “structural adjustment” a necessity, compelling it to abandon the neo- Marxian centre- periphery thinking that had been its well- embedded orthodoxy since the 1950s. Both shocks made possible a rapid reversal of fundamental political and economic strategy and both pointed India in the direction of a closer relationship with the sole remaining superpower, the United States. The path was by no means easy. India’s relatively slow adaptation to a more liberal domestic regime raised doubts about its capacity to turn itself around. On the political plane, India- US relations entered a rocky phase as the United States sought to tighten the nonproliferation regime, making India a major target of its goal to first stop and then roll back the threat of more and more states going nuclear. By the early 2000s, India’s position had improved. Its nuclear die had been cast through a series of tests in 1998. The Indian economy began to pick up pace. In the meantime, two global trends—the rise of transnational terrorism and the emergence of China as a potential challenger to American dominance—brought a convergence of views between India and the United States that outweighed their earlier frictions. A decade after the end of the Cold War, India was beginning to be seen more as a global player than a regional one. India’s search for recognition stems from a consciousness that it is its due, and is taken for granted across the spectrum of Indian political opinion. Yet, despite the tendency of the media to overplay this on an almost daily basis, Indian political leaders rarely use India’s “greatness” for domestic political support. There is, however, a thread running through India’s foreign relations that shows a consistent interest and sensitivity to the sta- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tus issue. Its chief characteristics are an acute consciousness of a history of foreign rule (and hence rejection of foreign domination through alliances) and efforts to assume leadership of the third world via the nonaligned movement. However, there is little domestic political pressure, ideological or otherwise, to assume a world role. For the most part, domestic politics has been just that, except in resistance to outside influence. Indeed,

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 192192 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 193 Indian history, barring the expansion of ancient southern kingdoms into Southeast Asia, shows little Indian interest in extraregional empire building. Such inf luence as Indian society has had to the North and the East has been largely of a social and religious nature. There is a common perception that Indian (read “Hindu”) civilization is all-absorbing—an outlook that is inward rather than outward looking. An overriding (and exaggerated) self-perception is that India is a peaceful, nonviolent society capable of negotiating differences. This self-image, when accepted outside, is a useful form of “soft power” for India, although India has yet to consciously promote it (in contrast to the explicit promotion of this form of soft power by both Brazil and France). How accurate is the image of an emerging power? India, compared with other major powers, ranks in the top five on military capabilities other than its expenditures ( Table 9.4). Yet, compared to major global powers, it has a long way to go. India is nowhere near the United States except in the numerical strength of its military personnel, which only emphasizes the relatively “labor-intensive” character of its military. The

Table 9.4 Military Indicators, India and Major Powers Compared, 2009

Country Military Active Armed Main Battle Submarines Principal Combat Aircraft Expenditure Forces (000) Tanks Naval Surface (including (US$m) Combatants naval)

1. United 552,568 1,539,587 8,023 57 107 4,201 States 2. United 63,258 160,280 386 8 27 360 Kingdom 3. France 60,662 352,771 637 6 32 351 4. China 46,174 2,185,000 7,660 59 78 1,943 5. Germany 42,108 244,324 2,035 12 18 298 6. Japan 41,039 230,300 880 16 52 350 7. Saudi 35,446 221,500 910 – 11 276 Arabia 8. Russia 32,215 1,027,000 23,000 106 102 2,248 9. South 26,588 687,000 2,330 12 47 499 Korea

10. India 26,513 1,281,200 4,065 16 47 632 - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright India’s Rank 10 3 4 4 5 4 India as % of 4.80 83.22 50.67 28.07 43.93 15.04 USA India as % of 57.42 58.64 53.07 27.12 60.26 32.53 China

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2009. The Military Balance, 2009. Abingdon: Routledge.

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 193193 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 194 Rajesh Basrur

Table 9.5 Selected Economic Indicators Comparing India with Major Powers, 2009

Country Population (thousands) GDP, PPP (US$m) Per capita GDP, PPP (US$)

1. USA 307,007 14,119,000 45,640 2. China 1,331,460 9,091,142 6,890 3. Japan 127,560 4,139,682 33,470 4. India 1,155,348 3,778,159 3,250 5. Germany 81,880 2,969,575 36,780 6. Russia 141,850 2,689,846 18,350 7. United Kingdom 61,838 2,256,830 37,230 8. France 62,616 2,172,097 33,930 9. Brazil 193,734 2,017,180 10,200 10. Italy 60,221 1,921,576 31,360 India’s Rank 2 4 10 India, % of USA 26.75 7.12 India, % of China 41.56 47.17

Source: World Bank. D ata and S tati stic s. [Ava i l able at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/ Resources/POP.pdf (for population), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ GDP_PPP.pdf (for GDP,PPP), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ GNIPC. pdf (for Gross National Income (GNI) PPP); all accessed January 27, 2011.]

comparison with China, also a labor- intensive military, shows India far behind in every category. Table 9.5 presents a comparative picture of leading economic indicators. Here, I rely on GDP PPP for comparisons of aggregate economic power. I also show per capita GDP PPP to modify the implications of the aggregate figures. The level of per capita GDP influences the level of defence spending a state can afford as well as its capacity to reward or resist others. Despite India’s fourth rank in GDP PPP terms, its economy at present is a long way behind that of the United States. In comparison with China, it is still small: China’s aggregate as well as per capita figures are twice those of India. India faces severe constraints on its growth path: poverty, inequality, illiteracy, corruption, and poor welfare standards (Narlikar 2007). These are bound to restrain its military capabilities. However, the Indian economy is expected to expand rapidly over the medium term. In January 2007, Goldman Sachs projected a pace of growth that would enable India - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright to overtake Japan in terms of GDP by about 2030 and the United States about a decade later (Poddar and Yi 2007: 5). Others echoed the judgment (Ablett et al. 2007: 13–14, 55–56). One recent projection expects India’s growth to be even quicker, anticipating that it will catch up with Japan in 2012 (Hawksworth 2010). Thus, while India’s present position is not very strong, it is likely to experience a significant rise in relative terms,

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 194194 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 195 making it the world’s third largest economy in the very near future. This has a bearing on its military expenditure, which can retain a relatively low per capita spending level while rapidly expanding in aggregate terms. And of course, barring a completely skewed development that leaves the average citizen behind—unlikely given its democratic apparatus—such a strong growth rate means the pressures of backwardness should begin to recede steadily, thereby enhancing its relative position as an economic power. Then its value as an attractive strategic partner for other states will increase, along with its weight and bargaining power in international regimes. In the military realm, India is in the process of building a modern armed force. Allocations for new acquisitions have nearly trebled for 2005–2010 as compared to 1999–2004.15 Bet ween 1999 and 2009, it spent $50 billion on new equipment and well over $30 billion is to be allo- cated for more purchases over the next four to five years.16 Significantly, new and forthcoming purchases include a high proportion of equipment for long- range operations: an aircraft carrier; 6 C- 130J transport aircraft; 12 submarines; and IL-78 air refuelling aircraft that can allow an Indian aircraft to fly nonstop to Alaska. These new capabilities are clearly designed to extend the strategic reach of the Indian armed forces to an unprecedented level. India has also established a military “base” in Ayni, Tajikistan, where it has placed an unspecified force (believed to be military helicopters).17 India has plans to build a blue water navy, allowing it strategic space across the Indian Ocean and beyond, and particular interest in protecting shipping in the Gulf and the Straits of Malacca. Conceivably, it could play a significant role in the not too distant future as the guardian of the Indian Ocean’s island states or become a joint security provider for the Gulf.18 It has widened its reach in the Indian Ocean by establishing a listening station in Madagascar.19 Indian ships regularly patrol the seas off the Gulf to counter the rising menace of piracy. Indian leaders are self- consciously aware of their country’s widening strategic radius. As Rahul Gandhi has noted: “What is important . . . is that we stop worrying about how the world will impact us . . . and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world.”20 This can be interpreted either as willingness to exert Indian power or as a word of caution to others. So far, the latter appears to be the case. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright While India’s military horizons have stretched well beyond South Asia, Indians are well aware that what they call their “extended neighborhood” (the arc from the Middle East to Southeast Asia) is one where other major players are already present, hampering India’s capacity to undertake autonomous activity. The United States is everywhere, Russia and China are strongly placed in Central Asia, and China and Japan likewise in Southeast

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 195195 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 196 Rajesh Basrur Asia. But India’s prudence has been evident even where it has been invited to play a larger role in maintaining order in neighboring regions. In 2003, the United States encouraged India to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq. Although there was some domestic support for the move, India refused.21 The IPKF’s experience in Sri Lanka clearly lingered in policy makers’ minds. Similarly, India has confined its role in Afghanistan to civilian construction and military training.22 Actions such as the sinking of a pirate vessel off Northeast Africa are exceptional. Normally, India’s preference is to act within a multilateral framework, such as the United Nations. Even though it is hemmed in by other major and regional powers and not particularly active in maintaining order beyond its neighborhood, states outside its region have recognized its potential as a major global power. Singapore’s foremost political figure, Lee Kuan Yew, predicted that India, along with China, will “reshape the world order before the end of the 21st century.”23 India’s free trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was more keenly sought by the richer ASEAN than by India, which delayed the signing (2009) for six years on account of domestic pressures. At the Asian- regional level, India has become associated with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia- Europe meeting (ASEM), and joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an observer. At the global level, recognition of India’s rising status has given it a place in several major institutional arrangements, notably the expanded avatar of the Group of 8 countries (G8), which it joined in 2009, the group of 20 major economies (G20) brought together for financial stabilization, the Group of 15 developing nations (G15) leading the unwieldy G77, and forums involved in regular consultations such as BRIC (Brazil-Russia- India- China), IBSA (India-Brazil- South Africa), and BASIC (Brazil-South Africa-India- China). Recognition of India’s rising status has come from diverse quarters. British foreign secretary David Miliband spoke in 2008 of a “global power shift” with the rise of China and India.24 China upgraded the status of its ambassador to New Delhi in January 2010 to the status of a vice-minister. 25 The most striking development is the important place accorded to India by the sole superpower, the United States. The relationship between the two countries underwent a transformation in the post–Cold War era. US officials proclaimed American commitment to “help India become a major world power in the 21st century.”26 In recognition of India’s key place in - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright their strategic calculations, American policy makers successfully undertook the herculean task of convincing staunch critics at home and abroad that India should be allowed to bypass the nuclear nonproliferation regime’s restrictions on civilian commerce with it. 27 This marked a turning point both in the emerging strategic partnership between the two countries and in the global recognition of India as an emerging major power.

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 196196 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 197 During the Cold War era, India’s deportment toward the United States had been a mirror image of its own neighbors’ behavior toward it. It had kept aloof from the United States and the global US- dominated economy; it periodically bowed to US power (as in seeking its help after the 1962 war and in accepting large- scale food aid in the mid- 1960s); it tried to play a balancing game between the United States and the Soviet Union; it resisted the entry of American power into the subcontinent; and it tried to offset its weakness by playing an active role in multilateral organizations such as NAM and the UN. Today, it confidently seeks a close relationship with both the United States and the global economy and welcomes American military presence in South Asia. Neither NAM nor the UN is central to its drive for great power status, though it does seek status and institutional power by seeking a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Yet its reluctance to become embroiled in military actions (other than UN peacekeeping) beyond its borders shows it has no illusions about its still limited status as a major power. The India- China relationship is more complex (Basrur 2010). In addition to linger ing border disputes, naval r ivalr y in the Indian Ocean (Mohan 2009), and mutual processes of rapid military modernization, both societies harbor considerable nationalist sentiment, further promoting the competitive side of their relationship. However, they have also demonstrated a remarkable capacity to set aside many differences and accelerate trade very rapidly. China is now India’s largest trading partner. They have cooper- ated in major multilateral negotiations on trade (the Doha Round) and the environment (the Copenhagen summit on climate change). It is often said that India worries far more about China than China does about India. Two points may be made here. First, Chinese policy makers have visibly resisted India’s rise. They have tried to box India into South Asia by backing Pakistan, opposing India’s quest for a permanent seat in the Security Council, and resisting the alteration of the nonproliferation regime’s rules to accommodate India. Second, China may have more to worry about as India’s rapidly warming relationship with the United States has produced the growing perception of an emerging US-China- India strategic triangle (Blank 2007). With China, in effect, taking the heat of American resistance to global power transition, India has been able to embark on its own transition to great power status (still in an early phase) with relative ease. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright India’s “rise” has been and is still a complex process. In material terms, it has certainly embarked on a higher rate of growth, but its military and economic capabilities lie well behind those of the United States and China (Tables 9.4 and 9.5). By itself, India has been unable to influence the course of events in any single major global event or process. Yet, it has been able to exploit US- China rivalry. Its growing market and

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 197197 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 198 Rajesh Basrur its prestige as a democracy enhances its stature in spite of its relatively limited capabilities. Nowhere is this more evident than in the bending of nonproliferation rules with considerable American help. That India has been able to attain widespread recognition as an “emerging power” despite its relative weakness is a reflection of its skilful leveraging of these advantages. If India has been assertive, it has been toward multilateral regimes. Three cases stand out. In each, India has successfully challenged the combined efforts by other powerful states to impose rules unpalatable to it. First, India has resisted the efforts of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime to impose a change in its nuclear weapons policy. In the Cold War era, India rejected the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and stayed away from the emerging regime. While it did conduct a single nuclear test in 1974, it did not become a nuclear weapons power, preferring to keep the option open, and eventually becoming a covert nuclear- armed state in about 1989. Following the end of the Cold War, it came under pressure to cap and roll back its clandestine weapons programme, particularly with the formalization of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India walked out of the negotiations and began preparations for fresh testing, which were eventually conducted in 1998 (Saksena 2006). It came close to being treated as a pariah, but its place in the post–Cold war order was stronger than before and the political calculus of the Bush administration helped it overcome the constraints imposed by the nonproliferation regime. There is little doubt that after 1998 there was no turning back and, because it could no longer be persuaded to toe the line of the regime, it was accommodated. The change reflected both the weight of India’s rising power and the fact that the United States went to considerable lengths in assisting India to alter the rules of the regime. However, India has neither played a significant role in shaping the regime thereafter, nor in the global drive for disarmament, a cause which it has long held dear. Another formidable challenge India met with partial success was at the Doha Round of trade talks. The talks, aimed broadly at expanding the scope of international trade regulation, broke down in July 2008 with developed and developing countries at odds over critical issues such as the level at which the former’s agricultural subsidies could be permitted, or the level at which prices could trigger protective tariffs on food and other key crops.28 The United States exerted enormous pressure for a deal, but resistance from - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright India and China led to the eventual collapse of the negotiations.29 India played a major role in the denouement, allying first with Brazil and later with China to stave off pressure. India’s minister for commerce and industry, Kamal Nath, who played a decisive part as one of the four lead negotiators, was described in the press as the “pivotal figure” in the negotiations.30 The episode reflected India’s rising clout, although its influence was limited to

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 198198 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 199 preventing unpalatable change. It remains to be seen whether it can bring more positive influence to bear on an actual agreement. Finally, India was active in shaping a limited climate change agreement at the December 2009 Copenhagen Summit. The summit was hampered by disagreements between the United States and developing countries over distribution of the costs of cutting down on greenhouse gas emissions and by American unwillingness to accept the call for quantitative targets for emission control agreed on in an earlier agreement thrashed out in Kyoto.31 Following the personal intervention of US president Barrack Obama, a watered down and essentially nonbinding deal was finally signed as India and other developing countries accepted that a weak agreement was better than none. Although the center of attention was the face- off between the United States and China, the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, India did play a major role in the negotiation of the final accord along with representatives from the United States, China, Brazil, and South Africa.32 Notably, the European Union blamed India as well as China for the disappointing end to the summit.33

Conclusion

The picture that emerges from the analysis above is as follows: In its immediate geographical sphere, India is in many ways a regional major power, with a restricted direct capacity to influence outcomes desirable to it (such limitations also apply to much stronger powers). What it does, or fails to do, is important to all its neighbors, whereas what they do affects it relatively less. This is true even of Pakistan: it is readily evident that India occupies most of Pakistan’s foreign policy horizon, while the reverse is far from the case. India also gains from American involvement in the region, primarily in restrain- ing those Pakistani policies that are inimical to Indian interests and security. India’s rising global profile and its closeness to the United States help lower resistance to its preeminence in South Asia. Its own shift to a more benign stance is also a contributory factor. There is increasing recognition of its status from the other states in the region, including from Pakistan, which sees India as steadily drawing away and upward from it. Thus, notwithstanding its local problems, India is a status- consistent regional power. Strong in the region and its capabilities continuing to grow, India - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright should be able to move more decisively away from local preoccupations to focus on the world stage. Limiting its ability to do so is its ongoing relationship with Pakistan. That relationship may remain problematic and constraining as long as the Pakistani military benefits from ongoing hostility with India, and as long as domestic uncertainties and turmoil leaves unclear the future of the Pakistani state. To the extent that

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 199199 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:129:11:12 PMPM 200 Rajesh Basrur the military remains vital to Pakistan’s “hybrid democracy,” and political turbulence continues under the onslaught of Islamic extremism, India will continue to be preoccupied with regional stability (Tremblay and Schofield 2005). Yet, it is simply too big—and growing larger—to be confined to its neighborhood. On the world stage, India’s profile is growing fairly rapidly, but it still has a long way to go. For all its impressive growth and aggregate GDP figures, and for all the expectations it has raised about its future as a major power, it remains a country with enormous problems of poverty, inequality, and corruption (Drèze and Sen 2002). Can a state become a great power, or receive the status of one when a substantial portion of its population is hungry? Indian leaders are conscious of this, and this keeps military spending down to about 2 percent of GDP. As India’s democracy becomes increasingly decentralized, the pressure to do something about improving distribution of wealth becomes stronger. Given the combination of democratization and economic liberalization, it is unlikely that India’s growth will remain highly skewed over time. But, given the enor- mity of its problems of poverty and inequality, the transformative process is likely to remain steady rather than rapid. For this reason, India is likely to remain a potential rather than an actual great power for some time to come. Beyond its immediate periphery, India does not now have much capacity to shape the international order in adjacent regions where there are states recognized as major powers. However, India does not have autonomous interests of great magnitude, and its warming relationship with the United States and its old camaraderie with Russia should stand it in good stead. At the global level, its capabilities are limited and its ambitions equally limited as we can see from its unwillingness to become militarily involved in Iraq and, beyond a point, in Afghanistan. It has charted a more active and influential course in the politics of regimes, in each case to protect its vital interests. Here again, it has not played an autonomous role (except with respect to distancing itself from the nonproliferation regime), but has allied with other powerful states to shape outcomes, although this shaping has not been substantial. India has had some ability to decide what should not be done; little influence on what is. Hence, it would be fair to say that, at the global level, India is a state with currently limited capacities and limited status attribution, but considerable potential in the - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright long term to lay claim to the status of a major power. In the meantime, as a player that is not deeply dissatisfied with international arrangements, as a power that has been able to make steady progress in attaining enhanced status, and as a state that tends to act in concert with others rather than go it alone, it is likely to have a stabilizing rather than a disturbing influence on the international system.

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 200200 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:139:11:13 PMPM India: A Major Power in the Making 201 Notes

1. I tend to use “power” and “capabilities” interchangeably, whereas the editors prefer the precision of the latter, as is evident from chapter 1. 2. For interesting efforts on these lines, see Cline (1980), which incorporates such elements as “will” and “strategy” in ranking states; and Hagerty (2009), which includes “economic freedom,” “political stability,” and “competence” (in governance). 3. In the present context, I apply these patterns to both the regional and international systems. 4. Smith, R. Jeffrey and Joby Warrick. “A Nuclear Power’s Act of Proliferation,” Washington Post, November 13, 2009. [Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/ article/2009/11/12/AR2009111211060.html; accessed November 13, 2009.] 5. See, for example, “Indo- US Nuclear Deal Risks Arms Race: NCA,” Daily Times, August 3, 2007 [Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\08\03\ story_3- 8- 2007_pg1_6] (all newspaper references were accessed on the same day unless otherwise stated); Muhammad Anis, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal Altered Balance,” News International, January 16, 2010. [Available at http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_detail. asp?Id=26701.] 6. Sri Lanka’s trade with India has grown significantly. Between 1997 and 2008, its exports to India as a proportion of its total exports have increased from 0.95 to 6.74 percent and its imports from India as a proportion of its total imports from 11.14 to 20.31 percent. The 1997 figures are from International Monetary Fund (1988) and the 2008 figures from Table 9.3. 7. Author’s inter v iew w ith M i l ind a Moragod a, for mer m in ister for econom ic refor m, Colombo, September 15, 2004. The India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1998. 8. Cited in “I Fought India’s War: Interview,” Week, May 31, 2009. [Available at http://week. manoramaonline.com/cgi-bin/MMOnline.dll/portal/ep/theWeekContent.do?sectionNa me=Current+Events&contentId=5538317&programId=1073754900&pageTypeId=107375 4893&contentType=EDITORIAL&BV_ID=@@@; accessed June 5, 2009]; and “India’s Help Eased World Pressure in LTTE War: Lanka,” Indian Express, November 17, 2009. [Available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indias- help- eased-world- pressure- in- ltte- war- lanka/542522/.] 9. When the Tata group called off its proposed $3 billion investment, the country not only lost its biggest single foreign investment ever, but also sent a strong negative signal for other potential investors. Anupama Airy, “Tata’s Withdrawal from Bangla to Impact Other Foreign Players,” Financial Express , August 13, 2008. [Available at http://www. financialexpress.com/news/tatas-withdrawal- from- bangla- to-impact- other-foreign- players/348023/.] 10. Also “China’s Nuclear Assistance and Exports to Pakistan,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 14, 2003. [Available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/npakpos.htm ; accessed March 8, 2010 via Nuclear Threat (NTI)] 11. The first major effort to apply such pressure occurred in 2001–2002, when Indian and Pakistani troops faced off in the wake of an attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan- linked terrorists. Since then, the United States has leaned on Pakistan repeatedly, though

with limited success (Basrur, 2005); “Will Not Hesitate to Strike Inside Pakistan: Obama,” - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright The Hindu, December 15, 2009. [Available at http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/15/ stories/2009121555661200.htm.] 12. Also, Ross H. Munro, “Superpower Rising,” Time, April 3, 1989, pp. 6–13. 13. There is a significant element of admiration for India in Pakistan today on this count. See, e.g., Tasneem Noorani, “Primacy of Law in India,” Dawn, February 16, 2007. [Available at http://www.dawn.com/2007/02/16/op.htm#1]; “Imran Looks to India for Pakistan’s Future,” Daily Times, January 30, 2008. [Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=2008\01\30\story_30- 1- 2008_pg7_27.]

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 201201 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:139:11:13 PMPM 202 Rajesh Basrur 14. Also Sumit Ganguly,. “Can India Be Great?” Diplomat, December 31, 2009. [Available at http://www.the-diplomat.com/001f1281_r.aspx?artid=358; accessed January 3, 2010.] 15. “Armed Forces Modernization on Track: Defence Ministry,” The Hindu, January 1, 2010. [Available at http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/01/stories/2010010153331800.htm.] 16. Rajat Pandit, “$50- bn Deals since Kargil,” Times of India, January 1, 2010. [Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/50- bn-defence- deals- since- Kargil/articleshow/ 5400429.cms.] 17. It must be noted, though, that India shares the facility with the host country and Russia. 18. Anand Giridharadas, “Land of Gandhi Asserts Itself as Global Military Power,” New York Times, September 22, 2008. [Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/ asia/22india.html?ref=world.] 19. Bruce Loudon, “India Sets up Spy Base,” Australian, July 19, 2007. [Available at http:// www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22096826-25837,00.html. ] 20. Ibid. 21. Amit Baruah, “No Troops for Iraq without Explicit U.N. Mandate: India,” The Hindu, July 15, 2003. [Available at http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2003/07/15/ stories/2003071505870100.htm; accessed January 24, 2010.] 22. Atul Aneja, “India Wary of Military Role in Afghanistan,” The Hindu, January 14, 2010. [Available at http://www.thehindu.com/2010/01/14/stories/2010011455661700.htm.] 23. “Speech by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor, at the S. Rajaratnam Lecture 09 April 2009 5:30 pm at Shangri-La Hotel,” Singapore Government Media Release, April 9, 2009. [Available at http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/pmo/ speech/S- 20090409-1.html ; accessed January 24, 2010.] 24. “Rise of India Leading to Global Power Shift,” Zee News, March 6, 2008. [Available at http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=428492&sid=NAT; accessed March 10, 2008.] 25. Ananth Krishnan and Sandeep Dikshit, “China Elevates Rank of Envoy in New Delhi,” The Hindu, January 26, 2010. [Available at http://www.thehindu.com/2010/01/26/ stories/2010012660741000.htm .] 26. “Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.- South Asia Relations,” United States Department of State, March 25, 2005. [Available at http://www.fas.org/terrorism/ at/docs/2005/StatePressConfer25mar05.htm; accessed on January 24, 2010.] 27. The process, consuming considerable political capital on the part of the Bush administration, took over three years from July 2005 to October 2008 to conclude. For a quick outline, see “Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” Times of India, October 9, 2008. [Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Chronology_of_the_Indo-US_nuclear_ deal/articleshow/3575350.cms.] 28. John W. Miller, “Global Talks Fail as New Giants Flex Muscle,”Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2008, p. A1. 29. Ibid. 30. John W. Miller, “Indian Minister Frustrates West at Trade Talks,” Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2008, p. A6. 31. Andrew C. Revkin and Tom Zeller, Jr, “U.S. Negotiator Dismisses Reparations for Climate,” New York Times, December 10, 2009. [Available at http://www.nytimes. com/2009/12/10/science/earth/10climate.html?th&emc=th.] 32. John M. Broder, “Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal,”New York Times, December 19, 2009. [Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/ - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright earth/19climate.html?_r=1&th&emc=th; accessed December 21. 2009]; Andrew C. Revkin and John M. Broder, “A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks,” New York Times, December 20, 2009. [Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/earth/20accord. html?ref=world.] 33. Chetan Chauhan, “EU Blames India, China for Fiasco,” Hindustan Times, December 24, 2009. [Available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/special-news- report/india- news/ EU- blames-India- China- for- fiasco/Article1- 489911.aspx.]

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99780230104648_10_ch09.indd780230104648_10_ch09.indd 202202 44/4/2011/4/2011 9:11:139:11:13 PMPM CHAPTER TEN Status and the Future of International Politics

Renato Corbetta, Thomas J. Volgy, Ryan G. Baird, and Keith A. Grant

More than three decades ago, Kenneth Waltz (1979) theorized about the existence of a discernible hierarchy within an international system dominated by anarchy: the hierarchy of the major power states. While anarchy is a constant characteristic of international politics, the ordering among major powers is susceptible to slow but significant change. In the international system as defined by Waltz, the differing distribution of capabilities accounts for this change, constitutes the system’s main moving part, and seeks to explain why and how states respond to the pressures and constraints that ultimately result from anarchy. Waltz speculated that all states react by engaging in some variant of power balancing. However, states’ specific response to systemic stimuli depends on the number of major powers in the international system and if a state is a major power, on the position it occupies within such a hierarchy. Ultimately, according to Waltz (1979), international politics is shaped by the number of and ordering among the major powers in the international system. One does not have to subscribe to a Waltzian view of international relations to agree with the notion that the amount and intensity of international conflict, as well as the type and effectiveness of the institutions - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright that affect international cooperation depends upon the number, posi- tionality, and role played by major powers in the international system. Scholars from varied theoretical perspectives have rushed to explore the myriad implications that result from the presence and actions of major powers in international politics. Yet, surprisingly, what exactly it means to be a major power has remained an elusive question within international

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 203203 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:174:50:17 PMPM 204 Renato Corbetta et al. relations scholarship. All of the contributors to this volume, regardless of their theoretical orientation, provide an important piece to the “major power puzzle” by exploring a crucial, but often overlooked dimension of the definition of great powers—namely, the dimension of status. Most studies of major powers have explored one of two avenues. Some have concentrated on the importance of the material capabilities that major powers are supposed to possess, while others have assumed that the notion of a major power is so obvious that it requires neither explicit conceptualization nor measurement. Both types of studies have contributed to the general view that, while the difference between major powers and other states matters, status differences among the major powers themselves are almost irrelevant. Of course, those who have focused on long cycles, power transition, or the hierarchical ordering of international politics have sought to differentiate among major powers in terms of their capabilities and willingness to structure international politics, but not their status. Most large N- based research on international conflict and cooperation has treated major powers in an even more monolithic fashion, reducing the concept to a dichotomous category, with the concept basically becoming a “placeholder” for the proper names of a subset of states in the international system. As a result, many international relations scholars may have oversimplified one of the most important engines of international change and stability, as originally theorized by Morgenthau (1985[1948]), Waltz (1979), and many others. Perhaps the most common criticism about the value of the concept of major power status is that it is so highly correlated with material capabilities that scholars should consider one or the other, but not both, in their analyses lest they generate inefficient findings (Ray 2003; Goertz and Hewitt 2005). While many scholars have heeded this criticism, too often it is forgotten that the creators of the (near) universally used Correlates of War measures of capabilities and major power status intended for the two to be different both conceptually and operationally (Small and Singer 1982; Singer 1988). While there is no doubt that all great powers must possess unusual amounts of material capabilities, major power status refers to the idea that a small subset of states occupies a prominent social position within the community of states. Often equated to the notion of prestige or rank, status is a social positional concept that extends beyond the simple possession of material attributes because it involves a social process of attri- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright bution or ascription. Because it is ascribed, status is a more elusive notion to observe and measure—quantitatively or qualitatively—than just economic or military capabilities. Yet, it is undeniable that considerations about status matter. Attributed status explains variation in the behavior of major powers, as high status ascription may confer on a handful of states an additional

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 204204 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:174:50:17 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 205 form of soft power with which to pursue their objectives in international politics. Additionally, status ascription in its various manifestations may also act to constrain or encourage risk- taking among major power policy makers. As we have suggested throughout this volume, the attribution of status to major powers is not uniform. States vary in the extent to which their material attributes and behaviors match the status ascribed to them. States possessing the material attributes necessary to be major powers, the willingness to behave as great powers, and in receipt of high status attribution from the international community, should be considered status- consistent major powers. However, domestic and systemic constraints on ascription can generate mismatches among these three dimensions. Some states may be attributed major power status while they lack some of the capabilities or the willingness to play such a role. We have labeled these states overachieving status- inconsistent major powers. Other states may possess the material capabilities or the willingness to be major powers, but they may be denied such status by the rest of the international community or by members of the existing major power club. We have labeled these states underachieving status- inconsistent major powers. From our perspective, this differentiation represents something more than an exercise in relabeling that is aimed at introducing artificial variation where there is none. Rather, the effort captures often perceived but seldom ar ticulated dif ferences among major powers1 and generates dif ferent hypotheses about the behavior of status- consistent and status- inconsistent major powers. In chapter 1, we have raised a few general hypotheses that may highlight these differences across status types. These include variation across major powers in their commitment to build cooperative architecture, and the extent to which they are willing to take risks by engaging in interstate conflicts in order to promote their vast range of interests. While we have focused primarily on the global level of analysis and the salience of major global powers, we recognize that status also matters for regional powers. Chapter 7 and the cases following on Brazil and India highlight the salience of a second club: the club of regional powers. During the last three decades, regional powers have been most active in the management of localized domestic conflicts and in the promotion of regional cooperative arrangements.2 As noted in chapter 7, all regional powers we have uncovered in the post–Cold War era have been attributed full status - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright consistency as regional powers from both the regional and global levels, likely assisting them with additional soft power as they seek to structure regional affairs. Yet, there exist in many of these regions additional states (states we have labeled regional challengers), seeking and receiving high status, that are not regional powers, making governance and regional order creation more problematic for regional powers. The case studies of Brazil

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 205205 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:174:50:17 PMPM 206 Renato Corbetta et al. and India also highlight another salient feature of the regional power club: some of these states seek more than regional status, and are searching for ways in which to attain membership in the club of global powers, suggesting a future of increased status competition between the two clubs.

A Further Look at the Processes of Status Attribution

Social identity theory indicates that status attribution can occur through one or more of three processes: self-reference, community attribution, and in- group attribution. We expect all three processes to be working in tandem for status-consistent major powers, while clashing for status- inconsistent ones. We have left to the other contributors of this volume the difficult tasks of exploring these expectations and explaining the specific dynamics driving status attribution within individual cases. The broad lesson we have learned from the chapters about specific major powers is that the processes of status attribution always appear to be driven by varying amounts of domestic political considerations and international constraints, with the mix in no small part driven by the type of attribution being addressed.

Self-Reference Of the three forms of status attribution, we have the least amount of systematic evidence regarding self-attribution. Yet, it is quite clear from the case studies that self- attribution, and the perceived need by policy makers for more major power status, or the bolstering of previously held status, appears to be one of the crucial ingredients driving status competition between states. What leads policy makers to demand more status or to seek to cling to the status they have? There is some evidence of the “dog that doesn’t bark” kind that the quest for status is neither uniform nor desired by all policy makers. At the same time, there appear to be certain dynamics associated with the quest to either attain major power status or to keep it as it begins to slip away. The case studies appear to provide two general directions that reinforce each other: political culture dynamics and domestic politics. For certain states, the value of having major power status (France), or losing it - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright (Russia) is deeply engrained in the political culture. Yet, this is not uniform. For example, the salience of major power status does not appear to have been a major issue for Chinese policy makers until the mid- 1980s. Moreover, domestic political pressures to keep or acquire major power status do not appear to be uniform across political systems. Domestic political incentives do not seem to be as historically salient for Indian or

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 206206 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 207 Japanese policy makers (at least until very recently) as for their French and British counterparts. Perhaps this is so because France and Britain have been attributed close to maximum major power status since the Westphalian state system began, and domestic political pressure for maintaining status is greater because these states’ domestic audiences hold deep historical identities tied to major power status. The extent to which domestic political pressures play a salient role for the pursuit of status by Russian policy makers continues to be an open question; however, at a minimum, it appears to be salient as a form of legitimation for Russian political elites. Possibly, the status issue may be so engrained in domestic politics through the political culture that it may be most noticeable when status is in danger of diminishing: while not explicitly termed a status concern, the issue of American reputation in world affairs was undeniably a central campaign theme in the 2008 US national elections. With regard to the specif ic case studies, France and Russia/Soviet Union constitute two dramatic examples of the importance of status self- reference in the domestic setting. As shown by Badie in chapter 5, a strong leader such as General De Gaulle was instrumental in shaping France’s politics of “grandeur” after the national trauma of three consecutive defeats on the world stage, the last of which culminated in the loss of France’s colonial empire. De Gaulle was relentless in his effort to preserve French identity as a major power by carving the right niche in international politics for his country. Yet, the pursuit of status in France is far less idiosyncratic than the desires of one leader; preserving French status has been a hallmark of every French president since De Gaulle. In chapter 3, Freire indicates that in the case of Russia, while salient during the Cold War for policy makers in the Kremlin, the process of self-reference has become even more important since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As was the case with France, the preser vation of major power status became an important issue surrounding domestic political contestation in Russia in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power was largely predicated on his commitment to restore Russia to what is collectively perceived as her rightful status in the international community. In both states the preservation—or restoration—of major power status became and is still a key topic in the context of heated political competition. In both cases, great power status rhetoric has been used by incumbent leaders to overcome or silence politi- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright cal opposition. Self- reference also plays a key role in China, as Deng discusses in chapter 4. Self- ascription of major power status has been a key element in Chinese domestic political discourse since the 1980s. However, the Chinese process of self- reference has different origins compared to Russia and France. China’s self- reference has been articulated in terms

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 207207 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM 208 Renato Corbetta et al. of achieving a status that has long been overdue but neglected by the international community. Deng effectively illustrates how the Chinese leadership has been careful to not claim major power status too forcefully on the international scene so as not to be perceived as a revisionist major power. Of course, this approach became much easier once global community attribution of major power status to China surpassed actual Chinese capabilities and willingness to consistently exercise global leadership. Among the global major powers identified in chapter 1, Japan has been the most reluctant to claim for itself status as a great power. In chapter 6, Kanie indicates that domestic self- reference to being a major power had begun to surface in Japan only during the last 20 years or so. Japan’s reluctance is largely explained by the institutional and political constraints imposed on the country in the aftermath of World War II. Kanie explains Japan’s growing assertiveness throughout the 1990s and the 2000s as the result of growing competition against the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) firm grip on power and of increasing international demands for Japan to play a greater leadership role in international politics. Accordingly, the Japanese route to major power status has been somewhat unique: choosing to pursue status in specific issue areas rather than in a more global sense.3 This strategy has yielded very limited success as aspirations for major power leadership in the area of global warming clashed with both domestic economic interests and with the interests of its close American ally. The growing political turmoil in Japan suggests, however, that this very conservative strategy may be abandoned in the near future, and especially if nationalist parties may attain power and seek a more assertive role for Japan, both in the region and globally.4 Nor are regional powers immune from self ascription to major power status, even when their abilities to create regional order are taxed. In the post–World War II world, Brazil’s self- attribution of status at the regional level has been constrained by the ponderous presence of the United States in the region and by Brazil’s own struggle to achieve stable representative d emoc r at ic i n st it ut ion s. A s Her z su g g e st s i n ch apt er 8 , Br a z i l ’s sel f- reference as a regional power began to emerge with the return to fully democratic institutions during the Collor de Mello presidency, and had strengthened considerably during the last few years under Lula’s presidency. Brazilian aspirations to regional—and possibly global—power status have been cast in the context of active promotion and leadership of regional and global - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright institutions of governance. Contrary to Brazil, India considered herself to be a major power after gaining independence and was quite assertive in her early years in attempting to chart a path independent of Cold War dynamics and by acting as a leader for nonaligned countries. At the global level, India’s aspirations were dashed by defeat at the hands of China in 1962 and by the scarce successes of the Non- Aligned Movement. Under

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 208208 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 209 Indira Gandhi’s leadership, India retrenched and pursued regional, rather than global power status, looking at South Asia as her exclusive security preserve—the so-called Indira doctrine. The strategy has been rather successful, and India has emerged as a status- consistent regional power that now appears ready once more to seek global major power status.

Community Status Attribution Almost all states surveyed in this volume have sought or continue to seek collective status recognition through a variety of means. As predicted in chapter 1, the two preferred avenues have been bold, assertive foreign policy moves and partnership in multilateral organizations. Freire, in chapter 3, argues that the case of the Soviet Union/Russia is emblem- atic in that, in the post-Stalin era, she had alternated vigorous foreign policy actions with leadership in a broad architecture of Eastern European institutions, a dense schedule of foreign visits, and participation in key multilateral agreements. This approach has not changed in the post–Cold War era. In fact, it may actually have intensified, first as Russia worked through the pains of the postcommunist transition and, in the last few years, as she attempted to recover her status on the spurt of an economic growth fueled by gas and oil resources. Deng illustrates in chapter 4 how Chinese policy makers are engaging in a delicate balancing act between playing a cautiously assertive foreign policy role on the one hand, while on the other receiving community attribution through participation in the most important international economic forums. Participation in economic institutions has allowed China to pursue two goals simultaneously: community recognition and expansion of economic capabilities. Institutional engagement has also been a key for French and Japanese status pursuits. According to Badie (chapter 5), participation and leadership in the EU has been one dimension of France’s three- pronged policy of grandeur established by De Gaulle. In chapter 6, Kanie shows how Japan has deliberately attempted to create a leadership position for herself in a variety of institutions devoted to climate change. Even regional powers seeking global status have pursued the institutions game, first in their regions and then globally, as in the case of Brazil (Herz, chapter 8), or by moving back and forth between active involvement in global and regional - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright institutions of governance, as in the case of India (Basrur, chapter 9). This widespread attempt by established and aspiring major powers to achieve status by community attribution through participation in international organizations is indicative of two trends delineated in the opening chapter. First, as reflected by their attempt to establish a regional or global order through cooperative institutions, the pursuit of status at the

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 209209 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM 210 Renato Corbetta et al. community level is one of the ways in which major power states respond to the constraints imposed by anarchy. Second, community attribution appears to be more easily achievable through enticement than through coercion. While underachievers are more likely to resort to some amount of coercion through intervention in ongoing conflicts, this appears to be far less the case for overachievers. When overachievers resort to “flexing their muscles,” as is the case of Russia and France, it is typically done in the immediate neighborhood (or what Badie calls their historical preserve). While positing that the dynamics that drive self-attribution may be a salient issue for future research, at least as important should be the relationship between self-attribution and community- based attribution. We have conceptualized and operationalized status inconsistency as the disconnect between unusual amounts of attributed status (community- based) versus unusual amounts of opportunity and willingness to act as a major power. Thus, underachievers demonstrate both high levels of opportunity and willingness but receive insufficient status, while overachievers receive much more status than their capabilities and/or willingness to act as major powers may warrant. However, and underlying at least one of these inconsistencies is the apparent disconnect between self-attribution and community- based attribution of major power status. Policy makers of states that see themselves as major powers but fail to receive the community’s (or the in-group’s) attribution of such status may be more likely to engage in status competition, and particularly if such status attribution is linked to domestic politics and potential domestic political costs for failing to secure substantial status from outside of the state. In this sense, the dynamics that drive self-attribution of status may be crucial in determining the extent to which status inconsistencies for certain states merely describe a state of affairs or constitute powerful stimuli for changing a state’s reputation in the international system.

In- Group Status Attribution Opportunity and willingness are crucial for the ascription of status. However, states often face structural constraints that may prevent them from reaching status consistency or from becoming a major power in the first place. A key constraint consists of the presence and role played by - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright other major powers. Underachieving status- inconsistent major powers lack sufficient recognition from established members of the major power club. Even overachieving major powers may have to surmount difficult barriers in order to continue the recognition accorded to them by other established great powers. With regard to in-group attribution, the United States plays, of course, a special role.

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 210210 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 211 Russia, China, and France clearly enjoy an advantage in terms of in-group attribution as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Yet, P5 membership by itself is not sufficient for major power recognition, as all three countries have struggled to be recognized as major powers in other arenas. In chapter 3, Freire indicates that, beginning with Khrushchev, the Soviet Union began to intensify diplomatic visits outside of the Soviet bloc and, in particular, visits to other major powers. As a status underachiever, such strategies during the early Cold War years were manifested by aggressive contestation of US leadership in Europe, the Third World, and even in the promotion of unsuccessful revolutions in Latin America. As the Soviet Union shifted from an underachiever to an overachiever, it exhibited far greater reluctance to pursue aggressive strategies against the United States, relying on the use of force only near (and within) its own borders. After the end of the Cold War, participation in the G8 meetings, security partnership with NATO, and the establishment of alternative interregional institutions of governance (e.g., the SCO) with global and regional powers have been centerpieces of Russian foreign policy, again consistent with its overachiever status. The French position with regard to in- group attribution is somewhat close to the Russian position. In chapter 5, Badie indicates that since the 1950s France has been aware of her fluctuations in her status attribution, as she has striven to preserve major power status in the context of her “politique de grandeur.” In particular, France has consistently kept her “major power audience” in mind when she intervened in what Badie calls the French foreign policy “preserve” and in various multilateral initiatives. President Sarkozy’s attempts to take the lead in a variety of international crises—from the 2008 Georgia- Russia dispute to the current financial crisis- can largely be understood in this context, as starting around 2001, France slipped from status consistency to being an underachieving major power and plausibly, these actions on the part of France can be interpreted as expanding its foreign policy activity to address the reduction in its major power status. On the other hand, China faces and has faced the opposite problem as an overachieving major power on a growing trajectory. It was not until 1971 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) successfully took possession of her seat among the Security Council’s P5, and President Nixon’s opening to China in 1972 was considered by most an expedient political - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright maneuver rather than recognition of China’s status as a full- fledged member of major powers’ club. Although the Chinese economy is among the five largest in the world, China had not been invited to become a member of the G8 and has only participated in various expanded incarnations of this institution. Once the global recession of 2008 underscored China’s value as a global economic player, its leadership role has been in far greater

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 211211 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM 212 Renato Corbetta et al. demand; yet, it has been extremely cautious in exercising the type of initiative consistent with a major global power. However, its reluctance is not inconsistent with its overachieving status as a major power. Relationships with the United States can become a double- edged sword in the quest of major power status, even as the United States often seeks to play a critical gate keeping role in determining which states enter and stay in the status clubs. Although Japan has achieved status consistency for a brief period after the end of the Cold War, what seems to jeopardize its status as a major power is its complex foreign policy dependence on the United States and the limitations that the US- imposed Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution places on the country. Recent attempts to assume a leadership role in the area of climate change have been frustrated by the United States’ unwillingness to become a party to the Kyoto Protocol and other international initiatives. Similarly, Basrur (chapter 9) highlights how containment of India by the United States during the Cold War had limited India’s foreign policy accomplishments outside of the South Asian region. Achieving greater foreign policy independence and, as a result, in-group recognition, has proven equally difficult for Brazil, which of course operates in a region that has been dominated by the United States since the early 1800s. Not surprisingly, several policies undertaken by the Lula presidency during the last few years have been directed at “injecting” more independence from the United States in Brazilian foreign policy (see Herz, chapter 8). In this context, the point made by Cline et al. in chapter 7, that no true regional power has emerged in the Middle East in part because of the United States’ large footprint in the region, appears to be right on target and is particularly significant. Demonstrating opposition to US leadership is not the only option available for states seeking major power (or even regional power) status, although traveling the road either in close proximity or through distancing from the United States prove equally difficult to follow. Note for example the fascinating coalition of states—one overachieving major power (Russia), two regional challengers (Turkey and Iran), and one regional power seeking global power status on the strength of its diplomatic skills (Brazil)—actively engaging with each other in Istanbul to find alternatives to US leadership in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program.5 Equally important to note is their inability to effectuate the course of affairs: one day after their summit, the UN Security Council passed a new round of - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright sanctions against Iran, with Russia’s concurrence (the caution of the overachieving major power), although both Turkey and Brazil voted against the sanctions.6 Clearly these states knew the outcome that was about to occur when they met in Istanbul. We suspect that it was more the pursuit of regional or global power status that drove these actors to Istanbul than the likelihood of achieving an alternative outcome to UN sanctions. And

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 212212 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 213 while the United States may have won on sanctions, we suspect that there will be some additional status attribution to Russia, Brazil, and Turkey for seeking an alternative path. How much the resulting attribution is worth, and how long it can last without eventual successes for the group contest- ing US leadership, are interesting theoretical and empirical questions.

Two Clubs or Three?

We have said little up to this point about the United States, and what we have said has been mostly indirect. Initially, the United States may appear as the least interesting case in our survey, as it has been a status-consistent major power throughout the time frame covered by our study and according to all indicators we considered. Moreover, it is generally accepted that the United States entered the major power club with the 1898 Spanish American War. Despite overwhelming references to American exceptionalism, the domestic processes leading to status self-attribution were not painless—one can think about the debate surrounding entry in World War I, or the failure by Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, effectively ending the League of Nations before it began. However, following the victory in World War II, self- reference, community, and in- group attribution converged. From that point onward, no analyst or decision- maker has questioned the US status as a formidable, and over the last 50 years, as the most formidable of major powers. What has been questioned however, has been the United States’ material attributes. The debate concerning whether the United States has sufficient capabilities to match her status as a global leader has been around at least since the 1960s, and it has undergone various iterations—the last two of which have occurred immediately after the end of the Cold War and at the time of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Indeed, if one uses capabilities rather than status as the only reference point, the United States may not appear as the consistent major power state we have portrayed in chapter 1. Concentrating on long-term cycles, rather than status, Thompson suggests in chapter 2 that differences between global and regional powers are more insightful than differences in status among major powers. From a global power perspective, the United States could appear as an inconsistent major power because its economic capabilities no longer match its military reach. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright While such an emphasis on capabilities and global reach does not generate hypotheses radically different from those outlined in chapter 1, from this perspective, it is declining capabilities for systemic leadership that explain US behavior (and reactions to it), and not status.7 Thompson’s chapter suggests another salient caveat: is it plausible that there are three clubs, rather than two, to which states may aspire and from

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 213213 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM 214 Renato Corbetta et al. which they may gain unusual status? We have focused on the club of major powers and the club of regional powers. Thompson’s analysis suggests a third: the global leader (or, superpower) club. Nor is he the only one to suggest this distinction. Wolhforth (2009) argues that during unipolarity states must assess their status compared to a “club of one” at the top of the hierarchy. Certainly this appears consistent with Thompson’s argument; during the Cold War, there was a club of two with global reach and after 1989 a club of one, with the “one” now experiencing substantial asymmetry between its military and economic capabilities, and challenges to its global leadership. We have rejected Thompson’s view that all those without full global reach are regional powers; certainly Chinese, Japanese, British, Russian, and French foreign policy makers do not seem to restrict their activities and interests to a regional, geopolitical setting. What sets the United States apart from these states is substantially greater capabilities and a more consistent willingness to act globally, but these are also characteristics of a major power that demonstrates status consistency over long periods of time. In fact, community attribution of its status (not to mention its self- attribution) may allow it play the global leadership role more forcefully, supplementing diminishing economic capabilities. In this manner, we see the status attribution dimension as adding additional explanatory power to more conventional, material- based arguments regarding the extent to which major powers are motivated and able to continue to seek global order and global governance. In fact, although its foreign policies may be contested, we do not see evidence that the United States is attributed any less status than its formidable capabilities and involvement in global affairs would dictate.8 Nevertheless, the issue of conceptualizing two versus three clubs with different types of status for their members remains an important and unresolved question that needs further examination. During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis may have been the point at which self-attribution, in- group attribution, and community attribution converged to reveal that the superpower club had two members, even if the two were not equal in capabilities or willingness to structure global affairs. After the Cold War’s end, Russian policy makers’ preoccupation with major power status was no longer about being a superpower as much as staying in the second club of major powers. Do these distinctions matter? Wohlforth (2009) argues that - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright when there is a club of one, status competition is likely to be dampened since the prospect of getting into the club under conditions of unipolarity appears to be unambiguously too burdensome. However, status competition remains an important possibility when there are multiple clubs, and maintaining status by belonging to the club of major powers continues to bring additional benefits both domestically and internationally. Thus,

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 214214 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 215 the earlier chapters provide testimony of policy makers in France, Russia, China, and Japan continuing to seek status through membership in a club less prestigious than the club of superpowers/global leaders. For two reasons, however, we are loath to create three “clubs.” First, we do not want to conflate our conceptualization of the clubs with the level of capabilities possessed by major powers. These are essentially status clubs, and it is understood that their members are not equal in capabilities. Distinguishing between major power clubs on the basis of their power differentials draws away from the salience of status in supplementing hard power capabilities, and forces discussion back into issues about the number of poles in the system, rather than the status of major powers. Second, our approach to status consistency creates distinctions that also approximate to some extent the differences in status attribution between very strong powers and those with less capacity. As the global leader, the United States, in our analysis, is the only state that demonstrates status consistency across the entire post- 1945 period, consistent with its global leadership and dominant global reach.

Normative Dimensions to Status Attribution

One of the original intents of this project was to delink the notion of major power status from material capabilities and the desire by states to act like major powers. This exercise has proved useful in that it has generated salient questions and hypotheses about how status is defined not only by researchers but also by the states themselves. However, as status is inherently a social concept, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge status’s normative dimension. Consistent with the dynamics of community and in-group attribution, one of the most interesting themes emerging from the individual case study chapters concerns how states collectively participate in the definition of which attributes and policies determine access to the regional or global major power club. And here we find a fascinating disconnect between self-attribution concerns and those created by community and in-group attribution. Consider the cases of China and Russia. As the relevant chapters attest, self-attribution is surrounded by doubt (at least by Chinese and Russian policy makers) that these powers can maintain their status without meet- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright ing the normative standards widely accepted in the post–Cold War era. To wit, most major powers are democratic states, with free market economies, and broad respect for global norms of human rights. Neither of these states possess these attributes, ones that are broadly accepted today (at least rhetorically) by both the community of states and major powers such as the United States, France, the UK, Germany, and Japan. Moreover, policy

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 215215 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM 216 Renato Corbetta et al. makers within both of these countries seem to defend vigorously the idea that they do not need to meet these normative standards (Russia), or that these normative standards are more relative than universal (China). In addition to refusing to meet these standards, neither China nor Russia is being hailed by a substantial portion of the global community as providing alternative normative models to the dominant mode that has emerged since 1989. Yet, both are overachieving status-inconsistent major powers, meaning that they receive more status than their capabilities and willingness to structure international affairs would suggest. Equally important is the fact that this disconnect is not unique to the post–Cold War era. The Soviet Union moved from an underachiever to an overachiever during the Cold War, even though its domestic institutions and economy—not to mention its persistent efforts to minimize the salience of Cold War international institutions—were inconsistent with the broad norms espoused by the global leader and its allies. So, how important is the idea that a major power, in order to gain and hold status, demonstrate not only strong capabilities and a willingness to structure international affairs independent of other major powers, but also offer a normative model for other states to accept and possibly emulate? Clearly, we have no clear- cut answer. What is perplexing is that such normative concerns occupy the thinking of major power policy makers in countries that are out of the normative mainstream, yet their status has not appeared to have suffered as a result. It is plausible that to some extent the conferral of major power status is far more instrumental for states outside of the normative mainstream than it is for states inside it. Should the Chinese economy slump, or should Russia fail to move beyond its present status as an basic materials producing state, or should either or both states experience substantial domestic instability in the near future, it is plausible that their status in international politics would decline substantially. It is possible that swimming in the normative mainstream allows other major powers to buttresses short-term fluctuations in their major power capabilities, and perhaps even in their willingness to structure international affairs. Although neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving major power status, adherence to the international community’s normative standards may facilitate the attribution of major power status, while being out of the normative mainstream may magnify the gap between capabilities and sta- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright tus for states whose membership in the major power club is in doubt. That adhering to, or rejecting the normative status quo of the in-group could act as catalyst for changing status attribution suggests potentially fascinating avenues of future research. For instance, could China and Russia maintain high status as overachievers without substantially increasing their military and economic capabilities if they acquiesced to these norms? Would such

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 216216 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 217 normative acceptance by China offset its cautious acceptance of a stronger global leadership role, allowing it to continue to receive high status? One could imagine—as Keohane and Nye (1984) argued that a declining hegemon can extend its time at the top of the hierarchy through the creation of institutional structures and normative arrangements—that an overachieving major power could maintain its status by integrating itself into the prevailing normative architecture. Alternatively, to what extent do conflicts about normative standards become sufficiently salient to lead a state such as China, endowed with major power status and an upward trajectory on its capabilities, to find enough soft power from its status to assume the role of a revisionist major power? Thus, we are loath to suggest that it is mostly capability and potential willingness to structure world order that matters and not other normative dimensions of being a major power. States tend to look at major powers as models for both domestic reforms and foreign policy trends, and the ability of major powers to blaze the path in certain areas of domestic or foreign policy may determine whether their status is conferred in the first place or renewed. Clearly more systematic research is needed to explore the complex interplay between the acceptance of global norms (or the modeling of alternative norms) and the more traditional factors involving opportunity and willingness to act as a major power that are salient for in- group and community attribution processes.

Status Attribution by Issue Area?

Japan offers yet another fascinating example for another question we have seen emerging from the individual country chapters: Does major power status have to be a “global variable”—to borrow a term from program- ming language? Or can an aspiring major power be attributed high status within specific issue areas? A trend common to status inconsistent major powers and to regional powers has been the attempt to carve out for themselves specific “niches”—either global or regional—in which they could take advantage of opportunities and manifest their willingness to lead. As explained by Badie in chapter 5, France has tested several niches over time. In chapter 6, Kanie shows how Japan has sought—but has so far failed—to achieve status in the issue area of climate change. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright The evidence presented in this volume seems to suggest that focus on specific issue areas is unlikely, in and of itself, to lead to consistent status attribution—at least at the global level. The strategy may be more successful for achieving regional power status—as suggested in chapter 7. Yet, the question is a challenging one because of its endogenous nature. Is focus on specific issue areas insufficient for consistent major power status

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 217217 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM 218 Renato Corbetta et al. attribution? Or do status-inconsistent powers and regional powers focus on specific issue areas exactly because they cannot achieve global status consistency? Thus, emphasis on status in specific issue areas appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research due to the number of questions it raises. For example, how do major powers and aspiring major powers decide to which issue areas they should allocate their resources? Which issue areas are more likely to receive more attention by major power states? Which issue areas are more or less effective in leading to status attribution? And, finally, is it possible to conceive of different major power hierarchies across various issue areas and, if so, how do these hierarchies compare to one another? The answer to these questions will likely be important for future efforts to predict the impact of major powers and their status ordering on international conflict and cooperation.

The Future of the Major Power Club

The focus on the status of major powers, and the extent to which there is observed and perceived status inconsistencies among them, allows researchers to explore new hypotheses and to reevaluate old expectations about the role of major powers in international politics. Attention to status also allows us to speculate about great powers and their future behavior beyond increasingly stale debates about US unipolarity or the Sino- American competition for system leadership. The post–Cold War international political system yields two sets of clubs—the club of major powers and the club of regional powers—with members holding varied types of status. The major power club since 1989 has ranged between six and seven members. Of these states, only the United States continues to hold an uninterrupted record of status attribution consistent with its capabilities and desire to order international affairs. The remaining members have moved back and forth between overachieving and underachieving status, with France and the UK struggling occasionally to balance between opportunity, willingness, and status attribution. What does the future hold for these states and international politics? We should note first that that the salience of status attribution is likely to increase rather than diminish in the foreseeable future. Because high status - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright confers both domestic political support for policy makers and an additional, important source of soft power with which to pursue foreign policy objectives, and given the growing complexities of international relations and the reduced structural, hard-power strength of major powers (Strange 1989; Volgy and Bailin 2003), we expect that additional soft power capabilities will become even more salient, sought-after commodities by both

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 218218 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 219 major powers and other states with aspirations to player a larger role in international politics. If major power status has instrumental value (and obviously, we believe that it has), then status competition should increase at least in the short term. Wohlforth (2009) argues that this is not likely the case under conditions of unipolarity as long as the space between the lead nation and other major powers is substantial and unambiguous. However, status competition is not restricted only to competition with the United States for equal status; membership and stabilization of membership in the major power club yields soft power payoffs even if major powers are not equal to the United States. Merely keeping membership in the club is another type of status competition—for both underachievers and overachievers—and it requires substantial commitment of resources, creativity, and willingness to engage myriad issues and challenges in international affairs. Furthermore, the roadblocks and available strategies for overcoming them differ substantially between overachievers and underachievers. For overachievers, the problem lies in keeping high status, a status that may not be matched by either their capabilities or their willingness to engage extensively with problems involving global order and governance. Furthermore, even among overachievers, some may have more flexibility in designing strategies to keep status than others. As an overachiever on an upward trajectory, China has behaved rather cautiously on the international scene, challenging other major powers primarily in the context of international institutions—for example, within the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to Iran’s nuclear proliferation—or when it had to resist outside pressures for further democratization. China has time on its side: its economic capabilities continue to grow and it can choose to commit some of its resources to substantially expand it military capacity to move from a very limited to a more global reach. Once it attains the capacity consistent with its major power status, it may take on a less cautious approach to global leadership. This, however, is not the case with Russia. As an overachiever on a downward trajectory, Russia has shown greater propensity toward risks, even acting “heavy- handedly” with regard to Georgia and Ukraine and antagonizing the United States with regard to American antimissile radar systems, Iranian nuclear proliferation, and the 2003 Iraq war. Her econ- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright omy, heavily dependent on the value of its natural resources, has limited capacity to substantially grow its economic or military capabilities without a wholesale restructuring of its economic base and its political system. For Russian policy makers, this represents a bleak scenario, and maintaining status requires far more risk-taking than for the Chinese, including steps Russia has already taken, such as the creation of new regional infrastructure

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 219219 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM 220 Renato Corbetta et al. that may work less well than expected,9 suggesting new security structures globally, flexing its economic muscle with Europe and its military muscle in the Caucuses, and engaging in symbolic diplomatic ventures in Latin America and the Middle East. Note however that most of the aggressive moves made by Russian policy makers—moves that carried substantial risks of exposing its limited capabilities—were executed around its regional, geopolitical neighborhood, where status issues were immediately balanced by potential security threats. Russian policy makers have taken virtually no such risks involving policy realms outside of basic regional security concerns, an absence of risk- taking consistent with overachieving major power status. As we noted in chapter 1, however, both countries’ behavior can change depending on their economic fortunes and the stability of their domestic politics. China’s status rests in large part on her ability to keep a steady economic growth rate in the face of a large population and rising income inequality, assuming its political system can remain stable. In the long haul, China’s ability to project her capabilities and influence outside of her region may be determined by how she meets these challenges. Russia’s future is likely to be determined by whether the current economic recovery rests exclusively on foreign demand for natural resources or has more solid foundations. In both cases domestic nationalism is likely to be a major factor in these countries’ destinies, but while China is more likely to carry out her challenges and demands in the context of international institutions—barring an unexpected major incident involving Taiwan—Russia is more likely to underestimate the risks she is taking if her economic resurgence cannot be soon demonstrated. Meanwhile, underachieving major powers are faced with an equally challenging dilemma. On the one hand, they have greater incentives— and sometimes greater resources—to strive to achieve status consistency. In chapter 1, we argue that this should lead to a greater propensity for risk- taking and foreign policy activism. On the other hand, the attribution of the status they seek is in the hands of consistent and overachieving major power states—underachievers are often labeled as such because they fail to be independent in foreign policy from other major powers (see chapter 1), or face severe domestic costs for engaging in global activism. Although rich in opportunity (capabilities), Japan and Germany have clearly shown unwillingness or inability to pursue greater foreign policy independence at - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright the global level and have preferred to operate primarily within a regional (Germany) or policy- specific (Japan) framework. In the post–Cold War era, however, both countries have displayed greater—although still limited—propensity for risk- taking as expected by our framework. As suggested in the opening chapter, the case of France and the UK invites comparison. We would expect both countries to take greater risks

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 220220 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 221 in order to compensate for their perceived loss of status, and to some extent they both have reacted according to our expectations, although in different ways. Great Britain has thrown her lot with the United States, agreeing to take part in both the Afghanistan and Iraq “adventures.” This choice has been costly domestically and internationally. Now hit hard by the economic recession, the UK appears bound to remain a status- inconsistent underachiever in the near future, or to lose most of its status as a major power. France, however, reacted to her loss in status by standing up to the United States in her opposition to the war in Iraq. Recently, France has taken some small- scale risks in reasserting her status by intervening as mediator in the Georgian- Russian dispute and in the showdown between the West and Iran. More recently, France seems to have carved for herself another “niche,” as Sarkozy has attempted to take a leadership role in the global reaction to the current economic depression. However, France’s fortunes appear closely connected to Germany’s fortunes. In comparison to Germany, in the past, France has compensated with willingness what she lacked in capabilities. Today, both countries’ future status seems to hinge on their ability to respond to the economic crisis in Europe, and the extent to which German policy makers are willing to exercise leadership outside of the European Union. Should Germany do so, France could once more find itself in substantial status competition with its old adversary. Economic fortunes and turbulent domestic politics also loom large in assessing Japan’s future status. Japan’s economic capabilities are second only to the United States, and Japan seemed willing to exercise more global leadership when it was hit hard by the financial crisis of the mid-1990s. In the aftermath of the crisis, status consistency again turned into status inconsistency. In the post–Cold War era, it appears that many of the systemic constraints placed on Japan’s ability to play a major power role have been removed. The United States has consented to and even encouraged Japan to play a more assertive role internationally. Japan is also displaying greater willingness to play such a role, although every Japanese action on the international stage emerges from a painful and hard- fought domestic political debate. If it manages to fully recover from the economic slow- down that began in the 1990s, we expect that Japan may use the additional status attribution accompanying this change to seek again to extend its - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright influence, and to maintain the attribution of its status. In such a case, status competition between a recovered Japan and an emerging China both within and outside the East Asian theater is not out of the picture. As noted in chapter 7, Australia, Brazil, India, Nigeria, and South Africa have emerged as major powers in their respective region. The gap between South Africa, Nigeria, and other regional powers is such that we do not

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 221221 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:184:50:18 PMPM 222 Renato Corbetta et al. expect them to pursue status at the global level any time soon. However, for India and Brazil, the scenario looks different, as seen in their respective case-study chapters. Both countries harbor enormous untapped potential, have expressed willingness to play a major power role, and have stable political (and democratic) institutions that would facilitate their entry into the major power club. In both cases, though, domestic weaknesses–in particular, a very large, diverse population coupled with enormous dis- parities in income distribution—are likely to delay their ascent. In both cases, one cannot but question their ability to escape their current regional boundaries. In Brazil’s case, expansion beyond the region may rest with the United States’ willingness to delegate a portion of its regional hegemony. In the case of India, much depends on the country’s willingness to abandon its obsession with the rivalry with Pakistan and to return to a role of global leadership in the context of international institutions as envisioned by Nehru. If both, or either country, is to surge to global major power status, their rise would probably occur through cooperation in international organizations and will likely result in some form of overachieving status inconsistency.

Concluding Thoughts

The genesis of this effort lies in our long- standing dissatisfaction with existing conceptualizations and measurements of the notion of major powers. The idea of major power had become a catch- all category, or, more often than not, exclusively associated with the possession of material capabilities. Yet, a number of previous efforts to capture the essence of what it means to be a major power made it clear that the idea included more than capabilities (Singer 1988), and that “perceived status” in the international system of states mattered in addition to military expenditures or GDP. Thus, the present work has been aimed at freeing us from the idea that “major power status = material power” and at restoring the element of status to its due place. Our focus on the notion of status has allowed us to (re)introduce the notion of status inconsistency, thereby recovering some important theoretical and empirical variation to a measure that seemed remarkably stable over time. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright We refrain from claiming prematurely that we have succeeded or failed in our goal. After all, the investigation of handful of countries over a 60-year time span has required an enormous effort of data collection and the invaluable contribution of several country experts. We believe, however, that this approach can provide many important insights into the study of major powers and their role in international politics. A major contribution

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 222222 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:194:50:19 PMPM Status and the Future of International Politics 223 of the status (in)consistency approach lies in the ability to account for situations in which capabilities do not match the status ascribed to a specific country. Scholars have always complained about such anomalies (e.g., Kennedy 1987; Singer 1988), but little has been done to address them. Another insight from this approach is that not all major powers behave identically at any one point in time, and their behavior may change lon- gitudinally, as they transition from status consistency to overachieving or underachieving inconsistency. Several countries within the major power club—for example, France, Russia/Soviet Union, Japan—experience such transitions and their behavior seem to change accordingly. Yet another contribution, we believe, lies in the fact that status attribution is a complex process involving some combination of self-reference and ascription by the rest of the international community and by existing major powers themselves. The individual country chapters strongly suggest that domestic processes are crucial in determining whether a country defines itself as major power state or not. The presence of strong leaders, nationalism, and the need to assuage or marginalize domestic opposition seem to be frequent factors behind a country’s self- appointment to major power status. Self-reference, of course, frequently translates into what we have labeled as willingness to behave as a major power. The individual case studies further reveal that community attribution can and must be actively sought by aspiring major powers even when their capabilities are limited. Finally, the status dimension of major powers underscores that the possession of military and/or economic power is not necessarily sufficient for other major powers to grant high status to an aspiring great power. In some cases, the reverse may also be the case: a state may be granted status by other members of the major club even when it does not possess corresponding material capabilities—for example, Italy in the early twentieth century. The gate-keeping role played by a strong system leader appears highly salient in determining what status an emerging major power is granted—for example, Japan—or whether a major power can emerge at all—for example, in the Middle East or South Asia. Finally, a status (in)consistency approach to major powers may allow researchers and practitioners to move away from the stale narrative of major power competition as a battle over scarce resources driven by narrow geopolitical considerations. While military and economic capabilities matter, their change is slow, predictable, and unlikely to explain short- - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright term changes in behavior. The focus on status, on the contrary, raises the possibility that competition among major powers may take various forms and may take place in a variety of issue-areas. Again, the individual country chapters offer key insights as to where and how such competition may take place. In addition to competing over capabilities, major power states and aspiring major powers may vie for the acquisition and preservation

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 223223 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:194:50:19 PMPM 224 Renato Corbetta et al. of status within traditional security organizations—for example, France and NATO—in the context of international economic institutions—for example, China, the WTO, and the expanded G8 (or G20)—through regional groups and coalition—for example, Brazil and various inter- American arrangements—and even in issue-area specific agreements—for example, Japan and its leadership role in climate change. We believe that such a more varied and richer representation of the search for status and the competition among major power provides a better representation of the complexities of post–Cold War international relations.

Notes

1. For example, one can think about the post–Cold War debate concerning whether Russia could still be considered a major power state and whether the major power status ascribed to her during the Cold War was deserved or not (Waltz 1993; Wohlforth 1994) 2. On the latter point, see Goertz and Powers (2009) and Volgy et al. (2009). 3. Albeit Japanese policy makers may have flirted with a substantially different approach following the uncertainties created by the end of the Cold War. As Layne (1993) notes, policy makers began to stockpile plutonium through purchases from Germany in the early 1990s. 4. The political turmoil is reflected most recently by the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama in June 2010, caught between conflicting domestic preferences and continued support of the American Marine base in Okinawa (Harden 2010). 5. “Russia, Turkey and Iran Meet, Posing Test for U.S.,” New York Times, June 8, 2010. 6. “UN Security Council Passes new Sanctions Against Iran,” New York Times, June 9, 2010. 7. How much that decline is in evidence is still not clear. Note that the US dollar remains the only viable international business currency, even on the heels of the 2008 global recession. Such viability reflects a strong economic position even in comparison to previous global leaders and helps to mitigate US economic decline relative to China. 8. Nor do we view evidence of challenges to its leadership as testament to its declining status. We assume that even status-consistent global leaders will be challenged, even at the height of their capabilities, and this was certainly the case toward the United States in Berlin by the USSR through the 1950s; by China in 1950–1952; and by the North Vietnamese in the 1960s. 9. Yuri Tavrosvsky, “Opportunity to prove adequacy of Eurasian Structures Ignores the Kyrgyz Crisis.” Vremya Novostei, April 21, 2010. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_11_ch10.indd780230104648_11_ch10.indd 224224 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:194:50:19 PMPM REFERENCES

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99780230104648_12_ref.indd780230104648_12_ref.indd 233233 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:404:50:40 PMPM 234 References Shirk, Susan. 2007. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press. Singer, David J. 1988. “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.” International Interactions 14: 115–32. Singer, David J. and Melvin Small. 1966. “National Alliance Commitments and Wars Involvement, 1815–1945.” Peace Research Society(International), Papers 5: 109–140. Siverson, Randolph M. and Harvey Starr. 1990. “Opportunity, Willingness, and The Diffusion of War.” American Political Science Review 84: 47–67. Siverson, Randolph M. and Harvey Starr. 1991. The Diffusion of War: A Study in Opportunity and Willingness. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Siverson, Randolph M. and Joel King. 1980. “Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation 1815–1965.” American Journal of Political Science 24:1–15. Siverson, Randolph M. and Juliann Emmons. 1991. “Birds of a Feather: Democratic Alliance Choices in the Twentieth Century.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35:285–306. Sjostedt, Gunnar. 1999. “Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations: Crisis or Transition?” in Peter Berton, Hiroshi Kimura and I. William Zartman, eds., International Negotiation: Actors, Structure/Process, Values. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory.” International Organization 39: 579–614. Soares de Lima, Maria Regina and Monica Hirst. 2006. “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities.” International Affairs 82: 21–40. Soares de Lima, Maria Regina. 2005 “A Política Externa Brasileira e os Desafios da Cooperação Sul-Sul.” Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política Internacional 48: 24–59. Soares de Lima, Maria Regina. 2005. “Aspiração Internacional e Política Externa” Revista Brasileira de Comércio Exterior 82: 4–19. Soares de Lima, Maria Regina. 2007. “Brasil en América Latina/ América del Sur.” Foreign Affairs En Espanol 7: 10–12. Soares de Lima, Maria Regina. 2008. “Brazil Rising.” Internationale Politik 2008: 62–67. Soderbaum, Fredrik. 2004. “Modes of Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, Sovereignty Boosting, and Shadow Networks.” Global Governance 10: 419–436. Solingen, Etel. 2005. “East Asian Regional Institutions: Characteristics, Sources, Distinctiveness,” in T. J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Song, Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Huang Jishu, Song Qiang, and Liu Yi. 2009. Zhongguo Bugaoxin: Dashidai, Da Bubiao Jiwomen de Leiyou Waihuan [Unhappy China: The Great Time, Great Vision and Our Challenges]. Jingsu: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe. Soutou, Georges H. 1996. L’Alliance Incertaine. Paris: Fayard. Soutou, Georges H. 2001. La Guerre de Cinquante Ans. Paris: Fayard. Souza, Amaury. 2002. A Agenda Internacional do Brasil Um Estudo sobre a Comunidade brasileira de Política Externa. Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI. Sullivan, Michael P. and Randolph M. Siverson. 1984. “Alliances and War: A New Examination of an Old Problem.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 8: 1–16. Swaine, Michael D. and Zhang Tuosheng, eds., 2006. Managing Sino- American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sylvan, David, Corinne Graff and Elisabetta Pugliese. 1998. “Status and Prestige in International Relations.” Presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations Conference, - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Vienna, Austria, September 16–19. Taiping, Wang, ed. 1996. Deng Xiaoping Waijiao Sixiang Yanjiu Lunwenji [Anthology on Deng Xiaoping’s Diplomatic Thoughts]. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe. Tajfel, Henri. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tammen, Ronald L. 2006. “The Impact of Asia on World Politics: China and India Options for the United States.” International Studies Review 8: 563–580.

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99780230104648_12_ref.indd780230104648_12_ref.indd 234234 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:414:50:41 PMPM References 235 The Constitution of the Russian Federation. [Available at http://www.constitution.ru/ en/10003000–05.htm.] Thompson, William R. 1973. “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory.” International Studies Quarterly 17: 89–117. Thompson, William R. 1997. “The Evolution of Political-Commercial Challenges in the Active Zone.” Review of International Political Economy 4: 285–317. Thompson, William R. 2001. “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics.” International Studies Quarterly 45: 557–586. Thucydides. 1951. Complete Writings: The Peloponnesian Wars. New York: Modern Library. [Trans. Richard Crawley, adapted by Suresh Bald, Willamette University.] Tiberghien, Yves and Miranda A. Schreurs. 2007. “High Noon in Japan: Embedded Symbolism and Post- 2001 Kyoto Protocol Politics.” Global Environmental Politics 7: 70–91. Tomlinson, Rodney G. 2003. “World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) User’s Guide (Revision 8.3).” Mimeo, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. Trindade, Antonio Augusto Cançado 1994. “A Proteção Internacional dos Direitos Humanos no Limiar do Novo Século e as Perspectivas Brasileiras,” in Gélson Fonseca Jr and Sértio Henrique Naabuco de Castro, eds., Temas de Política Externa Brasileira II. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra. Tsai, Kellee S. 2006. “Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China.” World Politics 59: 116–141. VaÏsse, Maurice. 1998. La Grandeur. Paris: Fayard. VaÏsse, Maurice. 2009. La Puissance ou l’Influence? Paris: Fayard. Van Asselt, Harro, Norichika Kanie and Maashiko Iguchi. 2009. “Japan’s Position in International Climate Policy: Navigating between Kyoto and the APP.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 9: 319–336. Vasquez, John. 2000. “Reexamining the Steps to War: New Evidence and Theoretical Insights,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Väyrynen, Raimo. 2003. “Regionalism: Old and New.” International Studies Review 5: 25–51. Vaz, Alcides Costa. 2002. Cooperação, Integração e Processo Negociador: a Construção do Mercosul. Brasília: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais. Volgy, Thomas J. and Stacey Mayhall. 1995. “Status Inconsistency and International War: Exploring the Effects of Systemic Change.” International Studies Quarterly 39: 67–84. Volgy, Thomas J., and Alison Bailin. 2003. International Politics and State Strength. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner. Volgy, Thomas J., Elizabeth Fausett, and Keith Grant. 2009. “Changing Architecture and Post- Cold War Transition,” in William R. Thompson, ed., Systemic Transitions: Past, Present and Future. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Wallace, Michael D. 1971. “Power, Status, and International War.” Journal of Peace Research 1: 23–35. Wallace, Michael D. 1973 “Status, Formal Organization and Arms Levels as Factors Leading to the Onset of War, 1820–1964,” in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Walt, Stephen M. 2005. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. New York: W.W. Norton Company. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Waltz, Kenneth N. 1993. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” International Security 18: 44–79. Wang, Hongying. 2007. “ ‘Linking Up with the International Track’: What’s in a Slogan?” China Quarterly 189: 1–23. Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wauthier, Claude. 1995. Quatre Présidents et l’Afrique. Paris: Fayard.

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99780230104648_12_ref.indd780230104648_12_ref.indd 235235 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:414:50:41 PMPM 236 References Webersik, Christian. 2008. “Wars over Resources? Evidence from Somalia.” Environment 50: 46–58. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What You Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” International Organization 46: 391–425. Whiting, Allen S. 2001. “China’s Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan.” International Security 26: 103–131. Wohlforth, William and David C. Kang. 2009. “Hypotheses on Status Competition.” Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 3–6. Wohlforth, William C. 1994. “Realism and the End of the Cold War.” International Security 19: 91–129. Wohlforth, William C. 2009. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.” World Politics 61: 28–57. Wu, Guoguang and Helen Lansdowne, eds. 2008. China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security. London: Routledge. Xiaoping, Deng. 1993. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan III [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3]. Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe. Yamamoto, Yoshinobu and Stuart A. Bremer. 1980. “Wider Wars and Restless Nights: Major Power Intervention in Ongoing Wars,” in Singer, J. D., ed., The Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models. New York: Free Press. Yang, Dali L. 2006. “Economic Transformation and Its Political Discontents in China: Authoritarianism, Unequal Growth, and the Dilemmas of Political Development.” Annual Review of Political Science 9: 143–164. Young, Crawford. 2002. “Deciphering Disorder in Africa: Is Identity the Key?” World Politics 54: 532–57. Zweig, David. 2002. Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

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99780230104648_12_ref.indd780230104648_12_ref.indd 236236 44/4/2011/4/2011 4:50:414:50:41 PMPM INDEX

Acharya, Amitav, 133, 150 WTO/GATT and, 165, 173 Africa, 102, 107, 120, 133, 135, 137, 139, see also status 152–153, 155 Bremer, Stuart, see MIDs anarchy, 1, 29–30, 203 Breznev Doctrine, 60–61 ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), United States Security Treaty), 50 150, 157, 196 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic see also Brazil, Russia, India, China Cooperation), 85, 117 Buzan, Barry, 51, 136, 150, 154 Argentina, 123, 164, 174–175, see also Wæver, Ole 177–178 regional challenger, as a, 135, capabilities, 3–4, 6–7, 11–22, 24, 28, 143–144, 147, 149, 157 48–50, 122, 134, 149, 161, 182, 197, see also status 204, 214, 216, 219, 223 ascription, see status economic, 28, 31, 33, 137, 164–165, ASEAN (Association for Southeast 209, 213, 214, 219, 221 Asian Nations), 85, 91, 196 military, 12, 28, 31, 33, 58–59, 137, attribution, see status 141, 143, 150, 157, 161, 193–194 Australia, 50, 123, 169 see also GDP, COW, PPP regional power, as a, 38, 134–135, CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), 151–153, 156, 157, 221–222 50, 185 see also status China/PRC (People’s Republic of China) Boulding, Kenneth, 138 ASEAN and, 85, 91 Brazil capabilities of, 47

capabilities of, 194 CCP (Chinese Communist Party), - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright Cold War and, 171 79–83, 92–93 environment, 165–166 Cold War and, 80 human rights, 166–170 major power, as a, 20–22 NATO and, 167 Post-Cold war and, 78 Post-Cold War and, 163–164, 170 reformist era, 78–79 regional power, as a, 135, 143–144 regional power, as a, 135, 143–144, 147 UN and, 166–169, 171 sino-american relations, 78, 87

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99780230104648_13_ind.indd780230104648_13_ind.indd 237237 44/4/2011/4/2011 6:35:336:35:33 PMPM 238 Index China/PRC (People’s Republic of Egypt, 36, 157, 164 China)—Continued regional challenger, as a, 135, Taiwan and, 89 143–145, 147–150, 151, 156 Tiananmen Square, 79 EU (European Union), 23, 47, 105, WTO and, 84, 86, 90 111, 126, 129, 199, 221 see also overachievers, status-inconsistent, status, Xiaoping Fordham, Benjamin, 12 Chirac, Jacques, 101, 103–104, 106–107, France 110–111, 113 capabilities of, 43–45, 194 see also France Cold War and, 99, 101–102 clubs francophone ties, 100, 102–103, 107 global leader, 213–214 major power, as a, 20–22 major powers, 213–214 NATO and, 99, 101, 103, 107 regional powers, 213–214 Quebec and, 102 two, 213–214 regional power, as a, 135, 143–144 three, 213–215 World War I and, 98 Cold War, 216 World War II and, 97, 99 Brazil, 171 see also Chirac, de Gaulle, China/PRC, 80 overachievers, underachievers, France, 99, 101–102 status, status-inconsistent India, 189, 191–192, 197 Russia/USSR, 60–3, 72–3 Gilpin, Robert, 4, 78, 82 US, 48–50 Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, 105, 108–110, see also Gorbachev 112–113 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent see also France States), 65 G-7/8 (Group of 8), 84, 108, 117, 177 Collor de Mello, Fernando, 163, 208 G-20 (Group of 20), 84, 108, 170 community-based status attribution, see GDP (gross domestic product), 3, status 12, 14–18, 19, 24, 25, 40–44, conflict intervention, see status 46–48, 53, 70, 122, 137, 140, COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data 155, 156, 157, 173, 184–185, Bank), 13, 25–26 194, 200 COW (Correlates of War), 5–6, 20, Georgia, 58, 71–74, 75, 152–153, 211, 21–22, 50–51 219, 221 CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Germany Organization), 58, 73 capabilities of, 43–45, 194 Cuban Missile Crisis, 61, 104, 214 major power, as a, 20–22

see also Cold War regional power, as a, 135, 143–144 - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright see also status de Gaulle, General Charles, 99–103, 106 global power, see status see also France global system leader, 27–28, 31–34, 41, 49–51 economic capabilities, see capabilities see also status ECOWAS (Economic Community of Gorbachev, Mikhail, 63–67, 75 West African State), 107 Great Britain, see United Kingdom

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_13_ind.indd780230104648_13_ind.indd 238238 44/4/2011/4/2011 6:35:336:35:33 PMPM Index 239 great power status, see status Japan Group of 77, 191 Article 9, 115, 212 capabilities of, 47, 194 Helsinki Final Act, 61 major power, as a, 20–22 hierarchy METI (Ministry of Economy Trade international, 4, 24, 52, 84, 179, and Industry) and, 127–128 203, 214 MOE (Ministry of Environment), 127 regional, 140 regional power, as a, 135, 143–144 Huntington, Samuel, 136 see also Kyoto Protocol, status Jintao, Hu, 84, 88 IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), see also China 170, 173, 196 IDEA (Integrated Data for Events Katzenstein, Peter, 136, 144–145 Analysis), 13 Kennedy, John F., 60 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 84, Kennedy, Paul, 6, 82, 223 90, 170, 186, 192 Keohane, Robert, 4, 183, 190, 217 India Khrushchev, Nikita, 59–61, 211 capabilities of, 18, 194 Kugler, Jacek 4, 40, 82 China and, 186 see also Organski, A. F. K. Cold War, 189, 191–192, 197 Kyoto Protocol, 116, 119, 124–126, 128, military indicators, 193–195 130–131, 199, 212 Pakistan and, 184, 186 Post-Cold War, 188–189, 196 Lake, David, 24, 133, 136, 150, 154, 179 regional power, as a, 135, 143–145, Levy, Jack, 6 147 Libya see also status regional challenger, as a, 135, inequality, 1–2, 28–29, 30 143–144, 147 GINI index, 2–3 see also status in-group status attribution, see long cycle theory, 24, 31–33, 213 status Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio, 104 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 117, 129 major power status, see status Iran Mearsheimer, John, 82 regional challenger, as a, 135, Medvedev, Dmitry, 70–73 143–144, 147 see also Russia see also status Mercosul (Mercado Comum do Sul, Israel Common Market of the South),

regional challenger, as a, 135, 164, 175 - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright 143–144, 147 MIDs (Militarized Interstate see also status Disputes), 11 Italy, 5, 194 military capabilities, see capabilities capabilities, 194 Morgenthau, Hans, 3 major power, as a, 108–109, 223 regional power, as a, 152–153 NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), see also status 191, 208

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_13_ind.indd780230104648_13_ind.indd 239239 44/4/2011/4/2011 6:35:336:35:33 PMPM 240 Index NATO (North Atlantic Treaty see also Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Organization), 50, 60, 67, 83, 88, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 99, 101, 107, 111, 167, 211 status Nehru, Jawaharlal, 60 regions Nigeria defining, 135–140, 143, 152–154 regional power, as a, 135, 143–144, regional powers, see status 147, 149, 151, 157, 221 Russia NPT (Nuclear Non- Proliferation capabilities of, 46, 70–71, 194 Treaty), 106, 163–164, 171, 198 Cold War and, 60–63, 72–73, 216 Nye, Joseph, 4, 183, 217 major power, as a, 20–22, 74 NATO and, 60 opportunity, 137, 143 see also Gorbachev, Medvedev, opportunity and willingness framework, overachievers, Putin, 8–9, 55, 74, 121–122, 134–141, status-inconsistent, status, 145–150, 155 underachievers,Yeltsin OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development), SAARC (South Asian Association for 119, 177 Regional Cooperation), 187 Organski, A. F. K., 40, 82 SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), see also Kugler, Jacek 61 overachievers, see status Saudi Arabia regional challenger, as a, 135, Pakistan, 26, 222 143–144, 147 regional challenger, as a, 135, see also status 143–145, 147, 148–149 SCO (Shanghai Cooperation see also status Organization), 58, 71–73 PPP (purchasing power parity), SEATO (South East Asia Treaty 184–185, 194 Organization), 185 PRC (People’s Republic of China), see Singer, J. D., see also COW, MIDs China social identity theory (SIT), 7–8 Putin, Vladimir, 69–70 soft power, 102 see also Russia South Africa, 102–103 regional power, as a, 135, 143–144, reach 147 economic, 12, 14–23, 25, 41–45, see also status 47–48, 62 status global, 27, 31–34, 41–53, 177, ascription, see attribution

213–215, 219, see also US attribution, 6–9, 109–110, 145–148, - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright military, 2, 12, 14–23, 25, 39–40, 48, 204–213 62, 142, 195, 213 Cold War and, 5 overreaching, 63, 109–113 community-based status attribution, Reagan, Ronald, 59–60, 62, 105 7–9, 55–58, 106, 121–124, 146, regional challengers, 24, 135, 141–142, 209–210, 215–216 146–150, 156, 205, 212 conflict intervention, 35–36, 51

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_13_ind.indd780230104648_13_ind.indd 240240 44/4/2011/4/2011 6:35:336:35:33 PMPM Index 241 constraints on, 105–112, 124–126 see also Australia, Brazil, China, cooperative institution building, India, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, 34–35, 51 Russia, South Africa, COW (Correlates of War) definition, UK, US 5–6, 20 status inconsistency, see status differentiating, 10–12 systemic leadership, 27–53, 213 importance, 9–10 in- group status attribution,119–120, Taiwan, 89 210–213, 215–216, 223 Thompson, William, 24, 27–53, 86, measurement validity, 16–20, 39–48 136, 148, 213–214 membership, 12–16, 37–48, 213–215 Thucydides, 1–2 MPS (Major Power Status) database, 14–16, 20–23 underachievers, see status MPS - COW compared, 20–23 UN (United Nations), 8, 34, 50, 84, 90, MPS critique, 27–53, 213–214 103–104, 124, 161, 166–170, 187, overachievers, 14–16, 105–109, 112, 191, 196, 211 see also China, France, Japan, UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Russia Convention on Climate Change), Post-Cold War, 20–23, 27 116 potential, 7 UK (United Kingdom) power-seeking, 100–104, 112 capabilities of, 42, 44–45, 194 regional challengers, see Argentina, major power, as a, 20–22 Egypt, Iran, Israel, Libya, regional power, as a, 135, 143–144, Pakistan, regional challengers, 147 Saudi Arabia see also status, status inconsistent, regional powers, 24,142–144, 147, status consistent 149, 214, see also Australia, US (United States of America) Brazil, China, India, Nigeria, capabilities of, 17, 44–47, 194, 213 South Africa major power, as a, 20–22 self-attribution, 31–32, 53, 58, 60, Post-Cold War, 49–50 120–121, 134, 145, 160, 164, status consistent power, as a, 10, 206–209, 214–216 14, 16 status-consistent, 14–16, 48–50, system leader, as a, 27–53 146–147, 181, 214, see also Brazil, see also status China, India, France, Japan, USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Nigeria, South Africa, UK, US Republics), see Russia status-inconsistent, 4, 14–16, 48–50,

146–147, 210, see also China, Wæver,Ole, 136, 150, 154 - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright France, Germany, Japan, Russia, see also Buzan, Barry UK, US Walt, Stephen, 2 status-seeking, 159–160, 176–178 Waltz, Kenneth, 3–4, 6, 25, 89, underachievers, 14–16, 35, 129–131, 203–204 see also France, Germany, Japan, Warsaw Pact, 60 Russia, UK Wendt, Alexander, 1

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_13_ind.indd780230104648_13_ind.indd 241241 44/4/2011/4/2011 6:35:346:35:34 PMPM 242 Index willingness, 3, 7–9, 12, 16, 20, 22–23, Saudi Arabia, 149–150 24–25, 31, 134, 136–137, 140–143, WEIS Project (World Event/Interaction 143–145, 204–205, 210, 217–223 Survey), 13, 25–26 American, 50, 214 Wohlforth, William, 10, 12, 78, 82, Chinese, 55–56, 59–61, 68–69, 208, 214, 219 216 World Bank, 84, 90, 155, 185, 194 French, 73–74, 84, 100 WTO (World Trade Organization), 84, India, 181–182, 195 86, 90, 165, 177, 224 Israel, 157 Japanese, 115–116, 121–122, 123–124, Xiaoping, Deng, 79–80, 88, 85–86, 93 126, 130 see also China operationalizing, 138–140, 142–144, 155, 156 Yeltsin, Boris, 65–68, 75 Russian, 216 see also Russia Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Groningen - PalgraveConnect - 2011-08-16 - PalgraveConnect of Groningen - licensed to University www.palgraveconnect.com material from Copyright

10.1057/9780230119314 - Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics, Edited by Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird

99780230104648_13_ind.indd780230104648_13_ind.indd 242242 44/4/2011/4/2011 6:35:346:35:34 PMPM