ACCIDENTAL HEROES Britain, France and the Libya Operation
An Interim RUSI Campaign Report, September 2011
Key Points Introduction Britain, France and the United States can details and judgments that have not • Britain and France found take some justifiable credit for the appeared in any other form and reflects themselves, uniquely, in the success of the Libyan operation. on some of the less obvious aspects of lead in an operation where the Whatever happens next in Libya, there the campaign. More extensive reports US pulled out of the combat at can be no doubting that the allied air will follow as information is gathered. an early stage; operation was critical to saving many • NATO found itself operating in innocent lives and removing a dictatorial Several features of this operation show new ways that will change the regime. Britain and France, almost alone evidence of improvisation, innovation, alliance; among the international community, and good luck, as well as the characteristic • The operation was unlike any took a consistent and robust line from military professionalism of the allied of those of the last decade, but the beginning and have now seen it forces involved. Non-NATO forces were more like those of two decades through to the verge of military success. integrated into an improvised command ago; They deserve the plaudits. structure that was then operated • The air and maritime campaign through NATO, while the alliance was demonstrated the success of The two allies have thus emerged as the politically divided about it. Surveillance precision weapons but also most key political and military players systems and weapons themselves were their dependency on high tech from a small war in which they had adapted and used in different ways; air- nothing much to gain and a lot of to-ground communications were ISTAR technologies; reputation to lose. Prime Minister minimal – an unusual situation in The maritime aspects of the • Cameron and President Sarkozy became conflicts such as this – and special forces campaign may re-ignite the accidental heroes in a civil war, justified from a number of different countries ‘aircraft carrier debate’ in – unlike most civil wars – on grounds of appear to have played important roles in Britain. principle. a conflict where foreign forces on Libyan • The RAF and the Royal Navy had territory were explicitly ruled out by the to divert assets from other tasks Like all military operations, this one was United Nations. to undertake this operation and more messy and ambiguous than successfully improvised some politicians like to admit. In this particular Amid the justifiable satisfaction of combat systems; case, it reflected a number of new, and military success, this was nevertheless a • Special forces operations on sometimes novel, political and military curious operation – both politically and the ground were extensive and elements. This Interim Report on the militarily – that will offer many pointers multinational. They helped turn Libya operation marks the opening of for the future and will require careful the tide between the rebels and RUSI’s research work to examine all analysis. Qadhafi’s forces. aspects of the campaign. It includes
CONTENTS
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The Road to War The Air Operation The Maritime The Ground Offensive Conclusion Contribution Timeline
David Cameron approves the deployment of four 15 Feb Protests begin against the Qadhafi regime across Libya 27 May Apache attack helicopters • Special Forces enter Libya to aid the evacuation of foreign nationals 24 - • Rebels in Misrata fight against government forces First strikes by Apache attack helicopters near the town 4 Jun 25 Feb beginning the siege of the city of Brega • Zawiyah, to the west of Tripoli, also falls to rebel forces
UN passes Resolution 1970 imposing arms embargo Rebels from the Nafusa Mountains take the town of 26 Feb 7 Jun and freezing assets of Qadhafi family Yafran
The International Criminal Court (ICC) confirms it French military officials confirm that weapons had 3 Mar is investigating alleged crimes against humanity 29 Jun been air-dropped to rebels in the Nafusa Mountains committed by the Qadhafi regime.
The rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) declares The Italians announce they will withdraw their 5 Mar 6 Jul itself the true representative of Libya carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi from Libya to save on costs
• Qadhafi forces retake Zawiyah, 175 rebel soldiers reportedly killed • The African Union (AU) reject foreign military West of Misrata on the road to Tripoli, rebels enter 10 Mar 1 Aug intervention in Libya Zlitan in a renewed offensive • Qadhafi counteroffensive continues towards eastern city of Benghazi French carrier Charles De Gaulle leaves Libya and 12 Mar The Arab League backs a no-fly zone over Libya 10 Aug returns to Toulon for maintenance • Rebels capture Sorman and Sabratha, west of Tripoli and continue fighting for Zawiyah. UN passes Resolution 1973 authorising a ‘no-fly zone’ 14 - 17 Mar • Main supply lines from Tunisia to Tripoli are cut. over Libya – China and Russia abstain 15 Aug • Rebels in the Nafusa Mountain region reportedly control Gharyan and Tiji • US, UK and French military assets begin bombing campaign Rebels push into Tripoli as part of a ‘three-pronged’ • Italian carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi leaves the port of 19 Mar 20 Aug assault called ‘Operation Mermain Dawn’ on the Taranto Libyan capital • First RAF Tornado aircraft arrive at Gioia del Colle airbase in Italy • Rebels push out of Benghazi in second-offensive • French carrier Charles De Gaulle leaves Toulon Naval Rebels enter Qadhafi’s Tripoli compound in Bab al- 20 Mar 23 Aug Base for Libya Azizia, signifying the end of the Qadhafi regime • First RAF Typhoon aircraft arrive at Gioia del Colle • NATO takes over from the US command enforcing • Libyan interim leader, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, arrives in no-fly zone, it is named Operation Unified Protector Tripoli 25 Mar 10 Sep • Fierce fighting in Ajdabiya leads to rebel victory, they • Strong opposition encountered in Qadhafi push onto Brega, Ras Lanuf and Bin Jawad strongholds of Ban Walid and Sirte Qadhafi forces go on the offensive and retake Brega David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy visit interim 7 Apr 15 Sep beginning a stalemate between the opposing forces government in Tripoli. French Defence Minister Gerard Longuet confirms that 24 May 20 Sep Heavy fighting continues in Ban Walid and Sirte France will send attack helicopters to Libya
Compiled by Grant Turnbull
2 | RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report The Road to War
There was something surprising – even to London and Paris – about the way unfolding events in Libya drew the two European powers into the leading roles they played. The protests on Libyan streets that began on 15 February rapidly became an outright challenge to the authority of the Qadhafi regime and within weeks a full-scale civil war had erupted across Libya, with rebel forces first on the offensive in Cyrenaica moving out from Benghazi, and in Tripolitania, west and south of Tripoli itself. Once government forces had recovered from the immediate shock of rebellion, they fought back with evident brutality directed at population centres, and rapidly reversed rebel gains in a series of helter-skelter engagements along the coastal strip of the country. Within two weeks the Libyan government was being widely condemned for its indiscriminate Prime Minister David Cameron (left), NTC Chair Mustafa Abdul Jalil and President Nicolas Sarkozy. attacks on civilians.1 Photo courtesy of the Prime Minister’s Office rapid international recognition. On 7 Colonel Qadhafi and his heir, Saif al- By the first week of March, the idea that March, the Gulf Cooperation Council Islam, evidently felt that they could snuff an international coalition should enforce (GCC) supported the establishment of a out the rebellion before any of this could a no-fly zone over Libya was being no-fly zone, and the following day the take effect, and they made blood- publically debated. But there was Organisation of the Islamic Conference curdling threats against the people of widespread scepticism both about its (OIC) did the same. The African Union, Benghazi. political feasibility and its utility in meeting on 10 March, pointedly rejected protecting Libya’s civilians from a the notion of any foreign military France and Britain took the diplomatic vengeful leadership in Tripoli. In the reaction to events in Libya. NATO beefed lead in outlining a toughly worded UN United States, John Kerry, Chairman of up its naval operations in the resolution to impose a no-fly-zone. This the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mediterranean to give itself more was drafted more in anger than called for a no-fly zone, as did Senator options in the crisis and the NATO anticipation of success but it would John McCain. But Defense Secretary, Secretary General continued planning clarify Paris and London’s position. The Robert Gates, pointed out that such a for a no-fly zone. The EU had met at head key moment came on Saturday 12 March zone would require an outright attack on of state level to increase the pressure on when the Arab League explicitly called Libya to disable its extensive air defence Qadhafi; and the UN dispatched a peace for a no-fly-zone. By Tuesday a draft UN system, while Chairman of the Joint envoy to Tripoli. resolution was in circulation via France Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen, regarded a and Britain. US Secretary of State Hillary no-fly zone as an ‘extremely complex The critical days were from 12-17 March. 2 Clinton urged support for it on operation’. Besides, Russia and China Up to this point, it was clear that the Wednesday 16 March and Prime Minister argued against the concept, both in international community was alarmed Cameron and President Sarkozy were principle and on practical grounds, so by events in Libya, but evidently split working the international phones to gain the chances of UN Security Council over how to react. A no-fly zone was support. Britain and France were authorisation were regarded as very low. favoured by some, but not all, European suddenly at the forefront of an The passing of Security Council governments, by the OIC and the GCC; international military intervention on Resolution 1970 on 26 February which but it was opposed outright by the behalf of an alarmed United Nations. re-imposed the arms embargo and froze African Union, China and Russia. The US the assets and travel of the Qadhafi was genuinely ambiguous – fearing Four particular elements came together family seemed to be as far as the UN was another engagement in a Muslim country during this week to create an unusual likely to go. only marginally less than it feared a situation. One was the impact that the failed engagement in any country. Arab League declaration had and its Events, however, moved extremely President Obama’s own political instincts appeals during the week for the quickly. On 3 March, the International were simply unclear. international community to avert a Criminal Court announced that it was massacre in Benghazi. This was critical investigating alleged crimes against Few believed that a no-fly zone would and it was uncharacteristic of the League humanity committed by the Qadhafi have more than a marginal impact on to be so firm and united on any matter family. By the end of the first week of the ability of Qadhafi’s forces to target affecting another Arab country. NATO March, the National Transitional Council civilians. At best, it would constitute a had always made clear that there could in Benghazi had declared itself the true strong statement of intent; with the be no action without an explicit mandate, representative of Libya and was gaining implication that more might follow. and the appeal of the Arab League to the
RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report | 3 UN suddenly seemed likely to create The fourth factor lay in the actions of the effect of alerting all Qadhafi’s forces one.3 President Sarkozy between Thursday 17 that the action had begun. After the and Saturday 19 March. An international French attack at 6pm, US and British Secondly, this had the effect of tipping summit was held in Paris on that submarines launched Tomahawk missiles the Obama Administration into a Saturday in an atmosphere of emergency. at fixed targets throughout Libya around decision to do what it had previously Rebel forces were falling back on the midnight. thought impractical. President Obama outskirts of Benghazi itself ahead of the was determined not to take on another armour and heavy artillery of Qadhafi’s London and Paris were now in a leading, military commitment, and he was soon forces. The three Allies who would be in but increasingly uncomfortable, position. to put unprecedented limitations on this the forefront of implementing a no-fly At this stage, only the three allies were one; but for the time being the US lined zone, and therefore bombing the Libyan taking offensive action against Libyan up behind a tough UN resolution that air defence infrastructure – the US, forces, and the only way to operate a no- now had a realistic chance of success. Britain and France – discussed their fly zone so as ‘to protect Libyan civilians’ plans. required the allies to stretch the meaning Thirdly, the threat of a massacre in of the UN resolution to the limit. They Benghazi and the speed with which any At the end of the meeting, however, had to destroy Libya’s air defences, UN decision would have to be President Sarkozy announced to the dismantle its military command system, implemented put unusual pressure on world’s media, and without consultation and attack Libyan forces on the ground the debate which took place in the with either of the allies who he had been wherever they could be found. As it Security Council on Thursday 17 March. with only minutes before, that French happened, Libyan forces made it easy for The aggressive statements of Qadhafi aircraft were in action over the city. them by relentlessly attacking population and his son, Saif, made it very difficult for Within two hours, French forces had centres wherever they operated; and Russia and China to exercise a veto in the engaged Qadhafi’s tanks and armour in a Qadhafi played into their hands by face of the evident alarm of the Arab dramatic series of attacks which halted continuing with his delusional bluster League’s spokesmen. In the event, ten of the immediate advance of government and threats. A more subtle dictator could the fifteen Security Council members forces on Benghazi.5 This played directly have put the three principal allies under voted in favour; five abstained, including to world opinion, as much as to that in far greater political pressure when the China and Russia who did not therefore Benghazi, but it was little secret that Arab League blanched as it confronted exercise their veto. Security Council Downing Street and the White House the realities of what it had advocated, Resolution 1973, when it appeared, were privately furious at what they took and voices in Europe and the US warned contained surprisingly strong and to be an act of grandstanding. This was of a dangerous military stalemate. specific wording.4 not the start of the campaign that they had envisaged or discussed and it had The political vulnerability of the principal
Did This Operation Set a Precedent? At first glance, Libya was a classic test- Still, the fact remains that a large The Libyan episode mirrors Western case of humanitarian intervention, now proportion of governments refused to behaviour in previous interventions, incorporated as a new United Nations consider Libya a test case for the R2P from the Bosnia operation in 1995, to the concept, and usually referred to as the concept. Indeed, the 17 March resolution Kosovo war in 1999 and the invasion of Iraq ‘Responsibility to Protect’, or R2P. The idea only passed by a simple majority because in 2003. In every one of these occasions, is that, while the national sovereignty of South Africa was persuaded to support it, a handful of Western governments used states remains the lynchpin of the global and that country publicly regretted its vote a UN Security Council resolution which system, there are extreme cases when the very next day. lacked full backing, supposedly on the this principle may be set aside and foreign behalf of the ‘international community’. intervention becomes justifiable, should a To make matters worse, the Western And, in every single case, once a resolution government fail in its fundamental duties nations which led the military operation passed in the UN, Western governments to ensure the life or basic welfare of its did nothing to enshrine the concept either. precluded any further debate. So it proved own citizens. For, the moment the resolution passed, this time: Russian and Chinese pleas to the West proceeded to interpret it in any reconvene the Security Council in order to The concept remains abstract and way it wished. debate the Libya situation were shrugged controversial, but the Libyan case was off. clear-cut: that country’s leader not only Officially, the military intervention was failed to protect his citizens, but actually only intended to protect civilians in The more this strategy is repeated, the threatened their wholesale murder. And Benghazi. But, after Benghazi was secured, more reluctant other countries are to the UN Security Council explicitly rejected the operation was expanded and became give a handful of Western nations a the claim that what happened in Libya was open-ended. In theory, the aim was never blank cheque to use force. In effect, the that country’s internal affair. ‘regime change’, but many argued this West may be preventing the concept of was precisely the main objective. The humanitarian intervention from taking Nevertheless, when the UN Security UN-imposed arms embargo on Libya was shape through its own short-sighted Council was asked on 17 March to approve brushed aside, first by using Qatar as a behaviour. Libya was an opportunity to a military intervention, China, Russia, conduit for weapon supplies to the rebels, define what R2P should stand for, but the Brazil, Germany and India all abstained. and then by supplying the rebels directly. concept still lacks a unified interpretation. Each country had its own reasons, and most of the abstainers subsequently modified, Analysis by Dr Jonathan Eyal or reinterpreted their arguments. Senior Fellow and Director, International Security Studies, RUSI
4 | RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report allies was not made any easier by early Council in Whitehall was less than clear NOTES confusion over who was running the in its own collective mind what the mid- operation. For the first ten days this was range military objectives of this operation 1. By the UN Human Rights Council and by Human a loosely coordinated series of national were. The NSC appears to have flip- Rights Watch, among many others. On 26 February the UN Security Council referred Libya to the operations. Only on 31 March, after a lot flopped more than once between seeing International Criminal Court. of political wrangling, did NATO take the operation as an immediate protection command of the whole operation, and of Libyan civilians wherever Qadhafi’s 2. David Lerman, Bloomberg.com, 7 March 2011. with that the United States pulled out of forces could be targeted, in Brega, or Ras the military front line to take a back seat, Lanuf or Misrata; and trying explicitly to 3. ‘Arab League Backs Libya No-Fly Zone’, BBC providing (albeit extensive) combat bring Qadhafi down with a mixture of Online, 12 March 2011. support to other allies.6 In pushing so military pressure and aerial coercion in hard for a no-fly zone, in the and around Tripoli. As the operation 4. United Nations Security Council SC/10200, 17 March 2011, para. 4. circumstances of wanting to ‘save progressed, and the ‘remove Qadhafi’ Benghazi’, Britain and France thus found objective strengthened, there appears to 5. ‘French Planes Stopping Airstrikes on Benghazi: themselves in the forefront of an air have been considerable uncertainty over Sarkozy’, Defense News, 19 March 2011. campaign which pitched them into a where the rebels were best placed to do nasty little civil war as the air arm of the so: in the East of the country, a very long 6. The US planned to pull out of combat operations rebel forces. way from Tripoli; in the capital itself; or on 1 April, but was prevailed upon to operate for in the Nafusa mountains, where a well- another 48 hours and eventually halted operations on the morning of 4 April. See, ‘NATO to take over Whether saving civilian lives organised rebel thrust eventually linked Libya No-Fly Zone’, CBS News 24 March 2011; ‘US automatically meant fighting to remove up with an underground opposition pulls out warplanes from Libya: Pentagon’, AFP, 4 Qadhafi was a difficult political line to movement inside Tripoli. April 2011. maintain. This made the military objectives more ambiguous than they Analysis by Professor Michael Clarke, might otherwise have been. It was Director General, RUSI reported that the National Security The Air Operation
The Libya campaign has been a salutary reminder of how a broad spectrum of military capabilities are usually required to address any modern conflict. In this one, air power, and the assumption of air superiority, has re-emerged as a critical factor.
The lack of any allied ‘boots on the ground’ also meant that nations were forced to lean more heavily on other levers of power, including diplomatic efforts, in order to achieve success, which resulted in a more pan- government effort.
Precision strikes to minimise casualties NATO’s ability and effectiveness in acquiring targets was a vital aspect of A Tornado GR4 aircraft is pictured being prepared for a sortie during Operation Ellamy, the UK’s contribution to the UN the campaign. There was clearly some sanctioned no fly zone over Libya. Photo courtesy of SAC Neil Chapman/RAF. Crown Copyright. (indirect) communication between the rebel forces and NATO forces regarding more intense bombing campaign in the specific sections of buildings rather than the positions of loyalist forces and city.1 demolishing the entire structure. potential targets, however, it would have been neither appropriate nor safe Cameras and sensors would observe While the coalition was criticised for for the Libyans to laser designate targets. targets before and during a strike to their tentative approach in the early part Without Joint Tactical Air Commanders ensure no civilians would be hit (this of the campaign, it seems to have paid (JTACs) on the ground, it fell to other air reduced the risk of embarrassing off with even loyalist forces reportedly assets to carry out this task. mistakes such as the Chinese Embassy recognising the fairness and accuracy of strike in Belgrade in 1999 as well as the airstrikes. To date between 50-100 NATO’s Rules of Engagement meant that protecting civilians who might have been civilians have perished from air strikes in coalition forces would not engage a used as human shields). this six month campaign – although target unless there were ‘eyes on the figures vary wildly at present – compared target’. As a result, the capture of In addition, precision-guided munitions to 400-500 in Kosovo. Zawiyah, Zlitan and Gharyan in early with a small blast radius have allowed August permitted coalition intelligence NATO forces to minimise collateral assets to concentrate their efforts on damage, in some cases only targeting Tripoli, which subsequently allowed for a
RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report | 5 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target and France also have some arrangements sustaining the operation. As a result Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) for sharing intelligence but bi-lateral training is a now a matter of concern, missions agreements do not permit that particularly for contingency operations. Given the importance of real-time information to go further. Discussions As the First Sea Lord, Sir Mark Stanhope information in this campaign, ISTAR will are underway to examine how France rightly stated, there will be some difficult be critical for future operations. might be able to insert its intelligence in decisions required to maintain this However, it is an area in which European a timelier manner for future operations. tempo if the operation extends much forces are lacking. General Mark Welsh beyond September.4 III, Commanding General USAF Europe, Combat/Kinetic Missions suggested that less-wealthy NATO Initially 123 combat aircraft were Similar stories have been heard across nations might consider choosing cheaper deployed under the US-led Operation NATO and much praise has been heaped ISTAR assets over more expensive Odyssey Dawn. Continuing now under on Scandinavian nations (Denmark, combat platforms when modernising the NATO-Led Operation Unified Norway and Sweden), who took on a lion their air forces as there was a critical Protector, around 130 combat aircraft share of the operations relative to the need for these capabilities.2 supplied by eighteen nations are size of their commitment and their committed to the operation. Of these, nation’s defence budget. It is no surprise As it stands, much of the dedicated only aircraft provided by the US, UK, that Norway, which undertook up to 17 intelligence assets were provided by the France, Canada, Denmark (a total of per cent of the strike missions with just US (at least 27 per cent). British ISTAR around fifty-five) are able to conduct air six aircraft felt unable to maintain such a assets, such as Sentinel were much to ground operations. The targets these pace of operations. appreciated by US and French allies, aircraft can prosecute are further limited however, they have an uncertain future by the munitions each carries. With an Helicopters as indicated in the Strategic Defence and average of fifty strike sorties a day some Helicopters have been seen by some as Security Review. squadrons have been stretched. the tipping point in the battle for Misrata and indeed the entire Libyan campaign, Despite these reservations, the operation Suppression of Enemy Air Defences has although this claim is somewhat a has been an excellent example of the been mainly left to US forces, although stretch. They certainly would not have multi-role or Combat ISTAR concept Italian Tornados were able to provide been able to prosecute the whole recently adopted by the Royal Air Force. additional support. Even after the US campaign (Libya is too large a theatre) Not only were US Predator and RAF severely reduced its commitment in and even after the main air defences had Tornados used in both strike and April, a US Department of Defense been removed, attack helicopters remain reconnaissance roles, air-to-air refueling spokesman said that the ‘US has done 77 vulnerable to smaller air defence assets platforms also provided additional ISTAR percent of all the refueling missions and and even small arms fire. Nevertheless, capabilities as they operated in the 27 percent of the surveillance flights. helicopters were effective in the airspace above Libya, increasing the area [The US also] provided 22 tanker aircraft following ways: that might be observed. and 13 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft to NATO for use in Libya • The French are extremely pleased with While collection of imagery and other operations, including two Predator the effectiveness of the rotary wing information proved successful, drones, a high-altitude unmanned Global platforms. Others have questioned the dissemination of that intelligence across Hawk, and an array of planes that have ISTAR coverage required to ensure the the alliance was less effective. Lieutenant sophisticated jamming, radar, safety of these operations. The ‘black General Patrick de Rousiers indicated communications and spying capabilities.’3 hawk down’ effect will always mean that integrating French intelligence that helicopters are high on the target proved problematic as the only Operation Unified Protector is a small list for enemy forces and this means mechanism allowing France to feed into operation by NATO standards but many that a number of air assets were the mission was through NATO at NATO are concerned that European forces are needed to support attack helicopter Secret Level. finding it so difficult to deploy aircraft operations. and sustain them. The fact that French In terms of sharing resources, France and Rafale and British Typhoon fleets are in • The arrival of the helicopters allowed the US have agreements on the military the process of ramping up is partly to the UK and France (and subsequently use of space assets. Moreover the UK blame for some of the challenges in NATO) to signal their intent with the
Brimstone Missiles Did UK forces nearly run out of ammunition in the Libya operation? It is a claim which has been much discussed in relation to the Brimstone missile. A new variation on this anti-armour missile is the Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone (DMSB) which makes it a laser-guided weapon with a small but very potent charge. But the military only had so many of these upgraded DMSBs, with a stockpile in Afghanistan of Brimstone that had not been used and were due for re-servicing. The supplier, MBDA, was able to increase production of the seeker heads; and other weapons were fired wherever possible. Supply then caught up with demand. But the stock of usable DMSBs was reported to have fallen to single figures at one stage. There is no question of the UK running out of munitions for this operation. Nevertheless, it ran very short of the new variant of the weapon which most suited the chosen tactics.
6 | RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report Finderup, Denmark and Uedem in the emerging talent at the US Air Force Air Sorties and Strikes Germany. There were initially no British to prepare for emerging security officers in the Italian CAOC owing toa challenges. Around 115 sortiesare slow reduction of RAF postings to NATO conducted every day, of which facilities over the last few years and in Certainly the French are very pleased part to the number of CAOCs dotted with the outcome and, based on private 45 are strike missions. around Europe. This meant that British conversations, the British are quietly forces were unable to influence the satisfied albeit cautious that the Over 22,342 sorties have been nature of operation, promote national operation is not yet over. However, given conducted, of which 8390 have doctrine or share experience. Air the concerns of many countries in the Commodore Ed Stringer was responsible lead up to this intervention and the been strike missions. for the British contribution but only from inevitable mission creep from United (Dating until 9 Sept) a distance in Cyprus and not the Nations Security Council Resolution designated command centre in Italy. 1973, is it likely that politicians will get Source: NATO international support for future air The presence of German officers in NATO interdictions? Perhaps not, if Syria is headquarters proved highly controversial anything to go by, where David Cameron arrival of an uplift of force midway given that the German government had has already made it that there is currently through the campaign. chosen to stay out of the operation. insufficient international political More controversially, seven officers were support to warrant military intervention. • They had a psychological effect both in fact deployed, as the operation on the rebel and loyalist forces, being started, to targeting posts in Brumssen Air operations are still likely to bean more visible (and audible) than the and elsewhere, in direct support of the attractive choice for political leaders in fixed wing aircraft overhead. The operations. This is perhaps seen as a sign the near term until operations in notorious reputation of Apaches where the military were keen to avoid Afghanistan wind down: especially as it involved in collateral damage in Iraq reneging on their NATO commitments provides the ability to intercede rapidly would also have played on the minds despite the political choice to abstain as security situations erupt. of the Libyans. from operations. Analysis by Elizabeth Quintana, Senior • Munitions used by helicopters are A model for the future? Research Fellow, Air Power and generally smaller and would have been The air campaign has been largely Technology more appropriate to the latter stages successful in limiting the movement of of the operation as most of the larger loyalist forces, protecting the population NOTES and providing the rebel forces with time 1. Samia Nakhoul, ‘The Secret Plan to Take Tripoli’, targets would have already been Reuters, Sept 6 2011 picked off. It also allowed NATO to to train and organise themselves. Is air 2. General Mark Welsh III, Commanding General, ensure lower collateral damage. policing in support of local forces likely United States Air Forces in Europe ‘Partnering by to be the future strategy for liberal Choice and Necessity’, speech given at RUSI 14 The British involvement in NATO’s joint intervention? If we consider former July 2011. 3. Sagar Meghani, U.S. still conducting limited air planning Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ speeches to the Air Academy and West Libya airstrikes, Associated Press, 13 April 2011 All air operations for Operation Unified 4. ‘The RAF and Expeditionary Operations’,RUSI Protector were tasked by the Combined Point earlier this year – both delivered Defence Systems, July 2011. Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Poggio before Libya became a concern – he Renatico (Italy) and supported by CAOCs indicated that the US would not commit in Brummsen, Germany; Izmar, Turkey; ground forces beyond the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq but he encouraged Libya and Afghanistan: Cost Analysis
Compared with operations in Iraq and are also included, the bill (both human and does illustrate is just how expensive it can Afghanistan, Libya was a relatively financial) for Afghanistan is even higher. be to deploy large forces on the ground. inexpensive operation for the UK. In June, Had NATO decided to deploy a major Defence Secretary Liam Fox estimated that The cost of the Libya operation amounted peace enforcement mission on the ground the net additional costs of a six month to around 12 per cent of that of Afghanistan in Libya, total additional costs to the UK operation would amount to around £260 operations over the same (six-month) (if it had joined such a force) would have million, including up to £140 million for period, and only 1.6 per cent of the increased several-fold. Despite the apparent the cost of replenishing munitions. This still £16 billion total additional cost of UK intensity of this operation, in terms of the seems a reasonable estimate for the total Afghanistan operations since they began in deployment of advanced munitions and additional cost to the Treasury, provided 2002. As in Afghanistan, the Libya figures sophisticated support capabilities, the the NATO military operation is substantially do not account for the full cost of the resource demands that it has presented are completed by end-September. personnel and equipment involved in the therefore of a different (and lower) order Libya operation. Nor, importantly, do they of magnitude than Afghanistan, which has By comparison, UK military operations account for the additional costs which remained the Ministry of Defence’s main in Afghanistan during 2010-11 cost the may be incurred from the need to plug the effort throughout 2011. Treasury an additional £4.5 billion, and a capability gaps that have been revealed by similar amount is likely to be needed in the operation. 2011-12. If the lifetime costs for caring for Analysis by Professor Malcolm Chalmers those disabled by the war during this year What the comparison with Afghanistan Research Director, RUSI
RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report | 7 The Maritime Contribution
Throughout the Libyan campaign, various Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH) ship Tomahawks are also designed to have navies have conducted tasks across a HMS Ocean.3 Indeed, the very public some coercive effect on an adversary. wide spectrum of operations in ways not demonstration of this new capability, off necessarily obvious from media reports. the coast of Cyprus a few weeks previously, The presence in theatre of the American This has ranged from maritime security could have been intended to have a guided missile submarine USS Florida and blockade enforcement to the use – deterrent or coercive effect on regime (SSGN-728) – which at one stage fired even if on a small scale – of traditional forces.4 ninety-three of its maximum potential high end capabilities such as mine counter load of 154 Tomahawk rounds – enabled measures, naval fire missions and carrier Tomahawk Land Attack the US Navy to retain the ability to fire strike. Even before the commencement of Tomahawk land attack is one of the Royal large numbers of Tomahawks even with combat operations in March, warships Navy’s four core strategic contributions to fewer platforms available. This was also and other maritime assets were deployed British defence and security policy.5 The the first conventional or nuclear launch to conduct non-combatant evacuation UK holds an inventory of sixty-five mission of any of the US Navy’s Ohio-class operations. The United States Navy’s Joint Tomahawks, deployed across its flotilla of submarines.7 Force Commander Admiral Samuel J. seven nuclear-powered attack submarines Locklear III stated that Libya demonstrated (SSNs). Given this force level and the not only the agility and flexibility of sea range of global commitments these Command, Control and Situational power, but also that the coalition’s ability submarines must support, it is challenging Awareness to assist ashore would have been reduced to maintain in theatre even one boat The presence of new partners within the without it.1 equipped with a Tomahawk load sufficient coalition presented challenges in to make more than a modest numerical integrating other navies into the The Royal Navy’s initial contributions to contribution. command and control network. The the campaign, however, required it to network was brought together by drop some other on-going naval tasks. For In Libya, press sources suggest around established naval traditions of operating example: seven UK Tomahawks were fired, together, longstanding NATO procedures compared to the 221 fired by the US and the role of key assets like the • HMS Cumberland had been conducting Navy.6 Indeed, when compared to the command ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC/ counter-piracy and other maritime United States – the only other Tomahawk- JCC 20) and the UK maritime command security operations in the Indian Ocean capable navy – the UK’s use of the weapon and Cruise Missile Support Activity before being redeployed to Libya. Her since it entered into service in 1998 has (CMSA) operations at its Northwood relief, HMS Liverpool, was sent to Libya; always been significantly lower. Alongside Headquarters. Moreover, the role of • HMS York was en route to the South participation in the opening strikes, firing established professional and personal Atlantic, for her second deployment the first UK ordnance in the operation, relationships brought by individual naval there in 12 months, when she was re- HMS Triumph fired a mix of Block III and personnel should not be underestimated.8 tasked to head to Libya; – in a first for the UK – Block IV Tomahawks, The habitual ease with which naval forces • HMS Westminster had been operating including conducting the first UK-only routinely work together was in UK waters. Tomahawk strike. demonstrated in the ‘fairly easy and straightforward’ maritime hand-over The UK had to choose for the duration of The strategic value of Tomahawks is to from the US-led to NATO-led phases of this crisis, however long that would turn reach deep into hostile territory and in the operation.9 One notable development out to be, between four critical national this case to target air defence, command from the UK’s perspective was the tasks – counter-piracy operations, and control centres that were intrinsic to contribution of the newly-established, deterrent presence in the South Atlantic, Qadhafi’s forces as a pre-requisite to multi-agency National Maritime domestic maritime tasking, or supporting operating a no-fly zone. The use of Information Centre at Northwood in a UN-mandated operation in Libya. This choice was made on the back of the February 2011 decision to drop counter- narcotics and disaster relief warship patrols in the Caribbean.2
Unique UK Maritime Contributions
Apache at Sea Following the recent Defence Review’s decision to withdraw from service the UK’s current aircraft carriers, the UK was not able to contribute a carrier to the operation. Nevertheless, in an unprecedented operational deployment delivering what some described as a ‘game-changing’ capability, British Army An Army Air Corps Apache helicopter takes off from HMS Ocean during Operation Ellamy, the UK’s contribution to UN Apache helicopters were embarked in the Security Council Resolution 1973 in the Mediterranean Sea near Libya. Photo courtesy of Guy Pool/Royal Navy. Crown Copyright
8 | RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report providing maritime situational Another key argument in the carrier its number of ships in theatre, the Joint awareness.10 debate is over the assumption that Chiefs of Staff Director Vice Admiral friendly and allied nations can provide William Gortney stated that this would be Surveillance capability was critical sufficient basing options to deploy land- ‘a function of how quickly the coalition throughout the campaign. From the based air power to fill any gaps opened up ramps up and becomes effective.’14 maritime perspective, while the Nimrod by the lack of a carrier. Interestingly, MR2 maritime patrol aircraft had already however, even within the NATO context, Analysis by Dr Lee Willett, Senior been withdrawn from service, Libya the availability of Gioia del Colle, the Research Fellow, Maritime Studies showed that the decision to scrap the Italian air base used for UK aircraft, could Nimrod MRA4 upgrade programme not initially be taken for granted and NOTES would raise renewed questions about the created some political turbulence. Some UK’s future maritime surveillance analysis suggests Italy had to tear up its 1. Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III United States Navy contribution. non-aggression pact with Libya and (Commander United States Naval Forces Europe required NATO to assume operational and Commander United States Naval Forces The Strategic Significance of an Aircraft command, on 31 March, before it could Africa). Speech to RUSI Future Maritime Operations Conference 2011, 6 July 2011. Carrier Contribution permit use of the base.11 Other recent 2. Nick Hopkins and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Navy In the UK, the polarity of the aircraft examples demonstrate that the Forced to Drop Warship Patrols in Caribbean carrier debate has only been exacerbated assumption of available shore-basing through Lack of Funds’, The Guardian, 7 February by the Libyan conflict. The operation always involves a balance of risks. 2011. served to highlight a range of questions 3. Kim Sengupta. ‘Libya: Flashes of Orange and relating not only to the Defence Review’s New Partnerships, New Players Shattering Noise as Apaches go to War’, Telegraph decision to withdraw the carriers but also The campaign provided the first Online, 19 June 2011.
RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report | 9 The Ground Offensive: The Role of Special Forces
Throughout the Libyan conflict the focus and Tobruk to try and build links with the special forces began to increase. In has been on the large-scale air campaign, rebels and understand who the ‘rebels’ addition to building relations and liaising especially in destroying Qadhafi’s actually were (a traditional human with rebel forces, special forces also had command and control capabilities as intelligence – HUMINT – function). to secure key critical infrastructure and well as aiding – in a limited capacity – These forces were also used to assess weapons sites (including those housing rebel ground advances. But on the the effects of coalition air strikes on remnants of Weapons of Mass ground an equally large-scale effort has Qadhafi’s regime.1 Destruction) around the country.4 French been undertaken by a range of forces, for instance, were very active in international special forces (SF). It took most of March for relationships the south-west desert area in April.5 with the rebels to be built. This is because Through an extensive analysis of open of the significant number of rebel This increase in the range of tasks did not source material (not all referenced – groupings across the West of the country match the relatively small increase in references are indicative), including which were detached from the National special forces numbers made by the UK media reports, individual sightings, Transitional Council. and France in March, particularly, as videos and photographs from the start of awareness grew of the poor state of the campaign to date, this section looks The coalition’s need to engage with this rebel organisation, discipline and at the likely evolution, role and larger number of dispersed groups capability. Coupled with political concern importance of coalition special forces in between East and West required an about an emerging stalemate, there was Libya, and in particular how rebel forces increase in the number of deployed a growing need for more extensive may have been organised and assisted forces. In late February it is likely that UK operational mentoring and training of by special forces. special forces personnel in Libya the rebels and the provision of specialist numbered between eight and twelve, equipment. The first intervention by special forces but by the end of March this is likely to The earliest known activities by special have increased to between twenty and Planning for Tripoli: the central role of forces took place from 23/24 February twenty-two (including supporting Arab special forces when a number of countries decided to elements).2 French special forces are To define the uplift in resources and undertake evacuation operations to likely to have numbered about ten from effort required to achieve this, the protect their citizens, including oil April.3 primary focus of coalition activity in April workers, from the emerging conflict in was planning and preparing for a future Libya. At the same time, it is reported As the conflict developed the range of advance on Tripoli. This planning process that the UK and France entered Benghazi tasks that needed to be undertaken by
Zawiyah Tripoli Tunisia Mediterranean Sea Benghazi Tobruk Misrata Zlitan Gharyan Sirte
Bani Walid Brega
Zintan Ras Lanuf Libya Key
Rebel held since March 2011 Egypt Sabha Reported locations of special forces Qadhafi stronghold
Location of fierce fighting
Algeria
Niger
10 | RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report involved a much wider range of countries, The need for greater numbers of special and ammunition supplies to the rebels including Qatar and the UAE.6 forces to mentor and train the rebels was (notably from June),10 including by met to an extent by Egypt having already establishing an air strip at Zintan. The Rebel ranks in each area were comprised, sent a significant number – possibly 100 size of the Qatari and UAE contributions broadly, of three elements: former (including supporting elements) – to is likely to have numbered approximately soldiers and police officers, a main body eastern Libya in late February and March 15 to 20 personnel (not necessarily of self-led cells of fighters built around a for the purposes of providing weapons, including support elements). few weapons and pickup trucks, and the training and organisation.7 However, the ‘shabab’. The shabab consisted of real centre of gravity for rebel potential Tunisia had an important role in roaming groups of younger people who lay in the West, given the proximity to facilitating Arab contributions: it would arrive at frontlines everyday Tripoli and pressure already being permitted forces and supplies to transit wanting to get involved, but with little brought to bear on the regime by rebel through and operate from their territory, idea of how to fight effectively. The forces in that region. Therefore, there on foot and by air.11 In addition, from approach seems to have been to focus was a requirement to increase special May, Tunisia helped develop and host an on building a higher quality component forces activity in western Libya. intelligence and planning cell/facility for – up to 100 – in each geographic area/ the rebels in Djerba.12 Jordan is also village based on people within the first It is notable that, from April, the UAE reported to have contributed special two elements of rebel ranks (usually established a special forces presence in forces for training purposes, given their from the Berber tribe and Misrata, and the Zawiyah District8 and started to significant experience in urban fighting some in Benghazi), with some training supply rebel forces in that area with and capturing fortified compounds; and provided to others. The theory was that equipment and provisions by air. Qatar Bulgaria provided a maritime SF the higher quality rebels act as the lead also assumed a very large role; it component of twelve people between element in an advance and impart established training facilities in both April and July to disrupt the Qadhafi knowledge to the more disparate rebel Benghazi and, particularly, the Nafusa regime’s access to the littoral elements. Mountains in May,9 and acted as a supply environment and aid rebel forces by route and conduit for French weapons allowing them to exploit the coast for
How the Rebels Became an Effective Fighting Force At the end of March, Qadhafi regime forces artillery fired from a truck) were ineffective the beginning of the long, and eventually launched a counteroffensive on the eastern in suppressing regime artillery, as they had successful, drive to Tripoli. One enabling front. The rebels retreated in disarray from no forward observers. factor may have been the mountainous Bin Jawwad, within a hundred miles of Sirte, terrain, enabling guerrilla warfare, in all the way to Ajdabiya, the same distance Why did this change? The following are four contrast to the flat eastern deserts that from Benghazi. overlapping, but not exhaustive, factors. amplified vulnerability to artillery.
That was typical of the poor operational First, outside powers began supplying Fourth, and finally, the dénouement of the performance that characterised the rebels’ rebels. UN Security Council Resolution 1970 war, the uprising in and assault on Tripoli, ground campaign. Why was that so, and had imposed an arms embargo on Libya saw NATO move to a higher plane of what accounts for the rebels’ eventual but this was qualified, it could be argued, close air support. That relied on targeting success on their western front? by wording in the subsequent resolution information from loitering drones, frontline authorising the use of force. Qatar sent AK- rebels using transmission equipment, and First, equipment: the rebel armoury 47s and MILAN anti-tank systems; France foreign special forces. It also benefited from included rifles like the Carcano cavalry airdropped rifles, machine guns and rocket an American decision to share sensitive carbine, dating to the interwar Italian launchers in the western Nafusa Mountains; and previously restricted imagery and occupation of Libya and submachine guns the UAE sent Belgian FN FAL rifles; and the signals intercepts with NATO allies. In short, without magazines. Rebels futilely carried UK and US sent body armour and tactical rebel effectiveness improved as the Libyan on foot guns designed to be mounted on communication equipment. campaign converged on the so-called and electronically fired from tanks. Arms ‘Afghan model’: airpower coordinated with were not only obsolete, but also scarce: Second, Western and Arab special forces indigenous ground forces, bolstered in Kalashnikov prices in eastern Libya reached from the US, Britain, France, Qatar and Egypt various ways by small contingents of special $2,000, and many fighters shared weapons. are likely to have trained and otherwise forces. assisted rebels through the summer, and Second, organisation: modern warfare played a key role in preparing Tripoli for Without further evidence coming to light, demands that infantry units exploit terrain its capture. The tactical proficiency of the we cannot properly evaluate the respective in small units, work together to provide amphibious force that assaulted Tripoli in importance of these four factors. It is covering fire, and use defence in depth August hints at this effort. possible that slow-moving but non-visible to concentrate forces where needed. The causes, such as a cumulative degradation of rebels, many of whom had no combat Third, the western Nafusa Mountains regime command and control, was essential experience, could not do so, in part owing became the crucial front by mid-June. for latter rebel advances. We should be to the absence of a command structure. Regime forces were driven out by units wary of extrapolating too easily from the Hence the early rushed advances that gave composed mainly of Berbers, a non-Arab Libyan case to other theatres, where the way to routs. ethnic group indigenous to North Africa. composition of rebel forces and operating Those units then severed key pipelines from environment may differ substantially. Third, vulnerability to indirect fire: the southern oilfields to the refinery at Zawiyah, rebels’ homemade rocket systems (plus and seized border crossings with Tunisia Analysis by Shashank Joshi, some Grad rockets – unguided rocket to interdict regime supplies. That was Associate Fellow, RUSI.
RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report | 11 the purpose of transiting people and special forces personnel from April/May range of influence and enabling weapons (including towards Tripoli).13 for the purposes of providing intelligence activities within Tripoli itself over a information and training and advice to period of four months, in preparation Western special forces could have rebel forces.15 for the rebel advance. If this had not confidence in the training roles been done, the Qadhafi regime and undertaken by Qatar and the UAE, Special forces who were training and security forces are likely to have held because the special forces in those advising rebel forces all had an additional out for much longer and in a more countries have in turn been trained by role to help ensure the security of rebel organised manner than they have. the UK and France over many years. leaders. However, the small number of However, it has been more difficult to Furthermore, Jordanian and UAE special special forces compared to rebels and infiltrate the towns of Sirte and Bani forces have increased their operational the limited force protection available to Walid for this purpose and the conflict experience through long-term them meant that the coalition had little is ongoing. A question is whether the deployments in Afghanistan. ability to intervene during any tensions capacity building and support from within or between rebel groupings. special forces has been enough to The real role of Western special forces enable the rebel forces to take these Supplying weapons became a real Neither British nor French special forces more difficult locations. priority for France from late June. This dictated timing for the rebel advance on entailed a greater obligation to train Tripoli in late August. The timing was a Overall, the high profile air campaign in rebels to use those weapons and in rebel decision, underpinned by tactical support of rebels was not undertaken in military organisation and tactics. France advice and intelligence from Western isolation of efforts on the ground, nor had a presence in Misrata and Zintan special forces (including the US, which could it have guaranteed the success of through approximately thirty to forty deployed a small covert team for the rebel attempts to advance. Special forces personnel. The UK is also likely to have purposes of intelligence collection and activity was a vital enabler. increased its presence to approximately also made much use of electronic 30 to 40 personnel by June (including interception of communications). Analysis by Mark Phillips, Military and supporting elements). As other countries Special forces from Qatar and the UAE Intelligence Research Fellow picked up the training burden, UK forces led the rebel advance from the west shifted their effort to provide advice on (from Zawiyah to Tripoli) in August, with NOTES tactics and tactical co-ordination to rebel Western forces concentrating on 1. ‘Special forces swoop on Libya to pull Britons to forces, and to focus on other high priority providing a real-time intelligence picture safety’, Daily Telegraph, 26 February; ‘France and tasks. Most UK forces during this period for the rebels (a task which is still being Italy will also send advisers to Libya rebels’, New were used to gather human intelligence done in relation to Sirte and Bani Walid). York Times, 20 April. to improve target identification and to These Forces are now providing 2. ‘NATO forces helping rebels in hunt for Gadaffi’, Associated Press, 25 August. infiltrate Tripoli, planting supplies and intelligence and reconnaissance 3. ‘France and Italy will also send advisers to Libya undertaking psychological operations, capabilities to locate former members of rebels, New York Times, 20 April; ‘West steps up with the aims of aiding ongoing planning Qadhafi’s regime and securing vulnerable Libyan presence as France and Italy send army for the rebel advance and also facilitating weapons stocks. teams’, Independent, 21 April. the advance when it eventually came. 4. ‘SAS ready to seize Gaddafi’s stores of mustard Conclusion gas’, Daily Telegraph, 2 March. Contrary to much reporting, UK special It is notable that special forces activity 5. El Khabar, 7 April; ‘French Special Forces carry forces are unlikely to have operated as was very extensive within Libya, and out strike in Libya’, RIA Novotsi, 7 April. forward controllers for air strikes in great that: 6. ‘The secret plan to take Tripoli’, Reuters, 6 September. numbers,14 though their HUMINT did 7. ‘Egypt’s stake in Libya’s unrest’, Stratfor, 28 provide greater context for decision- • Arab states provided the bulk of the February; ‘Egypt Said to Arm Libyan Rebels’, Wall making about targets: the technical training and mentoring effort and led Street Journal, 17 March precision of targeting systems and the advance on Tripoli; 8. ‘The secret plan to take Tripoli’, Reuters, 6 munitions, imagery from US unmanned • Western special forces concentrated September. aerial vehicles and information provided primarily on providing an intelligence 9. ‘Qatar military advisers on the ground, helping by rebels using externally provided picture to rebel forces, including Libyan rebels get into shape’, Washington Post, 13 transmission equipment meant that understanding the effect of coalition May. forward controlling by special forces was air strikes on Qadhafi’s regime; 10. ‘The secret plan to take Tripoli’, Reuters, 6 September. not vital. Italy also contributed ten • Western special forces undertook a 11. ‘Egypt’s stake in Libya’s unrest’, Stratfor, 28 February. It is possible that the air assets provided Special Forces Contributions by Qatar and the UAE were also used to transport some rebels outside Libya for training. Egypt: 100 12. ‘Libya: How They Did It’, New York Review of UK: 10-40 Books, 19 August. Deployed in February and March for training purposes 13. ‘Bulgarian frigate on its way to Libyan coast’, The Sofia Echo, 30 March; ‘Bulgaria sends frigate to France: 10-40 Jordan: N/A patrol near Libya’, Xinhua News Agency, 30 March; Personnel supplied for ‘British and French soldiers help rebels perepare training purposes Sirte attack’, The Guardian, 25 August. Qatar: 20 14. Though the The Guardian and Sky News Italy: 10 consistently reported this as a role for the UK. France is more likely to have adopted this function (Le Figaro, 23 May). UAE: 20 Bulgaria: 12 15. ‘France and Italy will also send advisers to Libya Deployed for maritime rebels’, New York Times, 20 April; ‘West steps up duties Libyan presence as France and Italy send army Special forces personnel between February and September teams’, Independent, 21 April.
12 | RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report Conclusion
There will be much to analyse from the in defence capabilities between now and launching missiles, getting weapons and Libya operation for some time to come 2020. personnel close to shore, collecting and many lessons will doubtless be intelligence, and providing combat derived from it. At this preliminary stage If future NATO operations are likely to be search and rescue facilities in case any a number of issues stand out that should as ambiguous and vulnerable as this one; allied aircraft went down in hostile be addressed further. success in this case principally dependent territory. on the determination of France and At the diplomatic level: Britain to act militarily, then bilateral and The ‘carrier debate’ in Britain will almost Britain and France found themselves trilateral defence relations between the certainly be re-ignited by this operation. taking the diplomatic, and military, lead key European players may loom much The fact is that the operation was in an operation where the US larger in the future than their successfully conducted without a British subsequently withdrew from front line commitment to NATO, as such. aircraft carrier being available. But it is combat. It is unlikely they anticipated equally a fact that the operation involved that this might happen, and it left them At the military level: four major ships that were capable of politically exposed. The ultimate success Notwithstanding difficulties in the launching aircraft – the French and of the operation should not prevent an command structures, a complex air and Italian carriers, the US assault ship, and honest appreciation of the strategic maritime operation was successfully Britain’s HMS Ocean acting as a judgements that lay behind British and conducted, based on precision weapons helicopter carrier. French actions over Libya. that effectively hobbled Qadhafi’s forces, leaving them isolated and without access British operations in Afghanistan were The relationship between the United to their heavy weapons. not affected by commitments to the States and its other NATO partners is Libyan theatre, but both the RAF and the unlikely to remain unaffected by this The precision of the attacks kept the Royal Navy had to divert assets from crisis. Ambiguity over the command number of civilian casualties – from all other tasks to cope. This crisis arrangements, the extensive back-up related causes, including friendly fire demonstrated that the forces could support that US assets had to provide, incidents on the rebels – extremely low improvise and ‘could cope’ even in light and the overt political splits in the (certainly less than 100). This avoided of the Defence Review. But it also alliance, even while it was acting as the one of the political nightmares of demonstrated that there are significant military arm of the United Nations in operations such as this, where domestic opportunity costs in doing so and that enforcing Resolution 1973, saw NATO support can drain away as news of even a comparatively small operation acting in a way it had never done before. innocent victims of bombing builds up. such as this puts the forces under some considerable strain. At the strategic level: This welcome precision was heavily After Iraq and Afghanistan where the based on ISTAR assets (Intelligence, In the case of exerting an indirect military emphasis was always on numbers of surveillance, target acquisition, effect on the ground in Libya, the ‘boots on the ground’, this operation reconnaissance); highly sophisticated, operation was remarkable for the seemed to be a throwback to some of expensive, and available to only a few of number and variety of special forces the crises of the 1990s in the Balkans. It the allies. Even in this case, however, operating – including significant was characterised by airpower, precision ISTAR assets among the key allies were operations by Arab special forces – who weapons delivered from a distance, and almost at full stretch. Their value in this supplied and helped organise rebel politico-military pressure to affect events operation has re-opened a number of forces, more than they were able to on the ground indirectly. Whether this the arguments around last year’s defence ‘train’ them. operation is an outlier to the trend we review, since Britain was due to lose have seen since 2001, or the beginning some of these ISTAR systems by 2015. The emphasis of special forces operations of a swing back to previous operations, centred in and around Tripoli, where the will be a matter of keen debate as the The maritime component was intrinsic rebellion would ultimately succeed or British Government still wrestles with to the air operation in a number of ways fail. the hard choices of making further cuts that were not obvious in media reports;
About this report This Interim Report on operations in Libya marks the opening of RUSI’s research work to examine all aspects of the campaign during 2011. Contributors: Professor Michael Clarke, Professor Malcolm Chalmers, Dr Jonathan Eyal, Shashank Joshi, Mark Phillips, Elizabeth Quintana and Dr Lee Willett. Edited by Saqeb Mueen and Grant Turnbull.
For detailed analysis on Libya, visit: www.rusi.org/libya
About RUSI The Royal United Services Institute embodies nearly two centuries of forward thinking, free discussion and careful reflection on defence and security matters. Visit www.rusi.org
RUSI Interim Libya Campaign Report | 13